{ "id": 3522885, "name": "THOMAS L. FORTAS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA A. DIXON, Defendant-Appellant (Michael E. LaVelle et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Fortas v. Dixon", "decision_date": "1984-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 84\u2014434", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "704", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 697" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5304078 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5471255 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3075200 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069499 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5434877 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524142 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5810309 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 814", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181588 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818-19" }, { "page": "6" }, { "page": "1496" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027224 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "1976" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11721475 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "101" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 709", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180289 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "1320" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200638 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "1570" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "568" }, { "page": "1578-79" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 F. Supp. 1136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3672113 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/587/1136-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 17400, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7827967635227943e-07, "percentile": 0.835276689876514 }, "sha256": "affdc7eea1a3dfaac6a602b8f98ee680a9d1da983f7a9711ffe729f68d728b2c", "simhash": "1:9d8a99f8673f36dc", "word_count": 2834 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:51.597464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS L. FORTAS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA A. DIXON, Defendant-Appellant (Michael E. LaVelle et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Thomas Fortas, brought this action to review a decision of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners overruling certain objections he had filed in relation to the nominating petition of defendant Patricia Dixon, a candidate for democratic ward committeeman of the first ward. Plaintiff argued that the board had erred in refusing to strike all the names on several sheets of the nominating petition where he had demonstrated that the circulators of the various sheets had filed false affidavits in connection with the circulation of these sheets. The trial court found that the ruling of the electoral board \u201coverruling all of the objections to the nominating papers of Patricia A. Dixon [was] contrary to law and the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d After striking the additional names from the nominating petition of defendant, she did not have the number of signatures required by statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10). Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the name of candidate Dixon not be printed on the primary ballot. We granted defendant\u2019s request for an expedited appeal to this court.\nThe record reveals as follows. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the nominating petition of defendant, alleging a number of deficiencies and improprieties. The only objections at issue in this appeal deal with plaintiff\u2019s contention that certain signatures were invalid because the persons who presented the various sheets of the nominating petition to the signers were not the persons who signed the circulator\u2019s affidavit. On January 9, 1984, the board\u2019s hearing examiner conducted a hearing on the validity of the candidate\u2019s nominating petition. During this hearing, plaintiff presented several witnesses and numerous affidavits in support of his allegations.\nIn particular, the following testimony was elicited. Oliver Gregory testified that he had personally circulated three sheets of the petition; sheets 1, 41, and 91. Sheets 1 and 41 bore the signature and affidavit of Ardelia Jones as circulator and sheet 91 was signed by Maxine Spencer as circulator. Sheets 5, 95, and 113 were all subscribed by a man, A. C. Kelly, as circulator. Ardelia Page and Lottie Judkins testified that they signed sheet 5 of defendant\u2019s nominating petition which was presented to them by Carolyn Johnson. Neither of them recalled any men accompanying Ms. Johnson. Frances Schaeffer testified that she signed sheet 95 which was presented to her by a \u201cfemale Spanish girl.\u201d Sharon Frazier, O. C. Frazier, and Cynthia Schaeffer signed at the same time. 0. C. Frazier corroborated the testimony of his grandmother, Frances Schaeffer, and identified the circulator as a person known to him as \u201cBecky.\u201d A close examination of sheet 95 revealed that the name of Rebecca Rivera was whited-out and the name of A. C. Kelly was written over the whiteout of sheet 95, as circulator. James Rhodes testified that he signed sheet 113, which was presented to him by a black woman who was alone. In addition, 17 affidavits were admitted in evidence to the effect that the person presenting the affiants the various sheets which they had signed was not A. C. Kelly. Frances Carter testified that she signed sheet 10 and identified Carolyn Johnson as the circulator. She further testified that no other persons were with Ms. Johnson when she signed the sheet. The circulator\u2019s affidavit was subscribed by Ardelia Jones. William Stevenson testified that he signed sheet 47 and identified Carolyn Jones as the circulator and further testified that no other woman was with her. The circulator\u2019s affidavit for sheet 47 was subscribed by Maxine Spencer.\nOn January 12, 1984, the hearing examiner announced his ruling on pending matters. Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to the signatures on sheet 1 were overruled on the ground that the objector had failed to properly specify the nature of his objections in the appendix of his petition. However, sheets 41 and 91 were struck in their entirety. On the other sheets challenged by plaintiff, the hearing examiner sustained objections as to all specific signatures where plaintiff produced evidence, either in person or by affidavit, from voters purporting to show that a person other than the circulator named on the sheet had presented the petition to the voters. A total of 74 signatures were thus stricken. The examiner overruled objections to other signatures appearing on the sheets which were alleged to have been circulated by someone other than the person signing the circulator\u2019s oath.