{ "id": 5660977, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANNETTE M. MINNIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Minnis", "decision_date": "1983-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201482\u20140569", "first_page": "345", "last_page": "363", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 345" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "32 DePaul L. Rev. 107", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "DePaul L. Rev.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993679 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938169 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070395 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2698132 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 N.E. 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2596941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/361/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" }, { "page": "572" }, { "page": "2788" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 A.L.R.4th 1153", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 348", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Nw. U. L. Rev.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Hastings L. J. 895", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Hastings L.J.", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "627 P.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10443589 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/627/1374-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Idaho 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4399955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/101/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ohio St. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6712478 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-2d/66/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ga. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1183854 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/248/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 A.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7993296 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/438/0892-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ga. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1182664 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/247/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 So. 2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9564214 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/408/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 A.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7976762 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/407/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 1067", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3162169 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1072" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/1067-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "66 Ohio St. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6712478 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-2d/66/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1631, "char_count": 44269, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.945585101153849e-07, "percentile": 0.848444445988936 }, "sha256": "ed3447fbe059b64041e5964ca06f3599656829238cb017ed9ee16d400e1b2217", "simhash": "1:37e28a687e0e4150", "word_count": 7452 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:29.032579+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANNETTE M. MINNIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WEBBER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was convicted of the offense of murder (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)) by a jury in the circuit court of Champaign County. The State did not seek the death penalty and the trial court declined to impose an extended sentence which was argued by the State. After considering factors in aggravation and mitigation, presentence reports and the arguments of counsel, the court sentenced the defendant to 25 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn appeal defendant has raised a variety of issues: (1) error by the trial court in excluding evidence of what has been called in the record the \u201cbattered woman syndrome\u201d; (2) reasonable doubt; (3) misbehavior by a spectator; (4) improper closing argument by the prosecutor; (5) admission of inflammatory photographs; and (6) errors in the instructions. We regard the question of the battered woman syndrome as reversible error; the instructional issues contain error but not reversible error; and the other issues are without merit.\nSince the question of reasonable doubt has been raised, a recitation of the facts as developed at trial is necessary. One pivotal fact which casts its influence over the entire record is that the body of the victim, Movina Minnis, defendant\u2019s husband, was dismembered by the defendant, parts of it placed in plastic refuse bags and the bags deposited in garbage dumpsters in various locations around the city of Decatur. Some parts, namely the head and neck, upper torso, and the hands were never recovered. Defendant testified that she threw these into the Sangamon River at Decatur. The parties lived in Rantoul where, defendant testified, the death occurred.\nThe fact of dismemberment arose very early at the pretrial stage. Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence. The State demanded its admission in order to establish consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant. The trial court denied the motion.\nThe State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the \"battered woman syndrome.\u201d It appeared that the defendant was ready to admit dismembering her husband, but claimed that she was a victim of this syndrome. The trial court indicated that evidence of the syndrome should be admissible in cases where the battered woman killed her husband in a nonconfrontational situation, the classic example being where a battered woman has killed her husband as he slept. The judge stated that he assumed the evidence would follow that pattern and denied the State\u2019s motion, but cautioned that he might change his ruling. That is, in fact, what occurred.