{ "id": 3520277, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAZEL JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "1983-07-07", "docket_number": "Nos. 81\u20142832, 81\u20142833 cons.", "first_page": "430", "last_page": "437", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 430" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3232381 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378427 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856433 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3330092 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490830 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S. Ct. 9", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 635", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 U.S. 815", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304568, 11304513, 11304377, 11304448 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/344/0815-04", "/us/344/0815-03", "/us/344/0815-01", "/us/344/0815-02" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311868 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 413992 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/327/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Yale L.J. 1439", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Yale L.J.", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 San Diego L. Rev. 414", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "San Diego L. Rev.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "529 P.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Cal. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2317619 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/13/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 Pa. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1757589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/486/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 P.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4531282, 10450566 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/200/0094-01", "/p2d/612/1117-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Col. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 4531282 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/200/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 58", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168959 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 435", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178379 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "581" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 766, "char_count": 15666, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3360025504340745e-07, "percentile": 0.7916336048935672 }, "sha256": "14c78f7fbbce4f9defb0038cda5abd74c874b5e2c64f52a19eef89c638d629a0", "simhash": "1:1327075060cec45c", "word_count": 2556 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:21.721217+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAZEL JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court granted a motion to suppress the defendant\u2019s bank records obtained through a grand jury subpoena served on her Illinois bank. The court held that the subpoena violated the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to privacy by an unreasonable seizure of her bank records. The State appeals this ruling.\nOn December 6, 1978, the defendant, Hazel Jackson, was fired from her job as a closing officer at Intercounty Title Company. On December 12, 1979, an employee of Intercounty phoned the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office of Cook County and related his suspicions that the defendant had been involved in an embezzlement scheme. On May 14, 1980, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office approved the issuance of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum to the defendant\u2019s bank, the Central National. The subpoena directed the bank to turn over the defendant\u2019s records covering the period from August 1977 to October 26, 1979. Nine months later, on February 27, 1981, the Cook County grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant charging her with theft in that she was unlawfully receiving unemployment benefits while still employed.\nOn May 21, 1981, the defendant filed her motion to suppress the subpoena. The motion alleged that there had been an unreasonable seizure of her bank records under the Illinois Constitution; that the subpoena had not been properly authorized by the grand jury; that the subpoena was not served with notice to her as a bank customer pursuant to the Illinois Banking Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 16\u00bd, par. 148.1(d)(1)); and that the subpoena was unreasonably broad in scope.\nDuring the hearing on the motion to suppress, it was stipulated that there was no evidence that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office had appeared before the grand jury or before any judge to request the issuance of the subpoena; that the grand jury docket for the relevant dates contained no information regarding the issuance of this subpoena; that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney handling the investigation did not recollect appearing before the grand jury to obtain the subpoena; that the official shorthand reporter assigned to record the grand jury proceedings of May 14, 1980, had no record of any testimony being presented to that body regarding the issuance of a subpoena to Hazel Jackson\u2019s bank; and that the defendant had received no notification that a subpoena had been issued for her bank records.\nRights of privacy are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures under both the Federal and State constitutions. (Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 350, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 581, 88 S. Ct. 507, 510; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6.) The first question is whether there is a right of privacy in the bank records. If there is, she has standing to make the motion to suppress the evidence. The second question then becomes whether the seizure was reasonable or unreasonable under the Federal and State constitutions.