{ "id": 3520314, "name": "JON R. LA BREE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHRIEBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "La Bree v. Schrieber Co.", "decision_date": "1983-06-13", "docket_number": "No. 81\u20143193", "first_page": "15", "last_page": "19", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 15" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5477415 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861276 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473189 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-51" }, { "page": "350-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516573 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470281 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 436, "char_count": 7457, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7614301851023285e-08, "percentile": 0.29916763486983217 }, "sha256": "e53c772de721e238a3811ab2f9529a24ac5930432a46f7acc74199b440a196a2", "simhash": "1:00cbae9cf852d7e5", "word_count": 1198 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:21.721217+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JON R. LA BREE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHRIEBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJon R. La Bree (plaintiff) brought this action for strict product liability against Schrieber Company (defendant) for injuries sustained by plaintiff while working with a product manufactured by defendant. After trial the jury returned a general verdict for defendant and against the plaintiff. The jury also answered a special interrogatory finding \u201cplaintiff guilty of assumption of risk.\u201d The jury left blank a special interrogatory requesting an answer as to the percentage of total fault to be ascribed to each plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff has appealed.\nUnder the view we take of this case, we need not address all the issues presented for review, or provide a detailed statement of the evidence. According to plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, defendant manufactured a certain \u201ccontinuous collating machine\u201d which plaintiff used in the course of his employment. Plaintiff alleged the product was unreasonably dangerous in that it had inadequate safety guards. As a proximate cause of that allegedly dangerous condition, plaintiff claims to have suffered severe injuries to his arm and hand.\nDefendant made a motion in limine to apply the theory of comparative negligence. (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886.) The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion. In announcing his ruling, with reference to the issue of assumption of risk, the trial judge stated:\n\u201cThis Court will therefore hold that to the extent that the defendant is able to plead and prove assumption of risk, he will be allowed to do that and instead of it being stylized as assumption of risk and totally barring the plaintiff\u2019s recovery, it will be called a form of comparative fault which will mitigate the damages.\u201d\nThe trial court gave the jury this instruction on assumption of risk:\n\u201cThe defendant has asserted the affirmative defense that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. To establish that defense, the defendant has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:\nFirst, that the plaintiff knew of the condition which the plaintiff claims made the collator unreasonably dangerous;\nSecond, that the plaintiff understood and appreciated the risk of injury from that condition and continued to use the collator.\nThird, that the known condition was a proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nIf you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions required of the defendant has been proved, then your answer on the special verdict as to assumption of risk should be \u2018yes.\u2019\nIf, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of the propositions required of the defendant has not been proved, then your answer on the special verdict as to assumption of risk should be \u2018no.\u2019 \u201d\nThe trial court also tendered two special interrogatories to the jury. One interrogatory asked \u201cWas the plaintiff guilty of assumption of risk?\u201d to which the jury answered \u201cyes.\u201d The second interrogatory involved the allocation of percentage of fault:\n\u201cAssuming that 100% represents the combined fault of the plaintiff and of the defendant that contributed as a proximate cause to plaintiff\u2019s injury, what proportion of such combined fault is attributable to the plaintiff on the one hand and what proportion is attributable to the defendant on the other hand?\nAnswer: To plaintiff_%\nTo defendant_%\u201d\nThe jury did not answer this special interrogatory regarding the allocation of percentages of fault.\nThe general verdict and the answered special interrogatory on assumption of risk read as follows:\n\u201cWE, THE JURY, FIND FOR THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.\nWE, THE JURY IN THIS CASE FIND THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK:\nWAS THE PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK? ANSWER (YES).\u201d\nThe recent supreme court decision in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 104, 118, 454 N.E.2d 197, holds specifically that \u201cthe defense of comparative fault is applicable to strict liability cases.\u201d Accordingly the trial court was correct in granting defendant\u2019s motion to apply the theory of comparative negligence. But the Coney court also held specifically:\n\u201cHowever, the defenses of misuse and assumption of the risk will no longer bar recovery. Instead, such misconduct will be compared in the apportionment of damages. Specifically, we hold: Once defendant\u2019s liabilities is established, and where both the defective product and plaintiff\u2019s misconduct contribute to cause the damages, the comparative fault principle will operate to reduce plaintiff\u2019s recovery by that amount which the trier of fact finds him at fault.\u201d 97 Ill. 2d 104,119.\nThus in the instant case the verdicts show that the basis of non-liability was plaintiff\u2019s assumption of risk. The jury did not complete the test by applying the principles of comparative fault to the case. Coney teaches us that comparative fault is applicable to strict liability cases and the application of that doctrine is incompatible with assumption of risk as a complete bar to plaintiff\u2019s recovery. Therefore, the final verdict was not only contrary to the specific ruling of the trial court when he granted defendant\u2019s motion to apply comparative negligence, but also the verdicts as rendered are contrary to the law as enunciated by Coney. It is thus apparent that the jury failed completely to grasp the matter before it and failed to perform its function as the trier of fact.\nDefendant argues plaintiff has filed an incomplete record, and therefore the judgment must be affirmed. We acknowledge that the record filed by plaintiff is incomplete. (See Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51, 415 N.E.2d 337.) Likewise we note that plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion is lacking in specificity. Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51.\nNevertheless, such deficiencies in the record do not affect that power of this court to adjudicate a particular issue in the interest of complete justice. (Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457, 461, 308 N.E.2d 611.) \u201c \u2018[T]he responsibility of a reviewing court for a just result and the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.\u2019 \u201d Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457, 461, quoting Hux v. Rohm (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225, 230 N.E.2d 831.\nWe are also keenly aware of the difficult task which able counsel and the trial court had in attempting to apply newly articulated rules of law particularly without the invaluable guidance of the Coney opinion. However we find it impossible to reconcile the jury\u2019s action and its failure to complete the tendered verdicts with the applicable legal principles. (See Moricoli v. P & S Management Co. (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 234, 238, 432 N.E.2d 903, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 560.) The judgment for defendant is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcGLOON and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald J. Lucaccioni, of Chicago (Joel S. Ostrow, of counsel), for appellant.", "Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Raymond R. Cusack and Thomas H. Fegan, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JON R. LA BREE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHRIEBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 81\u20143193\nOpinion filed June 13, 1983.\nRehearing denied July 25, 1983.\nRonald J. Lucaccioni, of Chicago (Joel S. Ostrow, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Raymond R. Cusack and Thomas H. Fegan, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0015-01", "first_page_order": 37, "last_page_order": 41 }