{ "id": 3558740, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE REESE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reese", "decision_date": "1984-02-14", "docket_number": "No. 81\u20142627", "first_page": "977", "last_page": "991", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 977" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6406016, 6405891, 6405382, 6405641, 6405771, 6405516, 6404976, 6406165, 6405175, 6405082, 6405275, 6404894 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0965-11", "/us/419/0965-10", "/us/419/0965-06", "/us/419/0965-08", "/us/419/0965-09", "/us/419/0965-07", "/us/419/0965-02", "/us/419/0965-12", "/us/419/0965-04", "/us/419/0965-03", "/us/419/0965-05", "/us/419/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404227 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2753, 2627, 2820, 3045, 2407, 2824, 2823, 2378, 2893, 2861, 3023, 2964, 2811 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0975-02", "/us/435/0975-13", "/us/435/0975-04", "/us/435/0975-01", "/us/435/0975-11", "/us/435/0975-08", "/us/435/0975-09", "/us/435/0975-07", "/us/435/0975-10", "/us/435/0975-12", "/us/435/0975-05", "/us/435/0975-06", "/us/435/0975-03" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3384832 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 1143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5497348 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/1143-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1369, "char_count": 29222, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9752924549080133e-07, "percentile": 0.9048135624895506 }, "sha256": "cbcc05d877c177ae6ca47a261ad428f220caf5f4a59ce0c95373639bddbf1b44", "simhash": "1:977740847c463c80", "word_count": 4708 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:09.364868+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE REESE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Willie Reese, appeals from his convictions of two counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)), one count of attempt (murder) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4), one count of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2), and one count of unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 10 \u2014 3). The sentences imposed were concurrent terms of 80 years\u2019 imprisonment for the murder conviction, 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the attempt (murder) conviction, 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, and three years\u2019 imprisonment for the unlawful restraint conviction.\nFour grounds for reversal are presented by defendant: (1) that he was not provided with effective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) that certain prosecutorial comments made during closing argument prejudicially influenced the jury and, thus, denied defendant his right to a fair trial; (3) that certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court culminated in reversible error; and (4) that the sentence imposed was not warranted under the circumstances of this case. As the issue of reasonable doubt was not raised, only a brief summary of the evidence is necessary.\nAt approximately 8 p.m. on November 18, 1979, defendant and Calvin Thompson visited Benjamin Smith in his first-floor apartment located at 118 North Waller, Chicago. The three men proceeded to a back bedroom where they met with Smith\u2019s girlfriend, Janice Bates, and Smith\u2019s cousin, Bernard \u201cDuke\u201d Pickett. After Thompson and defendant snorted some cocaine that Smith had offered to them, Thompson left the apartment and returned shortly thereafter armed with a Colt AR-15, .223-caliber semi-automatic rifle. While Thompson pointed the weapon in Smith\u2019s direction, defendant pulled out a .32-caliber handgun and likewise pointed it at Smith. Bates and Smith were then robbed of jewelry and approximately $80 in cash.\nThereupon, Bates was taken into the bathroom by defendant, Smith was ordered to lie on the floor, and Pickett was told to kneel in front of a chair and position his head on the seat cushion. Following repeated demands for more money, defendant threw a pillow over Smith\u2019s head and fired his gun into it, but the bullet missed its intended target. Defendant, believing Smith to be dead, lifted up Smith\u2019s leg and let it fall to the ground. Smith, feigning that he had been killed, lay on the floor motionless and then heard a double shot go off just in front of him followed by his girlfriend\u2019s plea not to shoot; however, two more shots were fired immediately thereafter.\nAs soon as Smith heard defendant and Thompson leave the apartment, he jumped up and saw Pickett kneeling in front of a love seat with the left side of his head blown away. Smith then went into the bathroom where he found his girlfriend fatally shot, lying between the sink and bathtub.\nAlthough arrest warrants for defendant and Thompson were obtained on November 24, 1979, it was not until May 1980 that defendant was arrested in California. Following extradition proceedings, defendant arrived in Chicago on July 23, 1980. Soon after his arrival at the Area 5 Headquarters, the Miranda warnings were read to defendant for at least the third time; after acknowledging that he understood his rights, defendant agreed to make a statement. While defendant confessed his participation in the instant offenses, former Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Ira Raphaelson took notes; also present was Detective Robert Smitka of the Chicago police department. Specifically, defendant\u2019s narrative of the events which transpired at Benjamin Smith\u2019s apartment on November 18, 1979, implicated Calvin Thompson in that defendant averred that after he fired his revolver at Smith\u2019s head, Thompson proceeded to shoot Pickett and Bates with the rifle.