{ "id": 3481151, "name": "EDWARD DWYER et al., Ex'rs of the Estate of John J. Dwyer, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COOKSVILLE GRAIN COMPANY et al., Defendants-(McLean County Bank, Defendant-Appellant); EDWARD DWYER et al., Ex'rs of the Estate of John J. Dwyer, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COOKSVILLE GRAIN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant-(McLean County Bank et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co.", "decision_date": "1983-09-08", "docket_number": "Nos. 4-82-0848, 4-83-0008 cons.", "first_page": "1001", "last_page": "1005", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 1001" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383189 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 A.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Md. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1947492 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/246/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ariz. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 620080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/109/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838116 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.W.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10135730 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/523/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 A.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.J. Super. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 914587 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/167/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 820125 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/67/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5260225 ], "year": 1873, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/84/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2750799 ], "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/91/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 N.E. 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1879, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3130889 ], "year": 1879, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/159/0311-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 8758, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9364038482776024e-07, "percentile": 0.7349455508796072 }, "sha256": "b211ef8bf425c81bad1d50ae04ea3910138b6eb67e4d150b963d47c9e94c7a7a", "simhash": "1:993945f2ac2c82c3", "word_count": 1461 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:51.886955+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EDWARD DWYER et al., Ex\u2019rs of the Estate of John J. Dwyer, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COOKSVILLE GRAIN COMPANY et al., Defendants\u2014(McLean County Bank, Defendant-Appellant).\u2014EDWARD DWYER et al., Ex\u2019rs of the Estate of John J. Dwyer, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COOKSVILLE GRAIN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant-(McLean County Bank et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLandlord\u2019s crop lien versus bank\u2019s security interest.\nWhich comes first?\nWe will not presume to overrule 110 years of our supreme court\u2019s settled law!\nThe crop lien takes precedence.\nThe Facts\nIn February of 1981, Edward Dwyer \"leased 300 acres of farm property to Robert Morefield for $60,000. One week later, Morefield borrowed $24,000 from the McLean County Bank in order to purchase a new combine to farm the rented property. To secure the loan, Morefield entered into a security agreement with the bank, giving the bank a security interest in the crops grown on the property. In accordance with article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 26, par. 9 \u2014 101 et seq.), the bank perfected its security interest in the crops by filing a financing statement with the recorder of McLean County.\nIn mid-June, Morefield began planting the crop on the Dwyer farm and in late fall he delivered the harvested crops to the Cooks-ville Grain Company. As payment for the crops, Cooksville delivered a check to Morefield in the amount of $72,155.16, payable jointly to Morefield and the bank. Morefield delivered the check to the bank, the bank deducted $29,655.16 to apply to Morefield\u2019s obligation, and then credited Morefield\u2019s checking account with the balance of $42,500.\nAfter learning that the crops had been sold and realizing that the proceeds had not been used to pay the $60,000 in rent due, Dwyer filed a complaint against Morefield, the bank, and Cooksville. Count I of the complaint alleged that Cooksville had wrongfully converted the crops; count II alleged that the bank had wrongfully converted the proceeds from the sale of the crops; and count III alleged that More-field and the bank had conspired to deprive Dwyer of the rent and to convert the crops.\nAfter a great deal of procedural maneuvering by all of the parties, the trial judge entered an order granting a motion by Dwyer for summary judgment on counts I and II and granting a motion by the bank for summary judgment on count III. Judge Knecht then awarded Dwyer a $60,000 judgment against Cooksville and a judgment for $29,655.16 against the bank. The bank filed a motion for clarification, noting that Dwyer was damaged in the amount of $60,000 and asking the court to apportion the ultimate responsibility for payment of the $60,000 judgment between Cooksville and the bank. Judge Knecht granted the bank\u2019s motion for clarification and ruled that he would apportion the responsibility for the payment of the total $60,000 judgment at a later date. Before that apportionment took place, however, both the bank and Cooksville appealed Judge Knecht\u2019s order granting Dwyer\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nWe affirm and remand the cause to the circuit court for apportionment of the liability for the total $60,000 judgment between Cooks-ville and the bank.\nThe central issue in this appeal is whether a landlord\u2019s statutory crop lien for rent has priority over an article 9 security interest in proceeds from the sale of crops grown on the rented land. It does.