{ "id": 3628658, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES SCOGNAMIGLIO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Scognamiglio", "decision_date": "1983-11-22", "docket_number": "No. 83 \u2014 158", "first_page": "749", "last_page": "755", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 747" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394435 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472805 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. B.J. 190", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. B.J. 292", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360514 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 1315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994807 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5492960 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 1174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106963 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970812 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3367403 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3035238 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0645-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 10668, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3608438240779086e-07, "percentile": 0.6357722013908919 }, "sha256": "1f199e82078e9a8d5a612cdd0204f1eda3d9a1f40651d97c2b083a1947b9774b", "simhash": "1:2b32186968d5b7f5", "word_count": 1762 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:31:44.831415+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES SCOGNAMIGLIO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, James Scognamiglio, was charged with speeding (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95 Va, par. 11 \u2014 601), and subsequently entered a plea of guilty to that offense. The trial court placed defendant on supervision, which it terminated instanter, and ordered him to pay a f\u00edne of $13 and $32 costs.\nThe State appeals (for the right of the State to appeal, see People v. Oswald (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 645, 435 N.E.2d 1369) from that portion of the order terminating supervision instanter and contends (1) that the imposition and termination of supervision instanter did not provide the statutorily required reasonable period of supervision, and (2) that supervision is not a statutorily authorized disposition for the Illinois Vehicle Code violation of speeding, a petty offense.\nWe address first the State\u2019s contention that supervision is not an available disposition for a petty offense such as speeding because a petty offense is defined in section 5 \u2014 1\u201417 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 1\u201417) as \u201cany offense for which a sentence to a fine only is provided.\u201d It cites People v. Jennings (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 226, 361 N.E.2d 1160, wherein the appellate court rejected that defendant\u2019s argument that the \u201cfine only\u201d limitation of section 5 \u2014 1\u201417 prevented imposition of a term of conditional discharge, and held that despite the language of section 5 \u2014 1\u201417, other provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.\nRev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143, 1005 \u2014 6\u20142) specifically provide for a sentence of conditional discharge for a petty offense. The State maintains that applying the rationale of Jennings, where, as here, the supervision provision of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141) does not explicitly provide for its applicability to petty offenses, supervision is not an available disposition. We disagree for the reasons that follow.\nThe Illinois Vehicle Code provides for general speed restrictions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95 Va, par. 11 \u2014 601.) It also imposes a penalty for violations of any provision of the Code for which no other specific penalty is provided under the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16 \u2014 104.) This is the case for speeding violations. Section 16 \u2014 104 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16\u2014 104) further provides that every person convicted of such a violation for which another penalty is not provided shall for a first or second conviction thereof be guilty of a petty offense. The Illinois Vehicle Code provides in section 1 \u2014 300 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 1 \u2014 300) that certain words and phrases when used in the Code, specifically \u201cpetty offense,\u201d shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Article V of the Uniform Code of Corrections.\nA petty offense is defined in section 5 \u2014 1\u201417 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 1\u201417) as \u201cany offense for which a sentence to a fine only is provided.\u201d It is thus evident that the sentencing provisions for convictions of general speed restrictions of the Illinois Vehicle Code are dependent on the pertinent provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections. Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(3)) provides that an offender convicted of a petty offense may be sentenced to a period of conditional discharge, a fine, and to make restitution to the victim. While supervision is not specifically authorized under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(3), the general statutory provision for supervision under the Unified Code of Corrections is contained in section 5 \u2014 6\u20141 of the Code. We note that prior to 1976, judges lacked authority to place defendants on supervision (see People v. Breen (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 323, 342 N.E.2d 31), but in 1976 section 5\u2014 6 \u2014 1 was amended by Public Act 79 \u2014 1334 to provide for supervision. (See People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, 445 N.E.2d 1174.) Specifically, the court now may enter an order for supervision if the defendant is not charged with a felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(c)) and the court is of the opinion that the offender is not likely to commit further crimes, that the defendant and the public would be best served if the defendant were not to receive a criminal record, and that \u201cin the best interests of justice an order of supervision is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this Code.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(c)(1), (2), (3).