{
  "id": 3628913,
  "name": "JOHN ROONEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rooney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JOHN ROONEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), appeals from an order of the trial court denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff, John Rooney (Rooney). On appeal, State Farm contends that because of Rooney\u2019s alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements of his State Farm auto insurance policy, the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Rooney in his action for declaratory judgment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 57.1.\nRooney allegedly sustained an injury to his lower back when, on January 10, 1980, at approximately 6:30 a.m., an automobile he owned and was driving was struck in the right rear by an unidentified vehicle. The accident occurred as Rooney slowed for another vehicle which was making a left turn on River Road in Franklin Park, Illinois.\nThe automobile insurance policy issued to Rooney by State Farm contained the following provisions:\n\u201cREPORTING A CLAIM-INSURED\u2019S DUTIES\n1. Notice to Us of an Accident of Loss.\nThe insured must give us or one of our agents written notice of the accident or loss as soon as reasonably possible. * * *\n4. Other Duties Under Medical Payments, Uninsured Motor Vehicle, Death, Dismemberment and Loss of Sight, and Loss of Earnings Coverages.\nThe person making claim also shall:\na. give us all the details about the death, injury, treatment and other information we need to determine the amount payable.\n* * *\nc. under the uninsured motor vehicle coverage:\n(1) report a \u2018hit-and-run\u2019 accident to the police within 24 hours and to us within 30 days.\n* * *\nSECTION III \u2014 UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE-COVERAGE U\nTwo questions must be decided by agreement between the insured and us:\n1. Is the insured legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or driver of the uninsured motor vehicle; and\n2. If so, in what amount?\u201d\nRooney\u2019s discovery deposition, taken on June 15, 1982, is relied upon by both parties; Rooney stated that on January 10, 1980, the day of the incident, he \u201creported\u201d the accident from his place of work by telephone to the Franklin Park police department and to the office of State Farm agent Irving Castings from whom he had purchased the policy. Rooney did not initially tell the police that he was injured, but the written report he filed with the police on February 6, 1980, does reflect that Rooney injured his back in the auto accident.\nRooney further stated in his deposition that when he telephoned Castings\u2019 office he spoke to \u201cone of the girls in the office\u201d and told her that his auto had sustained damage in a hit-and-run accident. The following colloquy then occurred between State Farm\u2019s counsel and Rooney:\n\u201cMr. Piekarski: Did she ask you if you had been injured in the accident?\nRooney: Yes.\nMr. Piekarski: Did you tell her you had been injured in the accident?\nRooney: No.\u201d\nThe office girl instructed Rooney to bring his auto to a State Farm claims office for inspection. Rooney did so but at no time did he inform any State Farm employee that he had suffered any bodily injuries in the January 10,1980, accident.\nOn January 11, 1980, the day following the auto accident, Rooney visited the clinic of his employer\u2019s physician and was examined for a claimed lower back injury. Rooney did not tell the doctor that his injury was the result of an auto accident. Instead, Rooney told the physician that he was injured on January 8, 1980, while shoveling sand at work. The following colloquy occurred between State Farm\u2019s counsel and Rooney:\n\u201cMr. Piekarski: Did you tell any of the doctors that treated you that you had been involved in an automobile accident?\nRooney: No.\nMr. Piekarski: Why not?\nRooney: Well, I figured if I have workmen\u2019s compensation, I have my weekly check, that was the reason. I had no other resources of any kind, no other income.\nMr. Piekarski: Did you believe if you told these doctors about the accident, you would have not received the workmen\u2019s compensation benefits?\nRooney: I think so.\u201d\nIn May 1981 Rooney underwent lower back surgery (laminectomy) at Loyola Hospital. Rooney filed a workmen\u2019s compensation claim for the January 8, 1980, injury and received benefits until October 1981. In July 1981, Rooney submitted to the workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier hospital bills approximating $9,000.\nOn August 24, 1981, Rooney, through counsel, made a demand of State Farm to arbitrate his uninsured motorist claim for injuries allegedly sustained by him in the January 10, 1980, auto accident. On October 22, 1981, State Farm in a letter to Rooney reserved the right to deny liability for Rooney\u2019s uninsured motorist claim because of Rooney\u2019s alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements of the policy. On March 4, 1982, Rooney filed an action for declaratory judgment asserting that State Farm\u2019s denial of benefits under its uninsured motorist provisions breached his insurance contract.