{ "id": 3521855, "name": "THELMA MINFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E. ALLEN BERNARDI, Director, Illinois Department of Labor, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Marshall Field and Company, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Minfield v. Bernardi", "decision_date": "1984-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141462", "first_page": "97", "last_page": "103", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 97" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 N.Y.S.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 App. Div. 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.", "case_ids": [ 2819561, 2813942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad/278/1037-01", "/ad/278/1037-02" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.W.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Mich. App. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2194768 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/101/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.W.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Mich. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1884827 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/363/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 A.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716760 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 A.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.J. Super. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 509407 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/85/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 A.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Pa. Commw. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1876305 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/26/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 A.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1148" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Pa. Commw. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1891109 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/38/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 P.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2095070 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/25/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.Y.S.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 App. Div. 2d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 2984737, 2983646 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/52/1003-02", "/ad2d/52/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 A.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Pa. Commw. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1861626 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/15/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672690 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.Y.S.2d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 App. Div. 2d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 5563732, 5559214 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/32/0697-02", "/ad2d/32/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991536 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3270251 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3147836 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3266824 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1070", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5478299 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405034 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2884532 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3181799 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163990 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 13200, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.924133502559672e-07, "percentile": 0.8468626935392758 }, "sha256": "b4e9886b16babf30de984a0b1be859f4add84e3ebd0f6008cb70ed6310fdaf4e", "simhash": "1:b9e7f6a10fa344f8", "word_count": 2170 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:51.597464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THELMA MINFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E. ALLEN BERNARDI, Director, Illinois Department of Labor, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Marshall Field and Company, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThelma Minfield (plaintiff) has appealed from an order affirming denial by the Department of Labor (department) of plaintiff\u2019s claim for unemployment compensation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.). The briefs before us are unnecessarily enlarged and cite many unnecessary cases. As we view the record here, we find one dispositive issue: whether plaintiff is entitled to unemployment compensation based upon her last employment with Marshall Field and Company (Field\u2019s).\nPrior to December 9, 1981, plaintiff worked full time for the city of Chicago and also worked part time for Field\u2019s. On December 9, 1981, plaintiff was discharged by the city of Chicago. Neither the circuit court nor this court is concerned with or has jurisdiction over the relationship and the rights of the parties as regards plaintiff\u2019s employment with the city of Chicago.\nHowever, on January 3, 1982, plaintiff left her work at Field\u2019s after her request for full-time work had been denied. Plaintiff applied for compensation. The referee and the Board of Review denied plaintiff\u2019s claim. The circuit court affirmed the denial. Plaintiff appealed to this court.\nThe record before us shows the following facts. Plaintiff had worked to support her eight-year-old son, who has a speech problem and a learning disability. Her part-time wages from her employment at Field\u2019s were insufficient to pay her expenses, including the cost of a baby-sitter.\nAt the hearing plaintiff told the referee she left her employment at Field\u2019s because, \u201cI needed more money. I couldn\u2019t afford to pay my baby-sitter. I needed more hours. They said they didn\u2019t have any available. They had a freeze on hiring.