{ "id": 5676778, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY JANE PALMER et al., Defendants-Appellants (Frank W. Palmer, Defendant-Appellee); MARY JANE PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK W. PALMER, Defendant-Appellee (Fon du Lac Township, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Palmer", "decision_date": "1984-04-16", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-83-0163, 3-83-0177, 3-83-0268, 3-83-0188, 3\u201483\u20140308 cons.", "first_page": "674", "last_page": "682", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 674" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "109 N.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313509 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Tex. L. Rev. 409", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Tex. L. Rev.", "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427, 431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Tex. L. Rev. 231", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Tex. L. Rev.", "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111261 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "79-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 1260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3009966 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472913 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3076344 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489785 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "1982 Ill. Laws 288", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5477821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5540321 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2746127 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0190-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 945, "char_count": 19333, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1668919609032855e-07, "percentile": 0.8636590395810722 }, "sha256": "d31972caad8d432948f837ff780eced40b113191f765497dd4c1079b1a30a828", "simhash": "1:4286a8d0c6857550", "word_count": 3112 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:44:31.202001+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY JANE PALMER et al., Defendants-Appellants (Frank W. Palmer, Defendant-Appellee). MARY JANE PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK W. PALMER, Defendant-Appellee (Fon du Lac Township, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt the heart of the five appeals here consolidated lie the simplicity of the vows of matrimony, the complexities of marriage and a contract entered into by the married couple, and, unfortunately, the bitter litigation that too often accompanies the destruction of the marital union. Mary Jane and her husband, Frank Palmer, were still residing together in their Champaign home on September 12, 1981, despite some marital discord. They travelled together to Peoria on that date to attend a wedding anniversary celebration. That evening, on their way to Frank\u2019s father\u2019s home in East Peoria, while Frank was at the wheel of their 1980 Rabbit auto and Mary Jane was seated in the front passenger seat, Frank exacted from Mary Jane a confession that she had had extramarital relations with her boss. Angry words were exchanged, Frank hit Mary Jane, and the auto hit a bridge abutment on Farmdale Road in Tazewell County. The extent of the physical confrontation between the Palmers subsequent to the accident is a matter of considerable dispute. In any event, Mary Jane had suffered two fractured neck vertebrae, a bent partial dental plate, and a broken leg by the time she was removed from the car and delivered to the hospital for treatment. At the time of the accident the Rabbit was covered by an automobile liability insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company issued in Mary Jane\u2019s name.\nA flurry of lawsuits ensued, including an action for the dissolution of the Palmers\u2019 marriage; a suit by Frank against Mary Jane\u2019s paramour for alienation of affections; a suit by Mary Jane against Frank for negligence and battery, later amended to include Fon du Lac Township for negligence; a countersuit by Fon du Lac Township against Frank for indemnity and contribution; and a suit by State Farm against Mary Jane, Frank and Fon du Lac Township for declaratory judgment. The dissolution and alienation of affections actions are not before us. The remaining lawsuits are.\nIn the suit brought by Mary Jane against Frank, the trial court granted Frank\u2019s motion for summary judgment with respect to the count sounding in negligence, based on Frank\u2019s assertion of the defense of interspousal immunity. With respect to the intentional tort count, the court denied Frank\u2019s motion. In the insurer\u2019s declaratory judgment cause, the court held that, by force of the household exclusion clause, Mary Jane\u2019s auto insurance policy afforded no liability coverage for Frank as a defendant in Mary Jane\u2019s suit against him or for contribution. The trial court certified the case for immediate appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 304(a) and 308(a) (73 Ill. 2d Rules 304(a), 308(a)).\nAs aforesaid, five appeals are before use for our review. In Nos. 83 \u2014 163, 83 \u2014 177 and 83 \u2014 188, Mary Jane, Frank, and Fon du Lac Township uniformly complain that the trial court erred in declaring that the Palmers\u2019 insurance policy afforded no liability protection for Frank either as a defendant in Mary Jane\u2019s suit or for contribution and indemnity in Fon du Lac\u2019s countercomplaint against Frank. In No. 83 \u2014 268, Frank contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment with respect to the intentional tort count of Mary Jane\u2019s complaint. And in No. 83 \u2014 308, Mary Jane contends that the trial court erred in granting Frank\u2019s motion for summary judgment with respect to her negligence cause of action against him.