{ "id": 5677303, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLAND PARQUETTE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Parquette", "decision_date": "1984-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 83\u2014197", "first_page": "233", "last_page": "239", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 233" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "75 Cal. Rptr. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "450 R2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Cal. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2308227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/70/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455316 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5482268 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2967154 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5393732 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 1200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5637760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3182454 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3241748 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 1217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3133752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0111-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 662, "char_count": 12584, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.7709062359064636e-08, "percentile": 0.36053607758599054 }, "sha256": "2ed80ae4df4178240ac25c149c352b5aff88a1c005d82f454598fed9919dbdff", "simhash": "1:a6ac426bde86ed66", "word_count": 2090 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:31.202001+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLAND PARQUETTE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn November 3, 1981, Roland Parquette was charged by information with three counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9\u2014 I) , two counts of home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 II) and three counts of armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 2). After a bench trial he was convicted of murder and was sentenced to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. He contends here that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress statements; (2) in admitting into evidence defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s rebuttal testimony regarding an abortion; (3) the State failed to comply with discovery; and (4) the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the mental state required for murder.\nAt a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements, Officer Schak of the Chicago police department testified that on October 7, 1981, he was investigating the shooting death of James Ward. That evening he and \u201cseveral\u201d other officers went to defendant\u2019s apartment. They heard \u201cbreathing or gurgling noise\u201d coming from the apartment. Twenty minutes of pounding on the door did not arouse an occupant. After 20 more minutes the apartment door was forcibly removed. Defendant was found asleep nude in his bed. Several officers, \u201csome\u201d with their guns drawn, awakened and arrested defendant. Several guns were recovered from the apartment, including one later identified as being of the same caliber as that used to kill Ward.\nOn direct examination Officer Schak testified with regard to interrogation of defendant at his apartment as follows:\n\u201cQ. While you were at \u2014 and Roland\u2019s apartment was at 510 at 2001 West Summerdale \u2014 was there any conversation between Mr. Parquette and police officers?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. What was that conversation?\nA. His name and\u2014\nQ. Didn\u2019t you ask or inquire of Mr. Parquette or any officer in your presence in the apartment ask Mr. Parquette anything in regards to the death of James Ward?\nA. No, sir.\u201d\nOn cross-examination the following exchanges occurred:\n\u201cQ. Did you say [in your police report] then the subject was roused and advised of his rights whereupon he admitted to the shooting of James Ward at his former address 3834 West George Street?\nA. Yes, sir.\n* * *\nQ. Well, now, is this correct where you had written in the police report that you were, he was roused and advised of his rights whereupon he admitted to the shooting of James Ward at his former residence at 3834 West George Street, is that correct?\nA. He wasn\u2019t roused and advised of his rights immediately; no, sir.\n* * *\nQ. Well, before the time that he was allowed to dress then he was questioned with respect to the shooting, is that right?\nA. No, sir. My recollection of what took place there is probably not what it should be but I know that he was allowed to dress immediately, and any questioning that was done was suspended by me almost immediately. I don\u2019t recall questioning him. I really don\u2019t.\n* * *\nQ. He was not advised of his rights at that point [upon being awakened], that is your testimony, is that right?\nA. Not when I woke him up; no, sir.\nQ. And not before he got dressed, right?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. And not in the apartment, period?\nA. He asked me questions. I don\u2019t recall. I don\u2019t recall what he asked me or what the conversation was.\nQ. Well, he did not waive his Miranda rights inside that apartment, did he?\nA. I don\u2019t recall.\u201d\nThe only other witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Phillip Mitchell. Following defendant\u2019s arrest, Mitchell interviewed defendant at the police station. Mitchell\u2019s testimony indicates that during his interrogation of defendant at least one other person \u2014 a police officer \u2014 was also present. Mitchell testified that defendant, after being advised of his Miranda rights, confessed to shooting the victim.\nDuring argument on his motion to suppress, defendant argued the State had failed to comply with the \u201cmaterial witness\u201d rule which requires the State to produce at the hearing all.material witnesses to a confession, or to explain their absence. The court responded that the rule \u201cdoes not apply in this case.\u201d Thereafter the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAt trial, Debra Ohlson, defendant\u2019s wife, testified that she and defendant had been separated for about V-lz years as of the date of the shooting. On the date of the incident she lived with the victim and Kim Shanholtz. She had lived with the victim for six months. She \u201cmay\u201d have told defendant she was living with Ward. Defendant and Ward had not previously met. She said her husband was a gun collector.\nOfficer Schak testified regarding defendant\u2019s arrest at his apartment and stated that defendant there \u201cadmitted\u201d to being at the scene of the shooting. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Mitchell testified as to his interrogation of defendant at the police station and recited defendant\u2019s oral confession to the shooting.\nJames Tripp and Allen Van Allen testified for defendant. Both testified to his good reputation and that they observed defendant drinking heavily several hours prior to the shooting.\nDefendant testified that he is a carpenter, married to Debra Ohlson, but separated from her. He visited with his wife and called her on the phone even though they were separated. He loved his wife in October 1981 when the shooting occurred. On the day of the incident he was drinking heavily. He dialed his wife\u2019s number on the phone and a male voice told him \u201clisten jackoff, don\u2019t call her anymore\u201d and then hung up. Defendant became \u201cmad,\u201d and knowing \u201cthere was a gun\u201d at his wife\u2019s apartment, he grabbed \u201ca couple of guns\u201d and drove to the apartment.