{ "id": 3491542, "name": "NATIONAL BISCUIT, INC., Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Henry E. Mosterd, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "National Biscuit, Inc. v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1984-10-09", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201484\u2014385WC", "first_page": "118", "last_page": "121", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 118" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075322 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952333 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938807 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983314 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163104 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904070 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475227 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0087-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 418, "char_count": 6574, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1409806227625067e-07, "percentile": 0.7670875792372451 }, "sha256": "41509c9aba0e8786939396ad3a7176f4f8c3820382ee2f6a3f7efbcfb9f2a3a4", "simhash": "1:6819aa11698261d5", "word_count": 1049 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:09:03.101627+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NATIONAL BISCUIT, INC., Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Henry E. Mosterd, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nHenry E. Mosterd claimed benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for injury to his back received while employed at National Biscuit, Inc. (Nabisco). The arbitrator granted payment for medical services and for 2113/t weeks\u2019 temporary total disability. The Industrial Commission affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, but modified it by granting benefits for permanent total disability. The circuit court confirmed. Nabisco appeals, contending that the Commission failed properly to weigh the evidence but rather substituted the arbitrator\u2019s factual determination for its own and that the Commission\u2019s finding that the injury is permanent is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe conclude that the Industrial Commission did not make an independent evaluation of the evidence and that this failure is dispositive of the case on appeal.\nThe 53-year-old claimant claimed he was injured on August 30, 1977, when he attempted to move aside a steel platform while at work in the Nabisco plant. Briefly, the evidence shows that claimant has a history of back injuries, having injured his back at Nabisco in 1953 and in 1958, and in car accidents in 1964 and in 1966. He injured his back a third time at work in 1965, for which he received a workers\u2019 compensation settlement representing 71/2% loss of the use of each leg. The accident which is the subject of this claim was the fourth injury claimant received on the job. A treating physician diagnosed claimant\u2019s condition as large defects at L4-L5 with a smaller defect at L3-L4, and spondylosis of the lumbosacral spine with a degenerative disc disease. The doctor further testified that the injury of August 30, 1977, aggravated a previously existing state of lumbosacral spondylosis. In response to a description of claimant\u2019s occupation, the doctor stated that he could do work, but none that required heavy lifting, acute back bending, or protracted walking, standing or straining. Claimant testified that he had been unable to return to work since the accident.\n\u2022 The principal evidentiary issue was whether claimant had in fact done heavy work on his house and in his yard, particularly during 1978 and a three- or four-week period in 1979. There was a substantial conflict in the testimony. Witnesses for Nabisco testified to having seen claimant doing heavy work, while claimant\u2019s witnesses testified that he had not.\nThe arbitrator\u2019s decision makes no reference to the conflict in the testimony in finding that the claimant is entitled to temporary total disability for 211% weeks. Inferentially, he must have accepted the testimony of the claimant\u2019s witnesses.\nThe Commission\u2019s decision refers to the conflicting evidence on the question of whether the claimant had done heavy work around the house after his claimed injury and states:\n\u201cAll of the testimony presented was conflicting; the Arbitrator heard, and saw the witnesses and was in the best position to determine their credibility. While the Commission may or may not have reached the same conclusion, the Arbitrator resolved the conflict in favor of Petitioner and Petitioner\u2019s son, who both testified Petitioner had not performed the work.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nOur supreme court has most recently stated:\n\u201c[I]t is the peculiar province of the Industrial Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the testimony, and to determine the weight to be given to- the evidence. Regardless of whether or not the Commission hears testimony in addition to that heard by the arbitrator, it exercises original jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator\u2019s findings. Seiber v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 87, 97; Orr v. Industrial Com. (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 242, 243.\u201d Berry v. Industrial Com. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 401, 405.\nThe Commission has original, not appellate, jurisdiction to review evidence taken before the arbitrator and to consider the evidence properly presented to it. (Gray v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 552, 558.) This review is neither a trial de novo nor simply a review of the record, but it is sui generis. (Gray v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 552, 558.) The Commission is not bound by the arbitrator\u2019s findings; it must consider all evidence presented to it and to the arbitrator in reaching a decision. (Gray v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 552, 559; Leason v. Industrial Com. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 486, 493.) While the arbitrator\u2019s findings are not without legal significance, and are entitled to some consideration, the Commission must resolve disputed questions of fact and draw reasonable inferences from them. Newgard v. Industrial Com. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 164, 169-70.\nWhile the Commission titled a part of its decision \u201cFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,\u201d except as to the ultimate conclusion that claimant is totally and permanently disabled as of August 30, 1977, the Commission has made no findings of law and fact.\nClaimant argues that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the Commission properly performed its duties. (Cf. Thomas v. Industrial Com. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 327, 336.) However, the clear language of the decision of the Commission destroys any possible presumption. Claimant in his brief suggests that we should imply additional language so that the statement would read, \u201cWe may or may not have reached the same conclusion, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and our view of the evidence.\u201d There is no basis, however, for adding this language, and even with the additional language it would still be clear that the Commission has failed to conduct its own independent evaluation of the evidence.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County confirming the decision of the Commission is therefore reversed. The decision of the Industrial Commission awarding the claimant permanent total disability and medical expenses is vacated and the cause remanded to the Commission for further action consistent with this opinion.\nCircuit court reversed; award vacated; cause remanded to the Commission.\nBARRY, KASSERMAN, McNAMARA, and WEBBER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Braun, Lynch, Smith & Strobel, Ltd., of Chicago (Francis J. Lynch, of counsel), for appellant.", "J. Michael Madda, of Chicago (Richard E. Aleksy, of counsel), for appel-lee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONAL BISCUIT, INC., Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Henry E. Mosterd, Appellee).\nFirst District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201484\u2014385WC\nOpinion filed October 9, 1984.\nRehearing denied November 30, 1984.\nBraun, Lynch, Smith & Strobel, Ltd., of Chicago (Francis J. Lynch, of counsel), for appellant.\nJ. Michael Madda, of Chicago (Richard E. Aleksy, of counsel), for appel-lee." }, "file_name": "0118-01", "first_page_order": 140, "last_page_order": 143 }