{ "id": 5659500, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Alexander", "decision_date": "1983-09-06", "docket_number": "No. 81\u20143108", "first_page": "33", "last_page": "38", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 33" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106824 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476013 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772134 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185347 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3149334 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5377462 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S. Ct. 3094", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 L. Ed. 2d 961", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3103080 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 1386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3102451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0810-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 756, "char_count": 13631, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.008881254790304e-08, "percentile": 0.42329533497898914 }, "sha256": "bb03e36aa70d5cb0bdfe3ef43a52908a7d7a51177452a96e3f58cf5d4e6b9b29", "simhash": "1:b1678b9644668101", "word_count": 2252 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:29.032579+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Jeffrey Alexander, appeals from his convictions of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2); burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1); unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 10 \u2014 3); and, armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 2). The sentences imposed were concurrent terms of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment on both the armed robbery and armed violence counts; seven years\u2019 imprisonment on the burglary count; and three years\u2019 imprisonment on the unlawful restraint count.\nThree grounds for reversal are presented by defendant: (1) that his four convictions are violative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in determining his sentence; and (3) that his conviction for unlawful restraint should be vacated since it is based on the same act as the armed violence conviction. As the issue of reasonable doubt was not raised, only the pertinent evidence will be summarized.\nOn the afternoon of October 31, 1979, defendant broke into the Perkins\u2019 residence located in Flossmoor, Illinois. Armed with an IversJohnson .22-caliber revolver, defendant grabbed complainant, Mrs. Leola Perkins, demanded her money and jewelry and, while brandishing the gun, threatened to return and kill her if she reported the incident to the police.\nUpon discovering that complainant\u2019s husband and children were to arrive home later that afternoon, defendant compelled complainant to go to various rooms to secure jewelry and money in the total amount of $115. At one point, complainant ran for the front door, but defendant grabbed her around the neck before she could reach the outside. He then held complainant between his arm and body, and proceeded to strike her in the face three or four times while yelling obscenities at her. Dragging her down the hall back to the kitchen, defendant pushed complainant on the floor and told her to stay there as he continued to search through the purse.\nFor the fifth time, defendant made a demand for more money. Complainant, sensing his desperation, informed defendant that more money was available in her children\u2019s savings account. At gunpoint, complainant was then forced into her 1973 Buick Electra, and was instructed to drive to South Suburban Federal Savings located in Floss-moor Commons. On the way to the bank defendant told complainant that she was to go into the bank alone, withdraw funds from the account and, were she not to bring the money out, he would return and\nkill her as well as everyone in her family. Leaving the keys in the car with defendant, complainant entered the bank and immediately advised bank personnel of the situation. As an employee of the bank was telephoning the police, defendant drove off in the Buick Electra.\nOn the night of November 11, 1979, officers of the Crete police department found defendant sitting behind the wheel of complainant\u2019s car as it was parked along a street in Crete, located in Will County, Illinois. Following a registration check confirming that the vehicle had been stolen, the police officers placed defendant under arrest.\nThe State\u2019s Attorney of Will County thereupon charged defendant with the felony theft of complainant\u2019s car, in violation of section 16\u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a)(1)). After a bench trial in June 1980, defendant was found guilty as charged and received a three-year sentence. That conviction was affirmed by both the appellate and supreme courts. People v. Alexander (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 810, 425 N.E.2d 1386, aff\u2019d (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 73, 442 N.E.2d 887.\nOn February 4, 1980, a Cook County grand jury charged defendant with having committed armed robbery, burglary, home invasion, armed violence and unlawful restraint. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of armed robbery, burglary, unlawful restraint and armed violence. From these convictions defendant now appeals.\nI\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s contention that his Cook County convictions are violative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he maintains that since these crimes, as well as the Will County felony theft, were not joined and tried in Cook County \u2014 the place of complainant\u2019s residence and South Suburban Federal Savings \u2014 the present action proceeded in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We find this assertion to be without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Zegart (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 440, 415 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied (1981), 452 U.S. 948, 69 L. Ed. 2d 961, 101 S. Ct. 3094, is misplaced. The Zegart court held that the double jeopardy clause was violated where the State attempted to charge defendant for reckless homicide, after he was already convicted of crossing over a highway dividing median. The State was thus precluded from using the same factual basis which led to the first conviction as the basis for the second conviction. 83 Ill. 2d 440, 445.\nHere, defendant was tried and convicted on completely distinct offenses, the commission of which occurred in two counties on two separate dates. Moreover, the State in no way attempted to prove that defendant committed armed robbery, burglary, armed violence and unlawful restraint in Cook County on October 31, 1979, by showing defendant\u2019s exertion of unauthorized control over the Buick Electra in Will County on November 11, 1979. Defendant cites the related case, People v. Alexander (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 810, 425 N.E.2d 1386, aff\u2019d (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 73, 442 N.E.2d 887, for the proposition that the State is prohibited from bringing a second prosecution based on the same factual situation which led to a conviction in a prior trial. We do not question the accuracy of this statement of well-settled decisional law. However, we find no merit to defendant\u2019s assertion that the facts of this case warrant the application of such authority. The factual basis which led to the felony conviction in Will County was not used as the basis for the Cook County convictions; for, the Alexander court concluded that \u201cthe State\u2019s theory was directed towards proof of the defendant\u2019s guilt of exertion of unauthorized control over Ms. Perkins\u2019 automobile in Will County, not with the initial theft in Cook County\u201d (emphasis added). People v. Alexander (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 73, 81.