\nSince defendant refused to allow this narration to be transcribed into a formal court-reported statement, Raphaelson asked him to read the notes, initial all scratched-out words, and then sign the paper at the bottom. Smitka and Raphaelson also signed this inculpatory statement at the bottom of the page as witnesses to defendant\u2019s signature.\nIn July 1980, defendant was indicted on six counts of murder, one count of attempt (murder), one count of armed robbery, one count of unlawful restraint and two counts of armed violence. The two armed violence counts were nol pressed and, following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of murder, armed robbery, attempt (murder) and unlawful restraint. From these convictions, defendant now appeals.\nI\nBefore reaching the legal arguments advanced by the parties, we first consider the merits of the State\u2019s motion before this court to strike a certain portion of the record, as well as the statement of facts and part I of the argument presented in defendant\u2019s brief.\nSpecifically, counsel for defendant at trial chose not to call Calvin Thompson to testify in the case at bar as a defense witness; yet, following defendant\u2019s conviction, sentence and appeal to this court, the assistant appellate defender filed a brief which extensively referred to testimony proffered by Thompson during his separate jury trial. This exculpatory testimony, in essence, provided Thompson\u2019s jury with an alibi that defendant and Thompson could not have been involved in the crimes with which they were charged. Thompson averred that on November 18, 1979, at approximately 8 p.m., he and defendant arrived at Phil Allen\u2019s house near Washington Boulevard. After Allen\u2019s mother let them in, they waited approximately 20 minutes and then, since Allen had not yet returned home, defendant and Thompson left for the Grand Motel on West Madison Street. Upon their arrival at the motel at approximately 9 p.m. that night, the two men allegedly registered for the eight-hour traveler\u2019s rate, showered, changed clothes and waited for Allen, who arrived at approximately 11 p.m.\nOfficer Renard Jackson of the Chicago police department, on assignment in the Austin District, was dispatched to the scene of the shootings at 8:45 p.m. It was Benjamin Smith\u2019s assertion that defendant and Thompson had arrived at his apartment at approximately 8 p.m. that night. Thus, as a result of Thompson\u2019s alibi and the testimonial evidence proffered in support thereof, he was acquitted of all charges at the conclusion of his separate jury trial in September 1981.\nDefendant now argues that had Thompson testified at his trial, such testimony might have been exonerative. Hence, the assistant appellate defender has incorporated testimony from an entirely separate prosecution into the instant report of proceedings, and has made extensive reference to said testimony in the statement of facts, and part I of the argument of the brief filed on behalf of defendant.\nIn the absence of a stipulation between the parties, matters outside the record cannot be considered by this court on review (People v. Haas (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 1143, 1149, 427 N.E.2d 853), even though they are included in the instant transcript of record (People v. Sheridan (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 963, 965, 367 N.E.2d 422, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 975, 56 L. Ed. 2d 68, 98 S. Ct. 1622). Regarding the present case, there was neither a stipulation between the parties, nor a request made by the assistant appellate defender to this court seeking permission to supplement the record from the trial below with the testimonial evidence proffered by Calvin Thompson at his separate jury trial. Therefore, the State\u2019s motion to strike is granted as to the improper incorporation of Thompson\u2019s testimony into the instant report of proceedings, as well as to the facts and argument contained in defendant\u2019s brief which are dehors the record.\nII\nDefendant initially claims that he was deprived of his constitutional guarantee of effective representation of counsel because his trial attorney did not call Thompson as a witness for the defense. We find no merit to this assertion.\nIn order to establish incompetent and ineffective assistance of either a privately retained or a court-appointed lawyer, it must be shown that \u201cthe incompetence produced substantial prejudice to the defendant without which the result would probably have been different.