{ "id": 3522423, "name": "AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOHN P. CARROLL, Indiv. and d/b/a Carroll Builders, Defendant-Appellant (Ziebell Water Service Products, Inc. et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Carroll", "decision_date": "1984-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141088", "first_page": "868", "last_page": "881", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 868" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5552146 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 817", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3158025 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2509841 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 1253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498979 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462287 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391903 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 N.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 931", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5313921 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625413 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 1255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626762 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0133-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1141, "char_count": 34135, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1153149936196095e-07, "percentile": 0.7637398937158112 }, "sha256": "4ee221acc7c983e7dea0314cdb357839363104efb47d0e6c56484b9a47bf9031", "simhash": "1:3e39e94fcd817fcf", "word_count": 5474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:51.597464+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOHN P. CARROLL, Indiv. and d/b/a Carroll Builders, Defendant-Appellant (Ziebell Water Service Products, Inc. et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WILSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, John P. Carroll, a land developer and builder, appeals from preliminary and permanent injunctions entered by the trial court enjoining him from tunnelling under plaintiff Fairfield\u2019s land in order to connect into water and sewer lines located therein. The issues presented for review are: (1) whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of an ordinance which, when complied with, entitles the village of Olympia Fields to receive certain property easements, and (2) the propriety of the issuance of preliminary and permanent injunctions. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.\nThe property involved in this litigation concerns a 112-acre residential development project, \u201cTrails of Olympia Fields,\u201d which was constructed by plaintiff Fairfield Service Corporation (Fairfield) located in the village of Olympia Fields, Illinois. Bordered by Vollmer Road along the north, 203d Street on the south, Governors Highway on the west and Kedzie Avenue on the east, the development is subdivided into three sections. Phase 1 in the southern portion of the development project comprises 77 residential lots. Phase 2, located approximately in the middle third, consists of 81 lots of single-family dwellings. Phase 3 in the northern third is undeveloped commercial property.\nIn 1978, Fairfield applied and was granted permission by the Metropolitan Sanitary District (MSD) to construct sewers in Phase 1. On the application, Fairfield represented that the village was the owner of the sewer system. Sewer construction in Phase 1 was completed in 1979 and in 1981 construction was completed for Phase 2.\nDefendant, doing business as Carroll Builders, owned land adjacent (east) and parallel to Fairfield\u2019s project. After constructing his own water and sewer lines, defendant prepared to tap into Fairfield\u2019s lines to the west by excavating a tunnel under Kedzie Avenue, which divides the parties\u2019 properties. Defendant was about to make the connection in February 1983, but before he entered beneath Fairfield\u2019s land, Fairfield filed a motion for a temporary injunction, alleging that it had constructed the water and sewer lines at its expense and that easements had not yet been dedicated to the village to permit entry onto the land or use of the lines.\nIn rebuttal, defendant argued that it had received permission from the MSD as well as the village to tap into these lines. Both Fair-field and defendant agreed, however, that the principal issue before the court was which party had the right to control the lines in question.\nGranting the temporary injunction, the trial court reasoned that it should maintain the status quo in order to permit both sides to prepare for full argument on the merits of this cause, which was scheduled to be heard in April 1983.\nIn the interim, on March 9, 1983, the village president requested that the village engineer, Edward J. Resner, conduct a \u201csecond inspection\u201d of the sewer line in Phase 2 in accordance with village ordinance 17W, section 3(H), which provides that a second inspection of water and sewer lines in a development project be completed prior to the village\u2019s acceptance of the lines and concomitant conveyance from the developer to the village of easements for access for maintenance and repair.