{ "id": 3518386, "name": "CRAIG E. THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER B. PLATT, JR., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Thompson v. Platt", "decision_date": "1983-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 82\u2014641", "first_page": "662", "last_page": "665", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 662" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5381629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5322404 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/99/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336450 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 927", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3193652 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5606399 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3034474 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470281 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 480, "char_count": 7116, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.31349023470797e-07, "percentile": 0.6249590227075015 }, "sha256": "d562f3048ad00e9970a0a5165716143523d7385aff1e21164aea886e0cb2d0a9", "simhash": "1:ce6e56f48fc53d38", "word_count": 1186 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:21.721217+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CRAIG E. THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER B. PLATT, JR., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case is presented to us for our consideration for a second time. It is a negligence action claiming damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff, Craig Thompson, in August of 1978 when the motorcycle he was operating ran into the rear of a truck/trailer combination operated by the defendant, William Platt, Jr. Following discovery depositions, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was allowed on November 5, 1980. The court found \u201cas a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.\u201d\nOn November 21, 1980, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. Before the motion could be heard, the supreme court decided Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886. On July 21, 1981, the circuit court effectively granted the motion to reconsider on grounds that plaintiff\u2019s suit was no longer barred by the doctrine of contributory negligence. On motion of the defendant, an. appeal was taken to this court. We reversed the trial court\u2019s order, finding that the motion for summary judgment was \u201cthe procedural equivalent of a trial,\u201d and remanded the matter for the court\u2019s consideration of the merits of plaintiff\u2019s motion to reconsider. (Thompson v. Platt (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 757, 436 N.E.2d 224.) The motion was heard and denied. This appeal by plaintiff followed.\nThe question before us today is whether the trial court correctly found that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. We affirm.\nSummary judgment is a harsh remedy which is to be avoided in favor of granting the parties an opportunity to present their evidence at trial unless all of the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and all permissible inferences, analyzed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so clearly favor the movant that no fair-minded person could dispute the movant\u2019s right to judgment in his favor. On appeal, this court -will affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to grant summary judgment only if, after scrutinizing the record, we are absolutely convinced there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant was, indeed, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nEven the issue of contributory negligence, a classic jury question, may be decided on summary judgment if it appears \u201cfrom undisputed facts that \u2018all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.\u2019 \u201d Killeen v. R.W. Dunteman Co. (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 473, 475, 397 N.E.2d 436, 438, quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504.\nA transcript of discovery depositions of the parties was attached to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The following undisputed facts are gleaned from that document. The plaintiff had been riding cycles since he was nine years old. He was 20 at the time of the deposition. The particular motorcycle that he was riding at the time of the accident was a 1975 250-Honda \u201cEl Cinor\u201d which he had purchased used from his father-in-law the beginning of the summer of 1978. There was no mechanical problem with the brakes on the date of the accident. The accident occurred around 11 a.m. and the weather was clear. There was a dip in the road which obstructed the plaintiff\u2019s vision until he was about one-quarter mile from where the accident occurred. The plaintiff said, however, that he first saw the Platt truck/trailer equipment when he was about one-eighth mile away. He observed at that time that the combination vehicle was occupying both lanes as it appeared to be turning into a side road. At that point, the plaintiff was traveling between 50 and 55 miles per hour. He applied his brakes \u201clightly,\u201d reducing his speed to an estimated 35 or 40 miles per hour, and collided with the trailer. Although the plaintiff observed no on-coming northbound traffic, he did not attempt to change lanes so as to get around the end of the trailer.\nBased on these facts, we have no doubt but that the trial court correctly found the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law.\nIt is now axiomatic that \u201c[a] driver approaching from the rear has a duty to keep a safe lookout and must take into consideration the fact that he may be required to stop or slow his vehicle suddenly. Failure to maintain a safe lookout for traffic ahead constitutes negligence on the part of a driver.\u201d Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 406 N.E.2d 927, 930, citing Burroughs v. McGinness (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 664, 667, 380 N.E.2d 37; see also Waldron v. Hardwick (1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 36, 240 N.E.2d 772; and Glenn v. Mosley (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 172, 350 N.E.2d 219.\nThe plaintiff in this case was not in the exercise of due care for his own safety when he emerged from the dip in the road one-quarter mile from where the defendant was maneuvering his truck/trailer combination and failed to take immediate note of the potential danger ahead. The plaintiff does not offer any excuse for his own apparent lapse of attention for the admitted one-eighth mile distance between the point where he first could have observed the defendant\u2019s equipment and the point where he in fact did take notice and begin to \u201clightly\u201d apply his brakes. We can only conclude, as the trial court correctly did, that the plaintiff\u2019s failure to take evasive action to avoid the collision was the product of his own negligence.\nThe plaintiff insists, however, that the defendant\u2019s activities immediately prior to impact are not undisputed and, therefore, leave triable issues of fact and render summary judgment in error. The factual disputes raised by the plaintiff include the possible suddenness of the defendant\u2019s turning maneuver, whether the defendant\u2019s turning signals and/or brake lights were activated, and whether the defendant\u2019s equipment was moving forward, backwards or standing still. While certainly these matters would be relevant to the degree of the defendant\u2019s negligence, we fail to see how they are material to the issue of the plaintiff\u2019s own contributory negligence. The defendant\u2019s negligence, if any were to be found, still would not account for the plaintiff\u2019s failure to exercise due care at all times to avoid a collision with vehicles on the road ahead of him.\nOn the record before us, it is evident with certainty that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County.\nAffirmed.\nALLOY and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lyle W. Allen and Nicholas J. Bertschy, both of Heyl, Royster, Voekler & Allen, of Peoria, and Bernard G. Stutter, of Knoxville, for appellant.", "Charles E. Covey and Burrel Barash, both of Barash, Stoerzbach & Henson, of Galesburg, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CRAIG E. THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER B. PLATT, JR., Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 82\u2014641\nOpinion filed July 29, 1983.\nLyle W. Allen and Nicholas J. Bertschy, both of Heyl, Royster, Voekler & Allen, of Peoria, and Bernard G. Stutter, of Knoxville, for appellant.\nCharles E. Covey and Burrel Barash, both of Barash, Stoerzbach & Henson, of Galesburg, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0662-01", "first_page_order": 684, "last_page_order": 687 }