\nAt trial the People built a largely circumstantial case, coupled with certain admissions by the defendant, as their case in chief. Certain Decatur residents stated that they observed a black woman fitting defendant\u2019s description place two garbage bags in the dumpster at their apartment house at about 1:15 p.m. on October 13, 1981. Their curiosity was aroused and when the garbage collector arrived a short time later, they asked him to open the bags. He did so and retrieved therefrom a black human leg. The Decatur police were immediately notified and instituted a systematic search of other dumpsters in the Decatur area. Six additional bags were discovered at four locations; these contained other body parts and one bag contained miscellaneous items: a dovetail saw, a hack saw, shower curtains and bathroom rugs, several pairs of plastic gloves, one right-hand vinyl glove, a woman\u2019s caftan robe, and a pair of men\u2019s swimming trunks. These items were identified as belonging to defendant and her husband. The lower torso was clothed in jockey shorts and the genitalia were present and unmutilated.\nOther witnesses placed a brown van which matched the description of one owned by defendant and her husband and driven by a black woman in various locations about Decatur between 11 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. on October 13.\nA pathologist assembled the body parts which had been found and performed an autopsy on October 14 at 6 a.m. From prior medical records obtained from Burnham City Hospital in Champaign it was later determined that the partial, dismembered body was that of Movina Minnis. The doctor was unable to determine the cause of death because anything involving the missing body parts, i.e., head, neck, upper torso, could have been the cause. He doubted that the dismemberment itself was the cause but could not rule it out completely.\nIt was likewise difficult to determine the time of death. Because there appeared to be no decomposition of the parts, he estimated that death had occurred within a 24- to 36-hour period prior to the autopsy and that dismemberment had occurred shortly afterwards.\nA co-worker of Movina, Michael Simlin, testified that they both worked at Kraft Company in Champaign on the 3:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. shift, Monday through Friday. They also had a car pool arrangement, each driving alternate weeks. Simlin drove the week of Monday, October 5, through Friday, October 9. They were returning home on Friday, October 9, when Simlin\u2019s car broke down about six blocks from Movina\u2019s home. Movina walked home and returned in his van to give Simlin a ride home. The following morning, Saturday, October 10, Movina picked Simlin up and helped him to repair his car. He left about noon and asked Simlin to come to his house to watch television since he had no plans for the weekend. Simlin never saw Movina again.\nThe next week, October 12-16, it was Movina\u2019s turn to drive. On Monday morning, October 12, at about 8 or 9 a.m., defendant appeared at Simlin\u2019s house and stated that Movina would not be able to drive since he was ill with tonsillitis. According to Simlin, defendant appeared normal at that time. She appeared again at Simlin\u2019s house on Wednesday morning, October 14, and reported that Movina\u2019s condition was worsening; again, according to Simlin, she appeared normal. Later in the day she informed Simlin that Movina had been offered a job at the power plant in Clinton, and on Thursday, October 15, she informed Simlin that he had accepted the job at Clinton and would not be returning to work at Kraft in Champaign. She admitted to Simlin, upon his inquiry, that Movina had not given any notice to his supervisor at Kraft.\nCertain employees of Kraft testified for the State. Movina\u2019s supervisor stated that he had an outstanding attendance record and would always notify him if he were unable to come to work. He further stated that defendant called him and advised that Movina was ill with tonsillitis and would not be at work. This occurred on Monday, October 12. He asked to speak to Movina personally because of such a company policy regarding excuses, and asked that Movina call him later. That call was never made. Defendant called the supervisor again on Tuesday and Wednesday with the same information that Movina was too ill to come to the phone and talk; she also stated that he would probably not return to work until the following week. Movina never returned to work.\nKraft\u2019s personnel clerk testified that defendant appeared at the company\u2019s office on October 23 to turn in Movina\u2019s uniforms and to pick up his payroll check for a one-week pay period which was still due to him. She refused to turn over the check until Movina had talked with his supervisor. Consequently, the check was not delivered to defendant. She also testified that Kraft was still holding a check for about $2,000 representing Movina\u2019s contributions to an employee thrift plan. According to the clerk, defendant\u2019s demeanor was cool and collected; she had known defendant as a former employee of Kraft.\nA significant witness for the State was Diana Hinton. She testified that she was acquainted with both defendant and Movina, having met them at a homosexual bar in Champaign about two years prior to October 1981. Shortly after this first meeting, she had spent two weekends with the Minnises at their home during which the three of them had engaged in trilateral sexual conduct. Hinton stated that she felt Movina was not partial to this form of sexual encounter but that defendant was the moving party; she was also aware that defendant had been beaten by Movina and that their marital problems were the result of \u201cMo\u2019s sexual preferences.