{ "id": 3559717, "name": "JOSEPH MUFICH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HEISLER GREEN CHEMICAL COMPANY et al., Defendants (Henrotin Hospital, Defendant-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Mufich v. Heisler Green Chemical Co.", "decision_date": "1984-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141160", "first_page": "958", "last_page": "963", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 958" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "10 Cal. Rptr. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Cal. App. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4370957 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/188/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Cal. Rptr. 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Cal. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6041538 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/53/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 P.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Cal. 2d 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2348435 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/39/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3226178 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469643 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358-60" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0352-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 585, "char_count": 12004, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0415411704511919e-07, "percentile": 0.55089022564636 }, "sha256": "94b1cdeaa94e3687f6e92a768b473132f64b5094b637e1f753906b56a7d38354", "simhash": "1:54d10245444a67fa", "word_count": 1945 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:09.364868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOSEPH MUFICH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HEISLER GREEN CHEMICAL COMPANY et al., Defendants (Henrotin Hospital, Defendant-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis cause is before us by virtue of our granting of defendant Henrotin Hospital\u2019s application for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)).\nPlaintiff Joseph Mufich filed a multi count complaint against several defendants, count V of which was directed against the hospital, plaintiffs employer. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that on December 28, 1981, while in the course of his employment as an engineer at the hospital he injured his foot while pouring, cleaning or inspecting a chemical container which contained a chemical manufactured by another defendant and which had been sold and distributed to the hospital by that defendant. On December 30, 1981, plaintiff went to the emergency room facility at the hospital for medical care or treatment and was there negligently treated by emergency room personnel. As a proximate result of the negligence he suffered personal injuries for which the hospital was liable.\nPlaintiff also filed a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act.\nThe hospital moved for dismissal of the action (count V) under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619) because section 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)) provides that an injured employee\u2019s exclusive remedy against his employer for injuries sustained in the line of duty as an employee is solely under the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss but, under Supreme Court Rule 308, entered the requisite order identifying the question of law involved as \u201cwhether an employee may maintain a cause of action at common law against his employer/hospital for medical malpractice in the treatment of a work-related injury.\u201d\nIn denying the hospital\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial judge held that this was a situation in which the dual-capacity doctrine applied, that is, when plaintiff was treated at the hospital the relationship between him and the hospital was that of patient and hospital and not that of employee and employer. We disagree.\nSection 5(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)):\n\u201cNo common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.\u201d\nSection 11 of the Act provides (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.11):\n\u201cThe compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in Section 3 of this Act, or of any employer who is not engaged in any such enterprises or businesses, but who has elected to provide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this Act, and whose election to continue under this Act, has not been nullified by any action of his employees as provided for in this Act.\u201d\nSection 8(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a)) requires that an employer provide and pay for all the necessary first aid, medical and surgical services, and all necessary medical, surgical and hospital services thereafter incurred, limited, however, to that which is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the accidental injury.\nIn McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876, plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment at the Caterpillar Tractor Company and was treated at the plant at various times by licensed physicians employed by Caterpillar on a full-time basis. After filing a claim and receiving an award under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, he sued Caterpillar and the doctors for alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment of his injury. The trial court dismissed as to Caterpillar and one doctor and entered summary judgment in favor of the other doctors. The appellate court, one judge dissenting (McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 77 (Webber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), held that section 5(a), the exclusive remedy provision of the Compensation Act, did not bar common law tort action against Caterpillar because, by furnishing medical services to its employees directly rather than having them provided at outside facilities by private medical personnel, Caterpillar had subjected itself to tort liability under the \u201cdual-capacity\u201d doctrine. The supreme court, with one judge dissenting, reversed the appellate court\u2019s holding that Caterpillar could not be sued under the dual-capacity doctrine.\nThe court stated:\n\u201cThe question for us is whether an employee whose injury arose out of and in the course of employment is barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act from recovering damages in a negligence action against the employer-company for aggravated injuries sustained in medical treatment by employees of the same company.\u201d McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 352, 356.