\u201d (People v. Royse (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 163, 168.) The determination of the efficacy of representation requires an examination of the totality of circumstances and the record as a whole. (People v. Shepard, (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 598, 603, 449 N.E.2d 222.) However, a review of counsel\u2019s competency does not extend to those areas involving trial tactics or strategy, which are purely matters of professional judgment. (People v. Haywood (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 540, 543-44, 413 N.E.2d 410, citing People v. Witherspoon (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 18, 22, 302 N.E.2d 3.) Decisions on whether or not to call certain witnesses for the defense, like jury selection, have been recognized as matters of trial strategy and, thus, are not within the scope of our review. People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 830, 849, 444 N.E.2d 782; see also People v. Witherspoon (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 18, 22, and People v. Shepard (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 598, 603-04.\nIn the case at bar, the fact that defendant\u2019s trial counsel did not call Calvin Thompson as a witness for the defense was purely a matter of professional judgment and trial strategy. The defense attorney even acknowledged this during the argument on his motions in limine: \u201cI do wish to advise the Court that in the event that Calvin Thompson does testify, it may be my judgment, at that time, that I will want our jury to hear that.\u201d The court soon thereafter stated: \"That is your strategy. You don\u2019t have to disclose that to me now.\u201d We regard this characterization by the trial court to be correct. Nonetheless, in support of the claim of ineffective representation, defendant cites People v. Stepheny (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 153, 263 N.E.2d 83, where after being convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging incompetent representation which the trial court dismissed without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Our supreme court held that the defendant was entitled to such a hearing because there was nothing in the record to indicate whether counsel attempted to locate and interview those persons present in the apartment at the time of the shooting; thereafter, defendant presented to the reviewing court favorable evidence that was actually available at trial. (46 Ill. 2d 153, 158-59.) The omitted testimony in Stepheny appeared to unequivocally support the theory of self-defense which defendant had argued throughout trial. Here, however, Calvin Thompson\u2019s testimony does not unequivocally provide defendant with an alibi, particularly in view of the inculpatory nature of defendant\u2019s statement made to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and the Chicago police officer, the voluntariness of which has not been challenged in this appeal. Consequently, we are of the opinion that defendant\u2019s trial counsel, in his judgment, could well have concluded that Calvin Thompson\u2019s testimony might have been as damaging as it would have been helpful.\nIn People v. Corder (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 434, 431 N.E.2d 701, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 561, another case relied upon by defendant, the accused was convicted on the strength of the identification testimony of one undercover police officer, who did not effectuate the arrest at the time of an unlawful delivery of a substance represented to be a controlled substance. The police officer stated that the criminal was clean shaven; however, counsel at trial was aware of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license showing the presence of a beard six days following his alleged commission of the crime. In addition, counsel had received a list of witnesses, none of which were interviewed. Since \u201c[njeither the license nor a single witness was subpoenaed,\u201d defendant\u2019s trial attorney was characterized as actually incompetent, and such incompetence was held to have produced substantial prejudice to defendant without which the outcome of his trial would probably have been different. People v. Corder (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 434, 438.\nHere, failure on the part of defense counsel to call Calvin Thompson as a witness for the defense may very well have emanated from a misjudgment in trial strategy as to what Thompson would actually say that would either inculpate or exculpate defendant. However, viewing the facts of this case in their totality, rather than focusing upon an isolated, tactical decision made during the course of trial, we cannot conclude that the instant record evinces that degree of prejudice to defendant without which the outcome of his trial would probably have been different. We reach this result particularly in light of the fact that there is no allegation on appeal of any reasonable doubt concerning defendant\u2019s guilt.\nIll\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that he was denied a fair trial because of the following question asked of a detective during the State\u2019s case-in-chief: \u201c[Wjhat happened between the time that you \u2014 that Willie Reese was arrested in May until the time that you went to California in July?\u201d Defense counsel\u2019s objection to this query was properly overruled since the question did not constitute direct evidence of defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt, but merely permitted an inference of suspicion. The record does not manifest an effort on the part of the prosecution to elaborate on, much less exploit, the detective\u2019s response that extradition proceedings took place.