\nWe consider in the first instance the issues raised by Mary Jane: (1) whether Frank\u2019s assertion of interspousal immunity bars Mary Jane\u2019s negligence cause of action against him; (2) whether Frank\u2019s waiver of the conflict of interest created by his insurer\u2019s defending him was made with Frank\u2019s knowledgeable consent; and (3) whether State Farm\u2019s \u201cfamily exclusion\u201d clause in Mary Jane\u2019s liability insurance policy precludes coverage for Frank in the claims filed by Mary Jane and Fon du Lac Township.\nInitially, we must reject persuasive arguments advanced on behalf of Mary Jane that the doctrine of interspousal immunity violates constitutional rights and contravenes modern realities. The Illinois legislature has seen fit to retain the defense as a codification of the public policy of this State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1001.) Interspousal immunity is not unconstitutional on due process or equal protection grounds (Heckendorn v. First National Bank (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 190,166 N.E.2d 571).\nNor does the doctrine violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution. The right to recover or debar recovery in tort from one\u2019s spouse is not a fundamental \u201cprivilege\u201d or \u201cimmunity\u201d bearing upon the vitality of the nation such that Illinois must conform its laws to treat all citizens, whether resident or nonresident, equally. Thus, the mere fact that the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abrogated in the great majority of States on public policy grounds does not, ipso facto, invalidate the statutory defense in Illinois.\nNext Mary Jane argues that interspousal immunity applies only during \u201ccoverture.\u201d Since she was residing with Frank by force of his intimidation rather than his protection and affection, she contends that coverture did not exist in the marital home. While we certainly recognize the inapplicability of one of the bases for enacting interspousal immunity (i.e., to encourage, promote and maintain marital harmony) to the unfortunate situation giving rise to the negligence cause of action herein, we are not persuaded thereby that \u201ccoverture,\u201d as that term is used in \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to husband and wife\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1001), means anything more than \u201cmarriage.\u201d (See Soedler v. Soedler (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 74, 76, 411 N.E.2d 547, 548.) Mary Jane and Frank\u2019s marriage, while not harmonious at the time of the accident, had not been dissolved. Since the personal injury negligence cause of action against Frank involved \u201ca tort to the person committed during coverture [marriage],\u201d the interspousal immunity defense was available as a procedural bar to count I (negligence) of Mary Jane\u2019s complaint.\nWe have reviewed the record on appeal and find that the questions of a possible conflict of interest and Frank\u2019s waiver of that conflict were adequately explored and resolved in the trial court. We have no doubt that Frank intended to use the statutory immunity available to him as a personal defense to Mary Jane\u2019s lawsuit to deprive her of any recovery for her injuries. In this case, State Farm, while agreeing to pay for independent defense counsel selected by Frank, had the same interest as Frank in avoiding Mary Jane\u2019s negligence cause of action. Frank\u2019s waiver of his attorney\u2019s possible conflict of interest and his assertion of the personal defense was made as knowledgeably and as intelligently as could be hoped for under the circumstances. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Frank and against Mary Jane on count I of her complaint, sounding in negligence.\nWe turn next to Mary Jane\u2019s contention that State Farm\u2019s family exclusion clause is invalid because it is overbroad, in contravention to Illinois public policy, and ambiguous. The clause in question is contained under \u201cSection I \u2014 Liability\u2014Coverage A\u201d and the paragraph entitled \u201cWhen Coverage A Does not Apply.\u201d It reads as follows:\n\u201cIn addition to the limitations of coverage in \u2018Who Is An Insured\u2019 and \u2018Trailer Coverage\u2019 THERE IS NO COVERAGE ... FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO: ... ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF THE INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS THE INSURED, The term \u2018insured\u2019 as used here means the person against whom claim is made or suit is being brought.\u201d\nMary Jane argues that the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of State Farm is overbroad because it declared noncoverage with respect to Fon du Lac Township\u2019s countercomplaint against Frank. She also contends that the exclusion clause itself is overbroad and ambiguous because it extends to family members residing in the insured\u2019s household without precisely defining the boundaries of a familial relationship. Frank joins Mary Jane\u2019s position, adding that ambiguity can be found by referring to \u201cSection II \u2014 Medical Payments \u2014 Coverage C\u201d which does not exclude family members.\nAs conceded by State Farm, the trial court\u2019s declaratory judgment in favor of the insurer extends only to the enforcement of \u201cSection I \u2014 Liability\u2014Coverage A.