\nState Farm filed an answer denying Rooney\u2019s allegations. State Farm also filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief, asserting that Rooney \u201cbreached his duties under the terms and conditions of the policy issued to him *** in failing to report the \u2018hit-and-run\u2019 accident to police within 24 hours and in failing to advise the company of an uninsured motorist claim within 30 days.\u201d\nBoth parties moved for summary judgment. Following oral argument and a review of the memoranda filed by the parties in support of their motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that \u201cthe telephonic notice given to the agent of State Farm and the police department was adequate notice under the terms and conditions of the policy and the applicable law.\u201d The trial court denied State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granted Rooney\u2019s motion for summary judgment. State Farm appeals from that order.\nState Farm asserts that because of Rooney\u2019s alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements of the uninsured motorist provision of his policy, the trial court\u2019s order was error.\nGenerally, compliance with the notice requirements of an insurance policy is necessary to establish coverage. (Illinois Valley Minerals Corp. v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co. (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 296, 300, 388 N.E.2d 253, quoting INA Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 80, 83, 379 N.E.2d 34.) The primary purpose of such a notice requirement is to enable the insurer to make a timely and thorough investigation of a claim and to protect itself against unjustifiable claims. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Maren Engineering Corp. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898, 403 N.E.2d 508.\nState Farm acknowledged that on January 10, 1980, Rooney, by telephone, notified the police and a State Farm representative that he had been involved in a hit-and-run accident. State Farm contends, however, that because of Rooney\u2019s alleged denial of bodily injury, the information provided by Rooney to the police and to State Farm was, under the terms of his policy, insufficient notice to support a claim for uninsured motorist protection.\nIt is well established that notice of an accident is \u201cdistinct and different\u201d from the proof of claim requirements of the uninsured motorist provision and \u201ccompliance with one is not necessarily compliance with the other.\u201d (8C Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice sec. 5083.45 (1981); see also Martinson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (1974), 63 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 216 N.W.2d 34, 37.) Notice of an accident will alert an insurer to the occurrence of an event from which a claim may arise, whereas \u201c \u2018[t]he object of requiring proofs of loss is to afford proper information to the insurance company as to the facts regarding the loss and its liability, in order to make it possible for it to adjust and determine the amount and extent of the loss.\u2019 \u201d Martinson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (1974), 63 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 216 N.W.2d 34, 37, quoting 8 D. Blashfield, Automobile Law & Practice sec. 331.1, at 146 (1966).\nRooney argues that after he notified State Farm of his accident, State Farm apparently chose not to investigate beyond the questions posed to him by the office girl when he telephoned the agent\u2019s office on January 10, 1980. Moreover, Rooney contends that he was not required to \u201cgo forward\u201d with information about his bodily injuries in the absence of a request by State Farm that he provide such information.\nState Farm, on the other hand, contends in this appeal that a request for such information was in effect made during the telephone conversation between Rooney and the State Farm representative when, on January 10, 1980, she asked him if he had been injured. According to State Farm, although Rooney was aware of his bodily injuries, his statement that he was not so injured negated any claim and rendered further investigation by State Farm unnecessary.\nDuring argument before the trial court, State Farm had also urged that Rooney\u2019s denial of bodily injury was a defense under his policy against his claim for uninsured motorist coverage. The court, however, did not accept this premise and stated that \u201c[t]he only question [was] whether the notice to the agent of State Farm was adequate notice so as to satisfy the terms and conditions of the policy.\u201d Following the trial court\u2019s granting of Rooney\u2019s motion for summary judgment, State Farm persisted in its contention that Rooney\u2019s denial of bodily injury excused coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of its policy. The following colloquy occurred between the court and State Farm\u2019s counsel:\n\u201cMr. Piekarski: He lied. He lied to them. I mean, I don\u2019t think that\u2019s notice. It\u2019s as simple as that. * * *\nThe court: I think you\u2019re entitled to raise these fact questions before the arbitrator.