{
  "id": 2853790,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Merle Hoover, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hoover",
  "decision_date": "1973-06-06",
  "docket_number": "No. 72-271",
  "first_page": "25",
  "last_page": "26",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 25"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "11 Ill.App.3d 1066",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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        2932682
      ],
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        "/ill-app-3d/11/1066-01"
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    {
      "cite": "101 Ill.App.2d 377",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2901458
      ],
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/101/0377-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "110 Ill.App.2d 163",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1594026
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/110/0163-01"
      ]
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:56:16.526311+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Merle Hoover, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GUILD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA complaint was filed by the State on July 31, 1972, charging the defendant with the sale and delivery of alcohofic beverages to a person not of age in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 43, sec. 131. Twenty-six days later, August 25, 1972, the State\u2019s Attorney moved for a continuance on the grounds of non-availability of his witnesses. The trial court on motion of defendant dismissed the cause stating among other things: \u201cWell, I\u2019ll deny the motion, for continuance on the facts as stated here. It\u2019s a close question but that will be the judgment of the court * * * the State not being ready to proceed, the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution will be granted.\u201d\nWe do not deem it necessary to discuss the facts herein. The judgment of the trial court in discharging the defendant was improper. The only grounds authorizing the discharge of a defendant without trial are found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, sec. 114 \u2014 1. In a most similar case, People v. Barksdale (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 163, the trial court dismissed the criminal case for want of prosecution upon the defendant\u2019s motion. In that case the witnesses were non-available and the court specificaHy held that the trial court has no power to dismiss the indictment except on the grounds set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, sec. 114 \u2014 1. In People v. Shick (1968), 101 Ill.App.2d 377, the court stated exactly the same thing. In a recent case in this court, People v. Guido (1973), 11 Ill.App.3d 1066, we stated that \u201cA dismissal for want of prosecution does not come within any of the statutory grounds set forth in Section 114 \u2014 1.\u201d We adhere to that opinion.\nDefendant also contends that the \u201cState did not subscribe to the statute which requires the clerk of the trial court to send a notice of appeal to the defendant as well as counsel for the defendant.\u201d We consider this argument specious. The defendant has filed an appearance and answer in this court and the argument is without merit. The fault, if any, lies with the clerk of the circuit court, not with the appeUant.\nWe therefore reverse the order of dismissal and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nT. MORAN and SEIDENFELD, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GUILD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John B. Roe, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon, (Richard L. CaldweU, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.",
      "Fearer & Nye, of Oregon, for appeHee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Merle Hoover, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 72-271;\nSecond District\nJune 6, 1973.\nJohn B. Roe, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon, (Richard L. CaldweU, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.\nFearer & Nye, of Oregon, for appeHee."
  },
  "file_name": "0025-01",
  "first_page_order": 45,
  "last_page_order": 46
}