{ "id": 3596668, "name": "MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Maryland Casualty Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.", "decision_date": "1984-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141474", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "157", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "619 F.2d 1178", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1376840 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/619/1178-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Cal. Rptr. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 P.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Cal. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2326744 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/65/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 F.2d 1288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1866466 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1292, n.9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/710/1288-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1079", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082811 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "455-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 1362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2997468 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126478 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2727098 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3412382 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 1282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5482322 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2924538 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 F.2d 655", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 980168 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/551/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 F. Supp. 1208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4055608 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/463/1208-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 F.2d 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2088104 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/386/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5534140 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1069" }, { "page": "1069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074014 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4-5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 928", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3177871 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3152284 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0187-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 840, "char_count": 15650, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0070864799723562e-06, "percentile": 0.9829466891699091 }, "sha256": "5a84aa93ae230a78ea6f98082a77fe2fdf386b3af87c13d6af6dc23167bbdde3", "simhash": "1:0461d07f24f7b744", "word_count": 2508 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:42.345915+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Maryland Casualty Co. (Maryland) appeals from a summary judgment granted to defendant Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. (C&NW) in a declaratory judgment action, whereby Maryland was found obligated to both defend and indemnify C&NW in a separate negligence action brought against C&NW by an employee of C&NW\u2019s lessee, Demos News, Inc. (Demos).\nThis appeal raises as issues whether: (1) Maryland has a duty to defend C&NW in the negligence action under the terms of its general liability insurance policy issued to Demos; (2) Maryland has a duty to defend C&NW under the terms of an excess coverage policy issued to Demos; and (3) the circuit court erred by prematurely determining Maryland\u2019s duty to indemnify C&NW.\nUnder a five-year lease dated July 1, 1978, Demos leased from C&NW three separate newsstand sites and other storage and office areas located in C&NW\u2019s Chicago passenger terminal. Demos obtained from Maryland a comprehensive general liability policy (CGL), revised effective March 1, 1979, to include C&NW as \u201cadditional insured.\u201d The excess coverage policy, called \u201cCheckmate,\u201d named only Demos as the insured.\nShortly after 5 a.m. on October 19, 1979, a Demos newsstand employee arrived at the passenger terminal to begin work. When she got to about 10 feet from her employer\u2019s office door, a man grabbed her around the neck from behind and led her back to a stairwell, where they both fell down the stairs. She was knocked unconscious. She regained consciousness and discovered that she was naked from the waist down, had been raped, and was covered with blood. The victim suffered lacerations of the chin and lip, a fractured nose and cheekbone, numerous bruises and numbness in her teeth. She experienced deafness in her left ear for a period of six months. Her attacker was never apprehended.\nThe victim subsequently initiated an action against C&NW, alleging that her attack and resulting injuries had been proximately caused by C&NW\u2019s negligence in controlling and maintaining the passenger terminal. C&NW tendered the defense of this suit to Maryland, which assumed the defense under a reservation of rights.\nMaryland initiated the instant declaratory judgment action on April 26, 1982, seeking a determination of its rights and obligations with respect to the defense and indemnification of C&NW in the underlying action. Maryland filed a motion for summary judgment followed by C&NW\u2019s cross-motion for the same relief. On March 1, 1983, the circuit court granted C&NW\u2019s and denied Maryland\u2019s motion, \u201cfinding the *** [CGL] policy covers the defense and potential indemnification\u201d of C&NW as to the underlying action. Maryland\u2019s motion for rehearing and stay were denied, and this appeal followed.