{ "id": 3633098, "name": "WALTER BRAUN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY & BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant (The Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, et al., Intervenors-Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "Braun v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "1984-06-15", "docket_number": "No. 83\u2014759", "first_page": "132", "last_page": "141", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 132" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591645 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5475078 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 1061", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 1099", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3087275 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/1099-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2704262 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5437547 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990985 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d' 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075233 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 791", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2672233 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" }, { "page": "799" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0791-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 807, "char_count": 20836, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2471063804223888e-07, "percentile": 0.7807935906687996 }, "sha256": "b741fe2172baf24b0e1468003cd1424873c3427f2e9f0a4b8b138e6f1c6053f9", "simhash": "1:887f708c2d420384", "word_count": 3306 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:49:19.537276+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WALTER BRAUN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY & BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant (The Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, et al., Intervenors-Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff sought administrative review of a decision rendered by the Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (Retirement Board) which denied his request to have his pension benefits computed on his actual exempt rank salary as deputy fire commissioner of the Chicago fire department rather than on the salary appropriated to the highest civil or career service rank he had attained. The trial court reversed the Retirement Board\u2019s decision and stayed enforcement of the order pending a determination on appeal.\nThe Retirement Board, the Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO (the Union), and four elected trustees of the Retirement Board appeal the trial court\u2019s decision, contending that pursuant to article 6 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Pension Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 6 \u2014 101 et seq.), the basis for computation of plaintiff\u2019s pension benefits is the current annual salary appropriated to the highest career service rank he had held prior to his exempt appointment. In his cross-appeal, plaintiff asserts that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that neither defendant Retirement Board nor intervenors has standing to sue. For the reasons stated below, we find that the intervenor appellants have standing to sue, and we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nPertinent to this appeal are the following:\nPlaintiff was hired by the Chicago fire department as a firefighter, a career service position, on May 10, 1948, and remained in the career service ranks in various capacities until January 1, 1972, at which time he was promoted to his first exempt rank position, chief of personnel, plans and training. From January 1, 1972, to the present, he has continued to serve in various exempt rank positions, the last of which as deputy fire commissioner.\nWhile working within the career service ranks, plaintiff\u2019s pension contributions and deductions were computed on his actual annual salary, and increased proportionately with his salary, but when he was promoted above the highest career service rank to the exempt ranks, his pension deductions were not increased concomitantly with his salary. Instead, they continued to be computed upon the salary appropriated to his highest career service rank. As a result of this practice, on September 20, 1977, while serving as chief of personnel, plaintiff sent a demand letter to the Retirement Board requesting that all future pension deductions be based on his actual salary rather than on his highest career service salary. In addition, he requested a statement from the Retirement Board as to the amount of money he owed to the retirement fund so as to bring his contributions current with the higher computation base. When he received no response, plaintiff sent a follow-up letter to the Retirement Board on December 5, 1977, stating that if no action were taken on his request by January 1, 1978, plaintiff would demand a formal hearing. When the Retirement Board failed to reply by August 11, 1978, plaintiff issued a formal demand for a hearing, followed by a second formal demand on December 19, 1978, and a third on April 25, 1979. Finally, after filing a suit seeking a writ of mandamus demanding that he be given a formal hearing, plaintiff was granted a hearing before the Retirement Board in February and April 1982.\nAt the February hearing, plaintiff characterized his current position of deputy fire commissioner as \u201cpermanent exempt\u201d and argued that because it is a permanent, not a temporary position, he is entitled to have pension deductions computed on his actual salary. The Corporation Counsel of Chicago (Corporation Counsel), acting as the Retirement Board\u2019s legal representative, concurred with plaintiff and relied on Quinn v. Retirement Board (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 791, 289 N.E.2d 117 (Quinn), as dispositive of the issue in plaintiff\u2019s favor.