\nDefendant also maintains that five comments made during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument prejudicially influenced the jury and, therefore, deprived defendant of a fair trial. Citations of error are made with regard to the following remarks:\n\u201c[STATE]: Ladies and Gentlemen, let me tell you if there was something wrong with this statement [defendant\u2019s confession], if there was some reason you couldn\u2019t hear that statement, that judge wouldn\u2019t let you hear it.\u201d\n\u201c[STATE]: Pictures. Why weren\u2019t any pictures taken [during the confession]? There was a picture taken of him that morning. We tried to show it to him, and he objected.\u201d\n\u201c[STATE]: Janice Bates had rights. Bernard Pickett had rights. Janice Bates had the right to bring up her two children.\u201d\n\u201c[STATE]: *** beyond a reasonable doubt is not some lofty, standard goal.\u201d\n\u201c[STATE]: Isn\u2019t it kind of a strange coincidence in this case, he leaves with the key and is arrested close to 200 days later in California and extradited back to Chicago.\u201d\nThe trial court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objections to the first three comments and, accordingly, instructed the jury to disregard them. In response to defense counsel\u2019s objection to the fourth remark, the trial court told the jury that \u201c[t]here is no definition of reasonable doubt that is going to be given by counsel ***.\u201d Regarding the fifth comment, the court stated that \u201cthe jury will decide the case based on the evidence. If it is not in evidence, the jury will disregard it.\u201d\nIt is an oft-repeated principle that a prosecutor is to be permitted great latitude in his closing argument (People v. Hine (1980) , 88 Ill. App. 3d 671, 679, 410 N.E.2d 1017), and the trial court\u2019s determination of the propriety of such an argument will not be disturbed on review absent extreme error (People v. Maldonado (1981) , 101 Ill. App. 3d 948, 951, 428 N.E.2d 1087, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 571). The standard for determining if prosecutorial comments made during closing argument constitute reversible error is whether those remarks were such that, without their having been made, the jury might have reached a different result. (People v. Barnes (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 965, 978, 453 N.E.2d 1371; People v. Panczko (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 409, 413, 407 N.E.2d 988.) In addition, we note with special significance that \u201cit is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations,\u201d for \u201cthe interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error cannot be so lightly and casually ignored in order to chastise *** prosecutorial overreaching.\u201d United States v. Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 507, 509, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 105, 106, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1979, 1980.\nWe therefore conclude that defendant was not substantially prejudiced; however, our determination is such only because it is manifest here that the evidence establishing defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. Indeed, defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence against him.\nIV\nThe next issue for resolution involves defendant\u2019s assertion that two evidentiary rulings made by the trial court culminated in reversible error.\nA\nFirst, defendant cites error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine a State\u2019s witness, Benjamin Smith, with regard to charges brought against him that were subsequently stricken with leave to reinstate. An examination of Smith\u2019s criminal record reveals that from January 23, 1979, through April 23, 1980, he was arrested and charged with possibly one felony and four misdemeanor offenses \u2014 all of which were disposed of in a preliminary hearing court. Defendant, however, w\u00e1s not arrested for the instant offenses until May 1980; he was not indicted for these offenses until July 1980. His trial commenced September 4, 1981. As a result, defendant\u2019s averment that the State dismissed Smith\u2019s charges \u201cDURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS CASE\u201d is delusive.\nNonetheless, it is well settled that the widest latitude must be given to defense counsel on cross-examination to develop matters that can reasonably show bias, motive or willingness of the State\u2019s witness to testify. (People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 156, 429 N.E.2d 526; People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 50, 52, 280 N.E.2d 708.) Cross-examination for such impeachment purposes is a matter of right, subject to the sound discretion of the trial court; reversal is warranted only where there is an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant. (People v. Winfield (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 818, 831, 447 N.E.2d 1029; People v. Lenard (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1049-50, 398 N.E.2d 1054.) \u201c[T]here is no such abuse unless an offer of proof demonstrates that the evidence excluded is positive and direct on the issue of bias or motive to testify falsely [citations], rather than remote or uncertain [citation].\u201d People v. Winfield (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 818, 831.\nThe period of limitation for misdemeanor prosecutions is one year and six months; the period of limitation for felony prosecutions is three years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 5(b).) The State could have reinstated at least two of Smith\u2019s five dismissed charges at the time of the instant trial. We think the jury was entitled to know the nature of Smith\u2019s criminal charges \u201cin order that it [could] have before it complete information so as to be better able to resolve the bias question.