\u201d Liability coverage under the section at issue is specifically and unambiguously excluded with respect to Mary Jane\u2019s direct suit against Frank. The court\u2019s order does not preclude, however, any other recovery which may be available to Mary Jane under other sections of the policy which might apply. Furthermore, Fon du Lac\u2019s inability to recover from Frank\u2019s insurer on its countercomplaint does not preclude it from prosecuting its cause of action against Frank. Any issues respecting insurance coverage other than \u201cLiability Coverage A\u201d are not before us. We reject Mary Jane and Frank\u2019s arguments that the trial court\u2019s order is overbroad.\nThe contractual exclusion does not violate the public policy of this State. Mary Jane\u2019s public policy arguments are essentially adopted by Fon du Lac Township and were addressed and resolved in favor of State Farm in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Suarez (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 556, 432 N.E.2d 1204.\nIn Suarez, as here, the insureds were husband and wife who sought to recover damages from an allegedly negligent third party. In Suarez, the third party, Ingles, was the driver of the car with which the Suarez vehicle collided. Ingles countersued for contribution from Victor, who drove the Suarez car, on grounds that he was partially responsible for his wife\u2019s (Estrella\u2019s) injuries. The Suarez\u2019 policy of insurance contained the same \u201cfamily exclusion clause\u201d that appears in the policy before us. State Farm, as here, filed a declaratory judgment action denying that the Suarez\u2019 insurance policy afforded liability coverage to Victor for the contribution claim. Summary judgment was granted in favor of State Farm, the court ruling that the clause at issue was clear and unambiguous, not in violation of Illinois public policy and finding further that State Farm was not obligated to indemnify Victor for any judgment obtained by Ingles in the contribution suit.\nIn our opinion, the Suarez decision adequately disposes of all remaining arguments of merit advanced by Mary Jane, Frank and Fon du Lac Township urging reversal of the trial court\u2019s award of summary judgment for State Farm in the declaratory judgment action. We need not replow the grounds stated in Suarez to affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. Suffice it to say, we adopt the Suarez reasoning.\nThe final issue before us in these appeals was advanced by Frank: whether recent amendments to section 1 of \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to husband and wife\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 1001) \u2014 ie., Public Act 82 \u2014 569 and Public Act 82 \u2014 783\u2014are substantive changes which must be applied prospectively so as to require dismissal of Mary Jane\u2019s intentional tort cause of action based on Frank\u2019s interspousal immunity defense.\nThe statute in effect on the date of the accident stated simply \u201cthat neither husband nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1001.) To that sentence, Public Act 82 \u2014 569, reenacted by the 1982 Revisory Act, Public Act 82 \u2014 783 (1982 Ill. Laws 288) added \u201cother than an intentional tort.\u201d Public Act 82 \u2014 569 has an effective date of September 24, 1981. The incident giving rise to Mary Jane\u2019s count II, sounding in intentional tortious misconduct, accrued on September 12, 1981. Mary Jane\u2019s complaint was filed on December 18, 1981. The crux of Frank\u2019s argument on appeal is that the amendatory act affects a matter of substantive law and may apply only to actions accruing subsequent to the date of enactment. We cannot agree.\nIn Allstate Insurance Co. v. Elkins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 384, 396 N.E.2d 528, our supreme court concluded \u201cthat the effect of the 1953 amendment [codifying interspousal immunity] was not to destroy the cause of action of the injured spouse, but to confer immunity on the tortfeasor spouse, which like a defense based upon the statute of limitations can be waived by the defendant spouse.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (77 Ill. 2d 384, 390, 396 N.E.2d 528, 531.) Subsequent appellate decisions have interpreted Elkins to mean that interspousal immunity is now a procedural, rather than substantive, defense. (Wirth v. City of Highland Park (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1077, 430 N.E.2d 236, 239; Larson v. Buschkamp (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221; Farmers Insurance Group v. Nudi (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 151, 438 N.E.2d 1260.) Thus interpreted, Elkins cast doubt on the precedential value of Heckendorn v. First National Bank (1969), 19 Ill. 2d 190, 166 N.E.2d 571, in which the court held that interspousal immunity operated as a substantive, rather than procedural, bar to a widow\u2019s claim against her husband\u2019s estate. In any event, recent appellate decisions have held that claims by third parties for contribution are not barred by the interposition of the interspousal immunity defense by an insurer of the allegedly negligent spouse. Wirth; Larson; Nudi.\nIn our opinion, these recent appellate decisions, grounded on an interpretation of Elkins to the effect that interspousal immunity is a procedural defense, comport with the public policy underpinning the common law doctrine. If \u201cdomestic tranquility\u201d or preservation of marital harmony are to be achieved by enforcing interspousal immunity, then, by construing the statutory defense as procedural and permitting the tortfeasor spouse to waive its effect, the injured spouse may nonetheless recover for injuries and, hopefully, alleviate unnecessary marital stress where the payor of damages may be a third party, as opposed to the tortfeasor spouse himself.\nThe guidance we find in Elkins and its progeny, however instructive, does not bear directly on the question before us today. The determination of whether a statutory amendment may be applied retroactively or prospectively only is primarily a question of legislative intent. Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc. (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 76, 78, 452 N.E.2d 847, 849, citing Moore v. Jackson Park Hospital (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 223, 447 N.E.2d 408.\nWe do not have the benefit of the legislators\u2019 comments to Senate Bill 115 of the 1981 regular session, \u201cAn Act relating to inter-spousal torts\u201d (enacted as Pub. Act 82 \u2014 569). Nonetheless, Public Act 82 \u2014 569, section 3, recites \u201cThis amendatory Act shall take effect upon becoming law.\u201d We glean from this that the legislature intended an earlier, rather than later, effective date, since the legislators\u2019 silence on an effective date would have dictated a January 1, 1982, effective date. By adding section 3, the legislators ensured that the new law would take immediate effect upon the governor\u2019s signature of approval. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, sec. 10; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 1, par. 1201.) Inasmuch as interspousal immunity is now generally viewed as procedural, and there is no specific legislative intent to implement the amendatory act on a prospective basis only, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s determination that Mary Jane\u2019s cause of action for intentional tort (count II) survives Frank\u2019s assertion of the immunity defense.\nIn so ruling, we are not bound by a rigid \u201cprocedural\u201d versus \u201csubstantive\u201d formula. Modern jurists look beyond the apparent simplicity of semantic dichotomies to achieve a fair and reasonable result. As observed by Justice Mils in Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc. (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79-80, 452 N.E.2d 847, 850:\n\u201cWhether retroactive application of legislation is permissible is not dependent on such outmoded distinctions as whether vested or nonvested rights are affected, or whether a statute affects rights or merely affects remedies. Rather, such cases must be decided on the basis of whether basic concepts of justice, fairness and equity militate for or against the retroactive application of the statute to a particular class of persons. Generally, retroactive statutes which courts have declared invalid have been deemed \u2018oppressive, impolitic, unjust, arbitrary, do substantial injury, are unreasonable, wanting in equity, [and] inconsistent with \u201cthe prevailing views of justice.\u201d \u2019 (Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 247-48 (1927).) *** The competing interests of the affected persons must be carefully weighed in order to arrive at a just result. See Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights II, 6 Tex. L. Rev. 409, 427, 431 (1928); see also Moore v. Jackson Park Hospital (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 223, 242-43, 447 N.E.2d 408, 416 (Ryan, J., concurring).\u201d\nIn our opinion, the interests and reasonable expectations of the injured plaintiff, allegedly the victim of a battery at the hands of her husband, outweigh the defendant\u2019s expectation that legislation enacted subsequent to the incident but prior to the filing of her complaint would not deprive him of an opportunity to defeat his wife\u2019s direct suit by virtue of the legislative act. Furthermore, our holding today is not inconsistent with the historically cited public policy bases for the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity \u2014 the primary one being to promote domestic tranquility and a secondary one being to guard against the danger of collusion by the married parties. As cogently observed by the court in Brandt v. Keller (1952), 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729, neither of these stated concerns can be said to have been served in a situation where, as here, an intentional tort claim arises during the final throes of a marriage. \u201cWhen one spouse assails another or brings suit, there is not much domestic tranquility left to disrupt. *** [T]he potentiality of collusion, or of the perversion of the administration of justice exists in all litigation, and cannot properly constitute legal grounds for construing a statute.\u201d 413 Ill. 503, 511, 109 N.E.2d 729, 733.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to each issue raised in these appeals and remand this cause for further proceedings.\nHEIPLE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "James L. Hafele, P.C., of Peoria, for appellant Mary Jane Palmer.", "Maximilian M. Prusak, of Prusak & Winne, of Peoria, for appellant Fon du Lac Township.", "Robert D. Jackson and Jeffrey W. Jackson, both of Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, of Peoria, for appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.", "James A. Martinkus, of Erwin, Martinkus, Cole & Ansel, Ltd., of Champaign, for appellee Frank W. Palmer." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY JANE PALMER et al., Defendants-Appellants (Frank W. Palmer, Defendant-Appellee). MARY JANE PALMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANK W. PALMER, Defendant-Appellee (Fon du Lac Township, Defendant).\nThird District\nNos. 3-83-0163, 3-83-0177, 3-83-0268, 3-83-0188, 3 \u2014 83\u20140308 cons.\nOpinion filed April 16, 1984.\nJames L. Hafele, P.C., of Peoria, for appellant Mary Jane Palmer.\nMaximilian M. Prusak, of Prusak & Winne, of Peoria, for appellant Fon du Lac Township.\nRobert D. Jackson and Jeffrey W. Jackson, both of Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, of Peoria, for appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.\nJames A. Martinkus, of Erwin, Martinkus, Cole & Ansel, Ltd., of Champaign, for appellee Frank W. Palmer." }, "file_name": "0674-01", "first_page_order": 696, "last_page_order": 704 }