\u201d\nHinton saw defendant and Movina at the same bar on October 7, 1981, at approximately 1 a.m. She never saw Movina after that occasion, but she did see defendant there on October 11 from- about 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. Upon inquiry by Hinton, defendant stated that Movina had left her and gone to California with another woman. She stated that defendant\u2019s conduct was nothing out of the ordinary.\nOn October 13 (the day on which the body parts were discovered) Hinton telephoned defendant at about 6:30 p.m. and arranged to meet her at the apartment of Athena Wade in Champaign. During the conversation defendant stated that she had spent the day visiting a friend in Decatur. After meeting at Wade\u2019s, defendant and Hinton left, returned to defendant\u2019s home, and there engaged in homosexual conduct at defendant\u2019s instigation. At defendant\u2019s invitation, Hinton lived with her from October 13 to November 2, 1981, and then returned home to live with her mother. After moving in with defendant, Hinton noticed that the bathroom rugs and shower curtains were missing and that all of Movina\u2019s personal belongings were still in the house. During the same period defendant gave away Movina\u2019s clothing and weight benches and had a bug shield labeled \u201cPleasure Pleaser\u201d removed from the brown van; she explained that it reminded her too much of Movina and had \u201ctoo much of a manly image.\u201d Defendant also instructed Hinton that if anyone, particularly his family members, asked about Movina\u2019s whereabouts, she was to say that he was not at home but would return \u201cin a little while.\u201d\nHinton\u2019s testimony continued; on November 4 she, Athena Wade, and Carrie Starks had lunch together and began to voice doubts as to the whereabouts of Movina. Hinton had heard of body parts being discovered in Decatur and placed a telephone call to the Decatur police concerning the matter.\nOn November 6, 1981, the Decatur police obtained a search warrant for defendant\u2019s home. The complaint for warrant, executed by Sergeant Donald Coventry, recites most of Hinton\u2019s testimony as set forth above and also similar statements by Athena Wade concerning the presence in the home of Movina\u2019s personal property; both Hinton and Wade stated to the police that the bathroom shower curtains and rugs were missing and that the bug shield had been removed from the van. The police, of course, had possession of the garbage bag containing the miscellaneous items, including shower curtains and rugs.\nA service station attendant from a station in Rantoul testified that he had removed a bug shield from a brown van early in October 1981 at the request of a black woman. The shield bore the legend \u201cPleasure Pleaser.\u201d A few days later he replaced a headlight in the same van for the same woman who explained that she had been stopped and given a ticket by the police for having only one headlight. A deputy sheriff testified that he had stopped defendant on October 15 at approximately 1:45 a.m. and had given her a warning ticket for having only one headlight. He stated that the van had no bug shield.\nA supervisor from Vetter Corporation in Rantoul testified that defendant had been employed there during the month of October 1981. She stated that defendant had told her she was a divorcee and that her ex-husband lived in California with their two children; also that she was dating a man who worked at Kraft Company on the second shift.\nAthena Wade testified that she was a friend of defendant and on November 17 picked defendant up to take her for a drink. During the course of the conversation defendant stated to her that she had killed her husband by strangling him with some pantyhose while he slept. On cross-examination Wade admitted that defendant and Movina at one time invited her to participate \u201cin a three-way\u201d with them but that she had declined.\nDeborah Lomax, a friend of defendant since high school, testified that defendant visited her home on November 4 and that her husband had inquired of defendant as to the whereabouts of Movina. The husband worked at Kraft Company. Initially defendant stated that Movina was working at the Clinton power plant but later stated that he had gone to California. Defendant returned the next day, November 5, to the Lomax home for another visit. At that time she stated that she was meeting a \u201cnew man in her life\u201d and that this man was going to \u201cdo nice things for her and take her nice places.\u201d\nThe police executed the search warrant on November 6. At about 9 or 9:30 p.m. on that date defendant called Lomax on the telephone and told her that the police were at her home. When Lomax asked what was wrong, defendant stated to her that she was \u201cin a lot of trouble\u201d because she had killed Movina.\nDuring the same search, defendant made another telephone call which was overheard by an investigator from the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. According to the investigator, defendant said, \u201cAthena, girl, Mo\u2019s dead, and I\u2019m in a lot of trouble.\u201d\nAnother officer from the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement described the bedroom in the Minnis home. He stated that it contained a king-sized waterbed with a wooden headboard but that the sides were padded \u201crather well.\u201d\nThat was the State\u2019s case. Defendant took the stand in her own behalf. She commenced by describing her marital problems with Movina which had their origin in her failure to bring enough women home for sexual encounters with him. She claimed that he had repeatedly subjected her to beatings on account of this. She stated that he wanted other partners because she was not pleasing him enough and that the other women were to teach her how. She approached other women regularly for the purpose and when they declined, Movina would beat her again because he felt she was not trying hard enough.