\nResner complied with this request on the morning of March 14, 1983, and informed the village president that afternoon that he had inspected portions of Fairfield\u2019s sewer system. Resner recommended that certain segments of the sewer lines be accepted by the village board, which it did at its board meeting that evening.\nThe following week, on March 21, 1983, the village attorney wrote a letter to Fairfield\u2019s counsel, Cornelius J. Harrington, requesting that in accordance with ordinance 17W, Fairfield immediately convey to the village the necessary easements for the sewer line in Phase 2. This request was denied. On March 28, 1983, the village board passed a resolution accepting the water lines and the Phase 1 development project.\nInjunctive proceedings before the trial court commenced April 14, 1983. First, defendant presented a motion to dismiss, asserting that the court did not have equity jurisdiction over this matter because Fairfield had not shown irreparable harm and had an adequate remedy at law (damages). Fairfield\u2019s primary motive, defendant alleged, was to destroy defendant\u2019s development project by making it impossible for defendant to sell homes in the spring season because he (defendant) would not have access to any water or sewer lines. Also, defendant urged, the water and sewer systems now belong to the village and, further, Fairfield\u2019s land development in Phase 2 was already burdened with a utility easement used by Northern Illinois Gas Company.\nFollowing Fairfield\u2019s argument in rebuttal that the village board proceedings were a \u201churry up operation between [defendant] and the Village Engineer,\u201d the court recessed and subsequently issued a ruling denying defendant\u2019s motion.\nFairfield then called defendant to testify as an adverse witness pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1102). Defendant stated that Fairfield\u2019s counsel, Cornelius J. Harrington, had briefly informed him in August 1982 that there was \u201ca problem between [defendant] and Fairfield\u201d which had to be resolved. Defendant then read into evidence a letter from Resner, the village engineer who had performed a second inspection of Fairfield\u2019s sewer lines in March and who also worked for Wight Engineering Company. Fairfield had hired Wight to work on its project. The letter was addressed to the village commissioner and requested a building permit for defendant, but \u201csubject to [defendant\u2019s] satisfactory submission of a sanitary sewer easement on the west side of Kedzie Avenue for the sewer he is connecting into.\u201d It went on to state that \u201cthe easement should be recorded prior to occupancy of any units.\u201d\nDefendant further testified that as of October 1982, he had not obtained an easement from anyone. In February 1983, defendant telephoned Resner but did not recall whether Resner had advised defendant to obtain an easement to tap into plaintiff\u2019s water and sewer lines. Part of the conversation with Resner did concern Fairfield\u2019s \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d signs, however. Defendant stated that he had telephoned Resner because defendant believed that he (defendant) had a written permit to tap in. This permit, Fairfield\u2019s exhibit 2, was entitled \u201cMetropolitan Sanitary District, Sewage System Permit 82\u2014 241.\u201d\nTestifying further, defendant acknowledged that he never asked Fairfield for an easement and that in spite of the October 1982 letter he dug a pit in February 1983 to connect to plaintiff\u2019s water and sewer lines.\nFairfield next examined William V. Briody, who stated that as project director at Fairfield Service Corporation he was responsible for the management of the \u201cTrails of Olympia Fields\u201d development project. His duties included working with engineers, obtaining permits and approvals from the village, the MSD, Cook County and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency as well as soliciting and awarding bids. Briody explained that for marketing and economic purposes this project was divided into three phases and had been paid for by Fairfield. The engineering firm of Wight and Company had designed the sewer and water lines in Phase 1 which were constructed in 1980. Sewer, water and storm sewer lines in Phase 2 were completed in 1981. There had not as yet been any residential development in Phase 3.\nTestifying further, Briody said that it was after the water and sewer lines were constructed that he learned that they had been built in such a manner as to be able to serve areas other than the property owned by Fairfield. Briody also identified Fairfield\u2019s exhibit 13, which was its request for final inspection and approval of Phase 2. After identifying several additional exhibits, Briody was examined concerning his letter to Anton Medovich, chief field engineer at Wight and Company, dated August 17, 1982. The letter requested an inspection of Phase 2 but only to \u201cascertain substantial completion on the part of the Contractor so final payment can be made to him.\u201d Briody stated that pursuant to this request he participated in the inspection of the site improvements, including the water and sewer lines.