{ "id": 3481234, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF JOANNE M. COOK, Petitioner-Appellee, and JOHN L. COOK, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Cook", "decision_date": "1983-09-06", "docket_number": "No. 82-1411", "first_page": "844", "last_page": "855", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 844" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3230930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 1308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 1108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12146715 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/1108-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5553834 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3100905 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 1126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5497771 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/1126-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 1382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5450012 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 845", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3188809 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0845-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3020282 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 1006", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3235707 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2999306 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 N.E.2d 624", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863576 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3180521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5786507 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/25/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469902 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530-31" }, { "page": "532" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1046, "char_count": 25404, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6944486272136403e-07, "percentile": 0.8278849461879824 }, "sha256": "6d391058d5f1538ac89f18bd4bf013c7a2a95dff6d4f32de9072a58163477b09", "simhash": "1:1be87a3cba849de4", "word_count": 4109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:51.886955+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF JOANNE M. COOK, Petitioner-Appellee, and JOHN L. COOK, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, John L. Cook (John), appeals the property distribution portion of a judgment dissolving his marriage to petitioner, Joanne M. Cook (Joanne). On appeal, John contends that the trial court erred in finding that Joanne\u2019s interest in certain property was non-marital; in evaluating the property owned by the parties; in finding that the temporary maintenance order entered by the court \u201cwithout prejudice\u201d was proper and that Joanne should receive temporary maintenance; in finding that John had dissipated marital assets; in awarding to Joanne the majority of marital assets in lieu of permanent maintenance; and in directing John to contribute $30,000 to Joanne\u2019s attorney fees. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nJohn and Joanne were married on June 13, 1953. The marriage produced two sons, both now emancipated. On May 11, 1978, Joanne filed a petition for dissolution and for partition of the marital home. On May 25, 1978, John filed an answer to Joanne\u2019s petition, and on December 6,1978, he filed a counterpetition for dissolution.\nBoth of the parties hereto filed numerous pretrial motions and petitions for rules to show cause, including a myriad of unsuccessful requests by Joanne for the production of documents seeking to establish John\u2019s financial status. On October 2, 1979, Joanne filed a petition for temporary maintenance and for \u201csuit money.\u201d A temporary maintenance order was entered on December 14, 1979, directing John to pay to Joanne $500 semi-monthly \u201cwithout prejudice pending a final determination relative to any award of temporary maintenance.\u201d John did not voluntarily comply with this or subsequently repeated maintenance orders, including some agreed to by both parties. The trial court noted that some 17 rules to show cause were requested by Joanne\u2019s attorneys in an attempt to compel John\u2019s compliance with temporary maintenance orders and on one occasion a body , attachment order was entered.\nOn October 23, 1980, Joanne \u201cconfessed\u201d to the grounds for dissolution alleged in John\u2019s amended counter-petition. The parties agreed to a bifurcated hearing (Ill. Rev. Stat-. 1979, ch. 40, par. 401, as amended), and on November 17, 1980, the trial court entered an order dissolving their 27-year marriage. A property distribution hearing began in June 1981 but was continued until January 11, 1982, following a mistrial ordered after the judge originally assigned to this case was transferred.\nThe testimony established that Joanne, aged 49 and in apparent good health, held an undergraduate degree in recreation. She was a homemaker until 1969 when she was employed as the bookkeeper and later the general manager of Just-Rite Coffee Service Company, owned in part by Dr. Elmer J. Justema. In 1972, Joanne entered into a real estate investment partnership with Doctor Justema, designated \u201cJ & J #1\u201d (the partnership).\nJohn, aged 53, also in apparent good health, held a degree in chemical engineering and had been engaged in the plastics business since 1958. He testified that he was employed as a manufacturer\u2019s representative for J.L. Cook Plastics and J.L. Cook Company (operated as one entity) of which he was sole owner. He also owned or had interests in several other businesses, including American Coil (of which he was sole proprietor); Metric Tool & Die Company (a screw machine company in which he owned a 50% interest); Cotronics, Inc. (a molding company in Logansport, Indiana); Tanfastic (a suntanning facility); and Alprod, Inc. and Porta-Chef Kane (the record does not establish the nature of these businesses).