\nAt the April hearing, the union was present for the first time and argued extensively against plaintiff\u2019s position, claiming that plaintiff\u2019s current exempt position is not permanent, thus, his pension is properly computed on the salary appropriated to the highest permanent career service rank he has held. As support for its argument that the designation \u201cpermanent\u201d applies only to career service positions and the exempt position of fire commissioner, the Union relied on section 6 \u2014 163 and 6 \u2014 211 of the Illinois Pension Code and their interrelationship with the 1981 Municipal Code of Chicago (Municipal Code) and the 1977 and 1982 Revised Chicago Personnel Rules (Personnel Rules). In response, plaintiff reiterated his reliance on Quinn and urged the trial court to adopt the opinion of the Corporation Counsel expressed at the February hearing.\nWhen the Retirement Board denied his request, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court, alleging, inter alia, that the Retirement Board\u2019s decision was erroneous and illegal in law and in fact and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion to intervene filed by the Union and certain individual pension trustees and granted plaintiff leave to file a two-count amended complaint wherein plaintiff sought, individually and on behalf of all annuitants of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago similarly situated, administrative review of the Retirement Board\u2019s decision (count I); and class certification and injunctive relief (count II). Count II was subsequently severed and continued until such time as a decision was rendered on count I.\nFollowing extensive arguments by plaintiff and interveners, the trial court found Quinn dispositive of the issue, reversed the Retirement Board\u2019s decision, and ordered the defendant Retirement Board to compute plaintiff\u2019s pension and the pensions of others similarly situated on the basis of their actual exempt salaries. The court also stayed enforcement of the order pending appeal.\nOpinion\nWe first address plaintiff\u2019s contention on cross-appeal that appellants lacked standing to prosecute this appeal. Specifically, plaintiff contends that: (1) the Retirement Board and its individual members are exceeding their statutory authority by prosecuting this appeal; and (2) the city of Chicago, represented by the Corporation Counsel, is the only party with standing to appeal and it has not elected to do so. We disagree and find Quinn dispositive of this issue.\nIn Quinn, plaintiff, the fire commissioner of the Chicago fire department, filed a complaint for administrative review of the Retirement Board\u2019s denial of his request that his pension benefits be computed on his actual exempt rank salary. At trial, the Corporation Counsel, acting as legal representative of the Retirement Board, urged the circuit court to reverse the Retirement Board\u2019s decision, which the court ultimately did. Subsequently, the individual members of the Retirement Board who had voted against plaintiff\u2019s request retained private counsel and appealed the circuit court\u2019s decision. Plaintiff and the Corporation Counsel each filed motions to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellants lacked standing to sue. Recognizing that the individual Retirement Board members who had voted against plaintiff\u2019s request had a special interest which was directly and materially affected by the circuit court\u2019s decision and that the ends of justice would not be served by foreclosing their opportunity to obtain a review of that decision, the Quinn court denied the motions to dismiss.\nSimilarly, in the present case, the Corporation Counsel, acting as the Retirement Board\u2019s legal representative, adopted plaintiff\u2019s adversarial position at both the hearing and at trial, leaving the Retirement Board no alternative but to retain private counsel in order to protect its interests. Contrary to plaintiff\u2019s contention, this action by the Retirement Board is statutorily authorized (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par 6 \u2014 190) and is further justified by the Retirement Board\u2019s need to protect its fiduciary obligations as administrator of the retirement fund. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 6 \u2014 174.) With respect to the Union, we find that their right to appeal arises directly from their uncontested right to intervene in the trial court proceeding. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 408.) Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s request to dismiss the appeal is denied.\nWe next address the issue as to whether plaintiff\u2019s actual salary earned in his exempt position or the salary appropriated to his highest attained career service rank provides the proper basis for computation of his pension benefits. All parties to this action concur that sections 6 \u2014 111, 6 \u2014 163 and 6 \u2014 211 of the Pension Code govern computation of these benefits, but differ as to the application of these sections to the particular action at bar. The relevant sections provide, in pertinent part:\n\u201cSec. 6 \u2014 Ill. Salary. \u2018Salary\u2019: *** annual salary of a fireman, as follows:\n(a) For age service annuity *** the actual amount of the annual salary.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 6 \u2014 Ill.\n\u201cSec. 6 \u2014 163. Annual salary for computing annuities and benefits \u2014 Amount of duty disability benefit limited. For age and service annuity *** salary as defined in Section 6 \u2014 111 shall be the basis of computation.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 6-163.