{ "id": 3490903, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATTHEW S. DICKERSON et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dickerson", "decision_date": "1984-11-30", "docket_number": "Nos. 3\u201484\u20140278 through 3\u201484\u20140281 cons.", "first_page": "59", "last_page": "63", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 59" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 U.S. 31", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179569 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678397 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483226 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 31", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179569 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483226 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/1011-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 449, "char_count": 9760, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.869744135263209e-08, "percentile": 0.4595142419500133 }, "sha256": "97f3975d1f86c2a5bc08563d5dd500111155c7ee3e563e09d1a05bbc7a06f1ed", "simhash": "1:a62b333605b648f7", "word_count": 1610 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:09:03.101627+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATTHEW S. DICKERSON et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe instant appeal raises the question of whether a trial court properly dismissed implied consent proceedings after finding the underlying municipal ordinances to be invalid. The defendants, Matthew S. Dickerson, Clinton Terry, Larry Sellers, and John Lesiotis, were charged in separate incidents with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and related traffic offenses. Each DUI charge was brought under a municipal ordinance. Each of the defendants refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of their arrest.\nThe defendants subsequently requested an implied consent hearing. During the hearings, the defendants argued that the underlying municipal DUI ordinances were invalid. The trial court agreed with this premise and dismissed the proceedings. It is from this order that the State now appeals.\nWe initially address the motion to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal brought by the defendant, John Lesiotis. Lesiotis argues that the appeal must be dismissed in cause No. 3 \u2014 84\u20140281 because it was not timely filed. The trial court issued an oral order dismissing Lesiotis\u2019 hearing on February 21, 1984. This order was entered in the record the same day. No notation was made that a further written order was required. The trial court subsequently entered a written order \u201cin support of\u201d its prior order on March 8, 1984. The State\u2019s notice of appeal was filed April 3,1984.\nSupreme Court Rule 303 provides, in relevant part, that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment. (87 Ill. 2d R. 303.) The time at which the judgment is entered is determined under the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 272. (87 Ill. 2d R. 272.) Rule 272 provides:\n\u201cIf at the time of announcing final judgment the judge requires the submission of a form of written judgment to be signed by him, the clerk shall make a notation to that effect and the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is filed. If no such signed written judgment is to be filed, thfe judge or clerk shall forthwith make a notation of judgment and enter the judgment of record promptly, and the judgment is entered at the time it is entered of record.\u201d\nIn the instant case, there is no evidence that the judge required submission of a written judgment. No notation of such a requirement was made. Thus, under Rule 272, the judgment was final at the time it was entered of record. The judgment was entered of record on February 21, 1984. The State\u2019s notice of appeal was filed April 3, 1984. The State\u2019s motion was not filed within 30 days, and, therefore, was not timely. Accordingly, the motion of the defendant, John Lesiotis, to dismiss the appeal in cause No. 3 \u2014 84\u20140281 is granted.\nWe now consider the merits of the State\u2019s argument in the remaining consolidated appeals.\nIn dismissing the hearings, the trial court relied on Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 454 N.E.2d 29. In Hartnett, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to a municipal ordinance. Like the municipal ordinances in the instant case, the ordinance in Hartnett provided a fine only as a possible sentence. The Hartnett court found that the ordinance was invalid because it did not conform to the requirements established in section 11 \u2014 501(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(c)). Section 11 \u2014 501(c) requires that driving under the influence be a Class A misdemeanor. Class A misdemeanors are punishable by fine and imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 8\u20143, 1005 \u2014 9\u20141.) Thus, the municipal ordinance in Hartnett was invalid because it failed to provide for incarceration as a potential sentence.\nThe trial court in the instant case found that the municipal ordinances prohibiting driving under the influence were invalid under Hartnett because none of the ordinances provided for a sentence which potentially included a term of imprisonment. The trial court then concluded that the defendants were not properly arrested for purposes of the implied consent statute because the ordinances were invalid. The trial court dismissed the implied consent proceedings.