\nAffidavits submitted by the parties indicate that at the time of trial John\u2019s monthly personal expenses totaled $2,738.53 and Joanne\u2019s monthly personal expenses were approximately $2,280. A credit application signed by Joanne in October 1978 and admitted into evidence indicates that while she was employed by Just-Rite Coffee Service, her monthly income was approximately $2,900 (including the $1,000 per month temporary maintenance to be paid by John). Joanne stated that she had not been employed since August 1979.\nAt the conclusion of 10 days of hearings, and following an exhaustive review of approximately 109 exhibits and a record in excess of 3000 pages, a task which the trial court labels \u201ca long and laborious process,\u201d the trial court found that John\u2019s income from his various businesses was \u201cunclear.\u201d The court noted that John \u201chas not filed any federal individual income tax returns since 1978. He has no personal checking account. He keeps no formal business records in regard to J.L. Cook Company and J.L. Cook Plastics. He personally keeps no check book, no ledger, and no journal ***.\u201d\nThe court found that prior to October 1980 John maintained two business-checking accounts, one used for payroll and the other for the operation of J.L. Cook Plastics. Since October 1980, John has operated J.L. Plastics on a \u201ccash basis.\u201d Bank deposit records of J.L. Cook Plastics produced by John indicate that total deposits of $261,379 were made in 1978 to the J.L. Cook Plastics account, whereas the 1978 Federal individual tax return prepared by John indicates that he earned only $29,000. Bank statements for 1979 reflect total deposits of $331,556 and for the first 10 months of 1980 total deposits of $270,588.\nJohn failed to submit evidence to reconcile apparent discrepancies between reported income and bank deposit records. The limited financial data proffered by John consisted principally of a financial statement prepared by a certified public accountant, Thomas Lane (Lane), who had been hired by John\u2019s attorney in July 1980 to prepare \u201cpayroll sheets and financial statements\u201d for use in the trial. Lane did no accounting for John\u2019s businesses prior to this time. The court noted that \u201cMr. Lane never took a physical inventory of the plant. He relied on [John\u2019s] representations in preparing the balance sheet and financial statements.\u201d Lane testified that he reviewed bank statements and cancelled checks for the business checking account prior to October 1980 and customer invoices and handwritten summaries prepared by John.\nIn making its findings and in rendering its decision the trial court noted that it had \u201ctaken into consideration all of the guidelines and factors delineated in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, including the various subsections thereto, and arguments of counsel, cases cited therein ***.\u201d Thereafter, the trial court found that marital assets, with a combined value in excess of $600,000, included the marital home at 801 Cleveland, Hinsdale, Illinois; a vacant lot in Vilas County, Wisconsin; an industrial building and real estate in Sandwich, Illinois, owned by J.L. Cook Plastics; certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home; two Cadillac automobiles; and John\u2019s various business interests.\nThe trial court found that Joanne owned nonmarital property including her interest in J .& J #1 Partnership; her interest in certain household furniture and furnishings; jewelry; and approximately $50,000 in stock purchased by her with the inheritance received from her father\u2019s estate and held in her name alone. The trial court assigned this nonmarital property to Joanne and in addition awarded to her, in lieu of maintenance, the marital home, the furniture and furnishings in the marital home not assigned to her as nonmarital property, the Wisconsin property and her 1978 Cadillac automobile. The court awarded to John his various business interests, the industrial building and real estate in Sandwich, Illinois, and his 1979 Cadillac automobile.\nAfter the parties waived a hearing on fees, the court allowed attorney fees based upon petitions filed by the attorneys for both parties. John was directed to contribute $30,000 toward Joanne\u2019s attorney fees and $30,000 to his attorney. Joanne was directed to pay $20,000 to her attorney. The court ordered John to sell his 700 shares of Cotronics, Inc., stock to pay the attorney fees, and a lien was impressed on the stock in favor of Joanne\u2019s attorneys to the extent of fees allowed.\nOn May 26, 1982, a written judgment was entered conforming to the court\u2019s findings and award of attorney fees. John appeals from that judgment. The portion of the judgment directing the sale of the Cotronics, Inc., stock was stayed by this court pending the disposition of this appeal.\nJohn initially contends that the trial court erred in finding that Joanne\u2019s interest in certain property was nonmarital. Specifically, John disputes that Joanne\u2019s interest in J & J #1 Partnership was non-marital property. John urges that the evidence establishes that Joanne\u2019s $30,000 initial investment in the partnership was acquired during their marriage as the result of a loan to her from her father, Lee Vogt (Vogt). Joanne maintains that the money was a gift to her alone from her father.