\n\u201cSec. 6 \u2014 211. Permanent and temporary positions. No annuity, pension or other benefit shall be paid to a fireman or widow, under this Article, based upon any salary paid by virtue of a temporary appointment. All contributions, annuities and benefits shall be related to the salary which attaches to the permanent position of fireman. Any fireman temporarily serving in a position or rank other than that to which he has received permanent appointment shall be considered, while so serving, as though he were in his permanent position or rank, except that no increase in any pension, annuity or other benefit hereunder shall accrue to him by virtue of any service performed by him subsequent to attaining the compulsory retirement, age provided by law or ordinance. This section shall not apply to any person certified to the fire department by the civil service commission of the city, during the period of probationary service.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1081/2, par. 6 \u2014 211.\nRelying on the statutory analysis set forth in Quinn, plaintiff asserts that the plain language of Pension Code sections 6 \u2014 111 and 6\u2014 163 unambiguously provides that pension benefits for exempt positions such as his are to be based on the fireman's actual annual salary. The fallacy in this argument is twofold. First, plaintiff focuses primarily on sections 6 \u2014 111 and 6 \u2014 163 of the Pension Code, minimizing the impact of section 6 \u2014 211 which sets forth the exception to the general rule contained in section 6 \u2014 163. Second, he mistakenly relies on Quinn, which decision is expressly limited to the unique position of fire commissioner.\nWith respect to plaintiff\u2019s analysis of the Pension Code, it is axiomatic that when construing a statute, a court must not be guided by a single sentence or by an isolated provision. (Winks v. Board of Education (1979), 78 Ill. 2d\u2019 128, 135, 398 N.E.2d 823.) Rather, the statute as a whole must be evaluated, with each provision being construed in connection with every other provision and in light of the statute\u2019s general purposes. (Miller v. Department of Registration & Education (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 387 N.E.2d 300; Borg v. Village of Schiller Park Police Pension Board (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 653, 657, 444 N.E.2d 631.) Accordingly, in applying the Pension Code provisions to the facts at bar, we cannot ignore or give cursory review to section 6 \u2014 211 which provides the exception to the general rule for computation of pension deductions.\nWith respect to plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Quinn, the pivotal distinction between Quinn and the facts at bar which renders Quinn inapplicable is the actual exempt position held by each plaintiff. In Quinn, plaintiff was the fire commissioner. Here, plaintiff is the deputy fire commissioner. Plaintiff argues that that distinction is irrelevant because the Quinn holding applies to any participant in the fund who holds an exempt position. In support of his contention, plaintiff relies on the following excerpt from the Quinn opinion:\n\u201cIn our opinion, the legislature clearly intended that after the 1967 amendment to Section 6 \u2014 163 the minimum annuity or pension of a participant in the fund would be predicated upon the actual amount of annual salary appropriated in the annual budget for the particular position occupied by the participant.\u201d (Quinn v. Retirement Board (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 791, 797.)\nWe find the foregoing paragraph unpersuasive of plaintiff\u2019s position for two reasons. First, it is dicta, not the holding of the court. Second, it merely paraphrases the general rule for pension computation which is not in dispute without reference to the section 6 \u2014 211 exception. In that portion of the opinion where the Quinn court does address the \u201ctemporary\u201d versus \u201cpermanent\u201d controversy triggered by the section 6 \u2014 211 exception, the court\u2019s conclusion is strictly limited to the position of fire commissioner, as indicated by the following: \u201cWithin the meaning of Section 6 \u2014 211, plaintiff was not appointed on a temporary basis, but received a permanent appointment as Commissioner.\u201d (7 Ill. App. 3d 791, 799.) Accordingly, our determination that Quinn is factually distinguishable from the present case renders irrelevant plaintiff\u2019s argument that legislative acquiescence to Quinn demonstrates the legislature\u2019s intent that computation of the pension benefits for exempt positions should be based upon actual annual salary.\nAlthough we find Quinn distinguishable on the facts, we recognize the similarity of the central issue confronted by both the Quinn court and by this court, i.e., the legislature\u2019s intended meaning of the words \u201ctemporary\u201d and \u201cpermanent\u201d as they appear in section 6\u2014 211. While we concur with the Quinn holding, we disagree with that court\u2019s reliance on an opinion letter rendered by the Corporation Counsel and an interpretation by the retirement fund\u2019s actuary. In the present case, as in Quinn, by adopting plaintiff\u2019s position, the Corporation Counsel became, in effect, the Retirement Board\u2019s adversary while concurrently acting as its legal representative. Thus, in our opinion, it would be highly prejudicial for us to give opinion letters issued by the Corporation Counsel determinative weight in our decision. (See People ex rel. Brenza v. Gebbie (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 565, 577, 126 N.E.2d 657.) With respect to the actuary, we decline to vest its nonlegal definition of a pivotal statutory term with legally authoritative weight. Instead, we look to House Bill No. 483 (Pub. Act 83 \u2014 16), an amendment to sections 6 \u2014 111 and 6 \u2014 211 of the Code, signed into law on July 7, 1983 (Willis v. Ohio Casualty Co. (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1104, 428 N.E.2d 1061), section 25.1 \u2014 3 of the Municipal Code, and Rule III of the Personnel Rules (see Gillespie v. City of Maroa (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 874, 878, 433 N.E.2d 688) for clarification of the legislature\u2019s intended meaning of the words \u201ctemporary\u201d and \u201cpermanent\u201d as they appear in section 6 \u2014 211.