{ "id": 5660787, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON MICHAEL DUNAGAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dunagan", "decision_date": "1983-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 81\u20141043", "first_page": "474", "last_page": "478", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 474" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3133307 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1005" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481541 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 12, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S. Ct. 1829", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 L. Ed. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 905", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192707, 6192519, 6192297, 6192970, 6193326 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0905-03", "/us/446/0905-02", "/us/446/0905-01", "/us/446/0905-04", "/us/446/0905-05" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581907 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0972-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 11005, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8972217693197e-08, "percentile": 0.36902962296257424 }, "sha256": "71f87fffeab2234df41364b7e97570a779acd28331f4fc95f3dbd52fd47f4054", "simhash": "1:82be38553243af93", "word_count": 1813 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:55:29.032579+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON MICHAEL DUNAGAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Leon Dunagan, was charged by indictment with the December 26, 1971, murder of Oscar Tucson Boyd. During a jury trial on the charge, defense counsel made an oral motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence, particularly an inculpatory statement made to police officers after defendant\u2019s arrest. The motion was heard and denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the offense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)) and sentenced to a term of not less than 50 nor more than 100 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The conviction was affirmed on appeal to this court (People v. Dunagan (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 972, 389 N.E.2d 1261, vacated (1980), 446 U.S. 905, 64 L. Ed. 2d 257, 100 S. Ct. 1829); defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied.\nDefendant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and on April 21, 1980, that court ordered that the judgment of the Illinois appellate court be vacated and the cause be remanded for further consideration in light of the decision in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371. In accordance with that order, on December 9, 1980, this court vacated the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remanded the cause for further consideration in light of the decision in Payton.\nA new hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence commenced on March 16, 1981. At that suppression hearing, the State stipulated that defendant\u2019s arrest occurred on December 28, 1971, at approximately 9:50 p.m., in apartment 1002 of a Chicago Housing Authority building located at 6215 South Wabash Avenue. Defendant\u2019s arrest was carried out without a warrant. Defense counsel conceded that probable cause existed for the arrest.\nThe only State witness to testify at the hearing was Claude Wiley, one of the arresting officers. He stated that at approximately 7:30 p.m. on December 28, 1971, he and his partner saw several individuals tampering with a trailer truck in the lot of a service station at 63rd Street and Wabash Avenue. When the officers approached, all of the individuals fled except Reginald Brown. During their conversation with Brown at that time, Brown told the officers that he had some information for them. The officers took Brown to Area 2 headquarters where he gave them a written statement, according to which Brown stated that Leon Dunagan, the defendant, committed the shooting that occurred two days earlier. Brown\u2019s statement contained defendant\u2019s name, age, address, and telephone number. This information corroborated earlier police reports that the shooting was committed by a young man, 16 or 17 years of age, who ran into the building at 6215 South Wabash Avenue after firing the shot. Brown also informed the officers that defendant had several weapons in his apartment. The officers then took Brown back to where they had originally picked him up and proceeded to the Wabash Avenue address at about 9:30 p.m. When the police officers knocked on the door of apartment 1002, a male voice asked who was there. The officers responded that it was the police. The door was opened and Officer Wiley asked if Leon Dunagan was there; the man responded that he was Leon Dunagan. The officers then entered the apartment. Defendant\u2019s mother and a young woman were present. Officer Wiley testified that neither the officers nor the defendant drew a weapon at any time during this interlude, although later the officers did draw their weapons when approximately 15 shots were fired at them as they left the building with the handcuffed defendant.\nDuring cross-examination of Officer Wiley, it was learned that the officers had never used Brown as an informant before, and that Brown was not present at the shooting but had received his information from someone else. Wiley also stated that they did not attempt to obtain an arrest warrant and had no particular reason to believe that defendant would not be present when they arrived at his apartment.\nFollowing the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that exigent circumstances existed which permitted the warrantless entry and again denied defendant\u2019s motion. The court then reinstated the judgment of conviction. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, defendant made a statement in his own behalf after which he was resentenced to not less than 14 nor more than 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant now appeals from this judgment, contending that the trial court erred in again denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress his confession.