\u201d People v. Rufus (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 467, 474, 432 N.E.2d 1089, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 578.\nHowever, as we noted in Rufus, \u201c[w]hile the trial court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination, we cannot say that defendant was manifestly prejudiced by this error.\u201d (104 Ill. App. 3d 467, 474.) Considering the substantial cross-examination of Benjamin Smith by defendant\u2019s attorney as well as his closing argument to the jury, Smith\u2019s credibility, like that of the State\u2019s witness in Rufus, was clearly brought to the attention of the jurors. Therefore, in view of the overwhelming nature of the evidence establishing defendant\u2019s guilt, we cannot conclude that the lower court\u2019s restriction on Smith\u2019s cross-examination warrants a new trial.\nB\nThe second evidentiary ruling contested by defendant concerns the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow the introduction of evidence that one of the murder victims, Bernard Pickett, had once assisted the authorities in apprehending Benjamin Smith on drug charges. It is thus urged that the preclusion of this evidence, allegedly suggesting a motive on the part of Smith to testify falsely, constituted reversible error.\nA defendant is entitled to all reasonable opportunities to present evidence which might tend to create doubt as to his guilt; but, it is within the discretion of the trial court to exclude such evidence, without infringing on the accused\u2019s constitutional right to present a defense, when the relevancy of the evidence is so speculative as to impart little probative value. People v. Hunt (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 958, 965, 426 N.E.2d 568; People v. Mikel (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 21, 30, 391 N.E.2d 550.\nFollowing denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a directed finding, Officer Joseph Gawlek of the Chicago police department was called by the defense to establish the alleged motive for the murder of Bernard Pickett. Pursuant to the State\u2019s request, and over defendant\u2019s objection, a voir dire examination was conducted. During this examination, it was established that on November 3, 1977, Officer Gawlek obtained a search warrant \u201cfor an individual named Ben at 1210 North Lockwood, on the first floor.\u201d Benjamin Smith was not in the apartment when the officer arrived; however, Pickett was present and told Officer Gawlek that everything in the apartment belonged to his cousin, Smith. Pickett also provided the police officer with a photograph of his cousin. Smith was arrested on November 28, 1977, for possession of controlled substance. After the arrest, Smith stated that he knew from whom the officer obtained the picture and inculpatory information; no elaboration on this statement was made.\nAt the conclusion of the voir dire examination, and pursuant to the State\u2019s motion in limine, the trial court ruled that Officer Gawlek\u2019s testimony was irrelevant to the resolution of the issues involved in the case at bar. We consider this ruling to be correct, for as the trial court aptly pointed out to defense counsel: \u201cThe Court can\u2019t preclude you from calling witnesses at times, but one thing the Court has to seek to do and that is to keep things on track and to avoid being derailed and going off on tangents.\u201d\nSmith\u2019s arrest took place on November 28, 1977. Pickett\u2019s murder occurred on November 18, 1979. In essence, defendant\u2019s attorney requested the trial court to speculate on a theory of defense that presented facts which, in the light of logic, were clearly too remote in time to have probative value; defendant\u2019s offer of proof was therefore properly denied for lack of relevancy.\nV\nDefendant further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining his sentence. We disagree.\nIn Illinois, a sentencing court\u2019s determination of the punishment to be imposed involves consideration of the subjective circumstances presented in each individual case, such as the defendant\u2019s mentality; his habits; his general moral character; his abnormal or subnormal tendencies; and his natural inclination or aversion to commit crime. (People v. Dukett (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 432, 452, 308 N.E.2d 590, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 965, 42 L. Ed. 2d 180, 95 S. Ct. 226.) In addition to providing for the possibility of the offender\u2019s rehabilitation, we recognize that the lower court is also charged with the \u201cdelicate responsibility\u201d of fashioning a sentence that will protect the interests of society. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 368 N.E.2d 882.\nIn the present case, it is suggested that the trial court was unconcerned with defendant\u2019s mitigating circumstances. To the contrary, however, we discern careful consideration of all relevant factors in aggravation as well as mitigation. The court stated during the sentencing hearing that \u201c[t]he defendant was a policeman in the army, he has a high school education, he has sought to attend college.