{ "id": 3489078, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN R. SPEED, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Speed", "decision_date": "1984-12-10", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20140566", "first_page": "348", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 348" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "517 F.2d 393", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1127750 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/517/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5553523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22" }, { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3118953 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688-89" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 819", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410826 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" }, { "page": "941" }, { "page": "941" }, { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 903", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3180266 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905-06" }, { "page": "905-06" }, { "page": "904-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3389292 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" }, { "page": "859" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5554523 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5431636 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0322-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 9364, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.332875025996016e-07, "percentile": 0.629274139148653 }, "sha256": "bf5a3c45afd8c667eddc7fb0f8c2b0bf070ecca2f177c14c85323d9a68d56b39", "simhash": "1:3b34ddf6fbd56935", "word_count": 1556 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:09:03.101627+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN R. SPEED, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is the second time this case comes before us. Defendant Steven R. Speed was charged by information in Ogle County with indecent liberties and rape. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 11\u2014 4(a)(3), 11 \u2014 1(a).) Following a bench trial, he was found guilty of rape and sentenced to a 12-year term of imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. In a Rule 23 order issued by this court upon defendant\u2019s first appeal, defendant\u2019s conviction for rape was affirmed, but his sentence was reversed and remanded due to the trial court\u2019s improper consideration of a factor in aggravation; namely, that the victim suffered serious physical or mental harm as a result of the crime. (87 Ill. 2d R. 23.) Upon remand, defendant\u2019s sentence was reduced to 11 years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals from this sentence, claiming that the trial court improperly imposed a more severe sentence solely because defendant continued to deny his guilt of rape following his conviction.\nIt is well established that a more severe sentence may not be imposed merely because a defendant claims he is innocent at the time of sentencing. (People v. Griffiths (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 322, 331, 445 N.E.2d 521; People v. Coleman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 429, 434, 403 N.E.2d 1266.) This was designed to protect an individual\u2019s right of appeal or prospects of post-conviction relief which might otherwise be jeopardized by the rewarding of a defendant\u2019s admission of guilt following trial. (People v. Sherman (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 857, 859, 368 N.E.2d 205.) Thus, in Sherman, the defendant\u2019s sentence following his conviction for burglary was reduced when the sentencing court expressly imposed a more severe sentence upon defendant than his codefendant solely because the latter admitted his guilt to the probation officer and defendant did not. However, it is also well established that the court may consider the lack of a penitent spirit in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, since this is a factor which may have a bearing on the defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation. (People v. Mosley (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 903, 905-06, 409 N.E.2d 381; People v. Moffett (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 939, 942, 371 N.E.2d 364.) A sentencing judge may also consider a defendant\u2019s lack of veracity on the witness stand since this, too, may have a bearing on defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential. (See People v. Wyatt (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 390, 393-94, 413 N.E.2d 82; People v. Genovese (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 382 N.E.2d 872.) Thus, numerous sentences have been affirmed on appeal despite a reference by the sentencing court to a defendant\u2019s persistent claim of innocence. (See People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 688-89, 420 N.E.2d 592; People v. Mosley (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 903, 905-06, 409 N.E.2d 381; People v. Porter (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 720, 721-22, 404 N.E.2d 337; People v. Coleman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 429, 434, 403 N.E.2d 1266; People v. Moffett (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 939, 941, 371 N.E.2d 364.) In determining whether sentencing was improperly influenced by the defendant\u2019s failure to admit his guilt following conviction, the courts have focused upon whether the sentencing court indicated, either expressly or impliedly, that there would be better treatment on sentencing if the defendant abandoned his claim of innocence. (See People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 688, 420 N.E.2d 592; People v. Porter (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 720, 721, 404 N.E.2d 337; People v. Moffett (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 939, 941, 371 N.E.2d.364.) If there is such an indication, then the sentence likely was improperly influenced by the defendant\u2019s persistence in his innocence. (See People v. Sherman (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 857, 859, 368 N.E.2d 205; Poteet v. Fauver (3d Cir. 1975), 517 F.2d 393.) If, however, \u201cthe record shows that the court did no more than address the factor of remorsefulness as it bore upon defendant\u2019s rehabilitation,\u201d then the court\u2019s reference to a defendant\u2019s persistent claim of innocence will not amount to reversible error. See People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 688, 420 N.E.2d 592.