\nShe then recounted her version of the events commencing with Movina\u2019s return from work about midnight on Friday, October 9 through Saturday, October 10 as follows: she was asleep but he awakened her and told her that he had company. She got up, dressed, and went into the living room where Movina introduced her to his friend, Duane, who, he said, was a male prostitute. She sat on the floor watching television, while Movina and Duane went to Movina\u2019s weight room. They returned shortly thereafter and placed a heavy set of barbells across her legs which were outstretched on the floor. She was unable to move. They then engaged in homosexual intercourse. Movina stated to her, \u201cIf you just do what you\u2019re supposed to do, I wouldn\u2019t have to do this.\u201d After the unnatural act was completed, Movina removed the barbells and she fled to the bathroom to vomit. When she came out, she attempted to leave the house but was restrained by Movina. Both he and Duane then attacked her sexually and later Movina beat her and again sexually assaulted her. He then tied her to the knob on the bedroom door and left the house. He assigned as his reason that he was concerned that she would tell someone about the homosexual intercourse.\nShe was uncertain when he returned home, but when he did, he was still ranting and raving that she might tell someone about what had happened. He untied her and she went to the bathroom to bathe. He followed and pushed her head into the toilet and repeatedly threatened her with death. He then forced her to perform fellatio on the bathroom floor and next dragged her to the waterbed where he commenced having intercourse with her. He then began to choke her. Her testimony as to what then happened was:\n\u201cSo, as he tried to choke me, I almost wanted to die. So, I don\u2019t know where \u2014 where I got the strength, but I prayed, I prayed for the strength to get him off me just one more time. And all of a sudden, *** I just gave it all I had. And I kicked him off of me ***. I kicked him off with the pressure of my knees being to my chest ***. When I pushed him off, he fell back ***. And when he fell back, he just laid there. I laid there, too. I couldn\u2019t even move. And I knew that if he got back up he was going to kill me, but I could not move.\n* * *\nI gave it all I had. If he comes back, I\u2019m just dead. But he didn\u2019t get up. And I got up, I went to the corner and I sat in it. That\u2019s where I was always supposed to set when *** when I was on punishment or didn\u2019t do anything he thought I was supposed to do. I was made to sit in that corner, to sleep in that corner.\u201d\nShe remained in the comer for some length of time, believing that Movina was watching her. Finally, she got up and went to the bed and touched him; she then realized he was dead. She dragged the body to the bathroom and into the bathtub and then obtained some trash bags and a saw from the garage. She then became aware that it was Monday morning, so she went to Simlin\u2019s house to tell him that Movina would not be driving to work at Kraft Company. She returned home and resolved that no one should ever know what had gone on that weekend; to that end, she decided to dismember the body.\nVarious parts were placed in the trash bags which were then loaded into the van; she then drove to Decatur and there conceived the idea of placing them in garbage dumpsters; this was done and some of the bags were thrown into the Sangamon River; after the bags were disposed of, she began driving and ended up in Chicago.\nAt this point the defendant\u2019s testimony was interrupted while the trial court and counsel engaged in colloquy concerning the battered woman syndrome. The prosecutor argued that the defendant\u2019s testimony indicated that the death was an accident and hence he objected to any evidence regarding the syndrome. The court disagreed and characterized the defendant\u2019s case as a traditional self-defense one; he expressed doubt that there was anything relevant in the syndrome, since if the jury believed the defendant, no further explanation was needed.\nDefense counsel argued that with the evidence of dismemberment before the jury, some explanation of it was necessary since such actions would not be comprehensible to the average juror. He stated, \u201cThe state of mind of the defendant at that time [the dismemberment] is crucial. If [the prosecution is] to be allowed to explore this through the dismemberment, we must have some way to deal with it.\u201d He then moved for a mistrial and argued that on retrial the court should exclude all evidence of dismemberment and thereby eliminate the problem.\nAfter extensive argument by counsel the court ruled that the evidence of the battered woman syndrome would not be admitted since it would be relevant only to the perception in the mind of the defendant at the time of the killing as to how a battered woman would perceive danger as being imminent even though her batterer was not then in a position to pose immediate danger. With respect to the argument that the syndrome evidence was necessary in order to deal with the dismemberment evidence, the court ruled that \u201cthe question of dismemberment has nothing whatsoever to do with the other issue, namely, the admissibility of the battered woman syndrome ***. [The dismemberment] is a factor which the jury can and should consider and literally has nothing whatsoever to do nor is it tied in any way with the battered woman syndrome.\"\nIt is thus apparent that the court ruled solely on the basis of relevancy; the State acquiesced in the ruling and offered no other basis for excluding the evidence. While the State argues on appeal that there was no foundation laid for the qualifications of the experts proffered by the defendant, as described below, this objection was not made at trial. The State was content with the trial court\u2019s sua sponte ruling on the basis of relevancy.\nDefense counsel then sought to make an offer of proof through the expert witness, Dr. Peg McMullen, concerning the applicability of the battered woman syndrome to the facts of this case. He was cut off by the court who said, \u201cI will indicate I\u2019m not too anxious to hear any testimonial offers. *** I think it would be really unnecessary plus a waste of my time in these proceedings ***. What I\u2019m going to say is nothing that she could say would change the ruling. *** But there\u2019s no need to actually hear the testimony because it would be much more time consuming.