{ "id": 3524504, "name": "ALLEN R. DYMEK, Indiv. and as a Custodial Parent of Robert A. Dymek, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT E. NYQUIST et al., DefendantsAppellees", "name_abbreviation": "Dymek v. Nyquist", "decision_date": "1984-09-18", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20141651", "first_page": "859", "last_page": "869", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 859" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156384 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 1120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3073590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3023996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1094" }, { "page": "1094" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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DYMEK, Indiv. and as a Custodial Parent of Robert A. Dymek, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT E. NYQUIST et al., DefendantsAppellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Allen R. Dymek, appeals from the entry of an order dismissing his complaint at law with prejudice pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2-615).\nOn March 9, 1982, plaintiff instituted the present action against defendant Robert E. Nyquist, a psychiatrist, and defendant Retha J. Dymek, plaintiff\u2019s former wife. Essentially, plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged that Retha took their son, Robert, a nine-year-old minor over whom plaintiff had been awarded custody, to see Dr. Nyquist for a, period of one year for purposes of psychiatric treatment. Robert allegedly underwent psychotherapy without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff. Subsequent thereto, Dr. Nyquist testified on behalf of Retha at a hearing held in connection with her petition for change of custody.\nBy virtue of these allegations, plaintiff averred that he had suffered \u201csevere emotional stress and disturbance to [his] mental tranquility\u201d as a result of Dr. Nyquist\u2019s conduct (count I); that Dr. Nyquist had breached the fiduciary duty of trust and confidence owed to Robert (count II); that Dr. Nyquist and Retha conspired \u201cto gain physical and mental custody and control of [Robert] *** and to maliciously, unlawfully and wrongfully injure the plaintiff in his mental and emotional well-being\u201d (count III); that Dr. Nyquist and Retha deprived, alienated and destroyed the affection of Robert toward plaintiff (count IV); and that Dr. Nyquist had engaged in malpractice through unauthorized treatment as well as unconsented revelation of privileged psychiatric information (count V).\nCount IV, originally premised on alienation of affections, was amended by leave of court on January 25, 1983, so that the words \u201cto alienate and destroy the affection\u201d were replaced by the words \u201cto injure and destroy the society and companionship.\u201d On that same day, January 25, pursuant to Dr. Nyquist\u2019s motion, the trial court entered an order dismissing counts II, IV, and V of the complaint, and striking counts I and III with leave to amend. Plaintiff, however, elected to stand on his pleadings and subsequently filed a motion for rehearing and to vacate the order of January 25, 1983. This motion was denied, and plaintiff\u2019s complaint was thereupon dismissed with prejudice on June 6, 1983. It is the propriety of this dispositive order which plaintiff now contests on appeal.\nI\nThe sole issue presented for review is whether the lower court properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice.\nCount I\nIn order to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, facts must be alleged which establish: (1) that the defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant\u2019s conduct, if alleged to have been \u201creckless,\u201d was such that the defendant knew severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result. Public Finance Corp. v. Davis (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90, 360 N.E.2d 765.\nRegarding the first element, the nature of defendant\u2019s conduct, liability exists only where such conduct has been \u201c \u2018so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency ***.\u2019\u201d (Plocar v. Dunkin\u2019 Donuts of America, Inc. (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 740, 745-46, 431 N.E.2d 1175, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 46, comment d (1965).) With respect to the second element, the severity of plaintiff\u2019s distress, \u201c \u2018[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.\u2019 \u201d (Public Finance Corp. v. Davis (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 85, 90, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 46, comment j (1965).) Pertaining to the recklessness of defendant\u2019s conduct, \u201cliability extends to situations in which there is a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress will follow and the actor goes ahead in conscious disregard of it.\u201d Plocar v. Dunkin\u2019 Donuts of America, Inc. (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 740, 746, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 46, comment i (1965), and Prosser, Torts sec. 12, at 60 (4th ed. 1971).