{ "id": 3519166, "name": "GEORGIA SATCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INLAND REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Satcher v. Inland Real Estate Corp.", "decision_date": "1983-07-18", "docket_number": "No. 82\u2014671", "first_page": "685", "last_page": "690", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 685" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "275 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2754241 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5622733 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5215664 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/26/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905004 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5215664 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/26/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 604, "char_count": 10549, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.103322868196151e-08, "percentile": 0.5060320119049412 }, "sha256": "501e88fea81523d889855dddd29fe91418150ccf4d1ea85db260e5f3ac90a79d", "simhash": "1:3a097b89974a0d65", "word_count": 1762 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:34:21.721217+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGIA SATCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INLAND REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Georgia Satcher, brought this small claims action in the Will County Circuit Court against the defendant, Inland Real Estate Corporation, seeking to recover $2,000 plus costs in damages for the defendant\u2019s alleged negligence in maintaining and controlling the plaintiff\u2019s apartment. According to the complaint and plaintiff\u2019s affidavit, the defendant owned the apartment building where plaintiff lived. Plaintiff returned from a vacation in November of 1981 to discover that her apartment had been broken into and $2,000 worth of items were missing. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint was filed on June 14, 1982. It was served on defendant\u2019s agent in Oak Brook, Du Page County, on July 2. The cause was set for hearing five days later, on July 7.\nThe defendant failed to appear, and an order of default was entered. On July 21, proof of plaintiff\u2019s damages was heard and judgment of default was entered in the amount of $2,000 plus costs. The record does not indicate that notice of the hearing on damages was sent to the defendant. On August 6, 1982, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment and alleged:\n\u201c1. Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the granting of [the] motion;\n2. Defendant has a meritorious defense to Plaintiff\u2019s claim; [and]\n3. Upon receipt of summons, Defendant *** forwarded the court papers to its [insurer]. The [insurer] denied coverage, and therefore, did not provide defense for [the] action, resulting in the default.\u201d\nOn September 8, 1982, the date set for a hearing on the motion, the plaintiff filed an \u201canswer,\u201d denying each of the allegations. The \u201canswer\u201d stated, inter alia, that on June 28, 1982, the defendant\u2019s insurer informed the defendant\u2019s agent that the insurance policy did not cover incidents of the type alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint. After entertaining arguments of counsel for both sides, the court denied the motion to vacate and entered its findings as follows:\n\u201cThe court finds that Defendant did not set forth a meritorious defense in its Petition, and based upon Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff\u2019s answer finds that Plaintiff\u2019s [sic] allegations in its motion regarding denial of insurance coverage were not meritorious and the court denies the motion to vacate the judgment.\u201d\nDefendant appeals, raising for our consideration a single issue\u2014 whether the trial court committed reversible error by applying an erroneous standard in ruling on the motion to vacate. Our review of applicable case law persuades us that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe seminal case in recent decisions interpreting section 2\u2014 1301(e) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141301(e)) is Widicus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1960), 26 Ill. App. 2d 102, 167 N.E.2d 799. There the court stated:\n\u201cThe question of whether or not a court should set aside a default should be so resolved as to do substantial justice between the parties and with the idea in mind of carrying out, insofar as it is possible, the determination of matters upon their merits. In resolving this problem, a court may well consider whether or not a defendant has a meritorious defense, and whether or not defendant\u2019s delay in responding to the court\u2019s command actually jeopardizes plaintiff\u2019s basic position. But this should not be the only, nor necessarily, the determining factors. It seems to us that the overriding reason should be whether or not justice is being done. Justice will not be done if hurried defaults are allowed any more than if continuing delays are permitted. But justice might, at times, require a default or a delay. What is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.\nThe entering of a default is one of the most drastic actions a court may take to punish for disobedience to its commands. The court has other powers which are ample in most instances. In our judgment, a default should only be condoned when, as a last resort, it is necessary to give the plaintiff his just demand. It should be set aside when it will not cause a hardship upon the plaintiff to go to trial on the merits. \u201d (Emphasis added.) 26 Ill. App. 2d 102,108-09,167 N.E.2d 799, 803.\nThe real question on appeal is no longer whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the motion to vacate, but whether its ruling serves the ends of justice. Lettvin v. Suson (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 215, 379 N.E.2d 49.