{ "id": 3563499, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE TIMMONS, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Timmons", "decision_date": "1984-09-18", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141044", "first_page": "679", "last_page": "688", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 679" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163788 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 1092", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3238117 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2799973 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E. 2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474664 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3382885 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2634527 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5634721 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0961-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 971, "char_count": 20999, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.432571400243278e-08, "percentile": 0.443838810679696 }, "sha256": "90a2a69bfdb9102c90b9fd08799b5405731701a8aeeca56d5d4dfeaa710e1572", "simhash": "1:b23e81367a0a8ee2", "word_count": 3447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:53.477818+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE TIMMONS, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant George Timmons, Jr. (Timmons), was charged with two counts of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141) and two counts of armed violence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 33A\u20141). Prior to trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the State nol-prossed the two counts of armed violence. At defendant\u2019s request, the jury also received verdict forms for voluntary manslaughter (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9\u20142). Thereupon, Timmons was found guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter. On March 30, 1983, Timmons was sentenced to two consecutive 25-year extended terms.\nTimmons appeals, presenting the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine to exclude the nonverbal statements of one of the victims; (2) whether the jury was properly instructed with regard to the use of defendant\u2019s prior conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing extended and consecutive term sentences; and (4) whether the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nFor the reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions for voluntary manslaughter and modify the sentences imposed by the trial court.\nAt pretrial proceedings, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude from evidence nonverbal statements allegedly made by a victim, John Brooks. At the hearing on this motion, Terry Brooks, the victim\u2019s brother, testified that he and his mother visited John in intensive care at St. Anne\u2019s Hospital in Chicago on January 10, 1982, at approximately 9 p.m., some 19 hours after the shooting. During this visit, Terry asked his brother if his shooting was \u201caccidental.\u201d John responded by \u201cnoddpng] his head up and down indicating yes.\u201d When Terry asked him if the shooting was \u201cintentional,\u201d John \u201cshook his head no.\u201d John was on a respirator, had tubing in his throat to assist him in breathing and appeared to be \u201cdrugged.\u201d John went into a coma on the morning of January 11, and so remained until his death on January 16.\nDr. Reginaldo Picache, a surgeon, testified: On January 10, 1982, at approximately 4 a.m., he performed surgery on John Brooks at St. Anne\u2019s Hospital. He observed that the patient\u2019s carotid artery and jugular vein were severed beyond repair, and he \u201cligated\u201d both of these \u201cvessels\u201d to prevent continual bleeding. There was also a hole in the trachea which rendered John Brooks unable to speak. It was Picache\u2019s medical opinion that Brooks\u2019 \u201cmental faculties were impaired from the time of the shooting to the time of death.\u201d Dr. Pi-cache at no time indicated to Brooks his physical condition because \u201c[Brooks] was not alert enough to understand.\u201d Following surgery, Dr. Picache monitored Brooks by communicating with nurses in attendance, and he based his opinion of John Brooks\u2019 condition on the nurses\u2019 \u201ctelephonic communications.\u201d Brooks was examined by a neurosurgeon on January 11, who found Brooks to be \u201cunresponsive\u201d because of swelling of his brain.\nPatricia King, a critical care nurse at St. Anne\u2019s Hospital, testified that she \u201ctreated\u201d John Brooks in the intensive care unit on January 10 and 11 following his surgery. Brooks, according to nurse King, was able to squeeze her hand with his right hand and to move his right leg, but his left side was paralyzed. Although King stated that Brooks responded to \u201ccertain commands by gesture,\u201d \u201che had a tube down his throat\u201d and \u201cwas unable to talk.\u201d At some time on January 11, Brooks \u201cbecame unresponsive to any kind of verbal, tactile, painful stimuli.\u201d\nLuretha Brooks, mother of John and Terry Brooks, testified that on January 10, at approximately 9:30 p.m., she and her son, Terry, visited John in the intensive care room at St. Anne\u2019s Hospital. When Terry asked John if the shooting was accidental, he \u201cnodded\u201d his head yes; when Terry asked his brother if the shooting was intentional, \u201che shook his head no.\u201d The parties then stipulated that Luretha\u2019s testimony would be the same as that of her son Terry.\nDefendant\u2019s counsel argued that John Brooks\u2019 nonverbal responses were dying declarations and therefore admissible as an exception to hearsay evidence.