{ "id": 3596631, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON J. SALAMON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Salamon", "decision_date": "1984-08-21", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201484\u20140073", "first_page": "1066", "last_page": "1071", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 1066" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5607813 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2803677 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. Ct. 1999", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 L. Ed. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541280, 541092, 541065, 541134, 541711, 541810, 541593, 541279 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0992-05", "/us/421/0992-03", "/us/421/0992-08", "/us/421/0992-02", "/us/421/0992-07", "/us/421/0992-04", "/us/421/0992-01", "/us/421/0992-06" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958038 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462993 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 812", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5408571 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0812-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536520 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3125703 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519592 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927159 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5450990 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3308254 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0555-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 670, "char_count": 13987, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1055494591555302e-07, "percentile": 0.762448891807978 }, "sha256": "c8c82bce69ac31a475592e3e4722764381ac4bd744be16b86e85e8760cb45bd9", "simhash": "1:b929fd90b3d03cf5", "word_count": 2371 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:42.345915+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON J. SALAMON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Leon J. Salamon, pleaded guilty to retail theft over $300 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 16A \u2014 3(a)), and was sentenced to three years\u2019 probation on December 29, 1982. The defendant had petitioned to elect to be treated as a narcotic addict under the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 911/2, par. 120.1 et seq.) The conditions of the probation order, set forth in full, were:\n\u201cA. Defendant shall not violate any criminal statute or law of any jurisdiction.\nB. Defendant shall make a report to and appear in person before the probation officer of this court assigned to his case as frequently as requested by said officer.\nC. Defendant shall permit his probation officer to visit him at his residence, or elsewhere, as requested by said probation officer, and shall answer all questions of said probation officer in regard to his living conditions, marital status, employment, etc.\nD. [This provision (involving costs incurred) was deleted from the conditions.]\nE. Defendant shall make restitution or reparation in the amount of $_within_days from this date.\nE Defendant shall not leave the State of Illinois.\nG. Defendant shall be placed in the TASC Program with an open mandate.\nH. First 90 days of probation to be served in McHenry County jail.\u201d\nTASC is an acronym for \u201cTreatment Alternatives to Street Crime,\u201d which is a drug abuse rehabilitation program. The term \u201copen mandate\u201d used in the probation order meant that the defendant would be placed in whichever program facility first had an available bed. Because the defendant was on parole from Cook County, consent to his participation in the TASC program was sought and obtained from his parole officer and the Prisoner Review Board.\nDuring the 90-day period the defendant spent in the McHenry County jail, he saw his probation officer, Jim Woolford, twice, and saw the TASC supervisor, Alexander Rinaldi, two or three times. Defendant\u2019s probation officer explained to him that as soon as a bed opened at TASC, all his contacts with him from that point on would be through TASC monitoring, and that he would have knowledge of his situation from TASC until treatment would be ended. Rinaldi testified he told the defendant that if for any reason he was released from McHenry County jail, that he should notify Rinaldi\u2019s office \u201cas far as where he would be living and telephone number and which we can contact him at, so when a bed did become available for him we could contact him and have him in that facility at that time or we would lose the bed.\u201d Although Rinaldi did not give the defendant a business card with a phone number on it, he testified he told him that if he did get released from the McHenry County jail, that he could get in touch with the officers at the booking desk, and that they would give him Rinaldi\u2019s phone number and office address. At an earlier hearing, Rinaldi testified the defendant would not be monitored by the TASC program until he was placed.\nThe defendant was not placed in a TASC program prior to the expiration of his 90-day jail sentence. However, because Cook County had another parole hold on him under an alias, \u201cJeff Collins,\u201d the defendant was transferred to the Cook County jail for two days and then to the Department of Corrections. Apparently, only the parole hold under the name \u201cSalamon\u201d had been cleared so that the defendant could be placed in the TASC program in connection with the McHenry County probation order. The defendant was incarcerated at the State prison in Joliet until April 29, 1983, when he was released on parole.\nBecause TASC had not heard from the defendant, a petition to revoke his probation was filed in McHenry County in June 1983, and he was arrested in July. Both Rinaldi and Woolford tried to phone the defendant when they learned he had been released from Joliet, but the number was disconnected. The defendant\u2019s wife had moved during the time he was incarcerated in McHenry County jail. There was testimony that he was released on parole to his current address.\nA probation revocation hearing was held during which the defendant testified he talked with Rinaldi twice while he was incarcerated in McHenry County jail, and that he was not supposed to contact Rinaldi when he got out; he said he was in jail for the 90 days waiting for Rinaldi to pick him up and take him to the program. He testified he explained to the parole board in Joliet about the TASC program, and that the board included enrollment in TASC as a condition on his parole plans. He testified that when he was released on parole from Joliet, he was assigned to three different parole officers before he actually was able to have an appointment with one, and that he told his third parole officer, Arthur Banks, whom the defendant testified he saw approximately once a week, about the TASC program, but that Banks had to give him another report date since his office was in the process of relocating and he did not have time to direct the defendant into a program at that time.\nBanks was not called to testify at the revocation hearing. The court revoked the defendant\u2019s probation, and sentencing was continued twice at the defendant\u2019s request in order to allow defense counsel time to talk with Banks in order to clarify some of the information obtained from Banks and included in the presentence report. The report included in the record showed that Banks said that the TASC program may have been recommended by the parole board, but that defendant had not been ordered to attend. He reported the defendant was uncooperative and failed to follow instructions to report to Banks once every other week. Banks had not seen the defendant for the entire month prior to August 22, 1983, when the defendant was arrested on a theft charge in Cook County. After sentencing hearing, the court sentenced the defendant to the Department of Corrections for four years, and he appeals.