\u201d\nAs a result of this ruling, defense counsel was limited to attaching to his post-trial motion two written reports of experts, Peg McMullen, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, and Arthur Traugott, M.D., a psychiatrist; plus hospital records of the defendant taken upon two prior occasions.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony then resumed. She detailed her relationship with Movina and estimated that she had been subjected to a beating at least once a week; further, that Movina would not permit her to have any contact with her children from a prior marriage. She also testified concerning Movina\u2019s alcohol and drug usage, stating that on October 10, 1981, the purported date of his death, he had been drinking and snorting cocaine, and had been using cocaine for about a year prior to his death. On cross-examination she admitted to having cashed a check made payable to her by the Kraft Thrift Plan in the amount of $848.46 on the morning of Friday, October 9, 1981. This had also been established in the prosecution\u2019s case in chief. This led to some confusion as to the sequence of events. There had been evidence that Thursday was payday for Movina and that the events with the male prostitute and the events following occurred on payday; on this theory the defendant would have been tied up, as above described, all day Friday. Nonetheless, on redirect, she testified that she considered Friday as payday, and that the events began on Friday midnight and continued throughout the weekend. This became a subject of controversy on final argument.\nA couple of actions by spectators in the courtroom during the defendant\u2019s testimony have become the subject of further controversy. It appeared that a spectator was shaking her head in a negative fashion. The court removed the jury from the courtroom and then ordered the spectator removed; he then admonished the remaining spectators that no one was to make any gestures, statements, comments, or any other actions designed as a method of criticizing the defendant\u2019s testimony. Later there was a similar happening. The court was advised that the jury had heard some derogatory statements concerning defendant\u2019s credibility made by a spectator. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial. The court commented that the spectator was \u201ca none too impressive figure\u201d and offered to inquire of the jury whether they had been influenced by the incident. Defense counsel opposed the procedure, stating that any inquiry would only heighten any potential damage. The court then denied the motion for mistrial.\nAfter all the evidence was concluded, the State moved to admit its exhibits. These included six photographs of the dismembered body taken during the autopsy. Defense counsel objected. The objection was sustained as to two of them and overruled as to the other four, the court holding that they were probative of the question of defendant\u2019s credibility of her version as to how she accomplished the dismemberment. A motion for mistrial based on the conduct of spectators was renewed and denied.\nA conference on jury instructions was then held. Defense counsel tendered instructions on involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter as lesser offenses. The court refused the instruction on involuntary manslaughter and also refused defendant\u2019s version of voluntary manslaughter which was taken from Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, No. 7.06 (2d ed. 1981); instead, the court gave the voluntary manslaughter instruction taken from the former 1968 edition of IPI Criminal. This will be discussed in more detail below.\nFinal arguments were heard, of which more is said below, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder.\nIn our opinion the most significant issue in this case is the trial court\u2019s handling of the battered woman syndrome. We are little concerned with the nature of that syndrome or its potential scope. We are greatly concerned that the defendant was deprived of her constitutional right to present a defense. The trial court, from his study of prior authorities and the legal literature on the subject, arrived at the fixed and immutable conclusion that the syndrome applies only to explain the woman\u2019s conduct at the time of the victim\u2019s death, not to events which transpire afterwards. On this basis he excluded the evidence as irrelevant as a matter of law and refused to listen to an offer of proof. This constitutes reversible error.\nThe syndrome is an emerging concept of very recent vintage; its defining characteristics have not yet been firmly established; for these reasons we are not inclined to be critical of the learned trial judge. Defendant concedes that the instant case is unique among the very limited number of eases dealing with the battered woman syndrome. Those courts which have allowed expert evidence on the syndrome have done so only for the purpose of explaining why the abuse a woman has suffered causes her to reasonably believe that her life is in danger and that she must use deadly force to escape her batterer. With respect to that aspect of its probative value, some courts have held it to be error to exclude expert evidence on the battered woman syndrome. (Ibn-Tamas v. United States (D.C. App. 1979), 407 A.2d 626; Hawthorne v. State (Fla. App. 1982), 408 So. 2d 801; Smith v. State (1981), 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678; State v. Anaya (Me. 1981), 438 A.2d 892; Mullis v. State (1981), 248 Ga. 338, 282 S.E.2d 334.) Other courts have refused to admit evidence on the syndrome. State v. Thomas (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137; State v. Griffiths (1980), 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522; and Buhrle v. State (Wyo. 1981), 627 P.2d 1374.