\nThe trial court granted the State\u2019s motion in limine to exclude John Brooks\u2019 nonverbal responses, finding that \u201cJohn Brooks did make a nonverbal response, assertion to his brother ***\u201d; that \u201cthere was a mortal wound inflicted on him\u201d; and that \u201cthe nonverbal assertion does not fit within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule and is not admissible as a dying declaration ***\u201d because the nonverbal responses made by Brooks were \u201cconclusionary.\u201d\nAt trial, Janeen Smith, a friend of Timmons, testified to the following: On January 9, at approximately 8:30 p.m., she arrived at the home of Desmona Timmons, defendant\u2019s sister, located at 4749 West Adams, Chicago, where a surprise birthday party was being held for Timmons. Desmona and Etheral Green were already present. Later that evening, Timmons arrived with John Brooks, Barbara Watson and Diane Perry. At approximately 2 a.m. on January 10, Janeen heard Timmons and Victor Rainey \u201carguing.\u201d She saw George Timmons (defendant\u2019s father), John Brooks and Etheral Green \u201ctrying to stop George Jr. from going downstairs.\u201d Defendant, Brooks and Green, however, went down the stairs. Several minutes later Janeen \u201cheard a shot\u201d and she ran down the stairs. Timmons was standing on the steps, approximately five or six feet \u201cabove\u201d Green, holding a gun in his hand. Janeen heard Green tell Timmons \u201cto calm down and don\u2019t go upstairs after Victor.\u201d Timmons told Green \u201cto get out of the way.\u201d Green then told Timmons, \u201cIf you want to shoot somebody so bad, Man, shoot me.\u201d Timmons thereupon shot Green in the head. Janeen ran to the first floor apartment to get towels and attempted to revive Green, but \u201che was dead.\u201d At this time, Diane Perry ran down the stairs to Janeen and said, \u201cOh, my God, [John Brooks has] been shot too.\u201d Janeen saw John Brooks lying on the steps leading up to the second floor. \u201cEverybody had been drinking\u201d at the party and \u201ceverybody was a little high.\u201d\nRobert Doss, who also attended Timmons\u2019 surprise party, testified to the following: On January 10, shortly before 2 a.m., he heard \u201cVictor [Rainey] call Timmons a punk.\u201d Despite the fact that \u201call the men were trying to stop him [Timmons] from leaving the apartment,\u201d Timmons left. John Brooks and Green \u201cwent after him.\u201d Desmona and Janeen also left the apartment. Doss \u201cheard some screaming, some shooting and after that [Timmons] came up into the apartment,\u201d holding a gun, and said \u201cI have a couple of bullets left.\u201d Timmons went into the \u201cback\u201d area of the apartment and shortly thereafter left the apartment.\nArthur Hajek, a Chicago police officer, testified: On January 10, at approximately 4:30 a.m., he was assigned to investigate a shooting at 4749 West Adams. Hajek searched inside the hallway for weapons, expended cartridge cases, expended bullets and bullet holes but found none. Hajek performed no search outside the building.\nDr. Uetil Choi, Cook County assistant medical examiner, testified: He performed autopsies on John Brooks and Etheral Green. Dr. Choi removed a bullet from Green\u2019s body and stated that Green was shot from a distance of at least two feet. Dr. Choi did not retrieve a bullet from Brooks\u2019 body.\nRalph Vucko, a Chicago police detective, testified: On January 10, at approximately 3:55 a.m., he was assigned \u201cTo investigate two people shot at 4749 West on Adams.\u201d In his investigation, he apparently discovered no evidence except that he found blood \u201caround the area of Etheral Green on the midlanding between the first and second floor.\u201d On January 10, at about 7 a.m., when Timmons surrendered himself at the Fourth Area police station, Vucko placed him under arrest.\nTimmons testified in his own behalf: He resided with John Brooks in the basement apartment of the building located at 4749 West Adams in Chicago. Victor Rainey and his mother lived in the apartment on the first floor; Timmons\u2019 sister and father also lived in the building. On January 9, prior to the party, Timmons and John Brooks consumed several pints of gin and beer. At approximately 9 p.m., Timmons arrived at his surprise party, where he consumed more gin, \u201cCanadian Mist,\u201d and \u201ca couple cans of beer.\u201d Timmons went to the back room of the apartment where Victor Rainey and John Brooks were \u201chaving words\u201d about money that Victor had given to Brooks. Shortly thereafter, Timmons went downstairs to his apartment and changed clothes. Timmons then went outside to the front yard of the building. Brooks was standing in the doorway. \u201cA car proceeded to come by the front of the house\u201d and Timmons heard a shot. He thought the shot came from the \u201cdark colored car.\u201d \u201cAfter\u201d he heard the shot, he \u201cducked\u201d and himself fired a shot. He heard John Brooks say, \u201cI\u2019m hit,\u201d and Timmons helped him into the hallway and \u201cplaced him by the first stairs going up the stairway.\u201d Timmons ran up the stairs leading to the second floor, heard Green call him and \u201cturned around.\u201d At that moment, \u201cthe gun [Timmons] had went off.\u201d He did not aim the gun. Timmons went down the stairs and left the apartment. He went to a service station and talked with the manager. Later that morning, Timmons surrendered himself at the Fourth Area police station. Timmons stated that his gun did not need to be \u201ccocked\u201d to fire.