\nBriody stated that on February 14, 1983 he noticed that defendant had begun to dig a pit which would enable it to tunnel under Kedzie Avenue in order to tap into Fairfield\u2019s water and sewer lines. Briody immediately called Fairfield\u2019s attorneys, installed three \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d signs and photographed the area. That same day, Briody talked to one of the men on defendant\u2019s construction site and informed him that Fairfield had not granted defendant an easement to enter onto the property and that Fairfield would take legal action to prevent defendant from doing so.\nBriody testified further that defendant had never asked for permission to tap into Fairfield\u2019s lines nor did he receive notice from the village or from Wight and Company that they intended to inspect any portion of the Phase 2 project. Briody was also not informed that there would be a village board meeting regarding Fairfield\u2019s water and sewer lines.\nBriody then stated that Fairfield had entered into an agreement with another company whereby the company agreed to extend Fair-field\u2019s sewer line in order to tie into it. The company completely paid for this construction work. Fairfield in turn granted the company an easement to connect into the lines. Defendant had never approached Fairfield to discuss whether such an agreement could be arranged, Briody said.\nOn cross-examination Briody identified a document entitled Request For Final Inspection, Phase 2, dated February 23, 1981. Although Briody had signed the document which stated that he certified that the project had been completed to his satisfaction, he said that his primary contention now was that he had not been notified prior to the second inspection which occurred on March 14,1983.\nFairfield next examined Edward J. Resner, village engineer and chief engineer at Wight and Company. Resner stated that Wight had designed the water and sewer system for Fairfield\u2019s development projects in Phases 1, 2 and 3.\nResner stated that he received a call from defendant in January or February 1983 advising him that defendant \u201cwas not having any success in dealing with plaintiff in obtaining the ability to tap into a sewer and water line.\u201d Resner responded that it was a legal question and that defendant should contact the village attorney. On February 14 defendant again called and said that he (defendant) was attempting to augur a sewer line to Fairfield\u2019s property but had ceased to do so because of Fairfield\u2019s \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d signs. Resner advised Fair-field to resolve the dispute of obtaining an easement to connect into the sewer and water facilities although he did not tell defendant to call anyone in particular.\nResner received a letter from the village attorney on March 9 requesting that he inspect the sewer lines on Fairfield\u2019s property. In compliance, on March 14, Resner examined the engineering drawings of the project and inspected one of the four manholes on the sewer line to which defendant sought to connect. Although the area where the water mains were installed were \u201cobserved,\u201d no tests were conducted. That same day Resner recommended in a hand-delivered letter to the village trustees that the village accept only that portion of the sewer and water lines in Fairfield\u2019s project to which defendant sought to connect. That evening, at the village board meeting, Resner made a presentation about the inspection of Fairfield\u2019s lines, which inspection had been conducted by him, along with Fred Keech, the director of public works and Anton Medovich, the chief field inspector.\nResner denied that he had said at the meeting that an additional \u201cwalk through\u201d inspection was necessary and stated that he had personally made the decision not to inspect the sewer and water lines in the other portion of the Phase 2 development project. In his opinion, however, another final inspection was necessary for the interior sanitary sewer lines before Fairfield could operate any of the sewer lines which would service any of the lots in Phase 2. No further inspection was required for defendant to be able to utilize the portion of the water and sewer line to which defendant seeks to connect, however.\nAs far as Fairfield\u2019s water line was concerned, Resner testified that he stated in a letter to the village president that pressure testing and chlorination records should be established before the village accepted the line as a public improvement.\nTestifying further, Resner stated that his inspection took approximately 30 to 45 minutes, that he did not make any notes and did not inform or give notice to Fairfield or its attorneys that an inspection would occur or that a village meeting would take place that day. Resner then explained that an observation of a construction project is a cursory review of the intentions of the design documents with respect to the actual installation of an improvement. An inspection, on the other hand, requires a higher degree of investigation which is performed often on a full-time basis when the contractor is actually installing the improvement. Attention is given to the original specifications.