\nI\nMaryland contends that the provisions of the CGL policy preclude any defense obligations to C&NW. Where the complaint alleges facts suggesting that coverage potentially exists, the duty to defend arises. (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187, 193, 355 N.E.2d 24.) The complaint must be liberally construed, and all doubts resolved in favor of the insured. (Sentry Insurance Co. v. S&L Home Heating Co. (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 687, 689, 414 N.E.2d 1218.) Only where it is clearly apparent on the face of the complaint that the claim is beyond policy coverage can the insurer justifiably refuse to defend. (La Rotunda v. Royal Globe Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 446, 451, 408 N.E.2d 928.) The victim\u2019s complaint here attributes no culpability to Demos nor mentions that plaintiff\u2019s injury was related to her employment, but alleges only the C&NW\u2019s negligence proximately caused her injuries. Maryland argues that these facts alone should preclude any obligation it might have to defend C&NW. C&NW, however, is an additional insured under the CGL policy and claims coverage for the entire terminal. Therefore, a determination of Maryland\u2019s duty to defend C&NW necessitates a closer examination of the CGL policy.\nInsurance policy terms must be read according to their plain and ordinary meanings; any ambiguities arising when several provisions of the policy are read together will be construed in favor of the insured. (United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 1, 4-5, 429 N.E.2d 1203; Sentry Insurance Co. v. S&L Home Heating Co. (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 687, 691.) The intent of the parties to an insurance contract is ascertained by considering the policy itself as well as the circumstances surrounding its issuance, such as the situation of the parties and the purpose for which the policy was obtained. (Dora Township v. Indiana Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 376, 378, 400 N.E.2d 921; Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 336, 312 N.E.2d 247.) Here, the CGL policy named Demos as the insured and C&NW as an additional insured, \u201cbut only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises designated below leased to the named insured ***.\u201d The premises designated are \u201c500 W. Madison.\u201d The policy limits coverage to \u201cthat part\u201d of the premises leased to Demos; C&NW\u2019s argument that the policy expressly covers the entire passenger terminal therefore must be rejected.\nC&NW also relies on an endorsement (G222) to the policy which defines \u201cinsured premises\u201d to include \u201cthe ways immediately adjoining on land.\u201d This provision appears in the \u201cadditional definitions\u201d portion of the policy designated \u201cpremises medical payments coverage,\u201d for which the limit of liability is $1,000; by contrast, the \u201cadditional definitions\u201d section of the \u201cpersonal injury and advertising injury liability coverage,\u201d for which the liability limit is $300,000, contains no such language. Clearly, the subject definition applies only to coverage for specific medical expenses. At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court requested this language be read into the record. In ruling on the motions, the court stated: \u201cSpecifically, I find the occurrence in question took place 'on the ways immediately adjoining the land\u2019 leased to [Demos] ***.\u201d The principal basis for the circuit court\u2019s decision is therefore misplaced.\nThe propriety of granting summary judgment to C&NW, in our opinion, turns on whether the attack on the victim arose \u201cout of the ownership, maintenance or use\u201d of the designated leased premises. Maryland maintains that the attack, occurring before the victim had begun work, did not arise from her employer\u2019s use of the premises but from her mere presence in the terminal, which was open to the public. The phrase \u201carising out of\u201d is both broad and vague, and must be liberally construed in favor of the insured; accordingly, \u201cbut for\u201d causation, not necessarily proximate causation, satisfies this language. (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1069, 416 N.E.2d 758, quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. (3d Cir. 1967), 386 F.2d 413, 415.) \u201cArising out of\u201d has been held to mean \u201coriginating from,\u201d \u201chaving its origin in,\u201d \u201cgrowing out of\u201d and \u201cflowing from.\u201d Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Branon (E.D. Ill. 1979), 463 F. Supp. 1208, 1210.\nThe parties each cite cases construing the \u201carising out of\u201d language in analogous contexts. Maryland relies principally upon National Hills Shopping Center, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (5th Cir. 1977), 551 F.2d 655, decided under Georgia law; however, that policy, unlike the one here, contained a clause excluding the particular losses suffered from coverage. (551 F.2d 655, 658.) Maryland also cites cases restricting the geographic scope of liability arising from the use of certain insured premises. (Cobbins v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 285, 290 N.E.2d 873; United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 1203.) The instant leased premises, however, include three separate newsstand sites as well as separate office and storage areas, all within the confines of the \u201cdesignated premises,\u201d the passenger terminal. It is foreseeable, therefore, that employees of Demos would necessarily and customarily use the nonleased portions of the terminal in order to go about their employer\u2019s business. Extending coverage here to areas of the terminal nearby Demos\u2019 leased premises in the terminal would not create potentially unlimited geographic liability.\nC&NW cites Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 416 N.E.2d 758, but there the named insured, lessee trucking company, provided various services to the additional insured, lessor owner of certain railroad yards, and required its employees to work outside the confines of the leased premises; moreover, the trucking company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the yard owner, which, by virtue of its financial control of the named insured, was provided additional coverage under the policy. 92 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1069.\nNone of the cases cited thus involved a situation closely paralleling that presented here: injuries caused by the alleged negligence of an additional insured under a liability policy and sustained by the employee of the named insured, immediately outside the leased premises as she was about to begin her daily employment. Nevertheless, by construing the policy liberally in favor of the insured \u2014 a procedure necessitated by the ambiguity of the \u201carising out of\u201d language \u2014 the instant injuries appear to have arisen from the operation and use of the leased premises, since they would not have been sustained \u201cbut for\u201d the victim\u2019s employment on those premises. She was about to commence her employer\u2019s operation when she was assaulted. She, in fact, was holding keys to open the office. Her presence in the terminal at that hour was not a fortuitous happenstance, but a regular and foreseeable occurrence. The policy, therefore, reasonably must be construed to cover any risks attendant upon her presence there resulting from C&NW\u2019s negligence and thereby activates Maryland\u2019s duty to defend C&NW.