\nRichard Hall, a biochemist, testified with regard to the effect of alcohol on the body. In Hall\u2019s opinion, a person who drank as much alcohol as Timmons allegedly consumed on January 9 would be intoxicated but would be able to walk, to speak and to change clothes, although he would be \u201cclumsy\u201d and \u201cslow.\u201d\nBy stipulation, the State introduced into evidence Timmons\u2019 1974 attempted armed robbery conviction. The trial court instructed the jury \u201cto accept this stipulation only for the purpose of assessing the credibility of the witness and for no other reason.\u201d\nTimmons was found guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter. Following a hearing, Timmons was sentenced to extended terms of 25 years on each conviction, the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nI\nDefendant initially contends that the trial court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine, which prevented admission into evidence as a dying declaration John Brooks\u2019 alleged nonverbal statement that Timmons \u201caccidentally\u201d shot him.\nThe trial court stated that to be admitted into evidence as a dying declaration \u201cthe rules of evidence require that the assertions [of a decedent] must be factual, competent and not conclusionary.\u201d The court found that the nonverbal responses of John Brooks were \u201cconclusionary\u201d and thereupon denied the admission of these statements into evidence.\nDying declarations have been \u201cbroadly defined as extrajudicial statements of fact by the victim, concerning the cause and circumstances of a homicide.\u201d (People v. Thomas (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 961, 970, 364 N.E.2d 641, 647.) Dying declarations are admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, where it appears \u201cthat they are made by the victim under the fixed belief and moral conviction that death is impending and certain to follow almost immediately, without opportunity for repentance and in the absence of all hope of avoidance, when he has despaired of life and looks to death as inevitable and at hand.\u201d (People v. Tilley (1950), 406 Ill. 398, 403, 94 N.E.2d 328, 331.) To determine the declarant\u2019s consciousness of his approaching death, \u201crecourse must be had to all facts and circumstances attending the party giving the dying declaration at the moment of its utterance. Within this context, the declarant must be sufficiently possessed of his mental faculties as to be able to have accurately perceived, recollected and communicated the circumstances surrounding his death. [Citation.] In making its preliminary determination, outside the presence of the jury, of the challenged statements\u2019 admissibility, the trial court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the declarant believed himself in extremis when the statements were made. [Citation.]\u201d People v. Thomas (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 961, 364 N.E.2d 641.\nHere, the trial court apparently failed to make the required threshold determination as to whether the deceased \u201cbelieved himself in extremis when the statements were made.\u201d We have searched the record and find no evidence that Brooks was aware that death was imminent at the time he made the responses in question. Dr. Picache did not advise Brooks of his physical condition because he believed \u201cBrooks was not alert enough to understand.\u201d Therefore, we hold, as did the court in People v. Thomas, that the evidence here \u201cwas insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [decedent] considered himself in extremis at the time his statements were uttered.\u201d\nWe find, however, that this error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. \u201cThe object of this court on review is not to determine whether the record is totally free of error, but whether any error occurred which operated to the prejudice of the appellant or unduly affected the outcome below.\u201d (Needy v. Sparks (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 350, 372, 366 N.E.2d 327, 347.) We have carefully reviewed the record, and it is our opinion that in this instance the court\u2019s ruling neither prejudiced Timmons nor unduly affected the jury\u2019s verdict.\nII\nTimmons contends that the trial court\u2019s instruction limiting the jury\u2019s use of defendant\u2019s 1974 conviction of attempted armed robbery was prejudicial because its wording did not \u201cconform\u201d to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions.\nUpon Timmons\u2019 stipulation that he had been convicted in 1974, the trial judge sua sponte instructed the jury:\n\u201cLadies and Gentlemen of the jury, you are to accept this stipulation only for the purposes of assessing the credibility of the witness and for no other reason ***.\u201d\nDefendant did not object to this instruction nor tender to the trial court defendant\u2019s own version to accord with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, No. 3.13 (2d ed. 1981), which provides:\n\u201cEvidence of a defendant\u2019s previous conviction of an offense may be considered by you as it may affect his believability as a witness, and must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of the offense with which he is charged.\u201d\nOn review, however, Timmons argues that IPI Criminal No. 3.13 instructs the jury that evidence of defendant\u2019s prior conviction cannot be considered as evidence of present guilt and that the trial judge\u2019s instruction here was \u201cconfusing and focused the jury\u2019s attention only on the believability of the defendant.\u201d\nIt has been well established that \u201cthe failure to object at trial to an asserted error in jury instructions waives the question.\u201d (People v. Tannenbaum (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 177, 180, 415 N.E. 2d 1027, 1029.) \u201c[I]f an accused wishes certain instructions to be given he must request the court to so act, since the trial judge is under no duty to give instructions upon its own motion.