{ "id": 3633235, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF DONALD LASOTA, Petitioner-Appellee, and CAROLYN LASOTA, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Lasota", "decision_date": "1984-06-19", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141489", "first_page": "37", "last_page": "42", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 37" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 754", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3423081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0754-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5582165 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 1229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591200 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3098095 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5440520 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1021" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5496177 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0657-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 578, "char_count": 11519, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1163701725102693e-07, "percentile": 0.8603335561262452 }, "sha256": "a4bb3f74ae8578886e9ecae97c6eabd4cf4dc9d78cb72de7b4de57aa4525f1f5", "simhash": "1:83c28544360fbfe6", "word_count": 1850 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:49:19.537276+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF DONALD LASOTA, Petitioner-Appellee, and CAROLYN LASOTA, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA dissolution of marriage judgment was entered in the circuit court of Cook County on April 16, 1980, in the marriage of respondent Carolyn Lasota (Carolyn) and petitioner Donald Lasota (Donald). In a post-judgment proceeding arising from the dissolution, the trial court denied Carolyn\u2019s petition for an increase in maintenance and granted Donald\u2019s petition for termination of maintenance. Carolyn appeals the trial court\u2019s orders.\nFor the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nCarolyn and Donald Lasota were married in Cook County on March 27, 1976. No children were born of this marriage. The order of dissolution provided that Donald pay to Carolyn maintenance of $35 per week, \u201cbased on her making $87 every two weeks.\u201d\nOn June 29, 1981, because Donald had lost his job and was receiving only $268 per month in Veteran\u2019s disability compensation, the trial court reduced the amount of maintenance payments to $11.67 per week.\nOn December 30, 1982, Carolyn petitioned for an increase in maintenance alleging that her living expenses have increased considerably since April 1980; that Donald is employed and \u201ccan well afford to contribute more maintenance\u201d to her; that she \u201chas been unemployed since September 1982, and although seeking employment, remains unemployed at the present time\u201d; and that \u201cthe $11.67 per week maintenance obligation of [Donald] is unreasonable in light of the ability of [Donald] to pay more and the present needs of [Carolyn].\u201d\nOn February 15, 1983, Donald petitioned for modification or termination of his maintenance payments to Carolyn.\nPending the hearing, the court entered a temporary order increasing maintenance payments to $60 per week.\nAt the maintenance hearing, Donald testified that in June 1981, when the court directed maintenance payments of $11.67 per week, he was unemployed. In August 1981 he became employed as a maintenance man at the building located at 1400 Lake Shore Drive. Donald received two promotions at this job and is currently supervisor of the building. Donald, who now resides with his new wife and her child, earns $842 gross every two weeks from his employment and receives $311 per month in disability compensation from the Veteran\u2019s Administration. Donald testified that his expenses amount to $1,658 per month. He stated further that two weeks prior to the maintenance hearing he had an operation for a retinal detachment in his left eye and was unable to work for two weeks. He will receive pay for the one week he was in the hospital.\nCarolyn testified that until October 3, 1982, at which time she lost her job, she worked as a waitress at the Montclare Lanes Bowling Alley, earning about $4 per hour. She collected unemployment compensation in the amount of $45 per week until December 25, 1982. Carolyn submitted to the court a list of approximately 80 restaurants, bars and bowling alleys at which she claimed to have sought employment. She currently supports herself with money she saved when she worked, with money she receives from her ex-husband from a previous marriage, and with $5,000 that her father had given to her in 1981. Carolyn stated, however, that she has spent all the money she received from her father. Carolyn claimed that her monthly expenses amount to $830 and that her rent was scheduled to be increased from $335 per month to $375 per month. From her previous marriage Carolyn has a 19-year-old daughter who attends the Moody Bible Institute and resides at the school. Carolyn \u201csometimes\u201d contributes to her daughter\u2019s support.\nThe trial court terminated Carolyn\u2019s maintenance stating that \u201cmaintenance should be given with the purpose that it eventually be terminated. And that\u2019s the basis upon which I made the overall ruling.\u201d\nCarolyn\u2019s motion for reconsideration was denied.\nI\nCarolyn contends that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her maintenance and argues that she is entitled to continued maintenance because she \u201cis unemployed and unable to find a job, and Donald is employed and able to contribute to her support.\u201d\nSection 504 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) sets forth the relevant considerations for the court in determining the amount and duration of a maintenance award. Among the factors to be considered are:\n\u201c(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;\n(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;\n(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;\n(4) the duration of the marriage-,\n(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; and\n(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 504(b).