\nThe court, after quoting the above-set-out sections 5(a), 8(a) and 11, stated:\n\u201cThe respondent here, in providing medical services to its employees, was meeting a duty imposed upon it as an employer under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. That it chose to provide the services directly rather than through physicians hired independently does not alter the fact that medical services were rendered in response to the Act in its capacity as an employer. Larson states that it is clear that dual capacity will not be found simply because an employer has a number of departments with separate functions and operations. 2A A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation sec. 72.80 (1976).\u201d 85 Ill. 2d 352, 358.\nThe court then discussed Duprey v. Shane (1952), 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8, upon which the majority of the appellate court had strongly relied, and upon which plaintiff in the case at bar also does, saying:\n\u201cThere the plaintiff was employed as a practical nurse at her employer\u2019s clinic and was injured in the handling of a patient. She was treated by her employer, Dr. Shane, a chiropractor, and another chiropractor employed by him. She later filed a personal injury suit against both chiropractors, whose treatments, she claimed, had aggravated her injury. The court held that her suit was not barred by the exclusive-remedy provision in California\u2019s workmen\u2019s compensation act. Upon first observing that a compensation award would not bar a personal injury suit against an independent physician engaged by an insurance company, the court stated: \u2018[I]t would seem to follow that the employee does not lose his right to such an action simply because the employer who happens to be a doctor treats the injury. In such event, the employer-doctor is a \u201cperson other than an employer\u201d within the meaning of *** [the] Labor Code. *** In treating the injury Dr. Shane did not do so because of the employer-employee relationship, but did so as an attending doctor, and his relationship to *** [plaintiff] was that of doctor and patient.\u2019 (39 Cal. 2d 781, 793, 249 P.2d 8, 15.) Here Caterpillar Tractor provided treatment on the basis of the employer-employee relationship and not as a treating physician.\nWe would observe also that in Dixon v. Ford Motor Co. (1975), 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 507, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872, 877, it was said that California courts, in decisions subsequent to Du-prey v. Shane, refused to extend its doctrine to different factual contexts. The court cited a treatise on workmen\u2019s compensation laws in California to the effect that \u2018 \u201cThe Duprey case represented a unique situation in which the employer was also a doctor. Subsequent attempts to extend its holding were unsuccessful.\u201d \u2019\nThe circumstances in Dixon strongly resemble those here. A widow brought a wrongful death action against the Ford Motor Company and two employees of its medical staff for what she claimed was negligent treatment of her husband in the employer\u2019s first-aid station, which she said caused her husband\u2019s death. The court held that the dual-capacity doctrine was inapplicable and that the exclusive remedy was under the workmen\u2019s compensation statute. Among the cases cited by the court was Deauville v. Hall (1961), 188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511. There, where an employer had furnished medical treatment to an injured employee, it was claimed that the employee should be permitted to file an independent action where his original compensable injury \u2018was aggravated by the carelessness of an unqualified doctor\u2019 and that the negligence of other medical personnel in diagnosing the employee\u2019s injury \u2018[gave the employer] a status separate and apart from that of the employer ***.\u2019 (188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 540, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514.) The court rejected this argument and, in holding that the workmen\u2019s compensation act provided the claimant\u2019s exclusive remedy, stated that \u2018there is nothing in the Act or the authorities to warrant an action in a court of law against an employer for the latter\u2019s negligence in providing *** medical treatment.\u2019 188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 540-41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514.\u201d McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 352, 358-60.\nThe court then referred to two other out-of-State decisions which refused to allow a recovery under the dual-capacity doctrine where the Compensation Act contained an exclusive remedy provision, and concluded:\n\u201cFor the reasons given, we hold that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act provided the sole means of recovery for the plaintiff\u2019s compensable industrial injury. That portion of the judgment of the appellate court which held that Caterpillar Tractor could be sued under the dual-capacity doctrine is reversed.\u201d 85 Ill. 2d 352, 360.\nIn the case at bar, Henrotin Hospital was only fulfilling the statutory requirement that it had as an employer to provide and pay for medical services which are necessary in case of an industrial accident. It was acting in its capacity as employer rather than in an unrelated capacity. The fortuitous circumstance that it was itself a hospital with complete medical facilities cannot change that fact. To require it, in order to be protected by the exclusive remedy provision of the Compensation Act, to set up a separate facility or to hire doctors to render medical attention to its employees injured in the course of their employment, would be to require it to do something it was already equipped to do without those unnecessary steps. The dual-capacity doctrine has no application to the facts in the case at bar.\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of the hospital\u2019s motion to dismiss based on the exclusive-remedy provisions of sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was error. Accordingly, it is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant the motion.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nJOHNSON and JIGANTI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, of Chicago (Phillip B. Allen and James J. Stamos, of counsel), for appellant.", "Susan E. Loggans & Associates and William J. Harte, Ltd., both of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOSEPH MUFICH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HEISLER GREEN CHEMICAL COMPANY et al., Defendants (Henrotin Hospital, Defendant-Appellant).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 83\u20141160\nOpinion filed February 16, 1984.\nRooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, of Chicago (Phillip B. Allen and James J. Stamos, of counsel), for appellant.\nSusan E. Loggans & Associates and William J. Harte, Ltd., both of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0958-01", "first_page_order": 980, "last_page_order": 985 }