\nDefendant contends that his fourth amendment rights were violated by the trial court\u2019s failure to quash his arrest and suppress his confession. It should be noted initially that defendant has conceded the existence of probable cause, and it is undisputed that the arrest was made without a warrant. He argues that in light of Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371, his warrantless arrest and all evidence which flows from it are invalid. Defendant\u2019s argument appears to be based on the premise that an arrest warrant is necessary under all circumstances and that evidence obtained following an arrest without a warrant must automatically be suppressed. This proposition must of course be rejected.\nContrary to the spirit of defendant\u2019s argument, an arrest and its consequences are not invalid simply because it was carried out without a warrant. There are circumstances which obviate obtaining a warrant prior to making an arrest. Since probable cause is conceded, the question becomes whether those circumstances necessary to validate a warrantless arrest are present in this case.\nIn Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371, the United States Supreme Court held that police are prohibited from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect\u2019s home in order to make a routine felony arrest. However, the Payton court also noted that a warrantless entry may be justified by a showing of exigent circumstances. See also People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543.\nIn the instant case, the trial court found that the entry into defendant\u2019s apartment was nonconsensual. The evidence showed that someone, most likely defendant, asked, \u201cWho is it,\u201d when the police knocked on the door. The door was opened when the officers responded, \u201cpolice.\u201d There is no evidence that anyone invited them in, simply that they entered when the door was opened. We agree with the trial court\u2019s finding. Thus, the issue here is whether exigent circumstances existed which would justify the police officers\u2019 decision to proceed without a warrant. See Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371; People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543; People v. Thompson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 995, 418 N.E.2d 112.\nIn determining whether exigent circumstances exist, courts must consider (1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed, (3) a clear showing of probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime, (4) strong reason to believe the suspect is in the premises, (5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, and (6) the peaceful circumstances of the entry. (People v. Thompson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004.) Additionally, the court may consider (1) prompt action by the police in arresting the suspect after learning of his possible involvement, (2) no deliberate or unjustified delay during which time a warrant could have been obtained, and (3) a belief that the suspect was armed and violent. See People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543.\nWe find it useful to evaluate the specific facts of this case in light of the criteria set forth in People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543, and People v. Thompson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 995, 418 N.E.2d 112.\nIn the case at bar, the police received the information regarding defendant\u2019s involvement at sometime after 7:30 p.m., and they arrested defendant shortly after 9:30 p.m., approximately 2 hours later. Although Brown was not a known informer, he did provide defendant\u2019s name, age, address, and telephone number, was acquainted with defendant and provided the police with a written and signed statement. As noted earlier, this information was corroborated by other information gathered by the police. Shortly afterward, the officers went to defendant\u2019s apartment. Here, the police acted promptly after learning of defendant\u2019s involvement. (See People v. Thompson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 995, 418 N.E.2d 112.) There was no deliberate or unnecessary delay.\nOnce the police officers received Brown\u2019s statement which supplemented the information already known to them, a decision had to be made: act quickly to arrest the suspect or get a warrant. We will not speculate about the various options available to the police officers.\nClearly, murder is a violent act. In this case, it was committed by shooting the victim. Thus, the police officers were well aware that defendant might be armed. Moreover, Brown told them that defendant had several weapons in his apartment. Based on these facts, the officers could reasonably believe that defendant was armed and possibly violent. See People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543; People v. Thompson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 995, 418 N.E.2d 112.\nWe believe that criteria for determining whether exigent circumstances existed have been met. As this court said in Thompson, each factor outlined above need not be present in its entirety; they need only be satisfied on balance. People v. Thompson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1005, 418 N.E.2d 112.\nAs the court stated in People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 173, 407 N.E.2d 543, the guiding principle of reasonableness governs searches and seizures under the Constitution. In making its determination of whether law enforcement officials acted reasonably in a given case, the court should be careful to judge the circumstances as known to the police at the time they acted. People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 173, 407 N.E.2d 543.\nWe believe that under the facts and circumstances of this case the police officers acted reasonably. The trial court\u2019s findings of exigent circumstances and its judgment will therefore be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nROMITI, P.J., and JIGANTI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James L. Rubens, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, David A. Shapiro, and Luann Rodi, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON MICHAEL DUNAGAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 81\u20141043\nOpinion filed September 29, 1983.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James L. Rubens, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, David A. Shapiro, and Luann Rodi, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0474-01", "first_page_order": 496, "last_page_order": 500 }