\nGenerally, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property, regardless of how title is held. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 503(b).) A spouse seeking to rebut this presumption has the burden of presenting evidence which clearly shows that the property was acquired by an excepted method enumerated in section 503(a) of the Act, such as by gift. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 503(a); see generally In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 518, 530-31, 427 N.E.2d 1239.) A gift is a voluntary, gratuitous transfer of property by one to another where the donor manifests an intent to make such a gift and absolutely and irrevocably delivers the property to the donee. (Dudley v. Uptown National Bank (1960), 25 Ill. App. 2d 514, 520-21, 167 N.E.2d 257.) Moreover to prove a gift it must be shown that the donor has relinquished all present and future dominion and power over the subject matter of the gift. In re Marriage of Simmons (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 651, 654, 409 N.E.2d 321.\nHere, Mr. Vogt, who was 72 years old when in 1972 he gave the money to his daughter Joanne, his sole heir, raised the money by borrowing against his insurance policies, converting a certificate of deposit and obtaining a $17,000 mortgage on his home. Vogt died in January 1974 and Joanne contends that he intended to make a gift to her of the $30,000 as an advance on her inheritance. John, however, maintains that Vogt intended to be repaid and telephoned often to inquire about repayment. Although denied by Joanne, John claimed that he had several conversations with her regarding repayment arrangements. John also attempted to demonstrate Vogt\u2019s intention to be repaid by introducing into evidence 13 cancelled checks drawn on Joanne\u2019s Oak Brook Bank account, payable to Vogt and containing a notation \u201cmortgage payment.\u201d Joanne conceded that she gave these checks to her father but denied that they were given as partial repayment of the $30,000. She stated that she agreed to help her father make the mortgage payments \u201cwhen she was financially able.\u201d\nIt is well established that conflicts in testimony must be resolved by the trier of fact. (Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356, 226 N.E.2d 624.) A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s findings of fact unless they are palpably against the weight of the evidence. (Collins v. Nugent (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1037, 443 N.E.2d 277.) After observing the demeanor of the parties and weighing the evidence, the trial court here concluded that Joanne\u2019s interest in the partnership resulted from a gift from her father. From our review of the record we conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding was not palpably against the weight of the evidence, and thus it should not be set aside.\nJohn also contends that, even if Joanne\u2019s original investment in the partnership resulted from her father\u2019s gift to her, she thereafter acted in such a manner that her interest in the partnership was transmuted from nonmarital to marital property.\nAs heretofore noted, section 503(b) of the Act presumes all property to be marital unless it is shown to have been acquired by an excepted method specified in section 503(a). Nonmarital property may, however, be transmuted to marital property by affirmative acts of a party such as transferring title of nonmarital property into some form of coownership (In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 518, 532, 427 N.E.2d 1239) or depositing nonmarital funds into a joint bank account from which marital expenses are paid (In re Marriage of Leon (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 383, 385, 399 N.E.2d 1006). Here, John suggests that transmutation of Joanne\u2019s interest in the partnership resulted from Joanne\u2019s actions in the marital home which were allegedly made on behalf of the partnership, including use of the family telephone for partnership business and the maintaining of records of partnership accounts. John also contends that Joanne purchased airline tickets for partnership business with nonmarital funds that had been allegedly commingled with marital funds in Joanne\u2019s Oak Brook bank account.\nJoanne denied commingling the marital and nonmarital funds and testified, without contradiction, that during the marriage she maintained two separate and distinct bank accounts, one in an Oak Brook bank for her individual and partnership use (although she states that she had paid from this account some marital expenses including \u201cvarious household repairs, maintenance and improvements\u201d) and one in a Naperville bank from which most marital expenses were paid. The source of funds from the Oak Brook account included the gift from Joanne\u2019s father, her income from Just-Rite Coffee Service and her inheritance. All of the contributions to the Naperville account were made by John, although the account was in Joanne\u2019s name alone.\nNonmarital funds in a bank account retain their nonmarital character unless the owner of the funds, by affirmative acts, demonstrates an intent to change such funds to marital. (In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 518, 531, 427 N.E.2d 1239.) Here, the evidence indicates no affirmative acts by Joanne that would demonstrate an intention to change either her Oak Brook account or her interest in the partnership from nonmarital to marital.\nJohn also contends that the trial court erred in finding that certain stocks, furniture, furnishings and jewelry were Joanne\u2019s non-marital property. Joanne had submitted an affidavit to the trial court listing many items of personal property, and she testified at great length that each item was acquired by her either through inherited funds, by gift or from income from nonmarital funds. