{
  "id": 3481641,
  "name": "REBECCA TRANQUILLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOHAMMAD IRSHAD, M.D., Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Tranquilli v. Irshad",
  "decision_date": "1983-09-23",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:51.886955+00:00",
  "provenance": {
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "REBECCA TRANQUILLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOHAMMAD IRSHAD, M.D., Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSex discrimination is not single gendered.\nThe concept inherently involves both males and females.\nWe affirm.\nTHE FACTS\nRebecca Tranquilli was six-months pregnant and without a job. Through Illinois State Job Services, she learned of an opening for a physician\u2019s secretary at Dr. Mohammed Irshad\u2019s office in Springfield. She phoned Dr. Irshad\u2019s office and spoke with his receptionist, Sue Atherton. During the conversation, Tranquilli informed Atherton that she was pregnant. Atherton replied, \u201cI don\u2019t want a pregnant broad working for me.\u201d Tranquilli asked her to repeat herself, Atherton did, and Tranquilli ended the conversation.\nTranquilli then filed a complaint against Dr. Irshad, alleging that she had been refused an interview for the secretarial position solely because she was pregnant and that such refusal constituted sex discrimination in violation of article I, section 17, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. After a good deal of procedural maneuvering by both parties, Dr. Irshad filed a motion for summary judgment. In an accompanying affidavit, he swore that all of the applicants for the position had been women, and in a supporting memorandum he argued that because only women applied for the position no sex discrimination occurred in the hiring process. In reply, Tranquilli argued that the fact no men applied for the position did not foreclose the possibility of sex discrimination.\nThe trial court granted Dr. Irshad\u2019s motion for summary judgment, Tranquilli appeals, and we affirm.\nOn appeal, Tranquilli argues that despite the fact that no men applied for the secretarial position, Dr. Irshad violated the sex discrimination restrictions of article I, section 17, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 when his receptionist refused her an interview because she was pregnant. We disagree.\nTHE LAW\nArticle I, section 17, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 17) states in pertinent part:\n\u201cAll persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of *** sex in the hiring *** practices of any employer ***.\u201d\nWe recognize that in certain instances a hiring practice which discriminates on the basis of pregnancy may constitute sex discrimination. Where, however, no men are in the job applicant pool and the hiring practice only favors nonpregnant women over pregnant women, pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination.\nSex discrimination is gender based.\nThe most fundamental requirement for a showing of sex discrimination is a demonstration that men and women were treated in a dissimilar manner because of their sex. (See Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), 411 U.S. 677, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 93 S. Ct. 1764; Reed v. Reed (1971), 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225, 92 S. Ct. 251.) If the applicant pool for a position is comprised entirely of one sex, there can be no dissimilar treatment of the sexes in the hiring process. (Costa v. Markey (1st Cir. 1982), 706 F.2d 1, en banc opinion on rehearing (1983), 706 F.2d 10.) And without dissimilar treatment of the sexes, there can be no sex discrimination. Loper v. American Airlines, Inc. (5th Cir. 1978), 582 F.2d 956 (without dissimilar treatment, age discrimination is not sex discrimination); James v. Delta Airlines, Inc. (5th Cir. 1978), 571 F.2d 1376 (without dissimilar treatment, pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination); Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (5th Cir. 1977), 544 F.2d 892 (without dissimilar treatment, marriage discrimination is not sex discrimination).\nCONCLUSION\nIn the case sub judice, only women applied for the secretarial position with Dr. Irshad. Because the applicant pool was comprised entirely of women, there was no dissimilar treatment of men and women in the hiring process. Consequently, there was no sex discrimination. Ergo, we affirm the trial judge\u2019s order granting summary judgment.\nAffirmed.\nWEBBER, RJ., and TRAPP, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE MILLS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Leahy and Leahy, of Springfield (Cheryl S. Redfield and Mary Lee Leahy, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Samuel C. Patton, of Springfield, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "REBECCA TRANQUILLI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOHAMMAD IRSHAD, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 83\u20140109\nOpinion filed September 23, 1983.\nRehearing denied October 25, 1983.\nLeahy and Leahy, of Springfield (Cheryl S. Redfield and Mary Lee Leahy, of counsel), for appellant.\nSamuel C. Patton, of Springfield, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1074-01",
  "first_page_order": 1096,
  "last_page_order": 1099
}