\u201d Plaintiff told the referee she was being paid the agreed rate by Field\u2019s. This employer did not cause her to leave or do anything to break the contract of hire.\nIn denying plaintiff\u2019s claim the Board of Review found:\n\u201c*** the evidence established that the claimant left work because she was dissatisfied with the amount of money which she had received working only part time. This is not good cause attributable to the employer within the meaning of the statute.\u201d\nPlaintiff has raised other issues before reaching the merits of her claim to compensation:\nI\nOn March 28, 1983, the trial judge, upon consideration of the record and arguments of the parties, entered an order finding plaintiff was discharged by the city of Chicago for misconduct and plaintiff was therefore ineligible for benefits based on her city employment. The trial judge also found the decision that plaintiff voluntarily left work from Field's without good cause was \u201cagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d The trial court therefore ordered that plaintiff was eligible for benefits based on her earnings from Field\u2019s \u201cif she was otherwise able and available.\u201d\nWithin 30 days plaintiff filed a timely post-trial motion. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1203.) The motion stated that the trial court had no jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits based upon her employment with the city of Chicago. Plaintiff stated no appeal had been taken from the referee\u2019s decision concerning the city employment.\nOn May 11, 1983, the trial judge considered plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion in open court and heard argument of counsel. At that time, which was more than 30 days after judgment, the department filed a written \u201cresponse\u201d to plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion. The department prayed that the post-trial motion be denied and alternatively for a decision that plaintiff left her employment with Field\u2019s without good cause.\nAfter this hearing, on May 11,. 1983, the trial court entered an order which vacated the previous order of March 28, 1983. The court ordered that plaintiff was denied benefits based upon her employment with Field\u2019s. This order did not mention plaintiff\u2019s employment with the city. The within appeal followed.\nWe hold the timely post-trial motion filed by plaintiff prevented the judgment from finality after the expiration of 30 days. (See In re Marriage of Uphoff (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 90, 95.) The timely post-trial motion gave the trial court complete jurisdiction over the entire matter \u201cuntil the disposition of any pending post-trial motion.\u201d (In re Marriage of Parello (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 926, 931-32, 409 N.E.2d 461, and cases there cited. See also In re Marriage of Uphoff (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 90, 95.) The fact that the department\u2019s post-trial motion or \u201cresponse\u201d was not timely filed as regards this 30-day period did not affect the power of the trial court to modify the judgment entered March 28, 1983. (Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 103, 210 N.E.2d 191; see also Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457, 460, 308 N.E.2d 611.) Consequently we find and conclude that the trial court had full and complete jurisdiction to' enter the order of May 11, 1983.\nPlaintiff relies primarily upon Putz v. Schulte (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 128, 432 N.E.2d 1070. The court there held that a late post-trial motion should not have been considered by the trial court and the decision in In re Marriage of Parello would not require the court to reach a different conclusion. Putz may affect the viability of defendant\u2019s motion or \u201cresponse.\u201d However, that fact is fundamentally irrelevant. Putz does not affect the applicability of Freeman which holds that once a timely post-trial motion is filed the trial court may modify any aspect, of the original judgment on its own motion. See Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 103,106.\nII\nPlaintiff criticizes the hearing held by the referee. Plaintiff contends the referee denied her a fair hearing because he did not fulfill his duty to ascertain all of the pertinent facts surrounding plaintiff\u2019s claim. See Flores v. Board of Review (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 667, 393 N.E.2d 638.\nOur study of the hearing in question convinces us the referee allowed plaintiff a complete opportunity to explain her reasons for leaving her employment with Field\u2019s. The referee\u2019s questions to plaintiff were nonadversarial and not leading. Plaintiff honestly told the referee her reasons for leaving her job as above set forth. At the end of the hearing, the referee asked plaintiff if there was anything additional she wished to state for the record. Plaintiff replied simply that she left employment with Field\u2019s because she was not making enough money. The referee was apprised of all the pertinent facts which have since been submitted to this court. Therefore, we conclude plaintiff was granted a fair and impartial hearing and was afforded due process of law. See Yadro v. Bowling (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 889, 895, 414 N.E.2d 1244.\nIII\nPlaintiff contends she received no notice of her right to counsel. The department responds that its practice is to mail an instruction sheet to each claimant with the notice of hearing. This sheet states that although legal services are \u201cnot necessary,\u201d either an attorney \u201cor someone else\u201d may represent or assist the claimant at the hearing. Plaintiff responds there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever received such an instruction sheet.\nIn any event, in our opinion, this point raised by plaintiff is meaningless. Plaintiff had the right to appear pro se or with counsel as she chose. In this type of situation, plaintiff has waived counsel and was therefore responsible for conducting her own case. (Bard v. Harvey (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 16, 21, 392 N.E.2d 371.) We will add that plaintiff was not prejudiced in any manner by her failure to have counsel. Indeed, if such prejudice had ever existed, it would have been more than overcome by the thorough and lengthy presentation of plaintiff\u2019s counsel in the trial court and in this court.