{ "id": 3525248, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT J. HARTWICK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hartwick", "decision_date": "1984-10-26", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201483\u20140798", "first_page": "272", "last_page": "276", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 272" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481762 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994547 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3428236 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159734 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2869156 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0700-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 8577, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2193741847726812e-07, "percentile": 0.5978385226320144 }, "sha256": "ceeb93fafbaab2bb2bd467cba63afc3348fca7d3e7bef491c600571e64d82c33", "simhash": "1:1539add6a4cc94e9", "word_count": 1402 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:57.846352+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT J. HARTWICK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nScott J. Hartwick, the defendant, appeals from his conviction of the offense of reckless homicide (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 3) and from his sentence of 30 months\u2019 imprisonment. He contends that evidence of a blood-alcohol test was erroneously admitted.\nOn July 29, 1982, the defendant was involved in a head-on collision in Stephenson County on Illinois Route 26, near the Wisconsin border, which resulted in three deaths. Defendant was taken in an unconscious state to a hospital in Wisconsin. There, an attending physician examined him and ordered, for medical reasons, certain blood tests which included a blood-alcohol test. A blood sample was taken and an analysis made by a medical technologist. The results of the test reflected a blood-alcohol level of .2%. Defendant remained hospitalized for two months, and after his discharge he was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and reckless homicide. However, the DUI charge was later dismissed.\nDefendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the results of the blood test on the basis that it was not performed in accordance with the mandates of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 1 \u2014 100 et seq.) and the Illinois Department of Public Health standards. It is undisputed that neither the hospital nor the medical technologist who analyzed defendant\u2019s blood was certified to conduct blood-alcohol tests pursuant to Illinois law.\nThe trial judge, in determining the admissibility of the blood test results, relied upon common law principles of reliability and relevancy, and not upon statutory law, and found that the evidence sustained the fact that normal, recognized medical procedures were used to withdraw the blood and to analyze it. He relied on the testimony of the attending physician in the emergency room, who stated that the test was ordered on his own volition for diagnostic medical reasons and who further testified to his opinion that the blood-alcohol level found \u201cimplies a severe intoxication.\u201d In addition, the medical technologist who withdrew the blood sample described in detail the method used. The medical technologist who analyzed defendant\u2019s blood for its aleohoi content also testified, and it was stipulated that the analysis was performed according to normal hospital procedure and that the alcohol level was .2%.\nThe Illinois Vehicle Code provides, as relevant, that no person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor may drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State. The Act further provides that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway within the State thereby consents to a chemical test of his blood to determine its alcohol content \u201cif arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 or a similar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).) Section 11 \u2014 501.2 of the Act provides as applicable here:\n\u201cUpon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 or a similar local ordinance, evidence of the concentration of alcohol, *** as determined by analysis of the person\u2019s blood *** shall be admissible. Where such test is made the following provisions shall apply: [including, as applicable here, certification requirements for performing a blood-alcohol test.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95Va, par. 11\u2014 501.2(a).\nThe blood test taken by Wisconsin hospital personnel did not, and obviously could not, comply with the certification requirements of the Illinois Vehicle Code. However, we conclude that the provisions of that code do not apply to a prosecution for reckless homicide and are limited in their application to prosecutions for offenses as defined in section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 11-501).\nThe language regarding chemical analysis, prior to an amendment effective July 13, 1982 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 951/2, par. 11\u2014 501), stated that the statute applied \u201c[u]pon the trial of any action or proceeding arising out of the acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving *** under the influence of intoxicating liquor ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95^2, par. ll-501(c).) Under the former statute this court held that the statute was applicable to charges of involuntary manslaughter (People v. Leffew (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 700, 703) and reckless homicide (People v. Weissinger (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 700, 701) arising from driving while under the influence. However, the amendment which is applicable here, by its terms, does not now encompass offenses which do not arise out of an arrest for an Illinois Vehicle Code offense. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 9572, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(a).\nWhile we are aware that a recent case not cited by the parties concludes that the amended statute applies to reckless homicide (People v. Murphy (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 695, 699), we do not agree. In Murphy, the court emphasized the words in the new statute \u201c[u]pon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding\u201d (emphasis in original) but does not discuss the language which follows, \u201carising out of an arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 or a similar local ordinance ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 9572, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(a).\nThe whole of the sentence must be read in context giving effect to the qualifying terms. (See, e.g., City of Mount Carmel v. Partee (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 371, 375.) The fact that the qualifying words were added by amendment indicates a purpose to change the law as it previously existed, particularly since the amendment was not for the purpose of removing a previous ambiguity. See, e.g., O\u2019Connor v. A & P Enterprises (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 260, 271.\nIn Murphy, the reviewing court also relied upon the language in section 11 \u2014 501.2(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code as further authority that the statute applies to reckless homicide charges. We again cannot agree. This section does not deal with restrictions governing the chemical analysis of a person\u2019s bodily substance, which is here involved. It instead applies to the refusal to submit to a chemical test and states that \u201cevidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person under the influence of alcohol *** was driving *** a motor vehicle.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 9572, par. 11\u2014 501.2(c).\nIn context, the statutory scheme indicates a purpose to provide restrictions on chemical testing as a constitutional safeguard to one who, merely by driving on the Illinois highways, impliedly consents to being chemically tested when he is charged with an offense under the Illinois Vehicle Code. While the legislature could well establish similar restrictions on chemical testing in any civil or criminal proceeding, it has chosen by the language of the amended statute not to do so. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 9572, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(a).) Therefore, we agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that common law principles apply to the chemical testing here involved. We are also satisfied from the record that the blood-alcohol testing process was performed in a manner using generally accepted methodology, insuring that the results were reliable.\nPeople v. Palmer (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 454, cited by defendant and which was also relied upon in Murphy, is inapplicable. In Palmer, a prosecution for the offense of driving while under the influence was involved, not reckless homicide.\nIn the view we have taken we also do not reach the State\u2019s alternative argument that if the sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code in question are held to apply to a charge of reckless homicide, they so apply only when State action is involved.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Stephenson County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLINDBERG and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Schirger, of Schirger, Beger & Ferguson, of Rockford, for appellant.", "Charles R. Hartman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (Phyllis J. Perko and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT J. HARTWICK, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201483\u20140798\nOpinion filed October 26, 1984.\nWilliam E. Schirger, of Schirger, Beger & Ferguson, of Rockford, for appellant.\nCharles R. Hartman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (Phyllis J. Perko and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0272-01", "first_page_order": 294, "last_page_order": 298 }