\nThe defendant concedes that under United States v. Miller (1976), 425 U.S. 435, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 96 S. Ct. 1619, the United States Supreme Court decided under circumstances substantially similar to those here that there is no privacy right in bank records and consequently the defendant there had no standing. Jackson contends that if Miller is applied the motion to suppress should be denied. However, she contends that the Illinois courts may set a higher standard under the Illinois constitutional provisions against unreasonable search and seizure as other States have done.\nIn Miller, the defendant, like the defendant here, had been charged with various Federal offenses and had made a pretrial motion to suppress his bank records. He contended that his records had been illegally seized by subpoena duces tecum in violation of the fourth amendment. The court of appeals concluded that the subpoenaed documents fell within a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. The Supreme Court held that the defendant possessed no privacy interest in the bank records that could be vindicated by a challenge to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reasoned that the subpoenaed materials were business records of the bank, not the defendant\u2019s private papers; that there is no legitimate \u201cexpectation of privacy\u201d in the contents of original checks and deposit slips because these are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments used in commercial transactions; that the fourth amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information voluntarily conveyed to a third party which the third party then turns over to government authorities; and that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party does not violate a defendant\u2019s rights even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued.\nJackson argues that she has a right of privacy in her bank records under article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6) and a right to privacy and notice under section 141.1(d)(1) of the Illinois Banking Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. I6V2, par. 148.1(d)(1)). A State may of course set a higher standard of rights than the comparable United States constitutional right. (See Cooper v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 87 S. Ct. 788.) Colorado, California and Pennsylvania rejected the rationale of Miller and held that there was a privacy right in bank records and consequently there was standing. Charnes v. Di Giacomo (1980), 200 Col. 94, 612 P.2d 1117; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. DeJohn (1979), 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283; Burrows v. Superior Court (1974), 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590.\nThe facts in the three cases cited above closely parallel the facts in the instant cause. In each situation, the petitioner moved to suppress the production of his/her bank records which had been subpoenaed from the bank pursuant to a State investigation of his/her financial activities. The State supreme court, in each case, considered and rejected an application of Miller holding that their respective State constitutions recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records which could only be intruded upon by a valid subpoena.\nThese courts rejected the rationale in Miller because it relies for its analysis of an expectation of privacy upon the ownership and possession of the records and not the reasonable expectations of the individual. The State courts accepted the fourth amendment test set out in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507, which provides protection for \u201cpeople not places.\u201d (Cf. W. LaFave, Search & Seizure sec. 2.7, at 411 (1978); 14 San Diego L. Rev. 414 (1977); 83 Yale L.J. 1439 (1974).) Under Katz, the fourth amendment gives protection for an individual\u2019s reasonable expectation of privacy which is not bound by the location and present ownership of the records. Consequently, the right to privacy is not waived by placing these records in the hands of a bank. The individual can still legitimately expect that her financial records will not be subject to disclosure. See Burrows v. Superior Court (1974), 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590.\nUnlike the State constitutions in California, Pennsylvania and Colorado, our Illinois constitution has a privacy provision which expressly grants our citizens protection from an unreasonable invasion of their privacy. Article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6) is entitled \u201cSearches, Seizures, Privacy and Interceptions\u201d and provides:\n\u201cThe people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe Constitutional Commentary on this provision explains, \u201cSection 6 expands upon the individual rights which were contained in Section 6 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution and the guarantees of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. I, sec. 6, Constitutional Commentary, at 317 (Smith-Hurd 1971).) The Commentary also states that \"the protection against \u2018invasion of privacy\u2019 is new and is stated broadly. No definition of types of privacy is offered.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. I, sec. 6, Constitutional Commentary, at 317 (Smith-Hurd 1971).\nIn reliance upon this express proscription against invasion of privacy in Illinois and influenced by the Commentary, which suggests that this protection should be broadly applied, we are led to conclude that the Illinois Constitution offers protection for the reasonable expectation of privacy which our citizens have in their bank records.\nWe believe that it is reasonable for our citizens to expect that their bank records will be protected from disclosure because in the course of bank dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of her personal affairs, opinion, habit and associations which provide a current biography of her activities. Such a biography should not be subject to an unreasonable seizure by the State government. Furthermore, we reject the idea set out in Miller that a citizen waives any legitimate expectation in her financial records when she resorts to the banking system. Since it is virtually impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining an account with a bank, opening a bank account is not entirely volitional and should not be seen as conduct which constitutes \u00e1 waiver of an expectation of privacy. See Burrows v. Superior Court (1974), 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590.