\nIV\nPlaintiff contends the referee and the Board of Review failed to make findings of fact. We reject this contention. The referee made a specific finding of fact that plaintiff quit her part-time job because it was not paying enough to live on. The referee also expressed the conclusion that the fact that plaintiff left work was not attributable to the employer and therefore plaintiff left without \u201cgood cause\u201d as defined in the statute. The Board of Review similarly found that the evidence established that claimant left work because she was dissatisfied with the amount of money she would receive working only part time. Both the referee and the Board of Review made good and sufficient findings of fact. See Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 314, 326, 388 N.E.2d 398.\nV\nTurning at long last to the merits of the present litigation, we agree with the determination of the department\u2019s Board of Review that plaintiff\u2019s decision to leave the employ of Field\u2019s because of her dissatisfaction with wages and hours did not constitute \u201cgood cause attributable to the employer within the meaning of the statute.\u201d See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 431(a).\nThe litigants have not cited, nor have we discovered, a similar case in Illinois. However, we have found cases from other jurisdictions which have concluded that dissatisfaction with wages paid does not constitute good cause voluntarily to leave employment. See, e.g., Weber v. Catherwood (1969), 32 App. Div. 2d 697, 299 N.Y.S.2d 957; Harris v. Daniels (1978), 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954; Mosley v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1974), 15 Pa. Commw. 447, 327 A.2d 199.\nSimilarly, courts have determined that dissatisfaction with the number of working hours does not constitute good cause to leave employment. In White v. Levine (1976), 52 App. Div. 2d 1003, 383 N.Y.S.2d 438, the court held that the employee\u2019s refusal to accept a reduction of working hours did not constitute good cause. (Accord, Hedrick v. Employment Division (Or. App. 1976), 548 P.2d 526.) In Keiper v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1978), 38 Pa. Commw. 117, 120, 391 A.2d 1146, 1148, the claimant testified \u201c[I] wasn\u2019t getting my 40 hours a week and I was disgusted and I quit.\u201d The court held such a reason did not constitute good cause for leaving employment. Accord, Owen v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1976), 26 Pa. Commw. 278, 363 A.2d 852.\nFinally, in Zielenski v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, Department of Labor & Industry (1964), 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52, 203 A.2d 635, 638, the court stated:\n\u201cClaimant\u2019s primary reason for voluntarily quitting his job *** was the unsteadiness of the job and the fact that he was working, on an average, only one or two days a week at a daily wage of $24.40. But this did not constitute good cause for giving up this partial employment for no employment at all.\n* * *\n***. The employee who works at an unsteady employment, averaging only one or two days a week at his accustomed trade, may well be dissatisfied with his job and seek another which provides more regular employment and better weekly wages. But he has a reasonable opportunity to pursue that course on the days when he is not working ***.\u201d\nIn the case at bar, it is clear from plaintiff\u2019s own testimony that she left her employment at Field\u2019s because she was dissatisfied with the amount of money she was earning and because Field\u2019s would not give her full-time employment. It is also clear that Field\u2019s did nothing which altered the terms, conditions, hours, or compensation of the job plaintiff originally accepted.\nPlaintiff relies on five cases all of which we find distinguishable from the case at bar:\nIn Keystone Steel & Wire Division v. Department of Labor (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 704, 346 N.E.2d 399, and Brainard v. Unemployment Compensation Com. (Del. Super. Ct. 1950), 76 A.2d 126, the compensation paid by the employer to the claimant was substantially reduced. On the contrary, in the case at bar, the compensation paid by Field\u2019s to plaintiff remained constant.\nIn Lyons v. Appeal Board (1961), 363 Mich. 201, 108 N.W.2d 849, and Laya v. Cebar Construction Co. (1981), 101 Mich. App. 26, 300 N.W.2d 439, claimants left employment which was over 270 miles from their homes and families. Clearly no such factor is present in the case at bar.\nFinally, in In re Claim of Marcus (1951), 278 App. Div. 1037, 106 N.Y.S.2d 901, the claimant quit employment as an alternate taxi driver where he was obliged to arrive on the job daily without any assurance that he would work any hours that day. On the contrary, in the case at bar, plaintiff\u2019s employment with Field\u2019s was dependable with assured hours and compensation.\nThe judgment appealed from is accordingly affirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Legal Assistance Foundation, of Chicago (Jeffrey B. Gilbert, Timothy Huizenga, and Michael Pardys, of counsel), for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Susan C. Weidel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THELMA MINFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E. ALLEN BERNARDI, Director, Illinois Department of Labor, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Marshall Field and Company, Defendant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 83\u20141462\nOpinion filed February 6, 1984.\nRehearing denied March 20, 1984.\nLegal Assistance Foundation, of Chicago (Jeffrey B. Gilbert, Timothy Huizenga, and Michael Pardys, of counsel), for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Susan C. Weidel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0097-01", "first_page_order": 119, "last_page_order": 125 }