{ "id": 3563139, "name": "THERESA ANN MEYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Meyer v. Allen", "decision_date": "1984-08-27", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201484\u20140150", "first_page": "163", "last_page": "165", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 163" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097134 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2602151 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/59/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 331, "char_count": 5113, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.498891489036207e-08, "percentile": 0.48645886304568337 }, "sha256": "a3014dc1be32d5963da07c14942200e66c319858186b6f8f7d74af98b5dc21ab", "simhash": "1:a4c738a6559eb38b", "word_count": 798 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:53.477818+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THERESA ANN MEYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 15, 1983, plaintiff, Theresa Ann Meyer, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County alleging that defendant, Marion Allen, had made certain defamatory remarks \u201cof and concerning\u201d plaintiff. Following a hearing held on January 23, 1984, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.\nOn appeal, plaintiff maintains that defendant\u2019s remarks constitute slander per se and the trial court erred in applying the innocent-construction rule.\nThe complaint contained the following allegations. Plaintiff was a registered dietician with the American Dietetics Association and, prior to defendant\u2019s allegedly defamatory remarks, she had enjoyed the esteem and good opinion of her neighbors. On December 18, 1982, defendant made certain remarks in the presence of 5 to 10 employees of the Family Tree Health Care Center (Center). Defendant, as paraphrased, stated: \u201c[Plaintiff] left us at a bad time. She left us in a bad position. She left the kitchen in a dirty condition. She resigned without reason.\u201d\nThe complaint also alleged that (1) defendant made the foregoing remarks even though plaintiff was \u201cinvoluntarily terminated\u201d from her employment at the Center, and (2) during her employment at the Center from March 23, 1982, to December 17, 1982, plaintiff had fulfilled her \u201cprofessional duty\u201d to properly maintain the Center\u2019s kitchen in a \u201cclean and sanitary manner in accordance with corporate, state, and federal standards.\u201d\nCounts I and II of the complaint contain virtually the same allegations. Count I requests general damages. Count II further alleges that plaintiff was terminated from her employment because she was pregnant and defendant made the allegedly defamatory remarks in order to \u201ccreate a pretext\u201d for plaintiff\u2019s absence. Count II requests punitive, as well as compensatory, damages.\nPlaintiff does not aver any special damages and, thus, her right to recover rests upon whether the allegedly defamatory statements are actionable per se. Fried v. Jacobson (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 24, 457 N.E.2d 392.\nPlaintiff alleges that defendant\u2019s remarks were defamatory because (1) such remarks indicate that she was \u201cprofessionally unreliable\u201d in that she voluntarily left her employment without reason at a time when she was needed and failed to properly maintain the Center\u2019s kitchen in a \u201cclean and hygienic manner,\u201d and (2) plaintiff was prejudiced in her profession as a registered dietician by such remarks. Allegations that a statement (1) falsely imputes plaintiff\u2019s inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of her office or employment, and (2) falsely prejudices plaintiff in her profession or trade are sufficient to support a defamation action against the person making the statement. (Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp. (1965), 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482.) Accordingly, we must determine whether defendant\u2019s remarks imputed to plaintiff an inability to perform the duties of her employment or prejudiced plaintiff in her profession.\nIn making this determination, we must apply the innocent-construction rule as set forth by the supreme court in Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195. In Chapski, the supreme court stated:\n\u201c[A] written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se. This preliminary determination is properly a question of law to be resolved by the court in the first instance.\u201d 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352, 442 N.E.2d 195,199.\nApplying the Chapski innocent-construction rule to. the facts before us, we conclude that the allegedly defamatory statement may reasonably be read as not imputing a lack of ability on plaintiffs part and as not prejudicing plaintiff in her profession. We believe that defendant\u2019s remarks, considered in context, indicate that (1) plaintiff chose to resign from her employment position without stating a reason for doing so, (2) plaintiff resigned at an inconvenient time for her employer, and (3) at the time plaintiff left, the Center\u2019s kitchen was dirty. Defendant did not say that plaintiff had no valid reason for leaving or that plaintiff had consistently failed to keep the Center\u2019s kitchen clean in the past or would not have kept it clean in the future. Because the remarks do not impute to plaintiff an inability to perform the duties of her employment and do not prejudice plaintiff in her profession, we conclude defendant\u2019s remarks are not actionable as a matter of law.\nFor the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nMILLS, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roger L. Prillaman, of Urbana, for appellant.", "Moore & Associates, of Champaign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THERESA ANN MEYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201484\u20140150\nOpinion filed August 27, 1984.\nRoger L. Prillaman, of Urbana, for appellant.\nMoore & Associates, of Champaign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0163-01", "first_page_order": 185, "last_page_order": 187 }