\nIt is well established that there is no requirement of joinder or of a single disposition of multiple crimes which arise from a series of acts. (People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 430, 433-34, 223 N.E.2d 158; People v. Patete (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 655, 657, 419 N.E.2d 921.) Because the offense in Will County was a crime entirely separate from the events which were the bases for the Cook County indictment, we are of the opinion that multiple prosecutions were permissible.\nMoreover, proper venue over the charges of armed robbery, burglary, armed violence and unlawful restraint could only lie in Cook County; for, all of the events giving rise to these crimes occurred in Flossmoor, a village located within Cook County. Whereas, the supreme court in People v. Alexander (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 73, 81, indicated that proper venue over the charge of felony theft existed in Will County; for, it was there that defendant was found by the Crete police officers to be exerting unauthorized control over complainant\u2019s car.\nWe further note that reference to the 1973 Buick Electra as an item stolen from the person and presence of complainant, at gunpoint, was stricken from count II of the Cook County indictment. Thus, as the trial court correctly stated: \u201cThe elimination, then, of the 1973 Buick motor vehicle from Count II eliminates the problem of double jeopardy.\u201d See Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228, 100 S. Ct. 2260; North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072.\nII\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in determining his sentence. We disagree.\nOur supreme court has firmly established that the determination of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and that, absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence imposed by the trial court may not be altered upon review. People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 275, 412 N.E.2d 541; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882.\nIn addition to providing for the possibility of the offender\u2019s rehabilitation, we recognize that the trial court is also charged with the \u201cdelicate responsibility\u201d of fashioning a sentence that will protect the interests of society. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 368 N.E.2d 882.) Our review of the record in the present case clearly indicates that the lower court was fully aware of defendant\u2019s past record, as well as his personal traits and family situation. However, it is also readily discernible that the court was faced with the task of imposing on defendant a penalty that was commensurate with the degree of seriousness involved in the offenses he committed.\nHere, as the trial court aptly commented, complainant was put through \u201can experience in terror that will affect her sense of security for a long time to come.\u201d For, upon breaking into her home, defendant did not just take cash and jewelry, and then leave. Rather, he proceeded to first put a .22-caliber revolver to complainant\u2019s head and threaten to kill her, as well as her entire family, should she ever cooperate with the police in his apprehension; second, he repeatedly dragged her throughout her own home in search of more and more money and jewelry; third, after grabbing complainant by the neck to foil her escape attempt, he angrily beat her in the face three or four times while screaming obscenities at her; fourth, he then threw her on the floor and continued to desperately demand, as well as search for, more money; fifth, he forced complainant at gunpoint to drive him in her car to a bank in order that she could \"withdraw money from her children\u2019s savings account to further satisfy his financial desires; and sixth, while en route to the bank, he once again threatened to return and kill complainant, as well as her entire family, were she not to comply with his instructions.\nAt the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, there was a stipulation that if Barbara Broderick were called to the witness stand, she would testify that on October 24, 1979, upon returning to her home in Flossmoor, she was confronted by a man closely resembling defendant. This man proceeded to grab and drag her into a bedroom; he made a demand for money and jewelry; he made her lay on the floor while he bound her; and, he then robbed her of jewelry and over $100 in cash. Defendant asserts that his counsel withdrew this stipulation; however, our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not permit the withdrawal, and referred to it only for the purpose of illustrating defendant\u2019s modus operandi on October 31, 1979.\nDefendant asserts that Ms. Broderick\u2019s stipulated testimony was incompetent information erroneously considered by the trial court as an aggravating factor. We find this argument to be without substance since our supreme court has recently held that evidence of other offenses not resulting in a conviction can be considered by a trial judge when determining a particular defendant\u2019s sentence; for, the court is not strictly limited to consideration of only that information which would be admissible under the adversary circumstances of a trial. People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 499, 431 N.E.2d 344.\nIn addition to the foregoing, the trial court indicated that a presentence report had been received. Recognizing that the trial court\u2019s determination of a sentence is entitled to great deference and weight on appeal, we are of the opinion that, based upon a review of the record in the case at bar and irrespective of the alleged facts in the Broderick incident, defendant\u2019s 20-year sentence should not be reduced.\nIll\nDefendant maintains that his conviction for unlawful restraint should be vacated since it is based on the same act as the armed violence conviction. As the State concedes, however, it is defendant\u2019s armed violence conviction that must be vacated in accordance with People v. Wisslead (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 190, 446 N.E.2d 512. We do not believe that the vacation of this single conviction necessitates resentencing defendant on the remaining charges. The sentence of 20 years imposed on the armed robbery count was within the limits permitted by statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(3)), and was justified based upon the nature and gravity of defendant\u2019s acts. Likewise, the other concurrent sentences were justified.\n- For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in part and vacated in part in accordance with the views expressed herein.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part.\nSTAMOS and PERLIN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven Clark and Donna Finch, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan, and Thomas J. Finn, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81\u20143108\nOpinion filed September 6, 1983.\nRehearing denied October 25, 1983.\nSteven Clark and Donna Finch, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan, and Thomas J. Finn, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0033-01", "first_page_order": 55, "last_page_order": 60 }