\nOn January 16, 1984, the board entered its decision finding that defendant had 35 signatures over the statutory minimum. On judicial review, the trial court struck all the remaining names on those sheets where there was evidence that someone other than the person signing the circulator\u2019s oath had, in fact, circulated the sheet. This resulted in an additional 94 signatures being stricken from the candidate\u2019s nominating petition and an order was entered prohibiting defendant\u2019s name from appearing on the ballot. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nSection 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10) requires that anyone circulating a nominating petition execute a circulator\u2019s affidavit in which the circulator is to certify:\n\u201c*** ^at the signatures on that sheet of the petition were signed in his presence, and are genuine, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief the persons so signing were at the time of signing the petitions qualified voters of the political party for which a nomination is sought.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10.\nThis portion of section 7 \u2014 10 has been strictly enforced by the courts of this State, which have viewed the circulators\u2019 oath as an important way to safeguard fair and honest elections. In Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 469, 404 N.E.2d 180, the supreme court invalidated the signatures collected by a circulator who had failed to appear before a notary to have his signature acknowledged. Similarly, in Havens v. Miller (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 558, 429 N.E.2d 1292, various petitions were stricken because the circulators had failed to provide an affidavit certifying that the persons who had signed the petition were qualified primary electors. Cf. Madden v. Schumann (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 900, 435 N.E.2d 176 (requiring substantial compliance with the affidavit requirement).\nHere, the situation is more serious than in Bowe and Havens. The sheets purportedly circulated by A. C. Kelly clearly evidenced a pattern of fraud, false swearing, and total disregard for the mandatory requirements of the Election Code. In one instance, Kelly went so far as to white-out the name of the person who had obviously circulated the sheet and inserted his own name as circulator.\nIt is well established that the trial court may reverse a decision of the electoral board when it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Williams v. Butler (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 532, 341 N.E.2d 394.) We believe plaintiff had clearly sustained his burden of proving Kelly had not personally circulated sheets 95, 113, and 5 and that Kelly\u2019s oath to the contrary was false. The testimony and affidavits adduced at the hearing could lead to no other conclusion. Accordingly, all the signatures on these sheets should have been stricken by the electoral board since the sheets did not contain the notarized affidavit of the actual circulator. This would have resulted in the deletion of an additional 32 signatures from the candidate\u2019s nominating petition.\nSimilarly, we believe the board erred in refusing to strike all the names on sheet 1. The unrebutted testimony of Oliver Gregory was that he had circulated this sheet, not the woman, Ardelia Jones that had signed the circulator\u2019s affidavit. The board had sustained objections to sheets 41 and 91 based on the similar testimony of Gregory but refused to strike sheet 1 because it had not been properly set forth in the objector\u2019s appendix. The hearing officer stated:\n\u201cSince this particular objection does not fall \"within any of the three noted in the Board rules, I must deny it. I will note, however, that the testimony of Mr. Gregory was fairly clear, that the person who signed the affidavit, according to the records, are [s-ic] Ardelia Jones, was not the one who signed the sheet.\nSo I am \u2014 obviously, the objector is not foreclosed from raising whatever points he may wish to do so in the future and in other forms. But based on my understanding of the Board practice and procedure and Board precedent, I am constrained to rule that way.\u201d\nWe find the trial court properly reversed the board\u2019s decision with respect to sheet 1. As the trial court correctly realized \u201cwhen in the course of hearing objections to nominating papers, evidence beyond specific objections comes to the electoral board\u2019s attention, it cannot close its eyes and ears if evidence is relevant to the protection of the electoral process.\u201d Accordingly, we find the trial court properly deleted the 23 names appearing on sheet 1.\nWhile we have some reservations with respect to whether other sheets were properly stricken in their entirety by the trial court, we do not deem it necessary to engage in a thorough analysis with respect to these sheets. The 55 signatures we have held to be properly stricken from the candidate\u2019s petition already place her well below the statutory minimum requirement for having her name placed on the ballot.\nIn view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment reversing the electoral board and ordering that the name of Patricia A. Dixon not be printed on the March 20,1984, primary ballot.\nAffirmed.\nMcGLOON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL,\ndissenting:\nI agree with the well-reasoned opinion of Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners (N.D. Ill., 1984), 587 E Supp. 1136) and, therefore, would reverse the result reached by the circuit court and leave defendant\u2019s name on the ballot.\nIn an order issued March 8, 1984, Judge Marvin Aspen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the minimum signature requirements set forth in section 7 \u2014 10(i) of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10(i)) are unconstitutional. (Smith v. Board of Election Commissioners (N.D. Ill., 1984), 587 F. Supp. 1136.) The board of election commissioners had determined that four named plaintiffs, candidates for the position of ward committeeman in the city of Chicago, will not appear on the ballot for the March 20, 1984, election because they failed to submit sufficient valid signatures on their nominating petitions to meet the 10% requirements of section 7 \u2014 10(i).