{ "id": 3562470, "name": "PATRICK BULLISTRON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHERN BUILDERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Bullistron v. Northern Builders, Inc.", "decision_date": "1984-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20142121", "first_page": "242", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 242" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559813 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2737470 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5416119 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436-37" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952744 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" }, { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2998516 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0685-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 679, "char_count": 12722, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.031887977348632e-07, "percentile": 0.5483423937071235 }, "sha256": "8240481fa56d4bf63b8d67c67e6ac8df94ca658cfa0501857eb81ac5e6be131f", "simhash": "1:5bc901958ca5a7ff", "word_count": 2103 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:53.477818+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PATRICK BULLISTRON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHERN BUILDERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Patrick Bullistron sued defendant Northern Builders, Inc., for injuries sustained by plaintiff while working on a job site owned by defendant. Defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was granted and plaintiff appeals.\nOn July 17, 1979, plaintiff was employed by Millgard Corporation as a construction laborer at a work site located in Wheeling. Millgard was working as a subcontractor to prepare foundations for a partially built warehouse owned by defendant, Northern Builders, Inc. Plaintiff\u2019s job involved working on a truck-mounted drilling rig which was being used to drill caissons for the building foundation.\nAt approximately 2 p.m. on July 17, 1979, plaintiff completed drilling the caissons for defendant\u2019s building. Several of Millgard\u2019s employees proceeded to change the oil in the drilling machine in order to prepare it to be moved from the job site. While changing the oil, the employees noticed that hydraulic fluid was leaking from an area surrounding a part called a Kelly bar. In order to reach the leaking hydraulic fitting, plaintiff\u2019s supervisor directed that the machine be driven alongside a partially completed brick wall which had been put up by bricklayers to a height of approximately three feet.\nIn order to loosen the cup at the base of the Kelly bar to get at the packing which was causing the leak, the plaintiff and another employee used a \u201cchain dog\u201d wrench. Plaintiff and the other employee stood atop the three-foot wall and passed the wrench to each other as the cup rotated. Once the packing was replaced, they began tightening the cup with the wrench until it became too difficult. At this point, plaintiff and the other employee located a piece of scrap lumber and wedged it between the cup and a part of the machine. This allowed for further tightening of the cup by use of the machine\u2019s power. As plaintiff stood atop the three-foot wall, the machine was turned on and the Kelly bar turned and the cup began tightening. As the tightening continued, the piece of wood apparently popped loose and struck plaintiff, knocking him off the wall and injuring him.\nBased upon the foregoing facts, the trial judge granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.\nThe statute which is the subject of this appeal is commonly referred to as the Illinois Structural Work Act and provides as follows:\n\u201cThat all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 60.)\nIn his complaint, plaintiff alleged that the wall he was standing on while repairing the truck-mounted drilling rig was constructed in an unsafe manner and that as a proximate result of this faulty construction, he was injured. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted that the drilling rig which plaintiff was repairing did \u201cnot constitute a house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure within the requirements of the Illinois Structural Work Act\u201d and that therefore no valid cause of action could be stated against Northern Builders, Inc. under the Act. Both parties argued their respective theories before the trial judge.\nInitially, plaintiff submits that the trial court based its grant of summary judgment on the fact that no construction work was being done at the time plaintiff was injured. The record does contain colloquy indicating that the court was exploring the relevance of the fact that the drilling rig was being repaired after the construction work had ceased. However, the colloquy immediately preceding the court\u2019s ruling revealed that the issue the court had focused on was whether the drilling rig was a \u201cstructure\u201d under the Structural Work Act. In the course of granting defendant summary judgment, the court stated that:\n\u201cGranting, as the case of Cooley cites, he is standing on the structure. I think I agree with you that Cooley does not involve the man standing on the structure, but that seems to be immaterial because that portion of the act indicates what his activities are directed to. That is the problem we have. For that reason, I will sustain the motion.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAlthough the court was not as precise as it could have been, we find that the court\u2019s ruling was based on the finding that the drilling rig did not qualify as a \u201cstructure\u201d under the Structural Work Act. The court\u2019s references to the Cooley case do not convince us otherwise because Cooley held, inter alia, that the crane involved in that case was not a \u201cstructure\u201d under the Act. See Cooley v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 685, 691-92, 442 N.E.2d 1330.\nIn determining what constitutes a \u201cstructure\u201d under the Structural Work Act, we are guided by the supreme court\u2019s rulings in McNellis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 146, 317 N.E.2d 573, and Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432, 328 N.E.2d 318. In McNellis, a workman received fatal injuries while unloading 20,000 pound pedestals from a railroad car located one-half mile from the construction site of a power-generating plant. The pedestals were to be installed as part of the plant\u2019s steam generating units. As the metal plates which secured the pedestals were cut loose, one of the pedestals fell, pinning the workman to the railroad car. Cranes were available to assist in the unloading but were not used. The construction contract provided that the general task of erecting the generators within the power station would necessitate the incidental tasks of unloading and storage, and the nature of the work required that unloading be performed some distance from the actual building. -Defendant argued that the unloading of equipment was not a structural work activity. The supreme court rejected this argument, stating that \u201cunder the terms of this contract and facts of this case the unloading may fairly be viewed as an integral part of the erection operation.