\nThe concept of rehabilitative maintenance is described in the Historical and Practice Notes to section 504(b)(2):\n\u201cThis subsection directs the court to consider the time necessary for the party seeking maintenance to acquire sufficient education or training to find employment. This concept of rehabilitative maintenance is new to Illinois law. The amount and duration of such maintenance should be determined by reference to what is necessary to obviate marriage-conditioned needs and to enable a formerly dependent spouse to acquire financial independence for the future. Under prior decisional law, there was no duty to seek employment. [Citation.] This subsection creates an affirmative obligation on the part of the spouse seeking maintenance to seek employment, where plausible, and this reflects one of the most important changes brought about by this Act. [Citations.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 504(b)(2), Historical & Practice Notes, at 529 (Smith-Hurd 1980).\nMaintenance awards rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless the award amounts to an abuse of discretion or is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Bramson (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 657, 427 N.E.2d 285.) Further, \u201cthe modification of the alimony [maintenance] award will not be set aside on review unless the trial court abused its discretion.\u201d Giamanco v. Giamanco (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021, 444 N.E.2d 1090, 1093.\nIt is generally held that a maintenance award will be modified \u201conly upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 510(a).) The burden of demonstrating the alleged substantial change in circumstances is on the party seeking relief. In determining whether and to what degree a maintenance award shall be modified, the circuit court should consider the same factors which, under the statute, are to be assessed in making the initial award. In re Marriage of Chalkley (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 478, 426 N.E.2d 237.\nIn In re Marriage of Mittra (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 627, 634-35, 450 N.E.2d 1229, 1234, the court held that the \u201cpetitioner [party receiving maintenance] is under an affirmative obligation to seek appropriate training and skills to become financially independent in the future,\u201d and that \u201cftjhe failure of the petitioner to make good-faith efforts to achieve this goal, following a reasonable time frame during which the objective should be accomplished, might form the basis for a petition for modification pursuant to section 510(a) of the Act.\" (Emphasis added.)\nOur review of the record here indicates that the trial court heard sufficient evidence of the parties\u2019 incomes and expenses, and of Carolyn\u2019s employment efforts and potential to enable it realistically to determine whether maintenance payments should continue. Although Carolyn claimed to have sought employment as a barmaid or waitress at 80 establishments, the trial court concluded that she has not taken an \u201cactive role in putting an end to the maintenance.\u201d\nThe trial court appears to have considered the various factors set forth in section 504(b) of the Act: the standard of living established during the marriage, the duration of the marriage (four years), the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties and Donald\u2019s ability to meet his own needs while meeting those of Carolyn.\nIn our opinion, the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Carolyn failed to meet her affirmative obligation to seek appropriate training or education in order to become financially independent. The trial court\u2019s termination of maintenance was, therefore, not an abuse of discretion.\nII\nDespite the conclusion we have above expressed, Carolyn contends further that the trial court\u2019s denial of her petition for an increase in maintenance was an abuse of discretion. She argues that \u201cthe evidence clearly established that there was a \u2018substantial change of circumstances\u2019 justifying such an increase in maintenance,\u201d in that Donald\u2019s income has substantially increased since the last maintenance order; \u201cCarolyn has absolutely no income,\u201d and her \u201cexpenses have greatly increased since the original Judgment for Dissolution in April, 1980.\u201d\nSections 504 and 510 of the Act are likewise dispositive of this issue. As we have heretofore noted, modification of a maintenance award must be based upon the factors outlined in section 504 and upon a showing of a \u201csubstantial change in the circumstances of the parties.\u201d Gorman v. Gorman (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 391 N.E.2d 70, 73.\nA maintenance award \u201ccan be modified either when the needs of the spouse receiving alimony change or the ability of the other spouse to pay alimony changes.\u201d Shive v. Shive (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 754, 760, 373 N.E.2d 557, 562.\nIn the instant case, although Donald\u2019s income has increased since the maintenance order of June 1981, Carolyn has not established that she has \u201cabsolutely no income\u201d or that her expenses have \u201cgreatly increased.\u201d She has failed to produce evidence of the amount of money currently in her bank account, and the only specific increase in expense to which she testified was the $40 per month increase in rent she anticipated for April 1983.\nFrom the paucity of evidence offered by Carolyn and from her trial demeanor, the trial court concluded that Carolyn had failed to demonstrate a substantial change in her circumstances and had failed also to \u201ctake some active role in putting an end to the maintenance.\u201d\nIn our opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carolyn\u2019s petition for an increase in maintenance.\nFor the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHARTMAN, P.J., and STAMOS, J., concur.\nThe trial judge appears at times to accept the list of 80 establishments where Carolyn allegedly sought employment, and alternately to question its legitimacy.\nThe record does not establish the amounts received by Carolyn from her ex-husband.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin, Barezky & Berkson, of Chicago (Howard A. London, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lance Haddix, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF DONALD LASOTA, Petitioner-Appellee, and CAROLYN LASOTA, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83\u20141489\nOpinion filed June 19, 1984.\nBeermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin, Barezky & Berkson, of Chicago (Howard A. London, of counsel), for appellant.\nLance Haddix, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0037-01", "first_page_order": 59, "last_page_order": 64 }