\nIn order to determine whether a plaintiff has stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a reviewing court must accept as true the allegations contained in the complaint. (Witkowski v. St. Anne\u2019s Hospital of Chicago, Inc. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 745, 752, 447 N.E.2d 1016, appeal denied, 96 Ill. 2d 552.) Here, plaintiff\u2019s complaint charges that Dr. Nyquist surreptitiously performed psychotherapy on Robert twice a month for a period of one year. By virtue of this course of action, it is claimed that Dr. Nyquist intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to plaintiff\u2019s mental tranquility.\nIt is our opinion that the psychiatrist\u2019s conduct, performed at the request of Robert\u2019s mother, cannot be characterized as so outrageous, so atrocious and so utterly intolerable that a person of ordinary sensibilities could not reasonably be expected to endure it. In support of a contrary conclusion, plaintiff cites and strongly relies on Burchfield v. Regents of the University of Colorado (D. Colo. 1981), 516 F. Supp. 1301. Such reliance, however, is seriously misplaced since Burchfield did not concern the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nIn addition, we note that plaintiff\u2019s complaint is absolutely devoid of any allegation that the purported psychiatric treatment was in any way detrimental to Robert\u2019s mental or physical state of health. In fact, there is no claim that Dr. Nyquist\u2019s care was unnecessary. In view of these deficiencies, we simply cannot conclude that the psychiatrist\u2019s actions reached such an extreme level of outrageousness and severity \u201cbeyond all bounds of decency\u201d so as to give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count I of the complaint, therefore, was properly dismissed.\nCount II\nThe trial court\u2019s dismissal of count II was premised on the authority of McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Levine (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 732, 439 N.E.2d 475, appeal denied (1983), 92 Ill. 2d 575. Plaintiff contends that McDonald\u2019s, which held only (as pertinent to this case) that there exists no affirmative, independent cause of action for a tortious interference with the attorney-client privilege, provides no basis for such dismissal. (McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Levine (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 732, 744.) The present case, however, concerns the psychiatrist-patient privilege \u2014 the invasion of which may constitute a recognized cause of action in Illinois. See Geisberger v. Willuhn (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 438, 390 N.E.2d 945 (\u201cThe cases that have recognized the contract theory as a cause of action make it clear that the action lies for the disclosure of \u2018personal\u2019 information, e.g., information relating to the patient\u2019s mental or physical condition ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.))\nNonetheless, even if the lower court had, in fact, applied irrelevant case law in reaching its decision, \u201cthe judgment may be sustained upon any ground warranted, *** regardless of whether the reason given by the trial court was correct.\u201d Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 457 N.E.2d 9.\nA\nPlaintiff asserts that Dr. Nyquist was in breach of his fiduciary duty through his unauthorized revelation of confidential information, i.e., by providing the results of Robert\u2019s psychiatric evaluations to his mother, Retha, and her counsel.\nIt is settled law in Illinois that where a person makes statements to a therapist during a professional consultation, those statements are privileged. (In re Marriage of Semmler (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 649, 654, 413 N.E.2d 502; see also Martino v. Family Service Agency (1982), 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599-600, 445 N.E.2d 6.) Indeed, the Mental Health and Development Disabilities Confidentiality Act (hereinafter the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 801 et seq.) provides that \u201cin any civil, *** proceeding, *** a recipient, *** has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the recipient\u2019s record or communications.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. dlVz, par. 810.) Section 4 of the Act, however, provides in pertinent part that: \u201c(a) The following persons shall be entitled, upon request, to inspect and copy a recipient\u2019s record or any part thereof: (1) the parent or guardian of a recipient who is under 12 years of age; ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 91V2, par. 804.\nA recipient is defined in the Act as a person who has received mental health services (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 9IV2, par. 802(6)); mental health services include, but are not limited to, examination, diagnosis, evaluation and treatment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 91^2, par. 802(3)); a record is defined in the Act as any record \u201ckept by a therapist\u201d in.the course of providing mental health services to a recipient (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. \u00a7V-k, par. 80 \u2014 2(7)); and a therapist, as used in the Act, includes psychiatrists (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 911/2, par. 802(9)).