\nUnder cross-examination, Resner stated that he had inspected defendant\u2019s adjacent property only once, on or about October 1982. He also said that he had only recommended a portion of Fairfield\u2019s sewer and water lines in Phase 2 for acceptance but that he had recommended partial acceptance of water and sewer systems in the past. Further inspections of Fairfield\u2019s as well as defendant\u2019s interior lines would be required before they could be put to use. Thus, although Resner approved the plans for the tap-in, defendant would not be able to put the tap-in to use until after a further inspection of the interior lines. Resner then identified a permit issued to defendant for the construction of his sanitary system by the MSD which he signed as municipal engineer and as the inspection engineer. At the close of Resner\u2019s testimony on re-cross-examination, defendant submitted a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied.\nDefendant then presented his case in rebuttal and first submitted a number of exhibits into evidence, including Fairfield\u2019s sewerage system permits for Phase 1 and Phase 2, issued by the MSD. Under a category entitled \u201cSchedule A \u2014 Basic Information,\u201d both permits identified the village of Olympia Fields as the owner \u201cof all sewer systems from [the] project to [the] MSDGC [Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago] interceptor.\u201d Defendant\u2019s sewerage permit from the MSD for its construction project also identified the village as the owner. Also admitted was defendant\u2019s application for a highway permit which was signed and approved by the Cook County superintendent of highways which granted to defendant the authority \u201cto install, operate and maintain a 10 inch water main and valve vault running under and across Kedzie Avenue.\u201d\nNext, defendant called his first witness, James Creswell, village attorney of the village of Olympia Fields. Creswell testified that on March 21, 1983, he sent a letter to Fairfield\u2019s attorney on behalf of the village requesting that Fairfield deliver to the village the easements for its sewer line. A second letter followed on April 6. On April 11 a motion was made and passed by the village board to clear up any questions as to the March 14 board meeting regarding the sewer and water lines in Phase 1.\nTestifying further, Creswell stated that the village had a tap-in ordinance in the general building codes and that any fees generated from a tap-in would go to the village.\nNext to testify was Anton Medovich, chief field engineer inspector for Wight and Company. Medovich stated that he performed periodic inspections in Phase 2 of the construction of the roads, public utilities and sewer and water lines. In 1980 Medovich approved and signed Fairfield\u2019s request for final inspection of the sewer lines in Phase 2.\nMedovich stated that on March 14, 1983, he, Resner and Fred Keith, director of public works for the village performed an inspection of the sewer lines along Kedzie Avenue in Phase 2 and did not find any deficiencies. He stated under cross-examination that all of the inspections he performed on Phase 2 were for Fairfield with the exception of the March 14 inspection which was conducted at the request of his supervisor, Resner. He also testified that he was acting in his capacity of providing services for Fairfield when he signed Fairfield\u2019s request for final inspection and approval of Phase 2. His periodic inspections were basically conducted to insure that the project was proceeding according to construction plans and specifications.\nDefendant next called William Briody, who testified that he had been misled by his engineers who installed oversized sewer and water pipes along Kedzie Avenue that would accommodate more capacity than what was required. It was because of the overcapacity that Fair-field was able to negotiate an agreement with another company in its Phase 3 project, Briody stated. When Briody learned of defendant\u2019s intentions to connect to Fairfield\u2019s sewer he spoke to defendant approximately three times between June 1982 and February 13, 1983.\nDefendant Carroll testified next. Currently the beneficial owner of his development project, defendant once owned the entire tract of land which includes Fairfield\u2019s property as well. Fairfield purchased its land from defendant in 1977.\nDefendant said that in January 1982 he submitted engineering drawings for his construction work to the village for their review and approval as well as to the MSD, the Illinois EPA and the State highway department who each gave their approval. Defendant testified that he \u201ctried to alert people to the fact that he was attempting to tap into Fairfield\u2019s sewer line but it wasn\u2019t until Fairfield placed \u201cNo Trespassing\u201d signs on its property that defendant said he first became aware of Fairfield\u2019s opposition to defendant\u2019s plans.\nTestifying further, defendant stated that there could possibly be a sewer connection somewhere else but that the tap in on Fairfield\u2019s property would be the most logical, direct and useful. The procedure that defendant intended to use, if permitted, was to augur under Kedzie Avenue with \u201clittle disturbance on the other side.\u201d\nDefendant testified under cross-examination that Phase 1 of his development project began in May or June of 1982 and included construction of water lines. Defendant stated that when he first became aware in 1981 that Fairfield had constructed sewer and water lines along Kedzie Avenue he talked to the director of public works of the village who informed defendant that as far as he knew defendant could tie into Fairfield\u2019s lines.