\nIn substance, Public Act 83 \u2014 16 adds \u201cSubject to Section 6 \u2014 211\u201d to the first sentence of section 6 \u2014 111, revises section 6 \u2014 211\u2019s title to read: \u201cPermanent and temporary positions,\u201d and adds the following clarifying paragraph to the end of section 6 \u2014 211:\n\u201cA fireman who holds a position at the will of the Fire Commissioner or other appointing authority, whether or not such position is an \u2018exempt\u2019 position, shall be deemed to hold a temporary position, and such employee\u2019s contributions and benefits shall be based upon the employee\u2019s permanent career service salary. The provisions of this paragraph shall be retroactive to January 1,1976.\u201d\nThus, pursuant to Public Act 83 \u2014 16, a temporary position is one filled by discretionary appointment. The question then becomes in what manner is the position of deputy fire commissioner filled.\nResolution of that query lies in section 25.1 \u2014 3 of the Municipal Code and Rule III of the Personnel Rules. Read in conjunction, they classify the office of deputy fire commissioner as a senior executive position to which an appointment is made at the discretion of the department head. We hold that plaintiff\u2019s exempt position is temporary within the meaning of that term as used in section 6 \u2014 211 and computation of his pension benefits is properly based upon the salary appropriated to his highest attained career service rank.\nPlaintiff argues that retroactive application of Public Act 83\u2014 16 would trigger serious constitutional problems on the grounds that: (1) it implies that section 6 \u2014 163, as amended, applies only to the fire commissioner position, thus creating an arbitrary distinction; and (2) it diminishes pension benefits in direct violation of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. We disagree. Contrary to plaintiff\u2019s position, section 6 \u2014 163 applies to all firemen who do not fall within the exception delineated in section 6 \u2014 211. Far from being arbitrary, this distinction has its roots in article 10 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 24, par. 10 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq.), which was subsequently incorporated into and superseded by the 1977 Personnel Rules. Moreover, Public Act 83 \u2014 16 does not change existing law; it merely clarifies it. Accordingly, it cannot act to diminish benefits to which plaintiff was never entitled.\nFinally, we address defendant\u2019s and intervenors\u2019 argument that the circuit court\u2019s order extending relief to a class rather than to plaintiff alone was an abuse of its discretion. Plaintiff\u2019s initial complaint which sought administrative review of the Retirement Board\u2019s decision on behalf of himself only was subsequently amended to include a second count which requested declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. By order dated October 1, 1982, the trial court severed the two counts and stayed consideration of count II, which included the class claim, until final determination of count I. Thereafter, in direct contradiction to this ruling, the trial court entered a final order directing the Retirement Board to compute the pension of \u201cothers similarly situated on the basis of their actual exempt salaries.\u201d Based on these uncontroverted facts, we concur with defendant and intervenors that the trial court\u2019s action was an abuse of discretion in that it violated section 2 \u2014 801 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 801), which sets forth the manner by which a class action determination is to be made, and denied defendant its fundamental right to present its argument against class certification. See Nye v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 272, 276, 448 N.E.2d 918.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and reinstate the decision of the Retirement Board.\nReversed.\nMEJDA, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.\nWith the adoption of the 1977 Chicago Personnel Rules, the term \u201ccivil service,\u201d formerly used in the superseded Civil Service Commission Rules, was revised to \u201ccareer service.\u201d\nApparently for a six-month period in 1981, plaintiff\u2019s pension deductions were computed upon his actual exempt rank salary. However, the record is void as to any explanation for this isolated occurrence.\nQuinn will be discussed in detail later in this opinion.\nThe vote of the Retirement Board had resulted in a four-to-four tie.\nPursuant to appendix A of the Municipal Code, the same analysis is applicable to every exempt position held by plaintiff prior to his current position of deputy fire commissioner.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Ahern, of Connelly & Ahern, of Chicago, for appellant Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago.", "J. Peter Dowd, of Jacobs, Burns, Sugarman & Orlove, of Chicago, for other appellants.", "Collins, Jutila & Shovlain, Chartered, of Waukegan (Peter T. Shovlain, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WALTER BRAUN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY & BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant (The Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, et al., Intervenors-Appellants).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 83\u2014759\nOpinion filed June 15, 1984.\nJames J. Ahern, of Connelly & Ahern, of Chicago, for appellant Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago.\nJ. Peter Dowd, of Jacobs, Burns, Sugarman & Orlove, of Chicago, for other appellants.\nCollins, Jutila & Shovlain, Chartered, of Waukegan (Peter T. Shovlain, of counsel), for appellee.\nPursuant to the 1977 City of Chicago Personnel Rules, an exempt position is one that does not require certification prior to appointment from a general employment list maintained by the Commissioner of Personnel." }, "file_name": "0132-01", "first_page_order": 154, "last_page_order": 163 }