\nThe Landlord\u2019s Crop Lien\nThe landlord\u2019s crop lien for rent arises from section 9 \u2014 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 9\u2014 316), which states:\n\u201cEvery landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing upon the demised premises for the rent thereof, whether the same is payable wholly or in part in money or specific articles of property or products of the premises, or labor, and also for the faithful performance of the terms of the lease. Such lien shall continue for the period of six months after the expiration of the term for which the premises are demised, and may be enforced by distraint ***.\u201d\nThe rule has long been established in Illinois that the landlord\u2019s crop lien is paramount to all other liens. (Lillard v. Noble (1896), 159 Ill. 311, 42 N.E. 844; Wetsel v. Mayers (1879), 91 Ill. 497; Richey v. Ford (1899), 84 Ill. App. 121.) The lien can be lost only by waiver or by failing to enforce it within the proper time. Thompson v. Mead (1873), 67 Ill. 395.\nThe bank, however, argues that although the landlord\u2019s crop lien may have been paramount before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Illinois, today the priority rules of the Code\u2019s article 9 govern all priority disputes including those involving the crop lien. As the bank points out, its perfected security interest would have priority over Dwyer\u2019s lien if the dispute is governed by article 9\u2019s priority rules. Article 9, however, cannot be applied when one of the conflicting interests is a landlord\u2019s crop lien. Article 9 expressly exempts both statutory and landlord\u2019s liens from its coverage.\nThe Scope Provisions Of Article 9\nSection 9 \u2014 102(2) of article 9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 26, par. 9\u2014 102(2)) states in part:\n\u201cThis Article [9] does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9 \u2014 310.\u201d (Section 9 \u2014 310 deals with liens for furnishing services or materials.)\nAnd section 9 \u2014 104 of article 9 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 26, par. 9\u2014 104) entitled \u201cTransactions Excluded From Article [9]\u201d states:\n\u201cThis Article [9] does not apply * * *\n(b) to a landlord\u2019s lien ***.\u201d\nThe drafters of article 9 could not have spoken more clearly. Article 9 does not apply to a landlord\u2019s statutory lien. This exemption has been recognized by the vast majority of the courts across our nation. See Hartwell v. Hartwell Co. (1979), 167 N.J. Super. 91, 400 A.2d 529; Associates Financial Services of Texas, Inc. v. Solomon (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), 523 S.W.2d 722; National Investment Trust v. First National Bank (1975), 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482; Bates & Springer of Arizona, Inc. v. Friermood (1973), 109 Ariz. 203, 507 P.2d 668; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors, Inc. (1967), 246 Md. 380, 228 A.2d 463.\nWe are aware of only one case which supports the bank\u2019s position that the priority rules of article 9 should govern in a dispute involving a landlord\u2019s statutory lien. That case, Peterson v. Ziegler (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 379, 350 N.E.2d 356, is from our Fifth District. In Peterson, the court, faced with a priority dispute between a holder of an article 9 security interest and a landlord with a statutory lien, applied the priority rules of article 9.\nAlthough the court in Peterson noted that a literal interpretation of section 9 \u2014 104(b) would preclude applying any rule of priority from article 9 to the landlord\u2019s statutory lien, it went on to state, without citing any supporting authority:\n\u201cThe purpose of section 9 \u2014 104(b), however, is only to indicate that article 9 does not govern the creation of a landlord\u2019s lien or the priorities between competing landlords\u2019 liens. In order for article 9 to be the comprehensive statute that it was meant to be on the. subject of consensual security interests, article 9 must always supply a rule for determining the priorities between a consensual security interest and any other kind of lien.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 39 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385, 350 N.E.2d 356, 362.\nWe emphatically disagree. There is no need for this court \u2014 or any court \u2014 to search for hidden purposes in the provisions of article 9 in order to determine its scope. The language of 9 \u2014 104(b) and 9 \u2014 102(2) is crystal clear \u2014 no part of article 9, including the priority rules, apply to a landlord\u2019s statutory lien. We expressly disapprove that portion of the Peterson opinion, where the court found otherwise.\nIn conclusion, we find that the adoption of article 9 in Illinois has not diminished the paramount nature of the landlord\u2019s crop lien. It still has superiority over all other interests, including those created under article 9.\nConsequently, the trial court did not err when it granted Dwyer\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions to the circuit court to apportion the liability for the total $60,000 judgment between the bank and Cooksville.\nWEBBER, P.J., and TRAPP, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas M. Barger III, of Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Bloomington, for appellant McLean County Bank.", "George L. Chesley, of DePew, Grimes, Chesley & Wilson, of Bloomington, for appellant Cooksville Grain Company.", "Don C. Hammer, of Hayes, Schneider, Hammer & Miles, of Bloomington, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EDWARD DWYER et al., Ex\u2019rs of the Estate of John J. Dwyer, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COOKSVILLE GRAIN COMPANY et al., Defendants\u2014(McLean County Bank, Defendant-Appellant).\u2014EDWARD DWYER et al., Ex\u2019rs of the Estate of John J. Dwyer, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COOKSVILLE GRAIN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant-(McLean County Bank et al., Defendants).\nFourth District\nNos. 4 \u2014 82\u20140848, 4 \u2014 83\u20140008 cons.\nOpinion filed September 8, 1983.\nThomas M. Barger III, of Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Bloomington, for appellant McLean County Bank.\nGeorge L. Chesley, of DePew, Grimes, Chesley & Wilson, of Bloomington, for appellant Cooksville Grain Company.\nDon C. Hammer, of Hayes, Schneider, Hammer & Miles, of Bloomington, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1001-01", "first_page_order": 1023, "last_page_order": 1027 }