\nAfter defendant had knocked on the door for a time, a man \u2014 later identified as Ward \u2014 partially opened the door. He said to defendant \u201clisten jackoff, get out of here.\u201d Defendant described the man as very \u201cdemanding\u201d and \u201cbelligerent.\u201d Defendant started walking away from the door. The man told him to \u201cget out\u201d of there. As defendant started down the apartment stairs, the man said \u201cthat\u2019s right jackoff, just keep going.\u201d Defendant then turned and fired one shot at the door opening. Defendant stated he was sorry Ward was dead; defendant was only trying to \u201cscare\u201d him. At the time defendant turned and fired, Ward was making a movement \u2014 he was \u201cturning *** away from the door\u201d and \u201cbackwards towards the apartment.\u201d\nOn cross-examination defendant stated Ward had never touched him nor pointed a gun at him nor had defendant seen a gun in Ward\u2019s possession. Although defendant could not see Ward\u2019s hands, defendant \u201cthought\u201d Ward would shoot him in the back.\nOn rebuttal, and over defendant's objection, defendant\u2019s wife testified that defendant had impregnated her in March 1981 and had advised her to \u201cget an abortion,\u201d for which he paid.\nAfter closing arguments, the court dismissed all charges except murder and found defendant guilty of that charge. Defendant was sentenced to 20 years.\nOn appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements.\nIt is axiomatic that for incriminatory statements obtained from a defendant as a result of custodial interrogation to be admissible, the statements must be found at trial to have been voluntarily made. (People v. Alvarez (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 111, 416 N.E.2d 1217.) At a hearing on a motion to suppress a confession \u201c[t]he burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 114-ll(d).\nWhen the voluntariness of a confession is challenged, the State has the burden of producing all material witnesses to the confession, or accounting for their absence. (In re J.C. (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 289, 387 N.E.2d 401.) Although the record here is not clear, apparently \u201cseveral\u201d police officers were present when defendant was arrested at his apartment and he appears to have made a statement of some kind. At least one police officer was likewise present at defendant\u2019s confession to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney at the police station. The material witness rule requires that the \u201cState must produce all material witnesses, that is, all witnesses whose testimony is material to the issue of the voluntariness of the challenged statement. [Citations.] This rule is a safeguard against the use of improperly induced or coerced confessions by the State. [Citation.] Alternatively, the State could explain the failure of such a witness to testify.\u201d People v. Robinson (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 621, 624, 410 N.E.2d 121, 123.\nThe significance of this rule is well illustrated by the case before us. Officer Schak\u2019s uncertain testimony with regard to whether defendant, in his apartment, was or was not questioned; did or did not make any statements; was or was not read his Miranda rights and did or did not waive those rights is, at best, confusing. Further, the determination of what occurred at defendant\u2019s apartment may well be material to establish the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s confession alleged to have been subsequently made at the police station. If defendant did in fact make a statement at his apartment, and such statement was determined to be unlawfully obtained, the voluntanness of any subsequent statement would require consideration of, inter alia, any effect from the first interrogation. People v. Davenport (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 130, 363 N.E.2d 1200.\nWe believe the purpose of the material witness rule will be well served by requiring a new suppression hearing in this instance. (In re J.C.) When, as here, a defendant \u201cdoes not receive a full evidentiary hearing in the trial court on the voluntariness of his confession, including the rights afforded him by Miranda,\u201d it is proper to remand the case for a \u201cnew full and complete hearing on the admissibility of the defendant\u2019s confession.\u201d People v. White (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 914, 923, 295 N.E.2d 300, 306.\nIf, after hearing, defendant\u2019s statement is found to have been voluntary and therefore admissible, the trial court should enter a new judgment of conviction. If defendant\u2019s statement is found not to have been voluntary, the circuit court should vacate the judgment of conviction and order a new trial. People v. King (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 326, 335 N.E.2d 417.\nTo forestall the issue of double jeopardy (People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 391 N.E.2d 366) in the event a retrial is held, we find that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe believe that two of the other issues raised by defendant merit comment. Defendant contends it was a violation of the husband-wife privilege (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 155 \u2014 1) to allow the wife to testify in rebuttal with regard to defendant having recommended and paid for her abortion. Since we find such testimony irrelevant, we do not reach the issue of whether it is violative of the statute. Rebuttal evidence is that which is introduced by the State to \u201cexplain, repel, contradict, or disprove\u201d evidence presented by the defendant. (People v. Bush (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 5, 430 N.E.2d 514.) The \u201crebuttal\u201d evidence here served none of these purposes and was irrelevant to any issue before the court.\nDefendant also contends the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the suppression hearing when its witnesses testified only in conclusory language with regard to the Miranda warnings given defendant. Both Officer Schak and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Mitchell testified that they had given defendant his \u201cMiranda warnings\u201d but did not specify the words actually employed to convey those warnings. We believe such conclusory testimony would be insufficient to establish that defendant received adequate Miranda warnings. See People v. Morgan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 200, 370 N.E.2d 1063; In re Dennis M. (1969), 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 R2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1.\nFor the reasons stated, this cause is remanded for a new hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.\nHARTMAN, P.J., and STAMOS, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwin R. McCullough, of Chicago, and Robert V. Boharic, of Riverside, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan, and James Fink, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLAND PARQUETTE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83 \u2014 197\nOpinion filed March 27, 1984.\nEdwin R. McCullough, of Chicago, and Robert V. Boharic, of Riverside, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan, and James Fink, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0233-01", "first_page_order": 255, "last_page_order": 261 }