\nAt the time the instant action was commenced, Robert was under 12 years of age. Although Retha was not in custody of Robert at the time of the alleged psychotherapy, the fact still remains that she was a parent of Robert. Since the Act makes absolutely no distinction between a custodial or a noncustodial parent, we hold that Retha was entitled by statute, upon her request, to the results of Robert\u2019s psychiatric evaluations. We think common sense suggests this humane position. Every parent, be he custodial or noncustodial, should be entitled to receive a copy of such a report unless it can be demonstrated a parent has no interest in the health, welfare or well-being of a child.\nB\nWe next consider plaintiff\u2019s claim that Dr. Nyquist\u2019s treatment of Robert was, in fact, unauthorized by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (hereinafter IMDMA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.). Specifically, plaintiff maintains that the following provision of the IMDMA prohibited the psychotherapy performed by Dr. Nyquist:\n\u201cJudicial Supervision. (1) Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the time of the custody judgment, the custodian may determine the child\u2019s upbringing, including but not limited to, his education, health care and religious training, unless the court, after hearing, finds, upon motion by the noncustodial parent, that the absence of a specific limitation of the custodian\u2019s authority would endanger the child\u2019s physical health or significantly impair his emotional development.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 608(a).\nOur research has failed to disclose a single Illinois case wherein a private cause of action against a third party to a custody proceeding has ever been implied from section 608(a) of the IMDMA. Nonetheless, it is clear that \u201c[sjection 608(a) *** speaks in terms of a single custodian with substantial authority.\u201d (In re Marriage of Manuele (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094, 438 N.E.2d 691, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 568.) From a plain reading of the statutory language, it is also clear that the parties may agree \u201cin writing at the time of the custody judgment\u201d that a noncustodial parent retain specified rights to determine, or to participate in the determination of, matters concerning, inter alia, the minor child\u2019s health care. (Cf. In re Marriage of Manuele (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094.) Regarding the case at bar, the record and briefs before this court are devoid of any indication that such a written agreement was, in fact, entered into at the time of the custody judgment.\nFurthermore, under section 608(a), whenever circumstances arise wherein the custodian\u2019s authority would endanger the child\u2019s physical health or significantly impair his emotional development, the noncustodial parent, upon motion, can seek \u201cspecific limitations of such authority. We note, however, that there is no averment here of any circumstances regarding potential endangerment to Robert\u2019s physical health, or significant impairment of his emotional development, by virtue of the custodial authority vested in plaintiff.\nIn view of the apparent secrecy of the psychiatric sessions involved herein, coupled with the fact that Dr. Nyquist testified as an expert witness on behalf of Retha at the hearing held in connection with her petition for change of custody, it is reasonable to conclude that the psychiatrist knew Retha as the noncustodial parent of Robert. There is no allegation here of an emergency situation, nor is there any allegation that Retha was precluded from seeking court permission for Dr. Nyquist\u2019s treatment. The psychiatrist, therefore, simply had no authority to subject a young child to psychotherapy \u2014 twice a month for a period of one year \u2014 without lawful consent of either plaintiff, as Robert\u2019s custodial parent, or the court having authority under section 608(a).\nIn essence, Dr. Nyquist\u2019s actions over the one-year period of psychotherapy constituted a most severe interference with plaintiff\u2019s custodial prerogatives and duties in the area of his minor child\u2019s health care. Since neither the written agreement nor the exigent circumstances referred to in section 608(a) are present in this case, we are of the opinion that the lower court erred in refusing to recognize a cause of action for Dr. Nyquist\u2019s alleged surreptitious, unauthorized psychiatric treatment of plaintiff\u2019s son.\nCount III\nCount III of plaintiff\u2019s complaint avers that Dr. Nyquist conspired \u201cto gain physical and mental custody and control of [Robert] *** without regard to the physical and mental well-being of said minor child, and to maliciously, unlawfully, and wrongfully injure the plaintiff in his mental and emotional well-being.