{ "id": 3593411, "name": "ROSEMARIE LEVY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NARROD MOVING SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendant-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Levy v. Narrod Moving Services, Inc.", "decision_date": "1983-12-27", "docket_number": "No. 83\u201466", "first_page": "528", "last_page": "533", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 528" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "122 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5127203, 5129350 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/3/0480-01", "/ill-app-2d/3/0480-02" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2620838 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3118586 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362-63" }, { "page": "362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592168 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070566 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0282-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 489, "char_count": 11526, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.631246434530064e-08, "percentile": 0.35188673162026046 }, "sha256": "2a05077a6cadac753db7ae5a9841ed4351e73527b758da858b970575c50588f0", "simhash": "1:cc9800132cdbf6eb", "word_count": 1835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:36.278372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROSEMARIE LEVY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NARROD MOVING SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendant-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Rosemarie Levy, appeals from the dismissal of her complaint against defendant, Narrod Moving Services, Inc. (Narrod), pursuant to Narrod\u2019s motion under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619).\nPlaintiff sought to recover damages for the destruction of her personal property, which had been stored in Narrod\u2019s warehouse, by a fire which occurred at the warehouse. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint sought recovery from Narrod under theories of negligence (count I), res ipsa loquitur (count II), and wilful and wanton misconduct (count III). In count IV, she sought a declaratory judgment against Adams Clay Consumer Claims Agency (Adams) and Transport Indemnity Company (Transport) to define the conditions of their liability to plaintiff under an insurance policy. Plaintiff\u2019s claim against Adams and Transport was settled for $7,000. Narrod raised this settlement as a bar to plaintiff\u2019s cause of action against it, claiming that the settlement \u201cfully satisfied\u201d plaintiff\u2019s claim. In its order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint the trial court found that \u201cplaintiff\u2019s claim has been fully satisfied both ex contractu and by statute.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint sets forth the relevant facts in this case. These facts must be taken as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Soules v. General Motors Corp. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 282, 284, 402 N.E.2d 599; Clement v. Prestwick (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 479, 479, 448 N.E.2d 1039.\nThe complaint against Narrod alleges, inter alia,\" the following facts. Plaintiff owned household goods and other personal property with a value of $78,161.17. On March 11, 1978, plaintiff delivered this property to Narrod for storage. Plaintiff agreed to pay $88.92 per month as a storage fee. Plaintiff made these payments. On June 8, 1979, plaintiff\u2019s property was totally destroyed by a fire at Narrod\u2019s warehouse.\nPlaintiff attached a copy of a certificate of insurance to her complaint as Exhibit B. This certificate listed Narrod as the master policyholder and \u201cNamed Insured\u201d and listed plaintiff as the \u201cInsured.\u201d The certificate was issued by Transport and indicated that \u201ccoverage B\u201d (for property in storage) was to be provided. The \u201cdeclared value\u201d of the goods in storage at Narrod\u2019s address was listed as $7,000, and the certificate of insurance stated that \u201cTRANSPORT\u2019S LIMIT OF LIABILITY IS THE DECLARED VALUE SHOWN ***.\u201d\nNarrod filed a motion to dismiss on October 7, 1982. In this motion it stated that the declared value of plaintiff\u2019s goods was $7,000 and that this was \u201ca specific declaration limiting any liability owed to plaintiff to the stated amount of $7,000 ***.\u201d Narrod claimed that this limitation of liability was in accordance with section 7 \u2014 204 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 26, par. 7 \u2014 204). Narrod\u2019s motion stated that because plaintiff had received $7,000 in settlement of her claims against Adams and Transport, she had been \u201cfully satisfied according to the terms and conditions of the policy, the Certificate of Insurance, and the Covenant and Agreement,\u201d and thus, had been \u201cfully satisfied both ex contractu and by statute.\u201d\nNarrod attached a copy of the \u201cComprehensive Movers\u2019 & Ware-housemens\u2019 Policy\u201d issued by Transport as Exhibit A. As Exhibit C, Narrod attached a copy of the \u201cCovenant and Agreement\u201d entered between plaintiff and Adams and Transport. In this agreement plaintiff agreed to release all claims against Adams and Transport for $7,000. The agreement also indicated that the $7,000 was in partial settlement of plaintiff\u2019s claim against Narrod. In the agreement, the parties expressly reserved plaintiff\u2019s right to pursue her claim against Narrod, but agreed that any recovery against Narrod would be reduced by $7,000, the amount received pursuant to the settlement with Adams and Transport and the partial settlement with Narrod. Narrod conceded in the trial court that the terms of the \u201cCovenant and Agreement\u201d were binding upon it.\nOn November 18, 1982, plaintiff filed an answer to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss in which she admitted that the \u201cdeclared value\u201d of her goods as stated in the certificate of insurance was $7,000 and that she had requested Narrod to procure insurance coverage for the property to be stored. Plaintiff admitted that she had received $7,000 from Adams and Transport in full satisfaction of any and all claims she had against them.\nOn December 20, 1982, the trial court granted Narrod\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nPlaintiff raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the release of one obligor releases a co-obligor where the release agreement states that the parties intend otherwise; (2) whether a party who procures an insurance policy for another is a beneficiary of that policy even if not named as a beneficiary; (3) whether a defendant who acts negligently may escape liability because the plaintiff has been partially compensated by a collateral source; and (4) whether a warehouseman may have his liability limited when he does not limit it in a specific warehouse receipt or storage agreement. Narrod, however, concedes in its appellate brief that the release of Adams and Transport did not release it from liability and that it was not a beneficiary of the insurance policy issued by Transport. Therefore, we need not address the first two issues raised by plaintiff on appeal.