{ "id": 3523741, "name": "In re Marriage of CHARLES RUSSELL SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and CAROL JO SMITH, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Smith", "decision_date": "1984-01-19", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201483\u20140230", "first_page": "213", "last_page": "218", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 213" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106858 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163990 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3114591 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3225794 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 1087", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501239 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476244 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0031-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 10116, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.173274113081918e-08, "percentile": 0.38315843896690505 }, "sha256": "5b5c1abeb88699b131d5998d3775f108b0445caf283e8fb149e55cebdb76e2a0", "simhash": "1:0921f4bf3d0e46fc", "word_count": 1663 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:51.597464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re Marriage of CHARLES RUSSELL SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and CAROL JO SMITH, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCharles and Carol Smith separately appeal several of the financial decisions that the circuit court made in dissolving their marriage, which lasted 11 years and produced two children. The Smiths were married in 1971; a daughter was born in 1974, and a son was born in 1975. The marriage was dissolved April 1, 1982. Charles and Carol are in their thirties.\nCharles farms in partnership with his father, Roy. In the farming partnership Charles and his father own and operate a 160-acre farm, where they cultivate crops and raise livestock. In addition to this, the partners cultivate 350 other acres. Income and expenses are shared equally. From 1977 to 1980, Charles\u2019 income ranged between $30,000 and $11,000; in 1981 he lost about $9,000. These amounts include various tax credits and capital gains in addition to income derived from the farming operations. Charles calculated that his annual living expenses were about $14,300.\nCarol is a registered nurse and works full time at a hospital in Jacksonville. She worked throughout the marriage except when she took maternity leave. At the time of the property hearing \u2014 September 1982 \u2014 her take-home pay was $450 every other week, and her gross pay was $625. She had no large assets or liabilities. She listed about $15,700 in annual expenses for her and the two children.\nThe circuit court found that the Smiths\u2019 wedding rings were their only items of nonmarital property and assigned them accordingly. The Smiths\u2019 marital property was concentrated in the farm and in the usual articles of domestic life. The circuit court awarded each spouse about $3,200 worth of household goods and about $5,500 worth of vehicles. Charles was awarded his two life insurance policies, which together had a cash surrender value of about $2,400 at that time. All the rest of the marital property comprised Charles\u2019 interest in the farm and share of the partnership assets and was awarded to him. The circuit court assigned the farm a value of $382,950, exclusive of growing crops, so Charles\u2019 half interest was worth $191,475. His farm machinery was worth $14,600. His share of the hogs and cattle on hand was worth about $110,000, and he had about $1,200 in a miscellaneous farm account. Charles was ordered to pay Carol $5,000 a year for six years, a total of $30,000, with interest, in lieu of marital property.\nThe circuit court assigned to Charles liabilities of $390,000, almost all of which were related to the farm and partnership, and freed Carol from any responsibility for them.\nThe parties do not dispute the circuit court\u2019s valuation of their assets and liabilities, though Charles correctly points out that the assets he received were worth $330,000, $10,000 less than the sum calculated by the court. Under the circumstances, the difference is insignificant.\nCarol was awarded custody of the two children, and Charles was ordered to pay $200 per month per child for support, reduced by half during the four weeks out of every year they are to spend with him on extended visitation. The court did not award maintenance and ordered each spouse to pay his or her own attorney fees.\nPROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE\nCharles, in his appeal, argues that the circuit judge awarded Carol an excessive amount of money in lieu of marital property and should have entered an order barring her from obtaining maintenance in the future. Carol, in her cross-appeal, argues that the circuit judge erred in denying her maintenance: in ruling on Charles\u2019 post-judgment motion the court struck its original award of $100 per month.\nA division of property will be affirmed unless it represents an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Aschwanden (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 31, 411 N.E.2d 238.) Here, the circuit judge was aware that his division of the marital assets and debts was leaving Charles with a negative net worth but believed that the numerals did not accurately portray the underlying facts. The circuit judge referred to Roy Smith, Charles\u2019 father and partner, as Charles\u2019 personal banker. The court understood that the relationship between Roy and Charles is not the traditional one of creditor and debtor, for father and son are partners in a family enterprise. The circuit judge also believed that Roy and Charles had an informal understanding that Charles would eventually own the entire farm through either gift or devise. The record does not contain direct evidence of this intention, though one could perhaps infer it from the family\u2019s circumstances.