\u201d 58 Ill. 2d 146, 151.\nIn Farley, the plaintiff was injured while aiding in the assembly of a self-propelled power shovel of mammoth proportions which was to be used to strip-mine coal. The issue before the court in Farley was whether this power shovel, which was admittedly larger than many buildings, was a \u201cstructure\u201d within the meaning of the Structural Work Act. The court focused on that portion of the Act which provided that the work covered by the Act must be directed to \u201cany house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 60.) Particular attention was directed to the legislature\u2019s choice of the phrase \u201cor other structure.\u201d The court held that under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the \u201cplain purpose [of the Act was] to limit the application of our statute to structures of the general type specified therein.\u201d (60 Ill. 2d 432, 436-37.) The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that:\n\u201cwhere a statute or document specifically enumerates several classes of persons or things and immediately following, and classed with such enumeration, the clause embraces \u2018other\u2019 persons or things, the word \u2018other\u2019 will generally be read as \u2018other such like,\u2019 so that the persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis \u2018with,\u2019 and not of a quality superior to or different from, those specifically enumerated.\u201d (Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436, quoting People v. Capuzi (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 486, 493-94, 170 N.E.2d 625.)\nApplying this doctrine to the instant case, it is apparent that the drilling rig in issue is not a \u201cstructure\u201d under the Act. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff was not engaged in work covered by the Structural Work Act at the time of his injury and that summary judgment was properly entered in defendant\u2019s favor.\nWe note that the work involved in Farley was strip-mining rather than the conventional construction work involved in McNellis. In rendering its decision, however, the court in Farley did not suggest that this factor influenced its decision. Indeed, the Farley court alluded to its holding in McNellis and explained that the holding in that case was grounded in large part on the contract provisions involved. (60 Ill. 2d 432, 437.) Had the nature of the work involved in Farley been a critical factor in the court\u2019s decision, the court would surely have pointed this out in its reference to McNellis. For the foregoing reasons, we interpret Farley as being applicable to Structural Work Act cases generally and as a limitation on the scope of the holding in McNellis. Upon reviewing the circumstances in McNellis together with the holding in Farley, we conclude that the Structural Work Act covers work performed on the structure itself or preliminary work involving material which will ultimately be incorporated as part of the structure.\nWe have examined Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 743, 460 N.E.2d 28, cited by plaintiff, and we find it to be unpersuasive. In Simmons, the plaintiff was sent to a power plant following some flooding in an ash pit. The plaintiff repaired permanent sump pumps which had malfunctioned and then endeavored to repair a temporary sump pump at the bottom of the pit which had also malfunctioned. While descending a ladder into the pit, the plaintiff slipped and fell and was injured. The plaintiff sued for his injuries and was granted judgment on his Structural Work Act count. On appeal, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was not involved in structural work at the time of his injuries because the temporary sump pump which was being repaired was not a \u201cstructure\u201d under the Act. The Simmons court viewed this contention as an unduly narrow view of the scope of the Act. The court opted instead to view the situation in a broad context to determine if the plaintiff\u2019s specific activity at the time of the injury was an integral part of a larger project which qualified as structural work under the Act. Under this approach, the Simmons court found that the plaintiff was sent to the power plant to repair the ash pit, which was found to be a structure, and that the repair of the temporary sump pump was an integral part of this work, thereby bringing the plaintiff\u2019s activities within the Act\u2019s coverage.\nThe court\u2019s holding in Simmons does not contain a single citation to Farley. Rather, the analysis focuses on the propositions set forth in McNellis that the Act is to be liberally construed and that actions which are an integral part of the construction process are covered by the Act. (121 Ill. App. 3d 743, 751.) We deem it important to point out that the activities in McNellis were held to be covered under the Act because they were \u201can integral part of the erection operation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (58 Ill. 2d 146, 151.) This phrase does not extend the Act\u2019s coverage to the myriad of activities which are a vital part of any construction project; rather, it serves as recognition that much of the preliminary construction directly leading to the erection of a building or other structure is not performed on the structure itself. (See 58 Ill. 2d 146, 150.) This interpretation finds its support in Farley, which circumscribed the seemingly boundless propositions contained in McNellis. We believe that the approach taken in Simmons expands the Act beyond its intended scope. Whether the hazards involved in Simmons and the instant case are such that the Act\u2019s protection should be extended to them is for the legislature to determine. See Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432, 437, 328 N.E.2d 318.\nFor the reasons expressed herein, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nDOWNING and PERLIN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Corboy & Demetrio, P.C., of Chicago (Todd A. Smith and David A. Novoselsky, of counsel), for appellant.", "Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Charles H. Cole, and Joshua G. Vincent, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICK BULLISTRON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHERN BUILDERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83\u20142121\nOpinion filed September 4, 1984.\nCorboy & Demetrio, P.C., of Chicago (Todd A. Smith and David A. Novoselsky, of counsel), for appellant.\nHinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Charles H. Cole, and Joshua G. Vincent, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0242-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 269 }