\nFinally, although generally considered an unambiguous word referring to a fixed situs, \u201cpremises\u201d has also been held to include \u201cprivate approaches and other areas necessary or incidental to an insured\u2019s operations.\u201d Allstate Insurance Co. v. Gutenkauf (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894, 431 N.E.2d 1282. See also General Casualty Co. of Illinois v. Olsen (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 986, 372 N.E.2d 846; Davis v. Sheehan (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 449, 357 N.E.2d 690. See generally 7A J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, sec. 4500.02, at 191-92 (Berdal ed. 1979).\nThe construction of an insurance policy is a matter of law. Summary judgment is an appropriate disposition where such construction is at issue, as here. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Schmitt (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1063, 419 N.E.2d 601.) The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to C&NW on the basis of the provisions of the CGL policy.\nII\nMaryland next argues that the excess coverage Checkmate policy does not cover C&NW for its liability in the instant occurrence. That policy provides in part, under section 3.1, that Maryland \u201cwill indemnify the Insured [Demos] for ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit which the Insured *** shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of Personal Injury Liability ***.\u201d The retained limit in the instant policy under section 1.4 is $10,000. Although the Checkmate policy does not designate an additional insured, section 4.2(d) in relevant part extends coverage to \u201cany additional Insured included in the underlying insurance but only to the extent that insurance is provided to such additional Insured thereunder.\u201d C&NW is such an additional insured in the CGL policy. Coverage under this provision, however, attaches only after the predetermined $10,000 retained limit has been exhausted. (Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 442 N.E.2d 1362; Checkmate Policy sec. 2.12.) Under the foregoing, C&NW must expend an amount in defense or settlement of the case equal to the retained limit before the excess insurance provided by Checkmate can be applied, assuming Maryland is not able later to assert a defense to its indemnification of C&NW.\nIII\nMaryland lastly characterizes as premature the circuit court\u2019s ruling that Maryland must ultimately indemnify C&NW. An insurer\u2019s duty to defend is broader than its duty to pay. (Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444, 451, 430 N.E.2d 1079.) The duty to defend is determined by the allegations of the complaint; however, the duty to pay \u201cwill not be defined until the adjudication of the very action which it [the insurer] should have defended.\u201d (Centennial Insurance Co. v. Applied Health Care Systems, Inc. (7th Cir. 1983), 710 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.6, quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966), 65 Cal. 2d 263, 272, 419 P.2d 168, 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109.) A declaratory judgment action to determine an insurer\u2019s duty to indemnify its insured, brought prior to a determination of the insured\u2019s liability, is premature since the question to be determined is not then ripe for adjudication. (Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (7th Cir. 1980), 619 F.2d 1178, 1189. See also Centennial Insurance Co. v. Applied Health Care Systems, Inc. (7th Cir. 1983), 710 F.2d 1288, 1292, n.9 (applying California law).) Our supreme court, in Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444, 455-57, has carved out an exception for declaratory judgment actions brought to determine insurance coverage where the issues are separable from those in the underlying action, the primary concern being that an untimely determination in the declaratory judgment action could subsequently prejudice a party in the underlying action through application of collateral estoppel. In the case sub judice, circumstances could arise which would permit Maryland to contest its duty to pay. The circuit court\u2019s finding that Maryland must indemnify C&NW could, through collateral estoppel, prevent Maryland from raising a defense to indemnification in such a proceeding. To avoid any possible prejudice to Maryland through the operation of collateral estoppel, the circuit court\u2019s finding as to indemnification must be vacated, without prejudice to the ultimate rights of the parties should any question arise with respect to them.\nAccordingly, we affirm the finding as to Maryland\u2019s duty to defend C&NW under its comprehensive general liability and excess coverage policies to the extent indicated in this opinion; and reverse and vacate as to Maryland\u2019s present duty to indemnify C&NW.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and vacated in part.\nSTAMOS and PERLIN, JJ., concur.\nAlthough the order granting summary judgment refers to \u201cpotential indemnification,\u201d the court\u2019s oral riding refers to \u201cultimately indemnify\u201d and \u201cultimately pay.\u201d For purposes of certainty and clarity, the order will be treated here as imposing upon Maryland the \u201cultimate\u201d duty to indemnify.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Kevin R. Sido, and Joshua G. Vincent, of counsel), for appellant.", "Ronald J. Cuchna and John S. Bishof, Jr., both of Chicago, for appellee Chicago and North Western Transportation Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83\u20141474\nOpinion filed June 26, 1984.\nHinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Kevin R. Sido, and Joshua G. Vincent, of counsel), for appellant.\nRonald J. Cuchna and John S. Bishof, Jr., both of Chicago, for appellee Chicago and North Western Transportation Company." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 172, "last_page_order": 179 }