\nMost important, the circuit judge thought that Charles would earn more money than Carol but that none of the marital assets that were related to the farm could be awarded to her practicably. Given the duration of the marriage and the small amount of marital property assigned to Carol, awarding her a total of $30,000 in cash in lieu of property was appropriate. Although Charles is responsible for all the marital debts, he also has the great bulk of the marital property. The farm debts and assets should remain in one person. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Carol $30,000 in lieu of property and in making the award payable in installments. In re Marriage of Hellwig (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 452, 426 N.E.2d 1087.\nIn making this award the circuit court\u2019s order said, \u201cPetitioner shall pay Respondent cash in lieu of an award of marital property the sum of Thirty Thousand and No/100 (30,000.00) Dollars payable in six (6) equal annual installments of Five Thousand and No/100 ($5,000.00) Dollars each beginning January 10, 1983, with interest thereon at the rate applicable to money judgments.\u201d Charles argues that the order is ambiguous and asks whether he must pay interest on the entire unpaid balance \u2014 which he believes would be unfair \u2014 or only on payments that are overdue. We construe the order as imposing interest on the unpaid balance; Charles may add the interest for each installment to that installment as it comes due. This will compensate Carol for the delayed use of those sums; it is an appropriate price for Charles to pay for the benefit of an installment rather than lump-sum method of payment.\nCarol argues that the circuit court\u2019s original award to her of $100 per month in maintenance should be reinstated. In ruling on Charles\u2019 post-judgment motion the circuit judge vacated that award because he believed that Carol herself was responsible for her lack of job security; her job insecurity was one of the reasons why the court initially awarded maintenance.\nMaintenance should be awarded only when the spouse requesting it lacks sufficient assets and income to provide for his or her needs. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 504(a).) Carol\u2019s full-time though temporary employment and the five-year award of cash make maintenance unnecessary. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carol maintenance.\nFinally, Charles argues that the circuit court should have entered an order barring Carol from obtaining maintenance in the future. In In re Marriage of Edelstein (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 574, 403 N.E.2d 323, a spouse was denied maintenance and barred from obtaining it in the future. We do not see either the necessity or significance of entering a similar order here. If an initial denial of maintenance is later modifiable, then, absent the parties\u2019 prior agreement to the contrary, an order foreclosing it in the future would also be modifiable.\nCHILD SUPPORT\nCharles argues that the amount he must pay for support of the two children \u2014 $200 per month per child \u2014 is excessive. This amount is reduced by half for the period when the children are with him on extended visitation. Carol argues against that reduction.\nThe amount awarded for child support is reserved to the circuit judge\u2019s discretion. (In re Marriage of Rizzo (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 636, 420 N.E.2d 555.) Here, the court thoroughly considered the parties\u2019 separate financial circumstances and the standard of living that the children would have enjoyed had their parents\u2019 marriage stayed intact. The court\u2019s result is not an abuse of discretion.\nCarol argues in her cross-appeal that the circuit court erred in reducing the amount of support in half during the yearly four-week period of Charles\u2019 extended visitation. The court made this reduction in ruling on Charles\u2019 post-judgment motion. The reduction is reasonable and appropriate, for Carol will not be bearing the children\u2019s day-to-day expenses during that part of the year.\nATTORNEY FEES\nCarol argues that Charles should have been ordered to pay her attorney fees, which were about $3,000. Charles has moved to dismiss this part of the cross-appeal as untimely. Unlike the two other issues Carol raises in her cross-appeal, the attorney fees question was determined by the circuit court\u2019s judgment, entered January 4, 1983, and does not arise from the disposition of the one post-judgment motion, Charles\u2019, on March 16, 1983. The appeal and cross-appeal were filed March 29 and April 7.\nThe motion to dismiss this part of the cross-appeal was taken with the case, and we now deny it. The supreme court\u2019s recent opinion in In re Marriage of Uphoff (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 90, establishes that the time for appealing or cross-appealing did not begrh to run until the circuit court\u2019s disposition of Charles\u2019 post-judgment motion.\nThe decision whether to allow one spouse to recover his or her attorney fees from the other spouse is reserved to the circuit court\u2019s discretion. (Hofmann v. Hofmann (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 205, 446 N.E.2d 499.) That discretion was not abused here. Charles\u2019 financial circumstances are not so much better than Carol\u2019s that he should be required to discharge this additional expense.\nAffirmed.\nTRAPP and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLER" } ], "attorneys": [ "I. J. Feuer, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Richard T. Mitchell, of Jacksonville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re Marriage of CHARLES RUSSELL SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and CAROL JO SMITH, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201483\u20140230\nOpinion filed January 19, 1984.\nRehearing denied April 3, 1984.\nI. J. Feuer, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRichard T. Mitchell, of Jacksonville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0213-01", "first_page_order": 235, "last_page_order": 240 }