{ "id": 3490651, "name": "RAYMOND DEAN LINDSEY, d/b/a Lindsey Auto Sales, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lindsey v. Edgar", "decision_date": "1984-12-28", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201484\u20140341", "first_page": "718", "last_page": "724", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 718" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. App. 3d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2681617 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/14/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1044" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3333482 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ariz. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 737494 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/135/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809624 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1203" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410230 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448551 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426007 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 N.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395208 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5305723 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 F.2d 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 587644 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/736/0433-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 686, "char_count": 11844, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.683795242145578e-07, "percentile": 0.826903807905403 }, "sha256": "60d4ad9f9040d24a55dd3af64afeccce804e1e7f55ae5f949800d97ad32e4aef", "simhash": "1:4a899b3e6fc876cc", "word_count": 1925 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:09:03.101627+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND DEAN LINDSEY, d/b/a Lindsey Auto Sales, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPursuant to section 5 \u2014 501(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 951/2, par. 5 \u2014 501(a)), the Secretary of State revoked the dealer\u2019s licenses issued to the plaintiff, Raymond Dean Lindsey. Lindsey filed for administrative review, but the circuit court of Sangamon County affirmed the Secretary\u2019s decision. Lindsey appeals, contending his conduct was not sufficient to justify revocation of his licenses.\nPrior to 1984, section 3 \u2014 118.1 of the Code provided, in part:\n\u201cWhenever a certificate of title is issued for a vehicle with respect to which a salvage certificate has been previously issued, the new certificate of title shall bear the initials \u2018S.V.\u2019.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 951/2, par. 3 \u2014 118.1.)\nIn 1981, Lindsey participated in a scheme designed to \u201claunder\u201d Illinois titles bearing the initials S.V.\nThe facts are not in dispute. Lindsey repaired and sold used cars through Lindsey Auto Sales and Dean\u2019s Hatch & Sunroofs. He purchased six vehicles that had salvage certificates and rebuilt them. He also applied for and received Illinois titles marked S.V. for each car. Lindsey assigned these titles to Missouri car dealers. In five of six cases, the Missouri dealer submitted the Illinois S.V. title to the State of Missouri and obtained a \u201cclean\u201d Missouri title, one not indicating the car had been salvaged. In the other instance, the Missouri dealer reassigned the title to a Kentucky dealer, who obtained a \u201cclean\u201d Kentucky title. The six cars, however, never left Lindsey\u2019s possession. The Missouri and Kentucky dealers assigned their out-of-State titles back to Lindsey. Lindsey then resold the automobiles, giving the purchasers \u201cclean\u201d out-of-State titles. Lindsey sold five of the cars to other Illinois used car dealers. He sold the sixth car to his cousin. According to Lindsey, all the purchasers knew the vehicles had been damaged and repaired. In four instances, the purchaser or a subsequent assignee submitted the out-of-State title to the Secretary of State and received an Illinois title without the initials S.V. on it.\nIn 1982, Lindsey was indicted on six counts of mail fraud for his participation in \u201claundering\u201d the titles. In a statement to a postal inspector, Lindsey estimated that removing the S.V. notation increased the value of a car $400 to $500. Lindsey also stated he gave the Missouri dealers about $50 per title to obtain the out-of-State titles. Finally, he conceded the deals were only paper transactions designed to circumvent Illinois law. A jury convicted him of the . Federal charges, and the Appellate Court for the Seventh Circuit upheld his conviction in United States v. Lindsey (7th Cir. 1984), 736 F.2d 433.\nOn March 31, 1983, the Secretary of State held a hearing to determine whether Lindsey\u2019s licenses should be revoked under section 5 \u2014 501(a). The relevant portions of that statute are as follows:\n\u201cThe license of a person issued under this Chapter may be denied, revoked or suspended if the Secretary of State .finds that the licensee, *** has:\n1. Violated this Act;\n2. Made any material misrepresentation to the Secretary of State in connection with an application for a license, junking certificate, salvage certificate, title or registration;\n3. Been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with selling, bartering, exchanging, offering for sale or otherwise dealing in vehicles, bodies and component parts;\n* * *\n12. Violated the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Act, as amended;\n13. Violated the provisions of Chapter 3 of this Act, as amended.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 951/2, par. 5 \u2014 501(a).)\nLindsey maintains his conduct did not fall within any of the above proscriptions of section 5 \u2014 501(a). The Secretary of State decided Lindsey\u2019s conduct was sufficient to justify revocation of his licenses. On review, the trial court agreed.