{ "id": 3594029, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN RAY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1983-09-07", "docket_number": "No. 82\u2014401", "first_page": "244", "last_page": "249", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 244" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3316723 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2932530 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957222 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 542, "char_count": 10895, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10232835968429048 }, "sha256": "a4882535855ca9ba1789bbed02b9836e929a0866cf663e712dd0170f16b0465b", "simhash": "1:96f3b60ab17d1fc4", "word_count": 1731 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:36.278372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN RAY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Martin Ray Williams, appeals from his conviction of armed robbery and murder. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in ruling that the testimony of a proposed witness was inadmissible hearsay.\nThe defendant was convicted on the basis of his accountability for the actions of Donald Grant. Grant was convicted of the 1976 killing of a security guard at the Red Fox store during his armed robbery of the store. The State established during-the defendant\u2019s trial that the defendant drove Grant to the Red Fox on the day of the shooting. The defendant knew that Grant was carrying the gun on this day. The defendant saw Grant load the gun immediately prior to Grant\u2019s entry into the Red Fox store. There was conflicting evidence, however, as to whether the defendant waited outside the store for Grant or drove away immediately after Grant left the car.\nGladys Underwood was Grant\u2019s girlfriend. She testified at Grant\u2019s trial that Grant admitted to her that he had shot the security guard. The defendant sought to have Underwood testify during his trial as to the substance of the conversation between Grant and Underwood. Underwood would have testified that Grant never mentioned that the defendant participated in the robbery or shooting. She would also have testified that Grant stated that the shooting was the result of a dispute between himself and the security guard. This evidence, according to the defendant, would have negated any inference of a common plan or scheme between Grant and the defendant in committing the armed robbery and murder. The defendant contended that Grant\u2019s statements were admissible, despite being hearsay evidence, as a declaration against penal interest.\nDuring the argument before the trial court on the admissibility of Underwood\u2019s testimony, counsel for the defendant avowed that Underwood would testify that Grant\u2019s statements were made to her shortly after the shooting occurred. The State avowed that Underwood would testify that she was unsure of when Grant spoke to her and that Grant\u2019s admission might have been made two or three days after the shooting. Following further discussion, the trial court held that Underwood\u2019s testimony was inadmissible because of the amount of time which had elapsed between the shooting and the admission by Grant, and because of the ambiguity of Grant\u2019s statement. It is from this ruling that the defendant appeals.\nThe principles of law relevant to the admissibility in criminal prosecutions of hearsay declarations against penal interest are set forth in Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038. The court in Chambers recognized that a witness may testify to a declaration against penal interest made by a third party which exculpates a defendant, even though it violates the hearsay rule, when sufficient indicia of reliability are present. The court utilized four factors in determining the reliability of such out-of-court statements: (1) the statement must be made to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement must be corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement must be against the declarant\u2019s interest; and (4) the declarant is available for cross-examination. (410 U.S. 284, 300, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 312, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1048.) The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Chambers analysis in People v. Craven (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 419, 299 N.E.2d 1.\nIn the instant case, the second, third and fourth factors are present. Grant\u2019s statement was clearly corroborated by other evidence. The statement was also clearly against his interest. Grant himself was in custody and therefore was available for cross-examination, although a grant of immunity for these proceedings might have been necessary. A question remains, however, as to whether the time element of the first factor is satisfied.\nAs noted earlier, the lower court was presented with conflicting avowals by the State and the defendant\u2019s attorney. The court\u2019s decision was complicated further by the fact that Underwood was attempting to avoid testifying at trial. She failed to appear in court on the morning she was to testify, despite the fact that a writ of attachment had been issued for her. Underwood was therefore unavailable to clarify at what time Grant\u2019s declaration was made when the court determined the admissibility of her testimony. Finally, the arguments of counsel were directed primarily to admissibility of the testimony under the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d exception to the hearsay rule. The \u201cdeclaration against interest\u201d exception to the hearsay rule, although raised, was never fully addressed by the court or counsel.