{ "id": 3428092, "name": "DAVID N. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARMACK DATSUN, INC., d/b/a Carmack Car Capitol, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc.", "decision_date": "1984-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201483\u20140464", "first_page": "979", "last_page": "983", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 979" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "701 F.2d 1238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 12150791 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/701/1238-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" }, { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469094 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493996 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0273-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 9814, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.134288990235536e-08, "percentile": 0.5074388506820282 }, "sha256": "dfcd37d115bbf55da753103f7ffbb4e823a49aa95fbce046daad0e0cda5da7a4", "simhash": "1:1f0bd405b3bffef0", "word_count": 1576 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:36.140001+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAVID N. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARMACK DATSUN, INC., d/b/a Carmack Car Capitol, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe principal issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff, an employee who alleged that he was discharged for submitting a claim under the group health insurance plan provided by his employer, stated a cause of action based upon the tort of retaliatory discharge. We conclude that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.\nOn January 5, 1982, plaintiff, David N. Price, filed a complaint against defendant, Carmack Datsun, Inc., d/b/a Carmack Car Capitol, in the circuit court of Vermilion County. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered an order on February 1, 1983, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $5,525 in compensatory damages and $2,762 in punitive damages.\nOn appeal defendant maintains that (1) the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, (2) the jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, (3) the amount of compensatory damages was improper, (4) plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages, and (5) the trial court erred in allowing a motion in limine filed by plaintiff.\nBy filing a motion to dismiss, a defendant admits the well-pleaded facts of the complaint and raises an issue of law as to the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint. Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 273, 433 N.E.2d 253.\nHere, the complaint contained the following allegations. During the time period pertinent to plaintiffs case, defendant, an Illinois corporation, was in the business of selling new and used automobiles with its principal place of business in Danville. On August 18, 1980, plaintiff, who was employed by defendant as a car salesman, sustained injuries in an automobile accident. These injuries required plaintiff to be hospitalized for approximately three weeks, and caused plaintiff to be off work for over two months. As an employee of defendant, plaintiff was afforded coverage under a group health insurance plan with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company. Plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses, most of which were covered by his group health insurance plan, exceeded $7,000. When plaintiff returned to work on November 26, 1980, Donald Carmack, defendant\u2019s president, inquired as to whether plaintiff would submit a claim under his group health insurance plan. In addition, Carmack sought to dissuade plaintiff from filing such a claim. When plaintiff subsequently advised Car-mack that he was going to file an insurance claim, plaintiff was discharged from his job as a salesman with defendant.\nThe complaint also alleged that (1) the discharge of plaintiff by defendant was in \u201cdirect retaliation\u201d for plaintiff\u2019s submission of his claim for insurance benefits under the group health insurance plan, and (2) as a result of his discharge, plaintiff suffered loss of income due to his \u201cinability to find comparable employment.\u201d\nDefendant maintains that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action because Illinois law does not recognize a cause of action in favor of a former employee and against a former employer for retaliatory discharge for submitting a group health insurance claim.\nThe leading Illinois authorities on the tort of retaliatory discharge are the cases of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, and Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876. In the Kelsay and Palmateer cases the supreme court formulated a rule granting a civil cause of action in certain circumstances to an employee under an \u201cat will\u201d employment relationship who is discharged by his employer in retaliation for certain conduct by the employee.\nIn Kelsay, the supreme court announced that, for the first time in Illinois, a cause of action should exist for retaliatory discharge in order to uphold and implement the public policy evinced by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). In its analysis, the court determined that the purpose of the Act would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation under the Act.\nIn Palmateer, the supreme court granted leave to appeal to determine the \u201ccontours\u201d of the tort of retaliatory discharge. There, plaintiff filed suit against a former employer, alleging wrongful discharge of the plaintiff in retaliation for supplying information to a local law enforcement agency that one of his co-employees might be violating the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1 \u2014 1 et seq.) and for agreeing to assist in the investigation and trial of the co-employee if requested. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed and determined that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action under Illinois law, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.\nThe supreme court in Palmateer determined that a discharged \u201cat will\u201d employee has a cause of action against his former employer if the employee was discharged in retaliation for his activities, and that discharge contravenes a \u201cclearly mandated public policy.\u201d As to the meaning of \u201cclearly mandated public policy,\u201d the court stated:\n\u201cThere is no precise definition of [clearly mandated public policy]. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of this State collectively. It is to be found in the State\u2019s constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decision. [Citations.] *** [A] matter must strike at the heart of a citizen\u2019s social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.\u201d Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878.\nThe parties have cited no case in which the tort of retaliatory discharge has been extended to a factual situation similar to the one in the case at bar. Plaintiff argues, however, that certain provisions of the Illinois Insurance Code concerning group accident and health insurance claims (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 73, pars. 964 through 982d) constitute the necessary \u201cclearly mandated public policy\u201d required by the Palmateer case.\nWe recognize that section 367 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 73, par. 979) regulates the issuance and maintenance of group accident and health insurance. For example, section 367 requires that (1) provisions allowing the addition of new family members be contained in the policy, and (2) dependent coverage continue for at least 90 days upon the death of the insured employee. In addition, section 367e (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 73, par. 979e) contains elaborate provisions which allow for the conversion of group health insurance to individual policies in various situations. However, while the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act requires covered employers to provide benefits to employees under certain circumstances, the Illinois Insurance Code does not require employers to provide group health insurance to their employees. The Code merely regulates the terms of such policies that are issued. Accordingly, we conclude that the provisions of the Code do not evince a clearly mandated public policy against an employer\u2019s discharge of an employee for filing a group health insurance claim.\nWe note that section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. sec. 1140 (1976)) provides:\n\u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ***.\u201d 29 U.S.C. sec. 1140 (1976).\nIn Kross v. Western Electric Co. (7th Cir. 1983), 701 F.2d 1238, the trial court concluded that plaintiff, by alleging that he was discharged for the purpose of depriving him of continued participation in Western Electric\u2019s company-provided life and medical insurance plans, stated a claim for damages cognizable under section 510 of ERISA.\nAlthough section 510 may provide a Federal remedy for employer conduct similar to that alleged in this case, we need not pass upon the exact application of ERISA to the case at bar because plaintiff did not allege a violation of ERISA, nor did defendant raise it as a defense. In addition, we conclude that section 510 of ERISA does not evince a \u201cclearly mandated public policy\u201d of this State for the purposes of extending the State common law tort of retaliatory discharge. We note that the Palmateer court stated that \u201cclearly mandated public policy\u201d is to be found in the \u201cState\u2019s constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.\u201d Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878.\nBecause the complaint in this case failed to state a cause of action based upon the tort of retaliatory discharge, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. As a result, we need not pass upon the other issues raised by defendant in this appeal.\nFor the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment entered by the circuit court of Vermilion County.\nReversed.\nMILLS, RJ., and TRAPP, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bruce Meachum, of Meachum & Meachum, of Danville, for appellant.", "Glenn A. Stanko, of Reno, O\u2019Byrne & Kepley, of Champaign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID N. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARMACK DATSUN, INC., d/b/a Carmack Car Capitol, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201483\u20140464\nOpinion filed June 7, 1984.\nBruce Meachum, of Meachum & Meachum, of Danville, for appellant.\nGlenn A. Stanko, of Reno, O\u2019Byrne & Kepley, of Champaign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0979-01", "first_page_order": 1003, "last_page_order": 1007 }