\nThe record on appeal consists of the common law record, without transcripts of hearings. Our review of the trial court\u2019s order convinces us that the court erroneously accorded too much weight to its finding that the Du Page County defendant\u2019s asserted excuse for failing to appear was not justified. This factor alone does not dictate denial of the motion to vacate. Furthermore, while obviously it would have been preferable to us, for purposes of review, had the defendant set forth a basis for its bare allegation of a meritorious defense, we do not believe that the motion is fatally defective in its failure to do so. Whether a meritorious defense existed or not was a proper subject of inquiry at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion. Of far lesser import was the question of whether or not the form of defendant\u2019s motion was technically complete. (See Knight v. Kenilworth Insurance Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 493, 275 N.E.2d 470 (defendant\u2019s motion to vacate default judgment alleged a meritorious defense and appellate court, without addressing such defense, determined justice would be served by allowing defendant his day in court).) But, most importantly, it appears on the face of the trial court\u2019s order that the court did not find that allowing the motion would work any injustice on this plaintiff.\nHardship or prejudice to the plaintiff, if any could be found, would weigh in favor of affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to vacate on grounds that substantial justice had been served. (Widicus.) The record indicates that the plaintiff appeared, at most, only three times by her attorney prior to the filing of defendant\u2019s motion to vacate. There is no indication that the plaintiff herself ever made an appearance. Although plaintiff in her \u201canswer\u201d generally denied that she would not be prejudiced by an allowance of the motion, the record before us is devoid of any facts whatsoever that could support a finding of prejudice to her.\nIn our opinion, substantial justice requires that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the merits in this case.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, direct that the default judgment against the defendant be vacated and remand this cause for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nALLOY, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\ndissenting:\nThis case is simple and straightforward. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant moved to vacate. Defendant\u2019s motion was answered and denied by plaintiff. A hearing was held on the motion to vacate and it was denied. Defendant appeals.\nThe majority opinion here, with no basis in the record, holds that the default judgment should be vacated and the cause remanded for a hearing on the merits. Why? Because, it is said that \u201csubstantial justice\u201d requires it.\nWhat, it may be asked, is the meaning of this phrase, \u201csubstantial justice\u201d? The majority opinion does not define it. Neither is it defined in the opinions cited therein. In truth, it means nothing or it means anything. It means whatever the user wishes it to mean according to the situation. It is, at once, a euphemism, a sophism and a soporific. That is to say, it is a high sounding phrase which, though saying nothing, appears to support a particular position and, at the same time serves to dull the awareness of the reader. If the courts were to fully embrace this phrase in all its implications, it could be used to encompass and supplant the entire body of jurisprudence. Much tedious reading and research among reported decisions could be avoided. All cases could be affirmed or reversed according to the requirements of \u201csubstantial justice.\u201d\nAs regards the setting aside of a default judgment, I am well aware that Widicus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1960), 26 Ill. App. 2d 102, was the first appellate case in Illinois to embrace the use of the phrase \u201csubstantial justice\u201d in derogation of the former tests of meritorious defense and due diligence. I am also aware that this case was cited with approval by our supreme court in People ex rel. Reid v. Adkins (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 402.\nThe fact remains, however, that the bare phrase \u201csubstantial justice\u201d offers no guidance to lawyers, litigants or courts. The instant case is a good illustration of its pernicious use.\nThec trial court, upon a full hearing of the motion to vacate and the answer thereto, found that the defendant did not set forth a meritorious defense. The court further found that defendant\u2019s recital concerning sending the court papers to his insurance carrier was not meritorious. Plaintiff\u2019s answer set forth that defendant knew that the insurance company named in his motion did not insure the subject claim and that this was known by defendant even before defendant was served with summons. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to vacate the default judgment. Yet, the majority of this court, on review, chooses to reverse the trial court for reasons of \u201csubstantial justice.\u201d\nIt may be fairly asked, if a defendant fails to demonstrate a meritorious defense and if, as in this case, the trial court finds his motion to vacate to be pure baloney, how, by any stretch of the imagination, is substantial justice being done to anyone by opening up this default judgment? The answer is, it is not.\nIf we are to govern by the rule of law and not by the rule of men, it is essential that we not employ glib and meaningless phrases to decide cases. If the phrase \u201csubstantial justice\u201d is to be used, its hollow body must be given flesh and bones. A definition that would include meritorious defense and due diligence would go a long way in that direction.\nFor the reasons stated, I dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard W. Christoff, of Sanford Kahn, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGIA SATCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INLAND REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 82\u2014671\nOpinion filed July 18, 1983.\nHEIPLE, J., dissenting.\nRichard W. Christoff, of Sanford Kahn, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0685-01", "first_page_order": 707, "last_page_order": 712 }