{ "id": 3633605, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1984-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201483\u20140807", "first_page": "284", "last_page": "288", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 284" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3230312 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3242223 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 1047", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3407063 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/1047-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5582227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515983 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5343026 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395339 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1148" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3368353 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0229-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 530, "char_count": 8835, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.80090061773832e-08, "percentile": 0.41592888234024455 }, "sha256": "b1e6b58bdb7049ef897d0723c2d4cf5fc2c8e1c09ae7899db4b3e2a6aae90147", "simhash": "1:babc3c6e1df3cbd0", "word_count": 1517 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:49:19.537276+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEBBER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was found guilty at a bench trial in the circuit court of McLean County of the offense of battery in violation of section 12 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3.) He was sentenced to 12 months\u2019 probation conditioned upon six months in the county jail.\nNo issue is raised as to reasonable doubt and therefore the facts become immaterial on appeal. The sole issue in this court is the validity of the defendant\u2019s jury waiver. We find it void and reverse the conviction.\nSome procedural history is required for an understanding of the issue on appeal. Defendant was charged by information on March 3, 1983. He was served with a copy of the information on that date and the matter was set for pretrial on April 11, 1983. On the following day, March 4, 1983, counsel entered appearance on behalf of the defendant. The docket shows that the pretrial was held and the case apparently assigned for the next jury calendar, although no transcript of the proceedings appears in the record.\nThe next docket entry is that of June 27, 1983, and appears to be the trial date. It shows that defendant failed to appear and a warrant was ordered to issue. It was returned July 14, 1983, at which time defendant appeared in the custody of the sheriff, bond was fixed and bail posted, and the cause continued to the next available jury setting.\nOn September 6, 1983, a document was filed by the circuit clerk as follows:\n\u201cThe undersigned defendant in the above entitled cause, comes now in open court in (his) own proper person, acknowledges receipt of copy of complaint in due time, acknowledges admonition by the Court as to effect of this plea, for plea herein says that (he) is guRty/not guilty in manner and form as charged in said complaint, and waives/dcmands a jury in said cause.\u201d (Strikeovers and underscoring in original; script in parentheses, balance in print.)\nThe document bears the signature \u201cKenneth Williams.\u201d\nThe docket entry on that date states: \u201cJury waiver filed. Cause set for BT on 10-3-83 @ 9:00 a.m. Mr. Banford to notice State.\u201d\nCounsel on appeal has supplemented the record with a document entitled \u201cBystanders Report of Filing of Jury Waiver.\u201d It was executed by the trial judge and states in substance that the waiver was filed with the trial judge\u2019s secretary by defendant\u2019s trial counsel and that defendant himself was not present at the time.\nThe case then proceeded through trial on October 3 and sentencing hearing on November 2, 1983. A further hearing on stay of sentence pending appeal was held on December 2, 1983. At no time during these proceedings was the question of the jury waiver raised by either the defendant or his counsel.\nSection 103 \u2014 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, implementing the constitutional guaranties of jury trial, provides:\n\u201cEvery person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless understanding^ waived by defendant in open court.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 6.\nThe statute is plain on its face and contains two requirements for a valid waiver: (1) that it be in open court, and (2) that it be understandingly made. These principles were interpreted in People v. Oatis (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 229, 361 N.E.2d 1146. In that case the defendant proceeded through a pro se bench trial and on appeal maintained that his jury waiver was not understanding^ made in open court. The court held that the defendant had not presented a sufficient record to demonstrate error and hence affirmed the conviction. However, the court also stated, \u201cIf the record shows that the waiver was not made in open court or not made under circumstances indicating an understanding waiver, the court should reverse.\u201d 47 Ill. App. 3d 229, 232, 361 N.E.2d 1146, 1148.\nIn the instant case the record is more complete than that in Oatis, although with the addition of the bystander\u2019s report, it becomes internally contradictory; i.e., the waiver states that it occurred in open court, while the bystander\u2019s report negates that aspect of the case.\nHowever, faced with the difficult choice of picking and selecting which element of the record to believe (a situation forced upon us by defendant), we elect to follow the bystander\u2019s report. The specific statement of the trial judge carries greater weight than a printed form. This should not be interpreted as a sanction for the procedure used here. Even if the waiver had been filed outside of open court, there was more than adequate opportunity at the commencement of the bench trial to confirm it according to the statute.\nIt follows that since the waiver was not executed, nor confirmed in open court, the statute was violated. The record required by Oatis is sufficient.\nDefendant also argues that the record does not demonstrate the second prong of the statutory test, intelligent waiver. However, the record has not been preserved by the defendant on this point, and we decline to consider it. People v. Oatis (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 229, 361 N.E.2d 1146.\nWe turn next to the nettlesome question as to whether the defendant has waived the issue by failing to raise it at the trial level. As has been indicated, neither defendant nor his trial counsel at any time during the proceedings, trial, post-trial motion, or sentencing hearing, raised the question of jury waiver. It appeared for the first time on appeal. Waiver is a familiar doctrine and needs no citation of authority. It applies to constitutional issues (People v. Black (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 544, 288 N.E.2d 376), and has been held specifically to apply to jury waivers. People v. Sheppard (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 313 N.E.2d 287.\nThe only basis upon which this court may consider the issue is that of plain error under Supreme Court Rule 615(a). (87 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) We have been cautioned by the supreme court that plain error is not to be lightly and indiscriminately used, and is limited to those cases \u201cin which the plain error affected substantial rights.\u201d (People v. Garcia (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 58, 86, 454 N.E.2d 274, 286.) Under our system of jurisprudence the right to a jury trial is basic and fundamental. Any tampering with it represents an infringement on a substantial right. We believe that the procedure used in the case at bar raises itself to the level of plain error and we so consider it.\nThe results reached by the appellate courts have generally tended to find plain error in circumstances similar to those found here. In People v. Banks (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 15, 389 N.E.2d 180, an apparently complete record contained no mention of waiver of jury trial; it was held to be plain error. Where the record indicates that a pro se defendant does not fully comprehend his right to jury trial, plain error exists. (People v. Miller (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 371 N.E.2d 917.) Similarly, when a defendant is handicapped in such a manner as to reduce his ability to comprehend his right to jury trial, plain error has been found. People v. Murff (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 560, 387 N.E.2d 920.\nWhile none of the special circumstances found in the foregoing cases appears to be present here, nevertheless the record is plain that defendant\u2019s waiver did not occur in open court and it is silent as to his comprehension of his right. Although defendant\u2019s criminal record is extensive, we decline to speculate on the level of his comprehension of the right to jury trial. The case is thus unlike People v. Eveland (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 97, 400 N.E.2d 1078, wherein the defendant had been fully admonished as to her right to jury trial. The waiver came by way of letter from her counsel. No objection was raised at trial, and it was held to be ministerial error, not elevated to the status of plain error. No admonishment of any kind appears in the instant record.\nWe are aware that many of the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 place great burdens on high-volume courts, such as traffic and misdemeanor tribunals. However, there are no safe shortcuts, and judicial economy is better served by following the statute in the first instance.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of McLean County is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for a new trial in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.\nReversed and remanded for new trial.\nTRAPP and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEBBER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jonathan Haile, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Ronald C. Dozier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Robert J. Biderman, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201483\u20140807\nOpinion filed June 29, 1984.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jonathan Haile, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nRonald C. Dozier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Robert J. Biderman, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0284-01", "first_page_order": 306, "last_page_order": 310 }