\nThe instant proceedings were brought under the implied consent statute, section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1.) Section 11 \u2014 501.1(a) provides that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle is deemed to have given consent to relevant tests if arrested for violating Section 11 \u2014 501 or any similar provision of a local ordinance. Section 11 \u2014 501.1(c) provides that a hearing on a refusal to take a relevant test shall cover only the issues of whether a person was placed under arrest for an offense defined in section 11 \u2014 501 or similar local ordinance, whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was under the influence, and whether the person refused to submit to the test. People v. Horberg (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 456, 462 N.E.2d 831.\nThe issues of whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds and whether the defendant refused to take the tests are unaffected by the validity of the municipal ordinances involved in the instant case. The issue for consideration by this court, then, is whether the defendants were properly placed under arrest where the ordinances violated were subsequently declared invalid.\nWe find that the defendants were properly arrested in the instant case for purposes of section 11 \u2014 501.1. In Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979), 443 U.S. 31, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 99 S. Ct. 2627, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant\u2019s arrest for violation of a municipal ordinance was valid even though the ordinance itself was subsequently declared invalid because it was unconstitutional. The court noted that police officers are charged with enforcement of laws unless and until the laws are declared unconstitutional. Thus, where the officer relied in good faith on an ordinance which was not grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional, an arrest based on a violation of that ordinance is valid.\nIn the instant cases, it is apparent that the arresting officers acted in good faith in relying on the respective ordinances. The fact that the ordinances were subsequently declared invalid does not negate the validity of the arrests.\nAdditionally, the ordinances in the case at bar were challenged in a collateral civil proceeding. Section 11 \u2014 501.1 should be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of protecting the citizens of Illinois on this State\u2019s highways. People v. Horberg (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 456, 462 N.E.2d 831.\nWe, therefore, find that the arrests of the defendants, Dickerson, Terry and Sellers, were valid arrests under section 11 \u2014 501.1. The causes must, therefore, be remanded for further proceedings on those additional issues which the defendants may choose to raise in their implied consent hearings.\nThe State\u2019s appeal is dismissed in cause No. 3 \u2014 84\u20140281. The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed in causes No. 3\u2014 84 \u2014 0278, 3 \u2014 84\u20140279, and 3 \u2014 84\u20140280, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.\nReversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.\nHEIPLE, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STOUDER,\ndissenting:\nI agree with the result reached by my colleagues granting defendant Lesiotis\u2019 motion to dismiss; however, I respectfully disagree with the reasoning and result reached regarding the other defendants. In my opinion the trial court correctly applied Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 454 N.E.2d 29, and dismissed the implied consent hearings.\nThe appropriate portion of the implied consent statute provides for a hearing where it is to be determined, inter alia, \u201cwhether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c).) It. is undisputed these defendants were not placed under arrest for a violation of section 11 \u2014 501; therefore, each arrest had to have been made for violation of an ordinance similar to section 11 \u2014 501. The basis of the invalidity of the ordinance in Hartnett was the court\u2019s conclusion that the ordinance was not similar to section 11 \u2014 501, and in fact the ordinance was so dissimilar it was invalid. The ordinances involved in the case sub judice are legally equivalent to or substantially the same as the ordinance in Hartnett and are as a matter of law dissimilar to section 11 \u2014 501. Since the arrests were not for violations of similar ordinances, this requirement of the implied consent provision is not satisfied, and the trial court properly found in favor of defendants.\nThe majority\u2019s reliance on Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979), 443 U.S. 31, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343, 99 S. Ct. 2627, is not determinative of this appeal, since we are concerned with an arrest under an ordinance which is dissimilar to section 11 \u2014 501 and not with the validity of an arrest pursuant to an ordinance subsequently declared invalid.\nBased upon my analysis of this case, I would affirm the trial court\u2019s judgments in favor of defendants.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE STOUDER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "James E. Egan, of McSteen, Phelan & Egan, P.C., of Joliet, for appel-lees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MATTHEW S. DICKERSON et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201484\u20140278 through 3\u201484\u20140281 cons.\nOpinion filed November 30, 1984.\nSTOUDER, J., dissenting.\nEdward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nJames E. Egan, of McSteen, Phelan & Egan, P.C., of Joliet, for appel-lees." }, "file_name": "0059-01", "first_page_order": 81, "last_page_order": 85 }