\nSection 7 \u2014 10(i) specifies that a candidate for the position of ward committeeman must submit petitions for nomination signed by not less than 10% of the primary electors of his party in his ward. The number of primary electors is equal to the total votes cast for the candidate from the same political party who received the most votes in the last regular election in that district. In contrast, section 7 \u2014 10(i) requires that candidates for the position of township committeeman need submit nominating petitions signed by only 5% of the primary electors in their district. Plaintiffs argued before the district court that this legislative classification based on geography violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.\nThe district court recognized that minimum signature requirements on nominating petitions may injure a voter\u2019s right to associate with the political party of their choice by excluding candidates from the ballot. (Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983), 460 U.S. 780, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 103 S. Ct. 1564.) The right of a party or an individual to be placed on the ballot is entitled to protection since it is intertwined with the associational rights of voters. Lubin v. Panish (1974), 415 U.S. 709, 716, 39 L. Ed. 2d 702, 708, 94 S. Ct. 1315,1320.\nIn evaluating the constitutionality of ballot access restrictions the district court followed the analysis utilized in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which required that a court must:\n\u201cfirst consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff\u2019s rights.\u201d (Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983), 460 U.S. 780, 789, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 558, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1570.)\nA court also must consider if there is a less burdensome alternative through which a State might reach its goals. 460 U.S. 780, 805, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 568, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1578-79.\nThe district court found important the State\u2019s interest in establishing a signature requirement to insure that ballots remain within manageable, understandable limits, to avoid voter confusion, to eliminate frivolous candidates and to require a modicum of support prior to placing a candidate\u2019s name on the ballot. See Lubin; Bullock v. Carter (1972), 405 U.S. 134, 145, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 101, 92 S. Ct. 849, 857; Jenness v. Fortson (1971), 403 U.S. 431, 442, 29 L. Ed. 2d 554, 562, 91 S. Ct. 1970, 1976.\nThe court found, however, that the evidence in the record indicated no significant differences between the offices of ward committeeman and township committeeman which would explain the disparate signature requirements and the more difficult burden placed on Chicago voters and candidates than upon township voters and candidates. The court was not convinced that gathering signatures in townships is more difficult than gathering signatures in the city. Nor was there any evidence that voter confusion, long ballots and frivolous candidates are a greater problem in the city than in the townships. Such an unjustified geographical classification, the court concluded, is contrary to the equality of citizens in the exercise of political rights. (Moore v. Ogilvie (1969), 394 U.S. 814, 818-19, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 1496.) The court determined that there are several less burdensome alternatives, including the elimination of the disparate signature requirements, by which the State could achieve its significant interests. Since the 5% rule presumably achieves the State\u2019s interests in the townships, the court reasoned that to apply the 5% rule to the city wards would allow the State to realize its interests while reducing the unequal burden on Chicago candidates. The district court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motions for preliminary injunctive relief and ordered that certain plaintiff candidates\u2019 names be placed on the ballot for the upcoming election.\nCounsel for defendant Patricia Dixon brought the Smith decision to the attention of this court and although defendant has not challenged the constitutionality of section 7 \u2014 10(i), I am constrained to adopt the rationale employed by the Federal district court. The weight of the burden of the 10% signature requirement and the State\u2019s inability to justify the disparate signature requirements between ward and township committeeman warrant sua sponte consideration of the constitutionality of section 7 \u2014 10(i).\nI recognize that as a general rule decisions of the United States district and circuit courts are not binding upon Illinois courts. (City v. Chicago v. Groffman (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 112, 383 N.E.2d 891.) Nevertheless, this court should give attention to a ruling of the Federal district court which finds an Illinois statute to be unconstitutional.\nDefendant has informed this court that she has moved to intervene in the action before Judge Aspen. While the practice of pursuing identical relief in separate courts is frowned upon, I must note that if her intervention in the Federal district court is allowed, defendant\u2019s name will appear on the ballot on March 20, 1984. During oral argument before this court, counsel for the defendant represented to this court that once the challenged signatures are removed, defendant\u2019s petition will still have sufficient valid signatures to meet the 5% rule. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the circuit court and order that defendant\u2019s name be placed on the ballot.\nThe case at bar was consolidated for the purpose of oral argument only with another case which raised issues concerning the sufficiency of nominating petitions submitted for ward committeeman, Watkins v. Bwrke (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 499. I would also apply the rationale of Smith to that case.\nIt is clear that a court may take judicial notice of other proceedings in other courts. People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164, 357 N.E.2d 792, 796.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL," } ], "attorneys": [ "James P. Chapman and Alan Mills, both of James P. Chapman and Associates, Ltd., and Thomas E. Johnson, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Andrew M. Raucci, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS L. FORTAS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA A. DIXON, Defendant-Appellant (Michael E. LaVelle et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 84\u2014434\nOpinion filed March 19, 1984.\nCAMPBELL, J., dissenting.\nJames P. Chapman and Alan Mills, both of James P. Chapman and Associates, Ltd., and Thomas E. Johnson, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nAndrew M. Raucci, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 719, "last_page_order": 726 }