\nThe literature, too, is recent. Examples are: Eber, The Battered Wife\u2019s Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 Hastings L. J. 895 (1981); Beyond the Juror\u2019s Ken: Battered Women, 7 Vermont L. Rev. 1 (1982); The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 348 (1982). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.4th 1153 (1982).\nIt is true that in nearly all the reported cases the syndrome evidence has been utilized, if permitted, as a form of self-defense in a confrontational situation; i.e., the battered woman kills her batterer during or immediately after an attack. However, the instant case is not an ordinary one. We agree that defendant\u2019s testimony, if believed by the jury, clearly established that the force she used in throwing her husband off her body and in defending herself was reasonable under the circumstances, and thus expert testimony was unnecessary to explain it. However, her reasons for dismembering his body were very much at issue. The prosecutor used the dismemberment as substantive evidence to prove defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt. A defendant clearly has the right to introduce evidence to rebut the State\u2019s evidence of consciousness of guilt. (People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313.) The State\u2019s use of the dismemberment evidence rendered any explanation of it which would be consistent with innocence vital to the defendant\u2019s case.\nBy ruling that expert evidence on the syndrome was irrelevant and by denying defense counsel his right to make an offer of proof, the trial court took much too narrow a view of the matter. We must of necessity, then, employ the reports attached to the post-trial motion. Dr. McMullen states that the defendant\u2019s conduct both at the time of Movina\u2019s death and afterwards was influenced by the fact that she was a battered woman. Dr. Traugott indicated an opinion that defendant\u2019s decision to dismember her husband\u2019s body was influenced by her emotional reaction to the shock of the situation, presumably including the abuse which defendant claimed to have suffered at the hands of her husband. She testified that she remembered thinking as she sawed his hands off, \u201cAt least he won\u2019t beat me no more ***. I hated his hands. They hurt me so bad.\u201d These reports make out a prima facie case of relevancy of the expert testimony. Whether it would be believed by a jury is beside the point. The defendant had a right to present evidence relevant to her explanation of her conduct, no matter how far-fetched it might appear to the average individual. We do not agree with the trial court that the dismemberment was an entirely separate and distinct issue. The State used it and exploited it thoroughly as it was entitled to do. By the same token, the defendant was entitled to rebut it if she could. The experts\u2019 reports indicate that the syndrome might extend to the dismemberment and thus their testimony became extremely relevant.\nThe State does not argue otherwise. Instead, their principal argument is directed at the foundation; first, as to the qualifications of the experts, and second, as to the existence of the syndrome itself. The brief, but pointed, answer to that contention is that the State did not raise such an objection at trial. When the court announced that he was ruling on the basis of relevancy, the prosecutor said nothing more but was apparently content to ride along on that ruling. The reports in the record admittedly contain little information concerning the experts\u2019 background and empirical studies, but the defendant should not be required to include in her offer of proof matters which were not contested. As to the second point, the trial court at its ruling on the motion in limine recognized the existence of the syndrome as sufficiently developed to warrant expert testimony. He changed his mind only because of the narrow view which he took of it. The defendant has provided the trial court and this court with a sufficient general understanding of the evidence she sought to introduce. She has demonstrated that the ruling was in error and that the evidence might have produced a different result at trial.\nDefendant's second argument is that the State failed to disprove her claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Although we have already held that the exclusion of the expert evidence on the battered woman syndrome is an error of sufficient gravity to warrant a new trial, it does not follow that the record as it appears without that evidence does not disclose that the State has sustained its burden of proof.\nDefendant argues that the State relied heavily, almost entirely, upon her admission by conduct and her inconsistent statements concerning her husband\u2019s whereabouts. However, the evidence was very much in conflict.\nDefendant claimed that Movina died as a result of hitting his head on the bed frame after she pushed him off of her body during his attempt to strangle her and to force intercourse upon her. As against this contention is her statement to her friend Athena Wade, made after her arrest and release on bond, that she strangled him with a pair of pantyhose while he slept. There were additional admissions made to Wade and to Lomax by telephone during the police search of the house on November 6.\nOther inconsistencies appear in the record. Defendant claimed that Movina threatened to kill her so that she would not reveal his homosexual activity. This appears rather vaporous in view of his frequenting a well-known homosexual bar. She also claimed to have received a severe beating just prior to Movina\u2019s death, yet Hinton testified that during her homosexual encounter with defendant on the night of October 13, when they were both naked and the lights were on, she observed no signs of injury on defendant\u2019s body. Defendant also claimed that the death occurred during an act of forced intercourse; yet the lower torso of Movina\u2019s body was clothed when it was found. We need not reiterate the various accounts which defendant gave of Movina\u2019s whereabouts during the days following October 10. They are set forth in detail above. These weigh heavily against her credibility.