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 503(a).) John\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s findings in this instance is based on the same arguments (acquired through marital funds or transmutation) used to challenge the court\u2019s conclusion that Joanne\u2019s interest in J & J #1 Partnership was nonmarital. Again, John has failed to rebut evidence presented by Joanne which indicates that these items were acquired pursuant to section 503(a), thereby making them nonmarital property. We must, therefore, agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the personal property listed in Joanne\u2019s affidavit and the stocks which she purchased and held in her name alone were nonmarital property and were properly assigned to her.\nNext, John contends that the trial court, using outdated financial data, erred in evaluating the business interests of the parties.\nIt has long been settled that the value of marital assets must be established in the record so that a court of review may determine the propriety of a trial court\u2019s apportionment of such marital property. (In re Marriage of Kundit (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 310, 314, 437 N.E.2d 777.) Here, after carefully and thoroughly analyzing the testimony of the witnesses, financial statements submitted by a certified public accountant engaged by John\u2019s counsel, the credit applications signed by John and John\u2019s answers to interrogatories, the trial court found that the value of John\u2019s business interests amounted to $2 54,300 including: J.L. Cook Plastics - $120,000; Cotronics - $38,000; Metric Tool & Die Co. - $30,000; American Coil - $23,000; Alprod, Inc. - $22,300; Porta-Chef Kane - $10,000; J.L. Cook Company - $6,000; Tanfastic - $5,000. The court also established the value of Joanne\u2019s interest in J & J #1 Partnership as $8,720.\nOur review of the record dictates our conclusion that John has failed to provide sufficient financial data to mandate a reversal of the trial court\u2019s evaluation of the parties\u2019 various business interests.\nJohn contends that the trial court erred in its finding that Joanne was entitled to temporary maintenance. He argues that such finding was improper in the absence of a hearing and that Joanne was not entitled to temporary maintenance because she was capable of obtaining employment and also as a result of the property which she possessed. John asserts that this finding is contrary to the evidence and to the requirements of section 504(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 504(a)), which authorizes a maintenance award only if the court finds that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and is unable to support herself through appropriate employment or is otherwise without sufficient income. It has been held, however, that when the basis for an award of maintenance has been established in the record, specific findings as to the statutory basis used by a trial court in awarding such maintenance are not required. In re Marriage of Coram (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 845, 848, 408 N.E.2d 418.\nHere, Joanne was unemployed and living outside the marital home during the pendency of these proceedings while John continued to earn income. The record indicates that Joanne\u2019s monthly expenses were approximately $2,280. At the time the temporary maintenance order was entered, the trial court was aware of John\u2019s reluctance to comply with requests for the production of financial data. Moreover, the record indicates that a full hearing on the issue of temporary maintenance was precluded by the numerous continuances requested by the parties. In our judgment the order of temporary maintenance was not unreasonable.\nJohn next asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he had dissipated marital assets.\nSection 503(c)(1) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 503(c)(1)) directs the trial court, when apportioning marital assets, to consider \u201cthe contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property ***.\u201d The trial court found that John \u201cattempted to dissipate and reduce the value of the marital property.\u201d\nOur review of the record reveals ample support for this finding. Prior to the parties\u2019 marital problems, John regularly maintained the payments of mortgage and taxes on the various properties owned by the parties. Subsequent to the filing of this action, however, John failed to make the monthly payments necessary to preserve and maintain the property. The court found that as a result of John\u2019s actions, mortgage foreclosure proceedings were held resulting in the sale of the marital home for $72,000. The marital home had been appraised in 1981 at $270,000 to $310,000, whereas at the time of judgment the marital interest in that property was reduced to a right of redemption. Also John had not paid the property taxes on the parties\u2019 Wisconsin property. AT&T stock, held jointly by the parties was ordered sold, the proceeds to be applied to the payment of these property taxes and to contribute, in part, to the payment of the arrearage of temporary maintenance. John also failed to pay the taxes on the Wisconsin property which accrued after the sale of the AT&T stock. As a result, additional property taxes encumbered the Wisconsin property when it was awarded to Joanne.\nThe record also indicated that John defaulted on a loan secured by the Sandwich, Illinois property and at the time of the trial a mortgage foreclosure action on the Sandwich property was pending.