\nHe contends he was not to blame for his failure to be placed in the TASC program. He argues the probation order did not include a specific provision that he contact Rinaldi and that, therefore, he had no obligation to do so. In support, he cites People v. Susberry (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 555. In that case, the order revoking the defendant\u2019s probation was reversed where the court found the defendant had not violated the conditions of his probation as set forth in the probation order. At sentencing there, the court had made a lengthy oral statement which included generally the conditions which were alleged to have been violated by the defendant as the basis for the revocation petition. The only specific condition included in the probation order was:\n\u201c \u2018Condition of probation is that building is to be reinspected six months from today and reports forwarded to the defendant, state\u2019s attorney and to the Court.\u2019 \u201d 68 Ill. App. 3d 555, 559.\nWith regard to that provision, the court noted that statement was not strictly a condition of probation, since the reinspection necessarily could be accomplished only by the governmental agency and not by the defendant. The court agreed with the defendant that the court\u2019s lengthy oral statement during sentencing could be construed to include varying conditions or requirements which, when read together, were vague and indefinite, and did not adequately or reasonably inform the defendant of the condition of his probation. (People v. Sus-berry (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 555, 562.) Accordingly, that court reversed the revocation of defendant\u2019s probation.\nThe condition included in the probation order here was that the defendant \u201cbe placed in the TASC program, with an open mandate.\u201d Somewhat similar to the condition in Susberry, the placement of the defendant in the TASC program necessarily could be accomplished only by the governmental agency and not by the defendant. However, unlike Susberry, there were no conditions or requirements here which were vague or indefinite; the defendant was simply instructed to notify TASC upon his release from the McHenry County jail so TASC would know where to locate him when a bed became available. The defendant admitted he did not try to call TASC. His defense was that TASC never picked him up from the McHenry County jail, he was not told to call TASC, and after his release from the Department of Corrections, he told his third parole officer about the TASC program, but the officer had not had time to get him into a program.\nIn a revocation hearing, the State need only establish a violation of the conditions of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Hoga (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 258; People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 447.) The termination of probation is a question which rests within the sound discretion of the court, and absent a clear showing that the decision to terminate was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that determination should not be overturned. (People v. Owens (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 51; People v. Stevens (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 516.) A finding of a violation of probation is not per se against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because there is a conflict in the evidence; the trial judge is in a better position to weigh the testimony of the witnesses than a reviewing court, and only when the testimony is contrary to the weight of the evidence will the reviewing court substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451.\nAlthough the performance of the condition here could not be complied with strictly by the defendant himself, nevertheless he was told by Rinaldi that if he was released from the McHenry County jail he was to notify TASC so that they would know where to reach him when a bed became available. Defendant admitted he did not do this, nor did he call his probation officer, and, further, he did not contact TASC even after his release on parole from the Department of Corrections. Even accepting defendant\u2019s claim that TASC was a part of his parole plans \u2014 which appears to be refuted by the presentence report \u2014 nevertheless, his parole from the Department of Corrections was related to his conviction for a crime separate and apart from the one for which he received a sentence of probation here. Consequently, his purported attempt to comply with the alleged TASC provision of his parole plans cannot be regarded as a novation, so to speak, of the previously imposed probation in McHenry County. Cf. People v. Dem-ma (1980), 92 Ill. App. 3d 303, 307-08 (where the court found the defendant\u2019s evidence that he subsequently attempted to enroll in another drug program after leaving the first one in violation of his probation-even if believed by the trial court to be a sincere effort \u2014 did not constitute compliance with the specific requirements set out when he was given probation).\nDefendant\u2019s contention that he could reasonably have assumed that his parole address was known by all interested authorities or could easily have been determined by inquiry to the Prisoner Review Board is without merit. It has been held that the State is under no duty to inquire of the correctional officials in other jurisdictions regarding a defendant\u2019s whereabouts. (People v. Washington (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 812, 813-14; People v. Beard (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 663, 666, affd (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, cert. denied (1975), 421 U.S. 992, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483, 95 S. Ct. 1999.) It was the defendant\u2019s duty to keep TASC advised of his whereabouts so that he could \u201cbe placed.\u201d Although the order could have been drafted more carefully to cover the contingency that the defendant might not be placed in TASC before the expiration of his jail term, nevertheless, Rinaldi did anticipate that exact eventuality, and he clearly and directly orally instructed the defendant what he was to do if he was released before placement. Defendant failed to comply with this simple act, which was a prerequisite to his compliance with the conditions of his probation. As such, it is important to note here that Rinaldi\u2019s instructions to the defendant did not amount to an alteration of the terms of the defendant\u2019s probation, but instead were integral to the implementation of the defendant\u2019s probation. (Cf. People v. Bellars (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 350, 355 (where defendant\u2019s claim that his probation officer had no power to unilaterally alter the terms of his probation was not addressed by the court in view of the fact the violation of the probation officer\u2019s direction or order was not the sole basis for the revocation).) Having thus interfered with TASC\u2019s ability to place him in a program, defendant now claims innocence because \u201csomething was to be done to him as opposed to a requirement that he take some action himself.\u201d We cannot accept the defendant\u2019s claim.\nThe preponderance of the evidence has been defined as evidence sufficient to incline an impartial and reasonable mind to one side of an issue rather than the other. (In re Estate of Ragen (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 13.) Although the defendant denied Rinaldi instructed him to call, the trial court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and it was inclined by the evidence below to find the defendant violated his probation. We are likewise inclined by the record before us, and find no abuse of the court\u2019s discretion in revoking the defendant\u2019s probation.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD, P.J., and NASH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Theodore Floro, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEON J. SALAMON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201484\u20140073\nOpinion filed August 21, 1984.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nTheodore Floro, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1066-01", "first_page_order": 1090, "last_page_order": 1095 }