\nOnce a jury has decided the question of self-defense, a reviewing court will not disturb that finding unless upon the evidence no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 317, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 572, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788.) We cannot so find on this record.\nDefendant next argues that the actions of the spectators, as described above, and the subsequent denial of a mistrial deprived her of a fair trial. We do not agree.\nThe incidents appear to be relatively minor and certainly do not attain the extreme found in People v. Herbert (1935), 361 Ill. 64, 196 N.E. 821. In that case, during the examination of the defendant in a homicide trial, the victim\u2019s widow stood up in the rear of the courtroom and shouted, \u201cYou dirty, lying thing, you! How dare you sit there and say that! You dirty liar!\u201d The supreme court held that this was not grounds for mistrial.\nIn the first instance here, the court removed the spectator and cautioned those remaining against any such further conduct. In the second instance, the court offered to poll the jury, but the defendant declined the offer. The declaration of a mistrial for reasons of this kind is within the trial judge\u2019s discretion because he is in the best position to assess potential prejudice. (People v. Holmes (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 814, 313 N.E.2d 297.) Here the trial judge found no prejudice and the defendant has failed to demonstrate that her motions for- mistrial were improperly denied.\nDefendant\u2019s next issue is that of improper closing argument by the prosecutor. The arguments, as might be expected in a case of this nature, were lengthy and heated. However, there was only one untimely objection made by the defendant after the jury had retired to deliberate and no mention of closing argument was made in defendant\u2019s post-trial motions. We therefore consider the matter waived. People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view photographs which she claims were gruesome and inflammatory; they were of the decedent\u2019s body parts assembled in the autopsy room. Defendant argues that since she did not dispute the dismemberment, the photographs were not probative of any issue nor could they reflect upon her credibility.\nThe principles governing the matter are well known. Photographs depicting the condition of the decedent are normally admissible as probative of one or more issues in a homicide prosecution. (People v. Foster (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6.) The fact that they are gruesome is no bar to admissibility. (People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 402 N.E.2d 238.) Likewise, it is no bar that they are cumulative to oral testimony covering the same issue. People v. Henenberg (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27.\nThe photographs here were properly admitted to corroborate and explain the pathologist\u2019s testimony concerning identification of the victim and the reasons why he was unable to make a sound medical determination as to the cause and time of death. Furthermore, they exhibit what appears to be a methodical dismemberment. This discredits defendant\u2019s testimony that she committed the act in a Lizzie Borden-type of frenzy. The trial judge carefully considered all of the photographs and in fact rejected several of them. It was his discretion which is controlling. {Foster.) We cannot say that it was abused and the defendant has failed to demonstrate error.\nDefendant\u2019s final contentions relate to the manslaughter instructions: first, the refusal of the instruction on involuntary manslaughter, and second, the giving of a former IPI Criminal instruction on voluntary manslaughter.\nAs to the first, we find that it was properly refused. The gist of involuntary manslaughter is recklessness. (People v. Simpson (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 497, 384 N.E.2d 373.) Under defendant\u2019s theory of the case, the death was the result of either self-defense or an accident; if self-defense, it was intentional, not reckless; if an accident, she is not guilty of anything. There was no error in refusing the instruction on involuntary manslaughter as an included offense.\nThe second problem is much more complex. Defendant submitted a voluntary manslaughter instruction cast in the form of IPI Criminal No. 7.06 (2d ed. 1981) as follows:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove the following propositions:\nFirst: that the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Movina Minnis; and\nSecond: that when the defendant did so, (1) she intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Movina Minnis; or (2) she knew that her acts would cause death or great bodily harm to Movina Minnis; or (3) she knew that her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Movina Minnis; and\nThird: that when the defendant did so she believed that circumstances existed which would have justified killing Movina Minnis; and\nFourth: that the defendant\u2019s belief that such circumstances existed was unreasonable; and\nFifth: that the defendant was not justified in using the force which she used.\u201d\nThe State objected, but was properly overruled. The evidence was sufficient to warrant giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as an included offense. However, the court refused defendant\u2019s instruction and gave its own instruction taken from IPI Criminal No. 7.06 (1968), as follows:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter the State must prove the following propositions:\nFirst: that the defendant intentionally or knowingly killed Movina Minnis; and\nSecond: that when the defendant did so she believed that circumstances existed which would have justified killing Movina Minnis; and\nThird: that the defendant\u2019s belief that such circumstances existed was unreasonable.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s theory apparently was that the revised 1981 instruction did not state the law. We disagree.