\nContinuing his testimony under cross-examination, defendant admitted that in October 1982 his attorney informed him that Robert Field, a village trustee, had said that there was a \u201cquestion\u201d about using the sewer on Kedzie Avenue if it had not been dedicated to the public. Defendant had also received notice from the village that he had to settle his dispute with Fairfield concerning the cost of constructing a public sidewalk.\nRedirect examination disclosed that defendant believed that since he had building permits and approvals from the village, EPA, MSD and the county highway department and since Fairfield\u2019s line had previously been tapped into, he thought that he could do the same. After stressing the financial hardship and imposition that this cause of action had created, defendant rested his case.\nIn rebuttal, Fairfield called Cornelius J. Harrington, one of its attorneys who had previously testified. Harrington stated that following the adjournment of the village meeting on August 9, 1982, he told defendant, who was present, that he (Harrington) understood that defendant had plans to tie into Fairfield\u2019s sewer and water lines, that Fairfield had never recorded the plat of subdivision of Phase 2 and that Fairfield would object if defendant attempted to tie into those lines. Following this testimony, Fairfield rested its case. Defendant rested his case in surrebuttal following brief testimony by his son.\nAfter closing arguments by both sides, the court entered its judgment in favor of Fairfield, holding that the inspection by the village engineer (Resner), and approval of only part of Fairfield\u2019s lines failed to satisfy village ordinance 17W, section 3(H), which requires a second inspection of all lines as a mandatory precondition to acceptance by the village board. Defendant now appeals.\nOpinion\nInitially, defendant contends that for several reasons the trial court misinterpreted the provisions of ordinance 17W section 3(H), which provides as follows:\n\u201cDeveloper shall install all sanitary sewer, storm and water lines as necessary to serve the improvements under construction. All stages of construction shall be subject to inspection and approval by the Village Engineer. The Developer shall maintain all lines for one (1) year after said approval. After the end of the one year period, a second inspection shall be made of all lines by the Village Engineer, and if said lines are approved, they shall be submitted for final acceptance by the Village Board. Upon acceptance of any lines by the Village Board, Developer shall convey to the Village easements necessary for access for maintenance and repairs of said lines. The Village, after final acceptance of any lines, shall operate, maintain and repair said lines as part of the Village system, but shall not be responsible for restoration of any landscaping or amenities placed over lines or be in any manner responsible for any damage direct or consequential because of malfunction of any of such systems, except for damage caused by the negligence of the Village.\u201d\nFirst, defendant contends that the ordinance does not require that all public improvements in a subdivision be accepted by the village board at the same time. The key language in section 3(H) in this regard, defendant posits, is that \u201cupon acceptance of any lines by the Village Board, ***\u201d the developer shall convey to the village the necessary easements and that \u201c*** the Village, after final acceptance of any lines, shall operate, maintain, and repair said lines as part of the Village system.\u201d Defendant further contends that Resner testified that municipalities occasionally accept only portions of water and sewer lines. Also, the subject of partial acceptance was discussed at the village board meeting on March 14 where it was voted to accept a portion of the sewer lines along Kedzie Avenue.\nIt is our view that defendant misinterprets the trial court\u2019s ruling. In reaching its decision that the village had not complied with the requirements of the ordinance, the court focused in part on Resner\u2019s inspection, which it found was defective. The fact that section 3(H) provides that the village may accept any lines was not found to be an impediment to the village\u2019s decision to accept Fairfield\u2019s water and sewer lines. Rather, the record discloses that the court specifically stated that the village had, in fact, \u201c*** formally accepted that part of the sewer line running parallel to Kedzie Avenue and part of Phase 1 of plaintiff\u2019s development.\u201d The court then went on to state that the village had not exercised any control over that part of the sewer line contained in Phase 2 and therefore had not accepted it. The one year maintenance period referred to in section 3(H) is triggered by the village engineer\u2019s approval of all the sewer lines in the improvement, the court observed, followed by a second inspection of all lines.