\u201d\nA civil conspiracy giving rise to a cause of action in Illinois involves a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing, through concerted action, either an illegal object or a legal object by an illegal means. (Daley v. G\u2019Sell (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 548, 553, 430 N.E.2d 556; Bau v. Sobut (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 732, 738, 365 N.E.2d 724.) The basis of the conspiracy is not the \u201ccombination\u201d; rather, it is the wrongful act alleged to have been done in pursuance of the agreement that may result in liability. (Daley v. G\u2019Sell (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 548, 553; Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machines, Inc. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1062-63, 403 N.E.2d 555, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 591.) The burden of proof in such cases always lies with the plaintiff to prove the conspiracy by clear and convincing evidence. Bergeson v. Mullinix (1948), 399 Ill. 470, 474-75, 78 N.E.2d 297; Alm v. General Telephone Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 876, 880, 327 N.E.2d 523, appeal denied (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 595.\nIn our opinion, the allegations in count III are adequate to state a cause of action for a civil conspiracy to violate, if not vitiate, plaintiff\u2019s court-decreed custodial rights in his child. Sufficient facts are set forth in the complaint at law so as to make it appear that the alleged wrongful acts of defendants did, indeed, result from a concerted action. This holds especially true in view of the fact, which we must accept as a verity (see Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Associates, Inc. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1096), that Dr. Nyquist testified as an expert witness on behalf of Retha at the hearing held in connection with her petition for change of custody.\nWithout question, a conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to a specific case if the evidence is sufficient. (Bergeson v. Mullinix (1948), 399 Ill. 470, 475; Lurie v. Village of Skokie (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 217, 229, 380 N.E.2d 1120.) Plaintiff here has alleged the ultimate facts, albeit inferential, necessary to support a legally cognizable claim for civil conspiracy. We stress that \u201c[w]hile ultimate facts necessary to support an action must be alleged, the pleader need not set forth evidence which very well may be derived from discovery subsequent to the filing of the complaint.\u201d (Ingram v. Little Company of Mary Hospital (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 456, 459, 438 N.E.2d 1194, appeal denied (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 568, citing People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 300, 430 N.E.2d 1005.) In addition, it is important to bear in mind that although a court-decreed custody change is certainly a legal object, plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to his day in court in order that he may attempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a concerted action on the part of defendants to effectuate such a change through an illegal means.\n\u201cIn sum, the pleadings are to be liberally construed with the view of doing substantial justice between the parties.\u201d (Hayna v. Arby\u2019s, Inc. (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 700, 710, 425 N.E.2d 1174.) Hence, it is our conclusion that the lower court erred in dismissing count III of plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nCount IV\nCount IV of plaintiff\u2019s complaint at law, which was amended on January 25, 1983, claimed that defendants conspired to separate Robert from plaintiff \u201cso as to deprive the plaintiff of the relationship, and to injure and destroy the society and companionship of the child towards the said plaintiff ***.\u201d It is plaintiff\u2019s contention that a cause of action for the loss of a minor child\u2019s society and companionship can be maintained by a parent in Illinois. We agree.\nOn July 5, 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court issued an opinion which reversed the trend of courts in this State to deny recovery for parental loss of a minor child\u2019s society and companionship. This trend had been recently evinced in the case of Bullard v. Barnes (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 445 N.E.2d 485, aff\u2019d and remanded with directions, (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, wherein the appellate court held that because there is a qualitative difference between the \u201csociety\u201d of a spouse and that of a child, there existed no basis for including within the damage provisions of the Wrongful Death Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 1 et seq.) the loss of a child\u2019s society. Bullard v. Barnes (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 390.\nOur supreme court disagreed, however, holding that since recovery has been allowed in cases involving the loss of a spouse (Elliott v. Willis (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163; Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157) and a parent (Hall v. Gillins (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352), \u201cit would be anomalous to now deny parents this form of recovery.