\nMr. Piekarski: The arbitrator\u2019s not entitled \u2014 those are questions of coverage. Those have to be done \u2014 those have to be determined here. The only issue before the arbitrator in arbitration is damages.\nThe court: If you wish to amend your answer I\u2019ll give you leave to amend your answer and set forth other matters.\nI think I agree that you\u2019re entitled to a hearing with respect to his conduct, but I can\u2019t say there was insufficient notice.\nMr. Piekarski: *** The questions as to whether or not he lied are important only to the issue of notice, and that is to be decided here. * * *\nThe court: The only thing I\u2019m talking about is notice. I\u2019m not talking about whether the fellow is a consummate liar. I have nothing to judge [that by].\n* * * The court: he did in fact call the police and notify them of the accident and I believe that\u2019s adequate notice.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIt is apparent that the trial court here considered as the pivotal question in granting summary judgment to Rooney whether the information given by Rooney to the police and to the representative of State Farm satisfied the notice requirements of his insurance policy. The court characterized as \u201cperipheral\u201d \u201cfactual matters\u201d such as \u201cwhether this [was] a bona fide accident ***; whether he actually suffered injury ***; and whether he [had not] discovered] he was injured until after he talked to the lawyers.\u201d The court likewise considered as a \u201cfact question\u201d whether Rooney \u201clied\u201d when he notified State Farm that he was involved in a hit-and-run accident but had suffered no bodily injuries. The court agreed that State Farm was \u201centitled to a hearing with respect to his [Rooney\u2019s] conduct\u201d and suggested that State Farm could \"raise these fact questions before the arbitrator.\u201d\nState Farm suggests that the colloquy and comments set forth above indicate that the trial court may have misinterpreted the scope of an arbitrator\u2019s jurisdiction when a claim for uninsured motorist protection is involved. It apparently feared that it would be precluded from arguing in arbitration such facts as the trial court had termed \u201cperipheral.\u201d\nUnder Illinois law, coverage disputes are not included in arbitration provisions of automobile liability policies relating to resolution of disputes arising under an uninsured motorist provision, and arbitration is limited to a determination of issues of liability of the uninsured third-party tortfeasor and damages to the insured. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Horn (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 583, 592, 321 N.E.2d 285; Flood v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 91, 94, 242 N.E.2d 149.\nState Farm appears to argue that in assessing whether the notice requirements of its policy have been met so as to exclude any dispute as to coverage, the court must first consider Rooney\u2019s questionable conduct such as his \u201clying.\u201d State Farm seemingly overlooks, however, that it was invited by the trial court to amend its answer and to \u201cset forth other matters,\u201d implying, we believe, that the court would have then considered Rooney\u2019s \u201cconduct\u201d before granting him summary judgment. Since the record reveals no action by State Farm to amend its answer, we must presume that State Farm chose to rely only upon the adequacy of notice and not upon questions of Rooney\u2019s conduct.\nOn this record, therefore, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s action in denying State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granting Rooney\u2019s motion for summary judgment was not error.\nFor the reasons herein stated, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nSTAMOS and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.\nSubsequent to the inspection of Rooney\u2019s auto, his property damage claim was satisfied by State Farm with the payment of approximately $380 for repairs.\nRooney also stated in his deposition that during the summer of 1979 he had missed six weeks of work due to a lower back injury which he sustained when he fell from his truck while at work.\nRooney also submitted a claim for these same hospital bills to State Farm under the medical benefits provision of his automobile policy. This claim was subsequently withdrawn by Rooney and is not involved here.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., of Chicago (Victor J. Piekarski, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Karr and Valenti, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas P. Valenti, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOHN ROONEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 82 \u2014 2881\nOpinion filed October 4, 1983.\nRehearing denied December 6, 1983.\nQuerrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., of Chicago (Victor J. Piekarski, of counsel), for appellant.\nKarr and Valenti, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas P. Valenti, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0112-01",
  "first_page_order": 134,
  "last_page_order": 141
}
