{
  "id": 3524237,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG P. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Romero",
  "decision_date": "1984-09-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 5\u201483\u20140545",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:57.846352+00:00",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG P. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCraig Romero, defendant, pleaded guilty to residential burglary and was sentenced to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, alleging that (1) he pleaded guilty based on a misapprehension of law brought about by misrepresentations of the prosecutor, and (2) the court erred in allowing defendant\u2019s trial counsel to testify as to the nature and substance of his conversations with defendant.\nThe first issue raised by defendant concerns the prosecutor\u2019s indication, prior to the acceptance by the court of defendant\u2019s plea, that the State would attempt to secure payment of restitution and any fine levied against defendant from real property which had been posted as bond for defendant by a friend, Carolyn Bridges. At the guilty plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Romero, have any promises of any kind or nature been made to you, other than the plea agreement, or any threats been made to you by the State\u2019s Attorney, your attorney, or by any other person, to induce you to make your motion to withdraw your plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Other than the bond, no.\nTHE COURT: What do you mean, \u201cother than the bond\u201d?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Well, this bond is being attacked. The person has put up for me, and she is not responsible. She just put it up to just, my bond, to assure my appearance in court. It is my understanding this is being attacked so far as my problems with the Court and she is not responsible for me.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Durso, have you gone into the matter of the bond with your client?\nMR. DURSO [defense counsel]: Yes, we have discussed it at length.\nMR. STURGEON [prosecutor]: Your Honor\u2014\nTHE COURT: Yes.\nMR. STURGEON: For the record, and I advised Mr. Durso, we have questioned the legality of it, but I have represented to Mr. Durso all along, and I am representing to the Court now, it is our intention, there was approximately property valued at $200,000 that was placed, that this defendant was free on $100,000 bond. I am going to research whether or not we can attack it.\nI never said I would not. I never made any claim. I have never talked to this defendant. It is my intention still to attempt to get the fine and restitution from that property valued at $200,000.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Romero, do you understand, and I have indicated to you, if you plead guilty to this charge, you could be sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of four to fifteen years, and you could be, in addition, fined up to $10,000, and in addition, you could be ordered to make restitution. Do you understand that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I understand that. I just don\u2019t have any money, so he is wanting to attack her property.\nTHE COURT: Whether that can be done or not is subject to the question first of all, of what the sentence is going to be, number one, and, second, the question is whether or not that bond can be used to satisfy your bond and/or any order of restitution that is made. That will have to be taken up and decided if, in my discretion, I indicate at the sentencing proceeding and at the arraignment for sentencing I am going to levy a fine and/or order restitution.\nTHE DEFENDANT: I see.\nTHE COURT: But, the question now is, because of the fact that the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, Mr. Sturgeon, has indicated that he is going to be making a request for a fine and/or restitution, do you feel that is a threat insofar as you are concerned and that is the only reason you are pleading guilty to this charge?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\u201d\nWhile defendant asserts that the prosecutor\u2019s representations concerning the State\u2019s desire to \u201cattack\u201d the property were such as to render his plea involuntary, the above-quoted portion of the record belies this claim. Both the prosecutor and the court quite clearly indicated to the defendant that there existed some question as to whether the State could attach the property posted as bond; additionally, defense counsel testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea that he told defendant the State \u201cprobably could not\u201d seize the property. Even more important, the prosecutor specifically informed defendant and the court that the State intended to try to seize the property whether or not defendant pleaded guilty. Thus, there was no basis upon which it can reasonably be said that defendant pleaded guilty in order to \u201csave\u201d the property posted by Ms. Bridges. While defendant points out that defense counsel testified that he told Ms. Bridges that the State \u201cmight be less vociferous\u201d in its attempt to seize the property if defendant pleaded guilty, the prosecutor\u2019s comment at the plea hearing unequivocally established that such would not be the case. Whether a plea of guilty may be withdrawn rests within the sound discretion of the court, and the court\u2019s exercise of this discretion will not be disturbed unless it appears that the plea was entered due to a misapprehension of facts or law, that defendant has a defense worthy of consideration, or where there is doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt and the ends of justice would be better served by a trial of the case. (People v. Worley (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 574, 576, 221 N.E.2d 267.) Viewing the record here in its entirety, we must con-elude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his plea.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention, that the attorney who represented him at the plea hearing should not have been permitted to testify as to his conversations with defendant, is also without merit. Defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his plea alleged that he was advised by his trial counsel that the State would be less likely to seize Ms. Bridges\u2019 property if defendant pleaded guilty, and defendant testified to that same effect. By questioning his attorney\u2019s handling of the case and putting into issue the substance of conversations between himself and his attorney, defendant waived the attorney-client privilege, and the trial court did not err in allowing counsel to testify as to his conversations with defendant. People v. O\u2019Connor (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 310, 314, 345 N.E.2d 520.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH, P.J., and KASSERMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Frederick M. Steiger, of Clayton, Karfeld and Steiger, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.",
      "John Baricevic, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG P. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201483\u20140545\nOpinion filed September 11, 1984.\nRehearing denied November 1, 1984.\nFrederick M. Steiger, of Clayton, Karfeld and Steiger, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.\nJohn Baricevic, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0461-01",
  "first_page_order": 483,
  "last_page_order": 486
}