\nSince Narrod concedes these points, we must focus our attention on plaintiff\u2019s contention that application of the collateral-source rule, as it applies to the payment of the $7,000 insurance settlement and Narrod\u2019s separate liability, requires us to reverse the order of dismissal.\nPlaintiff maintains that her claim against Narrod is not affected by her settlement with Adams and Transport. She contends that the money she received from them was the result of a settlement with her insurer. She argues that because Narrod did not pay any of the insurance premiums, that this payment came from a collateral source, and therefore, that her claim against Narrod remains intact.\nNarrod argues that plaintiff cannot maintain this action against it because she has received full satisfaction of her loss. It contends that the $7,000 settlement fully compensated plaintiff for her loss, since the declared value of the property was $7,000, as listed in the certificate of insurance.\nGenerally, when a personal injury is occasioned by the negligence of another, the fact that the injured party has been compensated by insurance does not affect the injured party\u2019s right to recover from the negligent party, where the negligent party has not paid the insurance premiums. (Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 353, 362-63, 392 N.E.2d 1; Ross v. Cortes (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 772, 774, 420 N.E.2d 846; Biehler v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp. (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 435, 444, 333 N.E.2d 716.) This rule, which is generally referred to as the collateral-source rule, is likewise applicable to property losses that have been compensated by insurance. Eacurco v. Haddad (1954), 3 Ill. App. 2d 480, 122 N.E.2d 605 (abstract); see also 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages sec. 211 (1965).\nHere, plaintiff received a settlement for $7,000 for her claim under an insurance policy. Narrod admits in its appellate brief that plaintiff paid the premiums for this insurance. Narrod also admits that it was not a beneficiary of this insurance policy. Since it is clear that plaintiff had this insurance procured for her own benefit, and that she paid the premiums and was the insured under the policy, we hold that the settlement for $7,000 that she received from Adams and Transport does not bar her cause of action against Narrod. (See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 353, 362-63, 392 N.E.2d 1.) The proceeds of this settlement constituted payment from a collateral source and Narrod cannot claim that these proceeds preclude plaintiff from pursuing her action for damages against Narrod.\nThe language of the \u201cCovenant and Agreement,\u201d which Narrod concedes is binding upon it, expressly provides that plaintiff may pursue her action against Narrod. However, it also provides that any recovery against Narrod would be reduced by $7,000. Thus, plaintiff has expressly agreed to deduct the first $7,000 of any recovery from Narrod, even though under the collateral source rule, she normally could recover from Narrod the amount paid to her by her insurer. While it is not clear from the record, a possible explanation for the inclusion in the \u201cCovenant and Agreement\u201d of this $7,000 reduction in any recovery against Narrod, is that Adams and Transport were negotiating for Narrod as the \u201cmaster policyholder\u201d and \u201cnamed insured\u201d under the \u201cComprehensive Movers\u2019 & Warehousemens\u2019 Policy\u201d issued by Transport. In any event, the question remains whether plaintiff\u2019s claim has been fully satisfied because the $7,000 \u201cpartial settlement\u201d with Narrod was actually a \u201cfull settlement\u201d because Narrod\u2019s liability had been limited to the declared value of $7,000 listed in the certificate of insurance.\nPlaintiff urges that Narrod failed to properly limit its liability in a warehouse receipt or storage agreement. She maintains that the certificate of insurance, with its declared value of $7,000, was insufficient to limit Narrod\u2019s liability. Therefore, she contends that the trial court could not properly have found that her receipt of $7,000 compensated her for all the damages for which she was entitled to recover.\nThis alleged limitation of liability was advanced by Narrod below as a basis for dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Narrod claimed that, in the certificate of insurance, it had properly limited its liability to $7,000. Therefore, it maintained that plaintiff\u2019s claim had been fully satisfied and that her complaint must be dismissed under section 2\u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2-619).\nContrary to Narrod\u2019s contention that the certificate of insurance accomplishes the same purposes as a warehouse receipt or a storage agreement, we conclude that on its face, the certificate of insurance is not, as a matter of law, a limitation of Narrod\u2019s liability under section 7 \u2014 204(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (HI. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 26, par. 7 \u2014 204(2)). Section 7 \u2014 204(2) clearly contemplates an express limitation of liability in a warehouse receipt or storage agreement. The certificate of insurance does not meet the statutory requirements of a warehouse receipt (HI. Rev. Stat. 1981/ ch. lll2/3, par. 128), is not a storage agreement within the contemplation of section 7 \u2014 204(2), and does not expressly limit Narrod\u2019s liability. Therefore, the $7,000 declared value in the certificate of insurance is not a limit of Narrod\u2019s liability. Thus, the $7,000 proceeds of plaintiff\u2019s settlement with Adams and Transport and partial settlement with Narrod did not fuUy satisfy her claim.\nFor the foregoing reasons the order of dismissal entered by the circuit court of Lake County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nUNVERZAGT and HOPF, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REINHARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Daniel Azulay, of Azulay & Azulay, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Laura R. Petroff, of Charles N. Besser & Associates, of Chicago, for ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROSEMARIE LEVY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NARROD MOVING SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendant-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 83\u201466\nOpinion filed December 27, 1983.\nJ. Daniel Azulay, of Azulay & Azulay, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLaura R. Petroff, of Charles N. Besser & Associates, of Chicago, for ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0528-01", "first_page_order": 550, "last_page_order": 555 }