\u201d (Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 515.) Although Bullard involved a wrongful death claim (whereas the conduct here is alleged to have nonfatal consequences, i.e., \u201cbrainwashing\u201d), the fact remains that the supreme court specifically concluded that \u201cparents are entitled to a presumption of pecuniary injury in the loss of a child\u2019s society, ***. Defendants may rebut the presumption by presenting evidence that a parent and child were estranged.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517.\nIn dismissing count IV of the instant complaint, the court below specifically relied on Koskela v. Martin (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 414 N.E.2d 1148, appeal denied (1981), 83 Ill. 2d 570. In Koskela, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of an autistic child\u2019s action for the loss of consortium, companionship and society of her injured father. However, in view of the position recently taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in Bullard, and accepting all of the facts properly pleaded in count IV as true (including the averment that prior to the psychotherapy, \u201cplaintiff and his son lived happily together in a harmonious family relationship\u201d), it is our opinion that we should now recognize a cause of action for parental loss of a minor child\u2019s society and companionship.\nFurthermore, we note that contrary to Dr. Nyquist\u2019s assertion, the present case does not concern the alienation of a child\u2019s affections. Rather, as explained earlier, plaintiff\u2019s complaint was amended by leave of court so that the words \u201cto alienate and destroy the affection\u201d were replaced by the words \u201cto injure and destroy the society and companionship.\u201d\nCount V\nPlaintiff\u2019s final claim reiterates the breach of confidentiality allegations contained in count II, and then goes on to declare that Dr. Nyquist\u2019s treatment of Robert was, in fact, unauthorized by the IM-DMA (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.).\nFirst, as we have previously indicated, Retha was entitled by Illinois statutory law to the results of her son\u2019s psychiatric evaluations. Dr. Nyquist\u2019s release of this information thus did not constitute a breach of the psychiatrist\u2019s fiduciary obligation of confidentiality.\nSecond, we note that count V, which \u201csounds in the tort of simple malpractice,\u201d is devoid of the requisite elements necessary to establish such a claim, i.e., that the psychiatrist owed Robert a duty, which was breached or not performed, proximately causing injury, and resulting in damages. (See Doyle v. Shlensky (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 807, 813, 458 N.E.2d 1120.) While it is true that Dr. Nyquist\u2019s psychiatric treatment of Robert was, indeed, allegedly surreptitious and unauthorized, we believe that in light of the foregoing deficiencies, such a circumstance, without more, simply cannot amount to actionable malpractice. The trial court thus correctly dismissed count V of plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nCONCLUSION\nA cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle a plaintiff to recovery. (Ogle v. Fuiten (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 356, 360-61.) We cannot say, as a matter of law, that there is no evidence under the instant allegations of fact which could prove unauthorized psychiatric treatment under section 608(a) of the IMDMA, a civil conspiracy, and parental loss of a minor child\u2019s society and companionship. Rather, counts II, III and IV of plaintiff's complaint set forth sufficient factual allegations upon which to go forward \"with a trial on the merits.\nFor the reasons set out herein, that portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing counts I and V of plaintiff\u2019s complaint is affirmed. That portion dismissing counts II, III and TV is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.\nHARTMAN, P.J., and STAMOS, J., concur.\nFormerly known as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, eh. 110, par. 45.\nDefendant- Retha J. Dymek failed to file a brief with this court in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 343 (87 Ill. 2d R. 343). The trial court\u2019s judgment as to this particular appellee is considered on the merits pursuant to First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nThe dismissal order of June 6, 1983, indicates that Retha had, at some indeterminate point, joined in on Dr. Nyquist\u2019s motion to strike and dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward L. Osowski, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Maurice J. Garvey, William J. Rogers, and Thomas E. Patterson, all of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALLEN R. DYMEK, Indiv. and as a Custodial Parent of Robert A. Dymek, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT E. NYQUIST et al., DefendantsAppellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83\u20141651\nOpinion filed September 18, 1984.\nEdward L. Osowski, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMaurice J. Garvey, William J. Rogers, and Thomas E. Patterson, all of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0859-01", "first_page_order": 881, "last_page_order": 891 }