\u201d The court considered the presentence investigation report which not only revealed defendant\u2019s personal traits and family situation, but also his unsatisfactory probation record and criminal history of unlawful use of weapons. Further, the court provided defendant\u2019s lawyer with ample opportunity, which he fully utilized, for argument in mitigation. In fact, as a prelude to this argument, defendant himself took the stand and testified as to his educational, athletic, military, religious and employment background. It is therefore amiss for defendant to now assert that the trial court completely failed to take into account mitigating factors.\nThe final citation of error for review concerns the propriety of the lower court\u2019s determination that defendant was eligible to receive an extended term of imprisonment.\nWithout question, sentencing judges are vested with wide discretion in order to permit reasoned judgments as to the punishment appropriate to the particular circumstances presented in each case. (People v. LaPointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 431 N.E.2d 344.) Within this broad discretionary framework, a trial court may impose an extended term of imprisonment upon any offender, at least 17 years old on the date the crime was committed, who is \u201cconvicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(2).) It was on this statutory provision in the Unified Code of Corrections that the trial court premised its determination that an extended-term sentence was warranted in light of the brutal and abhorrent conduct accompanying the instant offenses.\nFrom our review of the record, it is readily discernible that the sentencing judge was faced with the task of imposing on defendant a penalty that was commensurate with the degree of seriousness involved in the offenses he committed. Before rendition of the sentence, the court aptly commented on the especially brutal method employed to kill the victims: \u201cThey were literally blown away, literally blown away *** it had been determined that they were going to die and they had no alternative to do anything except die.\u201d\nAs we stated in a recent case involving an identical attack on the imposition of an extended-term sentence under section 5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b), \u201c[tjo characterize this action as if it was an everyday occurrence to which society\u2019s sense of outrage has become immune is ludicrous. We find defendant\u2019s acts to be clearly indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d People v. Hudson (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 346, 353, 430 N.E.2d 51, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 554.\nThe instant record evinces that the sentence imposed upon defendant was rendered after full consideration of all factors presented in aggravation and mitigation. In view of the brutal and heinous nature of the execution-style murders as well as the execution-style attempted murder, the trial court correctly held that an extended term was necessary to serve the ends of justice in this case. We are therefore of the opinion that defendant\u2019s 80-year sentence should not be reduced. As the State concedes, however, the sentencing order incorrectly reflects six counts of murder. Since defendant was convicted for the murder of two people, the lower court\u2019s order shall be corrected accordingly.\nVI\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, an indigent offender can be assessed costs in the appellate court upon affirmance of his conviction. (People v. Nicholls (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 166, 175-76, 374 N.E.2d 194.) As a result, under the authority of Nicholls and section 8 of \u201cAn Act concerning fees and salaries ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 53, par. 8), we assess defendant $50 in costs for the State\u2019s defense of the instant appeal and hereby incorporate it as part of this judgment. However, the State\u2019s request for an additional $25 for oral argument is denied. This denial is predicated on our interpretation of the per diem provision of the statute (\u201cFor each day actually employed in the trial of a case, $25\u201d) as referring to an actual trial in the circuit court, rather than an oral argument before this court.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the State\u2019s motion to strike is granted; the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed; and the order of sentence and commitment is to be corrected in accordance with the views expressed herein.\nHARTMAN, P.J., and STAMOS, J., concur.\nOne of two cases simultaneously tried before separate juries. The second jury trial, involving the prosecution of Calvin Thompson, was presumably requested due to the incriminatory nature of defendant\u2019s statement.\nThe value of a stolen automobile was not listed in the records of the Chicago Police Department, Identification Section.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven Clark and Karen Daniel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, James Bigoness, and LuAnn Rodi, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE REESE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81\u20142627\nOpinion filed February 14, 1984.\nSteven Clark and Karen Daniel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, James Bigoness, and LuAnn Rodi, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0977-01", "first_page_order": 999, "last_page_order": 1013 }