{ "id": 5679234, "name": "LEILA PHARR, Adm'r of the Estate of Bessie Levy, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Pharr v. Chicago Transit Authority", "decision_date": "1984-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 83\u2014100", "first_page": "205", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 205" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2727541 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3374282 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1070", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3130594 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3288890 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2873604 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0154-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 534, "char_count": 8756, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.042290519677731e-07, "percentile": 0.7478827916222143 }, "sha256": "07806f7f4cdd94b754ef28fdcac0376a08d9794455274eb4bcc458c06f1301f2", "simhash": "1:02abf14aec4004e4", "word_count": 1461 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:31.202001+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEILA PHARR, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Bessie Levy, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McGLOON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Leila Pharr appeals from orders directing a verdict in favor of defendant Chicago Transit Authority and denying her motion for a new trial. On appeal, plaintiff contends (1) the evidence presented questions of fact which precluded the entry of the directed verdict; (2) the trial court erred in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for substitution of judges; and (3) the trial court erred in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to reopen her case to call another eyewitness.\nWe reverse and remand.\nOn January 18, 1977, plaintiff Leila Pharr, administrator of the estate of Bessie Levy, filed a wrongful death action against defendant Chicago Transit Authority (C.T.A.). The complaint alleged that defendant negligently discharged its duty to plaintiff\u2019s decedent, a passenger, in that it caused her to fall while alighting from a bus, thereby causing injuries resulting in death. The incident occurred on January 22, 1976, at about 1 p.m.\nPlaintiff\u2019s witness Arnold Bell witnessed the occurrence. He testified that while he was walking from the south to the north side of Marquette Road, a C.T.A. bus traveling westbound on Marquette passed him. The bus stopped at the northwest corner of Hamilton and Marquette. The corner was not a designated bus stop. As Bell reached the north side of Marquette, he observed a young boy exiting the rear door of the bus. Plaintiff\u2019s decedent then began alighting. She had one foot on the pavement and the other on the bus step when the bus began to move forward. Decedent was thrown to the ground. The bus proceeded west on Marquette. The pavement where the passengers alighted was dry.\nOn cross-examination, Bell testified he could not see the rear doors of the bus when it stopped. The first time he told anyone of the manner in which decedent fell was in May 1981, when he spoke to plaintiff\u2019s attorney. The day after the accident, he was contacted by a Chicago police officer, but did not tell the officer that the bus began to move before the decedent alighted. He further testified that he did not know what caused the woman to fall. Bell\u2019s deposition was admitted into evidence. In his deposition, Bell also stated he did not know the cause of decedent\u2019s fall.\nOfficer James Carlos investigated the accident. He testified that he was unable to talk to the deceased because of her injuries. Bloodstains on the road were three feet seven inches from the curb on Marquette Road. He also spoke with a C.T.A. supervisor who identified the bus which was in the area at the time the accident occurred. The corner on which the accident happened was not a designated bus stop. On cross-examination, Carlos testified he spoke with Arnold Bell the day after the accident and included Bell\u2019s statement in his report. Bell told him that as the bus drove away from the corner, he saw a person lying on the pavement and a youth standing nearby. If Bell had said the woman fell as she was getting off the bus, Carlos would have put that in his report. On redirect examination, Carlos stated he never spoke with Bell again. Bell never stated that he did not see the deceased fall. Bell was never asked to provide a written statement.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s case, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. The trial court based its ruling on Bell\u2019s demeanor, plaintiff\u2019s lack of evidence that the C.T.A. was involved, and the conflict between Bell\u2019s trial testimony and his statements made to police and during his deposition.\nAfter judgment on the directed verdict was entered, plaintiff filed a motion for substitution of judges based on the trial judge\u2019s previous position as an attorney for the C.T.A. Plaintiff also filed a motion for a new trial. Both motions were denied.\nOn appeal, plaintiff first contends the trial court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict. She maintains that Bell\u2019s testimony evidenced a breach of duty by defendant, that the breach of duty caused decedent\u2019s injury, and at the very least, the evidence presented a question which could not be decided on a motion for a directed verdict.\nPlaintiff alleged in the complaint that defendant negligently operated the bus, failed to keep a sufficient lookout and ascertain whether plaintiff\u2019s decedent had reached a place of safety and moved the bus as decedent was alighting. Indeed, a common carrier must exercise the highest degree of care to its passengers, and the passenger-carrier relationship does not terminate until the passenger has had a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety. (Loving v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 154, 337 N.E.2d 428.) Bell\u2019s testimony regarding the events preceding decedent\u2019s fall would possibly establish a breach of defendant\u2019s duty to its passenger. If believed by the jury, the evidence would show that the deceased had not reached a place of safety when the bus began to move. Defendant has argued that Bell\u2019s testimony was inconsistent and was in fact contradicted by Officer Carlos. Also, the trial court based its ruling in part on these factors. However, it is the function of the jury to weigh the contradictory evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. (Lode v. Mercanio (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 150, 395 N.E.2d 1014.) Such matters may not be decided on a motion for a directed verdict. Frisch Contracting Service Corp. v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 799, 417 N.E.2d 1070.\nPlaintiff also alleged that defendant violated certain State and municipal laws. Specifically, she alleged violations of section 11 \u2014 803 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95V2, par. 11\u2014 803) and Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code sec. 27 \u2014 260 (1983), which provide, in part, that no person shall move the stopped vehicle until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. She also alleged a violation of section 27 \u2014 276(b) of the municipal code (Chicago, Ill. Municipal Code sec. 27 \u2014 276(b) (1983)), which prohibits the driver of the bus to unload passengers in any area other than the designated bus stop. Plaintiff presented evidence that defendant violated each of these laws. A violation of the statute or ordinance designed for protection of the public is prima facie evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff may recover if he shows the violation is the proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause is a factual issue to be decided by the jury where reasonable men might arrive at a different conclusion. (Greene v. City of Chicago (1976), 48 Ill. App. 3d 502, 363 N.E.2d 378.) In view of the evidence presented here, we find the matter should have been resolved by the jury.\nA motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when all the evidence, viewed most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no other verdict could properly stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of negligence to prevent the entry of a directed verdict.\nSecond, plaintiff contends the trial judge should have recused himself or granted the motion for substitution of judges made after judgment was entered. She maintains recusal or substitution was warranted because the judge formerly represented the C.T.A. in various actions.\nIn People v. Sangster (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 937, 360 N.E.2d 783, it was held that a trial judge was not required to recuse himself even though he had previously represented defendant in another case. The court held that neither Supreme Court Rule 61(c)(4) (87 Ill. 2d R. 61(c)(4)), requiring conduct free from the appearance of impropriety, nor Supreme Court Rule 67 (87 Ill. 2d R. 67), requiring disqualification for conflicts of interest, was violated because the judge had not represented defendant in any proceeding related to that over which he presided. In the case at bar, there were no allegations that the trial judge participated in proceedings related to this case, and thus recusal and substitution were not warranted in this case.\nBecause of our decision, we need not address the final issue raised by plaintiff.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nJudgment reversed; cause remanded.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McGLOON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald Kirk Goulding and Victor H. Goulding, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edmund J. Burke, Gary W. Bozick, and Kenneth E. Garstka, all of Hoffman, Burke & Bozick, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEILA PHARR, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Bessie Levy, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 83 \u2014 100\nOpinion filed March 30, 1984.\nRonald Kirk Goulding and Victor H. Goulding, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdmund J. Burke, Gary W. Bozick, and Kenneth E. Garstka, all of Hoffman, Burke & Bozick, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0205-01", "first_page_order": 227, "last_page_order": 232 }