\nUpon remand in the instant case, defendant took the stand and informed the court that since his imprisonment he had completed 49 hours of college level courses, had held a full-time job entering data into a computer, and had participated in Bible study and Alcoholics Anonymous programs. Mr. Speed also expressed his remorse for what had happened, stating that he was \u201csorry for what I did.\u201d On cross-examination, defendant again stated that he was sorry for the \u201cpain and suffering\u201d he had caused. However, he stated that while he was guilty of some crime, such as indecent liberties or attempted rape, he was \u201cnot guilty of the crime I was convicted.\u201d Nevertheless, he agreed he should be punished for having committed a crime.\nAt the close of the resentencing hearing, the court commented that there were \u201cfactors that have been persistent throughout this case in the relation of the probation officer from its inception and the defense of the case during the trial and even today, the defendant asserts that he did not commit the crime of which he stands convicted.\u201d After noting that both the trial and the appellate courts were convinced that defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the court stated that \u201cMr. Speed has not yet accepted that. *** Fact that he has not yet accepted that weighs heavily on the decision that we are about to make in these matters.\u201d The court then discussed its prior skepticism of defendant\u2019s testimony at the original sentencing hearing to the effect that defendant desired to rehabilitate himself and to avoid further criminal involvement. The court noted that such remarks \u201ccan be manipulative.\u201d The court further stated that it \u201c[did not] know whether Mr. Speed is manipulating me again today ***,\u201d and concluded with the following remarks, which defendant has specifically challenged in this appeal:\n\u201cWhen I reread the record, when I reread the probation officer\u2019s report and considered this matter and the Appellate Court mandate I thought the appropriate sentence was to re-sentence the defendant to twelve years. After a portion of the testimony I thought perhaps a ten year sentence might be appropriate. When Mr. Speed said he didn\u2019t commit the crime which he stands charged and convicted again tilted the scale the other way.\u201d\nAn 11-year term of imprisonment was subsequently imposed.\nAfter reviewing the comments made by the court here, as well as the authorities cited above, we conclude that defendant\u2019s sentence was improperly influenced by his persistent denial of guilt as to the crime of rape. We do not believe that the court was merely addressing the factors of remorsefulness or veracity as they bore upon defendant\u2019s rehabilitation. (Cf. People v. Costello (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 680, 688, 420 N.E.2d 592; People v. Genovese (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 382 N.E.2d 872.) Rather, we consider the remarks to be a clear indication that the court was improperly increasing defendant\u2019s term of imprisonment from 10 years to 11 years solely because defendant refused to acquiesce in the decisions of the circuit and appellate courts. We note that the lower court did not specifically find that defendant lacked veracity or remorse for his conduct. (Cf. People v. Mosley (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 903, 904-05, 409 N.E.2d 381; People v. Moffett (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 939, 942, 371 N.E.2d 364; People v. Genovese (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 382 N.E.2d 872.) Defendant\u2019s testimony at the resentencing hearing in fact indicated that he was sorry for what he had done and that he felt that he should be punished for having committed a crime, albeit a different crime than rape. With respect to the factor of veracity, we note that the testimony of defendant at trial was consistent with that of the victim in all respects save one, i.e., penetration of the victim\u2019s sex organ. Although we previously found the victim\u2019s testimony in this regard to be clear and convincing (87 Ill. 2d R. 23), defendant could still reasonably believe that no penetration occurred, given the extent of his alcohol consumption prior to the offense in question. Finally, we think the court\u2019s comments made it clear that it was defendant\u2019s unwillingness to accept the findings of guilt which weighed heavily against him, rather than any particular lack of veracity on his part.\nUnder all of these circumstances, we exercise the authority vested in us pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(bX4) (87 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), and reduce defendant\u2019s sentence to a 10-year term of imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. See People v. Sherman (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 857, 859, 368 N.E.2d 205.\nModified.\nNASH, P.J., and SCHNAKE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert T. Hanson, of Mt. Morris, and G. Joseph Weller and Kathleen J. Hamill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Dennis Schumacher, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN R. SPEED, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 84\u20140566\nOpinion filed December 10, 1984.\nRobert T. Hanson, of Mt. Morris, and G. Joseph Weller and Kathleen J. Hamill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDennis Schumacher, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0348-01", "first_page_order": 370, "last_page_order": 374 }