\nSection 9 \u2014 1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)) sets forth the mental states for murder: either the defendant (1) intends to kill or intends to do great bodily harm or knows that such acts will cause death, or he (2) knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. In other words, he must act intentionally or knowingly.\nSection 9 \u2014 2(b) of the Code sets forth the mental state required for the form of voluntary manslaughter with which we are dealing. It states:\n\u201cA person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.\u201d\nIn our opinion the legislature was simply using a shorthand method of reiterating the mental states for murder in the voluntary manslaughter section. We believe that the drafters of the revised IPI Criminal had this in mind when they made the change.\nOne author has characterized voluntary manslaughter as \u201cmurder plus extenuating circumstances.\u201d O\u2019Neill, \u201cWith Malice Toward None\": A Solution to an Illinois Homicide Quandry, 32 DePaul L. Rev. 107 (1983).\nUnder Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 451(a)) it was the duty of the trial court to use IPI Criminal (2d ed. 1981) unless such an instruction did not accurately state the law. We believe that IPI Criminal No. 7.06 (2d ed. 1981) does accurately state the law and the court was in error for refusing it. Since the case must be retried, this error is not likely to happen again.\nBecause of the exclusion of expert evidence concerning the battered woman syndrome, defendant\u2019s conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded for new trial.\nGREEN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WEBBER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE TRAPP,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI concur in the conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony explaining the battered wife syndrome, but dissent from the opinion insofar as it approves or accepts defendant\u2019s argument that such testimony is admissible to rebut the inference of guilt arising from the dismemberment of the body, and to rehabilitate defendant\u2019s credibility upon her testimony that she killed Minnis in self-defense or by misadventure during a physical struggle.\nDefendant\u2019s brief takes the position that upon all of the evidence dismemberment was not the cause which occurred separately and subsequently to death and that the prosecution\u2019s theory was that strangulation was the cause of death.\nThe full thrust of defendant\u2019s argument upon the exclusion of this testimony is stated in the language of the brief:\n\u201cHaving relied upon a defense of self-defense, the trial court\u2019s ruling was prejudicial because the credibility of the defendant\u2019s version of the events surrounding her husband\u2019s death depended upon her ability to explain why she disposed of his body as she did.\u201d\nIn People v. White (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196, defendant testified to shooting in self-defense as her live-in man was beating her. The trial court excluded defendant\u2019s testimony concerning the syndrome over defendant\u2019s argument that the testimony \u201c*** had a direct bearing on the credibility of the defendant as regards her claim of self-defense.\u201d (90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200.) The evidence was held to be irrelevant and immaterial for the reason that self-defense is determined by the trier of fact upon what transpired at the \u201cparticular instant\u201d that death was caused. See also State v. Thomas (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137.\nDefendant\u2019s motion in limine prior to trial recognized this rationale by her contention that dismemberment was irrelevant and immaterial because it was subsequent to the death. It is argued that the trial court would have admitted the testimony if the only evidence was that decedent Minnis was killed while asleep. Upon the event, defendant elected to testify that she killed by misadventure or in self-defense in the belief of imminent danger during a physical struggle and, in effect, abandoned the rationale of the battered wife syndrome. As in White, I do not agree that she can use the opinion evidence of the battered wife syndrome to support her credibility as to the testimony concerning a desperate struggle.\nI agree that the testimony was admissible upon the sum of the reasons that the prosecution charged murder by strangulation or other unknown means, that some evidence of strangulation was introduced by the prosecution through a purported admission by defendant, and that the State strenuously argued that defendant was guilty of murder in a context which would require the jury to completely reject defendant\u2019s testimony of a struggle which resulted in the death of the husband.\nI agree that the evidence of the battered wife syndrome would be admissible if the jury accepted the theory of the prosecution that death was caused by strangulation or other unknown means while the victim was asleep and that since the jury was required to choose between the theory of the prosecution as to the cause of death and the defendant\u2019s theory of the cause of death, the evidence concerning the syndrome would be relevant if the jury was persuaded that the victim died by strangulation or other unknown means.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE TRAPP," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and James G. Woodward, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Robert J. Biderman and Denise M. Paul, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEANNETTE M. MINNIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201482\u20140569\nOpinion filed September 30, 1983.\nTRAPP, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and James G. Woodward, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Robert J. Biderman and Denise M. Paul, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0345-01", "first_page_order": 367, "last_page_order": 385 }