\u201d (People v. Orr (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 100, 102, 180 N.E.2d 501, 502.) We conclude that defendant has waived this issue.\nMoreover, even if we in fact reviewed this issue, we would find no error. Any non-IPI instruction given by the trial court is to be \u201csimple, brief, impartial and free from argument.\u201d (87 Ill. 2d R. 451(a).) Here, the trial judge tendered to the jury a brief and accurate statement of the law. In our opinion, no prejudice to defendant resulted from the alleged nonconformance of this instruction.\nIll\nDefendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to two 25-year extended terms and in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant argues that the trial judge did not consider \u201cfactors in mitigation\u201d; that \u201cthe jury specifically found defendant not guilty of murder\u201d; and that \u201cdefendant did not commit voluntary manslaughter on the public at large.\u201d Defendant maintains that these factors militate against the imposition of consecutive and extended-term sentences.\nA\nWith regard to the extended-term sentences, section 5\u20145\u20143.2(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20143.2(b)) provides that an extended term may be imposed:\n\u201c(1) When a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of the same or greater class felony, within 10 years, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts; or\n(2) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d\nHere, the trial court found that:\n\u201cThese events and the conduct of the defendant and the conduct which the defendant made, in the Court\u2019s opinion, the defendant made an unjustifiable action, in the Court\u2019s opinion, grossly wicked reprehensible, odious, and heinous, and indicative of wanton cruelty separately and unrelated except as to place and persons, and in general within a short space of time the defendant with his pistol unjustifiably and unreasonably believing he would be killed shot John Brooks in the neck \u2014 in the throat outside of the apartment.\n* * *\nDuring part of this event there was testimony that a fear on the part of the persons, there, terror, which the Court does conclude that certainly some anxiousness on the part of Etheral Green, anxiety, implicit in his remarks if you shoot somebody\u2014 if you are going to shoot somebody, shoot me.\nThe scenario was such \u2014 the defendant\u2019s part in it was such that the Court would find that his conduct was heinous behavior and indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d\nMoreover, this was defendant\u2019s second conviction for a Class 1 felony within 10 years. This factor alone will support imposition of an extended-term sentence under the statute.\nIn the instant case, therefore, the imposition of extended terms was in fact supported, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in here imposing such sentences.\nB\nWith regard to consecutive sentences, section 5\u20148\u20144(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(b)) provides:\n\u201c(b) The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offenses and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis for which the court shall set forth in the record.\u201d\nIt has been generally held that \u201c[ejonseeutive sentences should be imposed sparingly. [Citations.] If the trial judge improperly finds that a consecutive term is necessary to protect the public, a reviewing court may order that the sentence be served concurrently.\u201d People v. Zadel (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 681, 683, 387 N.E.2d 1092, 1093.\nIn our review of this record we are not convinced that here consecutive sentences are mandated. Considering the totality of all pertinent facts, we accordingly modify the sentences to be served concurrently.\nIV\nDefendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial because the State used three of its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. The record indicates the State used 11 peremptory challenges. Eight challenges were used to exclude white persons and three challenges were used to exclude blacks.\nIn Illinois, the use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury does not warrant reversal unless there is a showing of a systematic exclusion by the State of blacks by peremptory challenges \u201cin case after case.\u201d People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202.\nHere, we must reject defendant\u2019s contention. We are in agreement with the trial court which found that \u201cthere was no purposeful discrimination in selection of the members of the jury.\u201d Defendant has not shown a \u201csystematic exclusion\u201d of blacks \u201cin case after case.\u201d We, therefore, conclude that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the State\u2019s use of its peremptory challenges.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions for voluntary manslaughter; we modify the sentences to be served concurrently.\nAffirmed in part; modified in part.\nHARTMAN, P.J., and STAMOS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frank P. Madea, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, David A. Cuomo, and John L. Malevitis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE TIMMONS, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83\u20141044\nOpinion filed September 18, 1984.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frank P. Madea, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, David A. Cuomo, and John L. Malevitis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0679-01", "first_page_order": 701, "last_page_order": 710 }