\nThus, although section 3(H) states that the village may accept any lines in a development, the village engineer initially must inspect and approve all lines prior to submitting them for final acceptance. The facts disclose, however, that Resner stated on direct examination that in his opinion, another final inspection was necessary for Fair-field\u2019s interior sanitary sewer lines before they could be used. Additionally, although Resner stated that he had personally made the decision not to inspect the sewer and water lines in another portion of the Phase 2 development project, this decision contravened the specific language of section 3(H), which requires a second inspection of all lines. Because this was not done, as the trial court properly ruled, the board\u2019s acceptance of Fairfield\u2019s lines on March 14 was ineffective.\nNext, defendant argues that the inspectional requirements of section 3(H) were fully met because there were two inspections of Fair-field\u2019s water and sewer lines in Phase 2, the first of which occurred in 1980 when Robert Richter, the village engineer at the time, and Gerald Louis Maullin, the inspection engineer, both certified their approval of the lines in Phase 2 by signing Fairfield\u2019s request for final inspection, which indicated that the lines were periodically inspected. The second inspection occurred on March 14, 1983, defendant contends, when Resner conducted an inspection at the direction of the village president. Phase 2 water lines were accepted by the board on April 11, 1983.\nFairfield, on the other hand, counters that section 3(H) specifically requires that all lines be inspected. Contrary to defendant\u2019s postulation, Fairfield asserts, Resner perfunctorily performed what can best be described as an \u201cobservation\u201d of the sewer line and did not inspect the water line at all.\nWithout addressing the propriety of the alleged first inspection of Phase 2, the trial court ruled, as we have previously stated, that all lines in Phase 2 had not been inspected and approved on March 14, 1983, which deficiency rendered the village board\u2019s subsequent vote to accept the lines ineffective. Again, we concur with this conclusion. In our judgment, Resner\u2019s testimony set forth above strongly suggests that the purported final inspection of the lines in Phase 2 was incomplete and possibly premature since the lines were not yet operative. Moreover, Resner said that he had informed the village that pressure testing and chlorination records should be established before Fair-field\u2019s water line was accepted as a public improvement. We are aware that section 3(H) does not delineate guidelines for conducting a \u201cfirst\u201d inspection and merely states that the second inspection should be made after the developer has maintained all lines for one year following an initial approval by the village engineer. We are convinced, however, that the plain and ordinary meaning of this language supports Fairfield\u2019s view that the final inspection in this case was inadequate. (Fess v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 133, 135, 446 N.E.2d 1255. See also Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 240, 245, 446 N.E.2d 1271, where we determined that in construing a statutory provision which has not yet been judicially interpreted, a court is guided by both the plain meaning of the language of the statute as well as legislative intent.) Indeed, section 3(H) suggests that a second inspection occur after all lines are operative. We therefore disagree with defendant\u2019s contention on this issue.\nFurther challenging the proceedings before the trial court, defendant asserts that Fairfield\u2019s cause of action should have been dismissed at the outset because it was an impermissible collateral attack on village ordinance 17W. In this regard defendant posits that Fairfield\u2019s complaint was a quo warranto proceeding which, as a direct action, may not be raised collaterally. We cannot agree with this contention.\nOur review of Fairfield\u2019s complaint reveals that Fairfield characterized defendant\u2019s anticipated entry onto its property as an impending trespass, stating that a controversy existed as to whether defendant had the right to connect into Fairfield\u2019s water and sewer lines (Count 1). Count 2 urged the court to issue a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Fairfield\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction was filed the following day.\nAdditionally, we note that defendant\u2019s cases cited on this issue are inapposite to the facts before us. In Village of Bridgeview v. City of Hickory Hills (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 931, 274 N.E.2d 925, the question presented for review concerned the propriety of quo warranto proceedings instituted by the State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, who challenged the village of Bridgeview\u2019s decision to annex contiguous land. A similar issue (the disconnection of property which had previously been annexed) was raised in North Main Fire Protection District v. Village of Niles (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 389, 368 N.E.2d 516. The questions presented in these decisions, however, are not before us in the pending matter.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument on appeal is that the trial court erroneously granted injunctive relief in the absence of any evidence that Fairfield did not have an adequate remedy at law and was irreparably harmed. Defendant contends further that the trial court also improperly refused to balance the equities between Fairfield and defendant. Again, we cannot agree.