\nHaving decided that there is a constitutional right of privacy in Illinois in a person\u2019s bank records, the second aspect of the constitutional problem comes into focus; that is, has there been an unreasonable seizure in violation of that person\u2019s legitimate expectation of privacy in those bank records. Even with a right of privacy in bank records guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, the protection is only against unreasonable search and seizures and not reasonable ones. See LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 4.12(e), at 207 (1978).\nWhen dealing with subpoenas, the determination as to what is a reasonable search and seizure is made by balancing the public interest against the individual\u2019s need for private security. (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (1946), 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614, 66 S. Ct. 494.) Where the government seeks to compel disclosure of private records, a person\u2019s privacy interest in nondisclosure must be balanced against the interest of the public in having effective grand jury investigations. In Illinois, the grand jury has been endowed with broad investigative powers. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 112\u20144(b); People v. Allen (1951), 410 Ill. 508, 103 N.E.2d 92, cert. denied (1952), 344 U.S. 815, 97 L. Ed. 635, 73 S. Ct. 9; People ex rel. Fisher v. Carey (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 259, 396 N.E.2d 17, aff'g in part and rev\u2019g in part (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 239, 380 N.E.2d 1150.) However, when these investigations infringe on a person\u2019s protected right of privacy, the reasonableness of the intrusion is tested by the validity of the subpoena.\nAlthough a subpoena is a constructive search presenting no question of an actual search or seizure (see People v. Allen (1951), 410 Ill. 508, 103 N.E.2d 92, cert. denied (1952), 344 U.S. 815, 97 L. Ed. 635, 73 S. Ct. 9), two guidelines have been followed by the courts in determining whether the intrusion into a person\u2019s privacy is a reasonable intrusion and whether the subpoena is valid: (1) the document sought must be relevant to the inquiry and (2) a specification of the document to be produced must be adequate but not excessive for the purpose of the relevant inquiry. (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (1946), 327 U.S. 186, 90 L. Ed. 614, 66 S. Ct. 494; People v. Lurie (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 331, 235 N.E.2d 637.) Only after applying these guidelines should a court determine whether a valid subpoena has been issued which is able to withstand a motion to suppress. People ex rel. Legislative Commission on Low Income Housing v. Keefe (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 460, 223 N.E.2d 144.\nWhen these two guidelines are applied to the subpoena at issue here,' we find that the intrusion into Jackson\u2019s bank records was reasonable. The subject of the grand jury\u2019s investigation was Jackson\u2019s unlawful receipt of State of Illinois employment security benefits while still gainfully employed. Her financial records for the period of time under investigation were subpoenaed from Central National Bank. Such financial records were obviously relevant to this investigation. Furthermore, Jackson asserted that the subpoena was overly broad, but presented no evidence to show why it was excessive and why certain documents should have been excluded. She thus failed to carry her burden of proof as to excessiveness. Therefore, we conclude that this subpoena in fact met the two guidelines of relevancy and nonexcessiveness and was valid.\nJackson raises two further issues. The trial court had found that the grand jury did not in fact cause the subpoena to issue because the grand jury docket does not record the issuance of the subpoena. There is no statutory requirement that a docket entry be made or a record kept and transcribed of requests by the State for grand jury subpoenas. Section 112\u20147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides only that the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury be transcribed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 112\u20147.) Accordingly, the record does not support the conclusion reached by the trial court that the subpoena was never authorized. See People v. Haag (1979), 80 Ill. App. 3d 135, 399 N.E.2d 284.\nJackson\u2019s final argument is that she was entitled to notice of the subpoena under the Illinois Banking Act. The notice provision that was in effect at the time the subpoena was issued is as follows (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 17, par. 360(d)):\n\u201cA bank shall disclose financial records *** pursuant to a lawful subpoena, summons, warrant or court order only after the bank mails a copy of the subpoena, summons, warrant or court order to the person establishing the relationship with the bank ***.\u201d\nWe do not agree that this notice provision provides Jackson with grounds to suppress the subpoena of her bank records. The statute by its terms only tries to set out the obligations which a bank owes to its bank customers. These are the obligations of confidentiality and the obligation of notice to a customer if this confidentiality is abridged. The statute does not attempt to regulate governmental intrusion into a customer\u2019s confidential bank owes to its customers. These are the obligations of confidentiality and the obligation of notice to a customer if this confidentiality is abridged. The statute does not attempt to regulate governmental intrusion into a customer\u2019s confidential bank records. Thus relying solely upon this statute, Jackson cannot attempt to suppress a governmental subpoena or claim the right to notice when one is issued.\nFor the above reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court granting the motion to suppress the subpoena.\nROMITI, P.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JIGANTI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Raymond Brogan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.", "Freddrenna M. Lyle, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAZEL JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNos. 81\u20142832, 81\u20142833 cons.\nOpinion filed July 7, 1983.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Raymond Brogan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.\nFreddrenna M. Lyle, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0430-01", "first_page_order": 452, "last_page_order": 459 }