\nThe defendant incorrectly argues that the discrepancy in the evidence as to the time at which Grant\u2019s statement was made goes only to Underwood\u2019s credibility and not the admissibility of Underwood\u2019s testimony. The trial court was required, under the Chambers analysis, to determine whether the declaration was made \u201cshortly after the crime occurred\u201d in order to determine whether Underwood\u2019s testimony was sufficiently reliable so that it would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. A decision as to the time of the declaration was critical to the court\u2019s determination of the admissibility of Underwood\u2019s testimony.\nUnfortunately, the lower court was presented only with conflicting avowals as evidence of the timing of Grant\u2019s declaration. This court has noted that the four-part test set forth in Chambers is a barrier to those hearsay declarations which might result in a compromise of the integrity of the fact-finding process of the courts. (People v. Foster (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 292, 383 N.E.2d 788.) It was incumbent upon the defendant to satisfy the Chambers test and establish the reliability of Grant\u2019s declaration. The defendant failed to do this.\nThe facts of the instant case demonstrate, however, that the defendant was not afforded a full opportunity to present evidence establishing the four factors set forth in Chambers. The issue of the admissibility of Underwood\u2019s testimony arose in connection with a request by the defendant that the court institute further proceedings to compel Underwood\u2019s attendance at trial. The court based its decision as to what procedures would be instituted against Underwood on the admissibility of her trial testimony. It is clear that Underwood\u2019s presence was itself necessary in order for the trial court to determine the admissibility of her testimony. Instead, the issue of admissibility was decided before the court determined what proceedings would be instituted against Underwood. The court was thereby forced to resolve the issue of admissibility on the basis of the avowals by counsel, rather than the statements of Underwood herself. Due to the absence of Underwood and the confusion during argument by counsel as to the basis for the admissibility of the contents of Underwood\u2019s testimony, evidence directly establishing the time of Grant\u2019s declaration to Underwood was never tendered.\nWe believe that the defendant should have an opportunity to demonstrate that Underwood should have been allowed to testify as to Grant\u2019s declaration. The defendant should have been granted whatever process was necessary to compel her attendance. For this reason, we affirm the judgment of the lower court but remand the cause for proceedings in which the defendant will have an opportunity to present additional evidence establishing that the proposed testimony by Underwood was admissible.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. If on remand it is determined that Underwood\u2019s testimony was improperly excluded, the defendant will be granted a new trial. If no error is found in the court\u2019s exclusion of Underwood\u2019s testimony, the judgment of the circuit court remains in full force and effect.\nAffirmed and remanded.\nSCOTT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY,\ndissenting:\nWhile I generally subscribe to the majority\u2019s analysis of the issue presented by this case, I cannot agree with my colleagues\u2019 disposition of the cause. In my opinion, the majority\u2019s failure to bridge the gap between the possible commission of an evidentiary error and the granting of a new trial constitutes a fatal flaw in an otherwise well-reasoned discussion of Chambers as it applies to these facts.\nI do not find reversible error on these unique facts even if it could be established that Underwood\u2019s testimony was admissible under the Chambers test. The error in excluding it was, I believe, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Underwood\u2019s testimony, even if it were totally consistent with what defense counsel avowed it would be, would have added little, if anything of substance, beyond what had been admitted at trial through the testimony of defense witness, Frank Bell.\nBell had worked with the defendant at the \u201cCozy Comer\u201d nightclub the evening of May 24, 1976. In the early morning after work, the defendant drove Bell home and the two arranged to go fishing along with Grant later that morning. According to Bell, on their way to the fishing hole a radio bulletin was aired concerning the shooting of a security guard at the Red Fox. Bell said that at that time Grant stated that he had shot the guard. Bell\u2019s testimony, like Underwood\u2019s, tended to support the defendant\u2019s theory that Grant\u2019s failure to discuss the defendant\u2019s participation thereby negated the defendant\u2019s guilt by accountability. The jury\u2019s verdict of guilty establishes that the jurors did not embrace the defendant\u2019s theory as supported by Bell\u2019s testimony. The jury was entitled to reject the defendant\u2019s theory.\nHaving reviewed the record before us, I am convinced that the totality of the evidence of the defendant\u2019s participation and guilt was overwhelming. The parties are well-acquainted with the facts and they need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that even if the anticipated omitted testimony were presented to the finder of fact, the defendant\u2019s guilt would still be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\nI see no reason to perpetuate this cause by conducting further post-trial proceedings which would not, in any event, alter the outcome. I would affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Pamela Peters, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Vicki R. Wright, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN RAY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 82\u2014401\nOpinion filed September 7, 1983.\nRehearing denied January 19, 1984.\nBARRY, J., dissenting.\nRobert Agostinelli and Pamela Peters, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Vicki R. Wright, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0244-01", "first_page_order": 266, "last_page_order": 271 }