\nA preliminary injunction is an extraordinary provisional remedy granted before the hearing of a case on its merits in order to preserve the status quo for the purpose of preventing a threatened wrong or any further perpetration of an injury (21A Ill. L. & Prac. Injunctions sec. 4 (1977).) Such an injunction does not decide controverted facts or the merits of the cause; rather, it only shows that sufficient cause has been made to authorize or require the court to preserve the rights in issue until a final hearing on the merits. (Duval v. Severson (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 634, 641, 304 N.E.2d 747.) An applicant is not entitled to a temporary injunction as a matter of right; he must show (1) that it is clear that he has a lawful right for which he seeks protection; (2) that he will be irreparably harmed and (3) that his remedies at law are inadequate. Kaplan v. Kaplan (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 136, 141, 423 N.E.2d 1253.\nIn the case at bar, Fairfield\u2019s two-count complaint alleged that it had been \u201c*** informed and believe[s] that [defendant] desires to connect its water and sewer lines *** into the water and sewer lines already constructed and owned by Fairfield and located immediately west of Kedzie Avenue.\u201d The complaint further enumerated the ways in which Fairfield attempted to place defendant on notice that such entry would constitute a \u201cforcible unlawful and wrongful trespass\u201d and it stated further than an actual controversy existed as to whether defendant had the right to enter upon or under Fairfield\u2019s property.\nIn response, defendant\u2019s answer acknowledged that the property belonged to Fairfield but alleged that defendant\u2019s intentions were to lawfully tap into the sewer and water facilities \u201cthrough an easement [granted] to the Village of Olympia Fields for access to the Village\u2019s water and sewer lines ***.\u201d Defendant admitted that a controversy existed but denied that Fairfield owned the lines in question.\nBased on these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing injunctive relief. Rather, our review convinces us that the court exercised the proper caution in granting the injunction; it identified the controlling issue presented, heard argument by counsel for both sides and received supporting evidence as to the ownership of the property in question. It was Fairfield, however, who was ultimately successful in demonstrating that there was a clear or immediate necessity to maintain the status quo because of a threatened actual and substantial injury. We believe that the trial court\u2019s findings are well supported by the evidence and therefore conclude that the preliminary injunction was properly granted. Summit Electric Co. v. Mayrent (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550, 308 N.E.2d 313.\nWe turn now to the propriety of the issuance of the permanent injunction. A permanent injunction is designed to extend or maintain the status quo indefinitely after a hearing on the merits where it has been shown that the plaintiff is suffering irreparable harm and there is no adequate remedy at law. ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 817, 833, 413 N.E.2d 1299.\nIn the pending matter, the trial court made several findings, one of which was that the village board\u2019s acceptance of the sewer and water lines was ineffective because the requirements of section 3(H) had not been met. The threatened injury Fairfield complained of, which was an unlawful trespass onto its land in order to tap into its lines, could not be measured and corrected by an award of money damages alone as defendant\u2019s act would result in a continuing trespass and would cause irremediable injury. It has been previously held that in such situations, injunctive relief is warranted. Pliske v. Yuskis (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 89, 95, 403 N.E.2d 710.\nAccordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s judgment will be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMEJDA, P.J., and LORENZ, J., concur.\nWe are unsure of the correct spelling of this name since it appears as a signature of Fairfield\u2019s request for final inspection.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WILSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Reuben & Proctor, of Chicago (Edward G. Proctor, Thomas F. Ging, and James R. Daley, of counsel), for appellant.", "Kirkland & Ellis, of Chicago (Cornelius J. Harrington, Jr., Frank L. Winter, and James N. Nowacki, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JOHN P. CARROLL, Indiv. and d/b/a Carroll Builders, Defendant-Appellant (Ziebell Water Service Products, Inc. et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 83\u20141088\nOpinion filed March 16, 1984.\nReuben & Proctor, of Chicago (Edward G. Proctor, Thomas F. Ging, and James R. Daley, of counsel), for appellant.\nKirkland & Ellis, of Chicago (Cornelius J. Harrington, Jr., Frank L. Winter, and James N. Nowacki, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0868-01", "first_page_order": 890, "last_page_order": 903 }