\nJohn, without citation of authority, seeks to avoid a finding of dissipation of marital assets on the ground that his obligation to pay maintenance to Joanne rendered him incapable of. maintaining their marital assets. Our review of the record, however, persuades us that in fact John made little effort to comply with the court\u2019s temporary maintenance orders or to maintain the marital assets.\nTo compensate Joanne for the dissipation in value of these marital assets and in lieu of maintenance, the trial court awarded to Joanne a majority of marital assets. John contends that this award was erroneous and that Joanne should have been required to establish that she was entitled to receive permanent maintenance prior to an award of property in lieu of maintenance.\nIt is generally held that the purpose of the Act is to make the division of property the primary means of providing for the future financial needs of the spouses. (Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 576, 376 N.E.2d 1382; In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 1126, 1130, 427 N.E.2d 1262; In re Marriage of Rothbardt (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 561, 566, 425 N.E.2d 1146.) Moreover, where it is shown that an award of periodic support cannot be relied on or the party ordered to make such payments is shown to be dilatory in paying his bills, an award of property in lieu of maintenance may be appropriate. See In re Marriage of Gan (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 271, 404 N.E.2d 306.\nHere, the record indicated that sufficient marital assets, valued in excess of $600,000, existed to provide for the parties\u2019 post-marital financial needs. Furthermore, John\u2019s apparent unwillingness to comply with court orders was evident. Under these circumstances, therefore, the court\u2019s award to Joanne of marital assets in lieu of maintenance was not error.\nFinally, John contends that the trial court erred in directing him to contribute $30,000 toward Joanne\u2019s attorney fees.\nAn award of attorney fees in dissolution proceedings rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise thereof will not be disturbed on review unless such discretion is clearly abused. (In re Marriage of Brophy (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1117, 421 N.E.2d 1308.) Fees granted should provide fair compensation for reasonable and necessary services determined by the court after considering the financial position of the parties; the skill and standing of the attorneys employed; the importance, novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; the time and labor required; the usual and customary charge in the community; and the benefits resulting to the client. Donnelley v. Donnelley (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602, 400 N.E.2d 56.\nHere, the trial court considered the petitions for fees submitted by the parties\u2019 attorneys as well as the conduct of the parties. The court concluded that John\u2019s conduct made necessary an unusual amount of legal services and as a result directed him to pay $30,000 of the $50,000 awarded to Joanne\u2019s attorneys. In view of John\u2019s failure or inability to comply with court orders and procedures, and in view of his failure to document his finances and to demonstrate his inability to pay the prescribed fees, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in its judgment.\nAs previously noted, that portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment directing the sale of the Cotronics stock was stayed pending disposition of this appeal. In view of our decision such stay is dissolved.\nFor the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDOWNING, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.\nIn a colloquy with the trial court, John\u2019s attorney advised the court that he had explained to John that \u201c[the Judge] has reviewed all of the exhibits and *** heard the trial testimony, and I am sure [the court] made mental corrections in regard to the briefs.\u201d\nIt is clear that if Vogt gave the $30,000 to Joanne and in addition himself serviced the mortgage cost, he would have expended substantially in excess of $30,000.\nIn connection with the evaluation of John's assets the trial court noted that \u201c[John], through his accountant, gave certain values to these assets. Other values were given in credit applications and still other values were given in answers to interrogatories.\u201d This variance made difficult the court\u2019s assessment of asset value. The court properly, in our opinion, adopted \u201cmean\u201d (average) value.\nWe find no support in the record for John\u2019s contention that the value of J.L. Cook Plastics should be diminished by approximately $111,000 allegedly owed to the Federal government in payroll taxes. The court found that, although at trial John claimed to owe payroll taxes for 1979, 1980 and 1981, his tax returns at no time indicated his liability for payroll taxes.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Office of Douglas R Trent, of Wheaton (Douglas P. Trent and C. Stanley Austin, of counsel), for appellant.", "Kalcheim & Kalcheim, Ltd., of Chicago (llene E. Shapiro, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF JOANNE M. COOK, Petitioner-Appellee, and JOHN L. COOK, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 82 \u2014 1411\nOpinion filed September 6, 1983.\nLaw Office of Douglas R Trent, of Wheaton (Douglas P. Trent and C. Stanley Austin, of counsel), for appellant.\nKalcheim & Kalcheim, Ltd., of Chicago (llene E. Shapiro, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0844-01", "first_page_order": 866, "last_page_order": 877 }