{
  "id": 3524098,
  "name": "RUBENSTEIN LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.",
  "decision_date": "1984-03-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 82\u20143096",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:51.597464+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "RUBENSTEIN LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Rubenstein Lumber Company, sought a declaratory judgment that defendant, Aetna Life and Casualty Company, must defend and indemnify plaintiff in an action for retaliatory discharge brought against plaintiff by a former employee who had filed a claim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). The court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm.\nThe facts of this case are undisputed. On March 23, 1979, one of plaintiff\u2019s employees, who sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment, filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commission. This employee subsequently filed a complaint against plaintiff alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Retaliatory terminations are prohibited by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, which provides that \u201c[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer *** to discharge or to threaten to discharge, or to refuse to rehire or recall to active service in a suitable capacity an employee because of the exercise of his rights or remedies granted to him by this Act.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h).\nFrom July 1, 1978, to July 1, 1980, plaintiff paid premiums to defendant for a \u201cWorkmen\u2019s Compensation and Employers\u2019 Liability Policy.\u201d Under the policy, defendant agreed \u201c[t]o pay promptly when due all compensation and other benefits required of the Insured by the workmen\u2019s compensation law\u201d and to \u201cdefend any proceeding against the Insured seeking such benefits ***.\u2019\u2019\nThe issue here is whether, under the terms of the insurance policy, defendant is required to defend and indemnify plaintiff in the retaliatory discharge action. Plaintiff contends that the retaliatory discharge action, though a common law action, arises out of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and is therefore a proceeding within the meaning of the policy. Plaintiff further contends that the retaliatory discharge action seeks compensatory damages which constitute compensation within the meaning of the policy. We reject plaintiff\u2019s arguments.\nThe policy in this case does not require defendant to defend plaintiff in any proceeding, for the pertinent provision in the policy does not end with the word \u201cproceeding.\u201d Rather, the provision requires defendant to defend plaintiff in \u201cany proceeding against the Insured seeking such benefits ***.\u201d The benefits to which this provision refers are those described in the earlier \u201cCoverage A \u2014 Workmen\u2019s Compensation\u201d provision as \u201call compensation and other benefits required of the Insured by the workmen\u2019s compensation law.\u201d Thus, defendant agreed to defend plaintiff in any proceeding seeking compensation and other benefits required of the insured by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. We must therefore refer to the Act itself. Though the Act expressly prohibits retaliatory discharges (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h)), the Act does not provide for any compensation or benefits to an employee in the event that his employer violates the Act by discharging the employee in retaliation for filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim. While the tort of retaliatory discharge exists in order to uphold and implement public policy such as that mandated by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (see Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129-32, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79), it is independent of the prohibition against retaliatory discharge which is found in the Act itself (see Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-82, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357). In addition, compensatory damages, which have been defined as damages which make good or replace the loss caused by wrong or injury (see Cody v. American Educational Co. (1907), 131 Ill. App. 240, 242), are not within the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \u201ccompensation.\u201d Therefore, we believe that a tort action seeking compensatory damages as a result of a retaliatory discharge is not a proceeding seeking compensation and other benefits required of the employer by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. We conclude that under the terms of the policy here, defendant is not required to defend and indemnify plaintiff in the retaliatory discharge action brought by one of plaintiff\u2019s employees. Moreover, even if the policy was written to expressly require defendant to defend and indemnify plaintiff in the retaliatory discharge action, we believe that such a provision would be void as against public policy, for it would be an attempt to indemnify and insure the company for damages resulting from its voluntary misconduct. An agreement to indemnify or insure against one\u2019s voluntary, not accidental, misconduct is against public policy and unenforceable. See Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 494, 500-01, 336 N.E.2d 881, 885.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcGILLICUDDY and WHITE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE RIZZI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Frank Glazer, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Galliani and Kuzel, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "RUBENSTEIN LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 82\u20143096\nOpinion filed March 21, 1984.\nFrank Glazer, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nGalliani and Kuzel, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0717-01",
  "first_page_order": 739,
  "last_page_order": 741
}