{ "id": 3520521, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. HOLBERT W. CARREL, Defendant; (The People ex rel. the Honorable William H. South, Circuit Judge, Appellee, v. DENNIS J. HOGAN, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Carrel", "decision_date": "1983-07-22", "docket_number": "No. 82\u2014124", "first_page": "358", "last_page": "361", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 358" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 1352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 1148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3230609 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/1148-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2667895 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3413612 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S. Ct. 916", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 11722188 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898533 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S. Ct. 2338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 460, "char_count": 6292, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09885267442233119 }, "sha256": "18ee190e0361b7373fe1d97b4356b239a744c104946a39e2243bf9579da891b9", "simhash": "1:aa6bd0de91c24483", "word_count": 1043 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:21.721217+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. HOLBERT W. CARREL, Defendant\u2014(The People ex rel. the Honorable William H. South, Circuit Judge, Appellee, v. DENNIS J. HOGAN, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Dennis J. Hogan, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County finding him guilty of direct criminal contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of $500. The State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that respondent failed to comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), which requires an appellant\u2019s brief to include an argument \u201cwhich shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, which citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).\nThe State asserts that respondent\u2019s brief is unintelligible and cites as an example a portion of page 9 of respondent\u2019s brief. The statement in respondent\u2019s brief, referred to by the prosecution, states in its entirety:\n\u201cIt was after a recess that Judge South said Attorney Dennis Hogan, Respondent and Appellant here, and, non-People v. Carrel party there, could not permissibly intercede but \u2018may\u2019 advise Mitchell, who was and is, theoretically, the delegator of Judge South\u2019s consecutive extrinsic punishment possibility advising power as well as his extrinsic and inherent sentencing powers delegor, to say nothing of her being theoretically the delegator of this Appellate Court\u2019s power to review Judge South\u2019s exercise of sentencing power. Attorney Hogan was not to advise \u2018this Court in this proceeding.\u2019 because Attorney Hogan the advisor of delegor Mitchell was not a \u2018party\u2019. Yet, as it turned out. Or, given No. 81 \u2014 590 of this Court, perhaps we should say, still. The Judge said \u2018If\u2019 Hogan would then, please, be seated \u2018we\u2019 will proceed.\nWell, Attorney Hogan, hardly ever a causer of togetherness only intentionally hires out like other lawyers as some threatened somebody else\u2019s attorney in litigation oriented around actions on penal statutes whether or not it gets to Appellate Courts. So, since there has been no grant of traditional Federal Title 42 U.S.C. legislative power or authority\u2014other than, possibly, mandamusable Chapter 38 I.R.S. Sec. 111\u20142(d)\u2014to an administrative or private person to determine reasonableness of the level of pre-trial of the merits penalization of the 5th Amendment secured property or litigation interests of accused persons reached at any given time or place he has to assay probabilities and act, as does any other lawyer. The threatening vacuum perceived by police and States Attorneys to exist in their power to draft and timely anchor defense attorney proof \u2018reasonableness\u2019 law-fact in the prompt prosecution regard does not exist. Venue council of revenue revision dragnet fishing folk having employed Thornber and other unaccounted for malum in se taxable costs to the public, causing, seines necessitating unprompt harboring of prima facie only evidence, they, not a defendant\u2019s attorney caused and created the Article I, Sec. 7 ambiguity. Trapper v. North Carolina, 101 S. Ct. 2338, People v. Adams, 46 Ill. 2d 200, 207, 263 N.E.2d 490, affirmed 92 S. Ct. 916, 405 U.S. 278, 31L. Ed. 2d 202.\u201d\nThe State further asserts that the statement of facts contained in respondent\u2019s brief is also largely incomprehensible and, therefore, does not conform with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(6) that such statement shall \u201ccontain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, *** without argument or comment.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6).\nWe have considered the briefs and the State\u2019s motion to dismiss and conclude that respondent\u2019s brief fails to comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341 (87 Ill. 2d R. 341) and that the instant appeal should be dismissed.\nThe portion of respondent\u2019s brief which is quoted is but one example of respondent\u2019s failure properly to present the issues relied upon by him in his appeal. As stated by the court in 4.7th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 232, 371 N.E.2d 294, 297, the purpose of Supreme Court Rule 341(e) \u201cis to require parties to proceedings before a reviewing court to present clear and orderly arguments for that court\u2019s consideration.\u201d Based on appellant\u2019s failure to comply with Rule 341(e), the court in 47th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. dismissed the appeal.\nFurther, the State has represented in its motion to dismiss the appeal in the case at bar that the State was required to expend 40 hours of attorney time on another of respondent\u2019s pro se appeals and over 100 hours in yet another appeal in which appellant represented the appellant, all the result of the unintelligibility of the appellant\u2019s brief.\nThis court previously has expressed its view concerning the failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 341 in In re Estate of Kunz (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763, 288 N.E.2d 520, 523, in which it was stated:\n\u201cIt is difficult to say at what point a presentation to the Appellate Court is so inadequate in its compliance with the rules and the law as not to justify consideration of the parties\u2019 position, but it is clear that in this cause it is under the minimum. *** Reviewing courts are entitled to have the issues clearly defined, to be cited pertinent authorities and are not a depository in which an appellant is to dump the entire matter of pleadings, court action, argument and research as it were, upon the court.\u201d\nThis rationale was restated in In re Marriage of Snow (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 1148, 1149, 401 N.E.2d 1352, 1353.\nBecause of the fact that respondent\u2019s brief in the instant appeal is for the most part unintelligible, we conclude that he has failed to comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341 and that his appeal should be dismissed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, appellant\u2019s brief is stricken and his appeal is dismissed.\nAppeal dismissed.\nJONES and EARNS, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dennis J. Hogan, of Murphysboro, for appellant, pro se.", "John R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Stephen E. Norris, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. HOLBERT W. CARREL, Defendant\u2014(The People ex rel. the Honorable William H. South, Circuit Judge, Appellee, v. DENNIS J. HOGAN, Respondent-Appellant).\nFifth District\nNo. 82\u2014124\nOpinion filed July 22, 1983.\nDennis J. Hogan, of Murphysboro, for appellant, pro se.\nJohn R. Clemons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Stephen E. Norris, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0358-01", "first_page_order": 380, "last_page_order": 383 }