\nWe believe this explicit language in section 5 \u2014 6\u20141 clearly authorizes supervision for a petty offense under which classification a speeding violation under the Illinois Vehicle Code falls. Where the language of a statute is clear, it will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. (People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475-76, 433 N.E.2d 674.) Nonetheless, to discover the legislative intent, it is proper to consider the history and course of the legislation (People v. Beam (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 240, 243, 384 N.E.2d 1315), and the debate on this legislation supports the view that supervision under this new legislation was intended as an available disposition for violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code. See 79th Illinois General Assembly, Transcript of Senate Proceedings, Third Reading of Senate Bill 1997, June 23,1976, at 4, 7.\nRecent amendments to the supervision provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u2014 6 \u2014 1, 1005 \u2014 6\u20143.1, as amended by Pub. Act 83 \u2014 207, eff. January 1, 1984) will make supervision inapplicable to defendants charged with violating section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar ordinance provision if previously convicted or assigned supervision for such offense within a five-year period. Since statutory amendments are to be construed together with the original legislation as constituting one law and as part of a coherent system of legislation (see Follett\u2019s Illinois Book & Supply Store, Inc. v. Isaacs (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 600, 605-06, 190 N.E.2d 324), by making a special exception to supervision eligibility for one offense contained in the Illinois Vehicle Code, the legislature further demonstrated that supervision is otherwise an available disposition for other offenses contained in the Illinois Vehicle Code.\nCommentators who have examined the supervision provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections also have concluded that supervision is available as a disposition for traffic violations arising under the Illinois Vehicle Code. See Brady, Major Traffic Charges such as DWI: The Double Standard Forged under Distinctions between State and Ordinance Cases, 70 Ill. B.J. 292 (1982); Sullivan, Supervision Comes to All of Illinois, 65 Ill. B.J. 190 (1976).\nAccordingly, we conclude that the defendant, who was convicted of a general speed restriction provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code, is eligible for the disposition of supervision under section 5 \u2014 6\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections.\nNext, we reach the question whether the order imposing and terminating supervision instanter was authorized by statute. Section 5\u2014 6 \u2014 3.1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:\n\u201c(b) The period of supervision shall be reasonable under all of the circumstances of the case, but may not be longer than 2 years.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20143.1(b).)\nIn People v. Oswald (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 645, 435 N.E.2d 1369, this court held, in the context of an order of supervision terminated instanter for misdemeanor offenses, that termination of supervision instanter was not authorized by statute because it was a way to avoid the above-cited statute, which requires that the period of supervision \u201cshall be reasonable,\u201d without exercising discretion. (106 Ill. App. 3d 645, 650, 435 N.E.2d 1369.) The defendant reasons, as did the court below, that our opinion in Oswald should not be read to apply to traffic offenses, such as speeding, where because of the volume of the cases it would be impractical, and often unnecessary, to require a reasonable period of supervision.\nIt is a settled rule of law that the legislature has the authority to set the nature and extent of penalties. Courts will not interfere with such legislation unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the very broad and general constitutional limitations applicable. (People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga (1981), 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542, 416 N.E.2d 259.) As we stated in Oswald, \u201c[although the legislature has not seen fit to set a minimum period of supervision, the phrase \u2018the period of supervision shall be reasonable,\u2019 must be given its ordinary meaning. (People v. Blair (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 371, 373.)\u201d (106 Ill. App. 3d 645, 650, 435 N.E.2d 1369.) There is nothing in this statute nor in its legislative history to indicate the legislature intended that the provision for a reasonable period of supervision should not apply to all offenses, including traffic offenses, for which a disposition of supervision is authorized under section 5 \u2014 6\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(c)). If, as defendant contends, a reasonable period of supervision for traffic offenses imposes impractical and unrealistic consequences upon the judicial system because of the high volume of traffic cases, the inappropriateness of actual supervision of those offenders, and the impracticality of reviewing their driving record at the end of the period of supervision, this is a matter for legislative correction. We conclude that the imposition and termination of supervision instanter as was ordered in the instant case for the traffic offense of speeding is not authorized by statute.\nWe therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate that portion of the order terminating supervision instanter and to enter an order in the proper exercise of discretion under section 5 \u2014 6\u20143.1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nLINDBERG and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REINHARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of WOieaton (Barbara A. Pre-iner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Phyllis J. Perko, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "John F. Donohue, of Oak Brook, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES SCOGNAMIGLIO, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 83\u2014158\nOpinion filed November 22, 1983.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of WOieaton (Barbara A. Pre-iner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Phyllis J. Perko, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nJohn F. Donohue, of Oak Brook, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0749-01", "first_page_order": 771, "last_page_order": 777 }