\nAs Lindsey notes, we are not bound by the Secretary of State\u2019s decision. When the facts are not in dispute, their legal effect becomes a matter of law, and upon questions of law, the decision of an administrative agency does not bind the reviewing court. (Kensington Steel Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1944), 385 Ill. 504, 509, 53 N.E.2d 395, 397.) On the other hand, the Secretary\u2019s interpretation of section 5 \u2014 501(a) is not totally irrelevant. \u201cThe cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature.\u201d (People ex rel. Hanrahan v. White (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73, 285 N.E.2d 129, 130.) Statutory interpretations by administrative agencies express an informed source for ascertaining the legislative intent. Adams v. Jewel Cos. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 336, 344-45, 348 N.E.2d 161, 165.\nGenerally, the interpretation of a statute must be grounded on the nature and object of the statute as well as the consequences which would result from construing it one way or another. (Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21, 373 N.E.2d 1332, 1335.) The predominant purpose in licensing a trade or profession is to prevent injury to the public by assuring that the occupation will be practiced with honesty and integrity and by excluding those who are incompetent or unworthy. Ranquist v. Stackler (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 545, 551, 370 N.E.2d 1198, 1203.\nWith this purpose in mind, we turn to the Secretary\u2019s findings in this case. The Secretary decided Lindsey had violated section 3\u2014 118.1. His licenses, therefore, could be revoked under either section 5 \u2014 501(a)(1) or (13). The Secretary first looked to the legislative background of section 3 \u2014 118.1. Under the original bill, the word \u201crebuilt\u201d was to appear on titles rather than the initials S.V. One purpose of the bill was to track titles of salvaged cars, which had been a major problem in \u201claundering\u201d of titles to stolen cars. The bill also provided consumer protection by informing the purchasing public when a car had been rebuilt. To appease the rebuilder\u2019s association, however, the Senate deleted the word \u201crebuilt\u201d and substituted S.V. S.V. simply stands for salvage vehicle. At first, the House refused to concur with the Senate amendment. The House felt the bill\u2019s consumer protection quality would be substantially weakened. After a joint committee voted to adopt the Senate amendment, the House accepted it. The House sponsor and other members, however, contemplated a campaign by the Secretary of State to inform the general public as to what the initials S.V. meant. Lindsey\u2019s statement that an automobile\u2019s value increased when its title had no S.V. designation makes it clear that the Secretary\u2019s program was somewhat successful. The legislature recently amended section 3 \u2014 118.1 to reinsert the word \u201cREBUILT\u201d for the initials S.V. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 3\u2014 118.1\nFrom this background, the Secretary concluded the purpose behind the statute was consumer protection as well as crime prevention. Viewing Lindsey\u2019s scheme as an intent to increase the value of his vehicles by concealing from potential consumers the fact that the vehicle had been rebuilt, the Secretary held Lindsey had violated section 3 \u2014 118.1. Lindsey maintains he legally exchanged titles in his out-of-State transactions. He acknowledges that his entire plan was an attempt to evade the statutory S.V. requirement, but he contends his licenses cannot be revoked for merely violating the spirit of the statute. We disagree. Even if the letter of the law does not apply, a situation within the object, spirit, and meaning of the statute falls within it. (Department of Revenue v. Joseph Bublick & Sons, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 568, 575, 369 N.E.2d 1279, 1282.) Lindsey\u2019s scheme simply cannot be condoned.\nThe Secretary also held Lindsey was guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with dealing in vehicles. Thus, his license could be revoked under section 5 \u2014 501(a)(3). Proof of his guilt is supplied by his conviction for mail fraud and by his own admission. Lindsey notes that for fraud to be actionable, there must be some injury. (Cole v. Ignatius (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 66, 448 N.E.2d 538.) The Secretary expressly found that no one had suffered any damage as a result of Lindsey\u2019s scheme. Lindsey concludes he committed no fraudulent act because no one was defrauded.\nThe tort action for fraud remedies an individual\u2019s injury. Hence, the individual must suffer some damage before he can receive compensation. Section 5 \u2014 501(a), on the other hand, was designed to protect the public as a whole from unscrupulous car dealers. Lindsey\u2019s conduct, along with his intent to deceive both the Secretary of State and future consumers, makes him unworthy to hold his licenses. Merely because the proper authorities uncovered Lindsey\u2019s plan before anyone was actually injured makes Lindsey no less unworthy.\nThe Secretary further found Lindsey had made a material misrepresentation in connection with an application for title in violation of section 5 \u2014 501(a)(2). Lindsey contends he made no false statement on any title application. A misrepresentation, however, may consist of the concealment of the truth as well as the assertion of what is false. When the failure to disclose a material fact is calculated to induce a false belief, the distinction between concealment and an affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. (State v. Coddington (Ariz. App. 1983), 135 Ariz. 480, 481, 662 P.2d 155, 156.) Even if a statement is technically true, it may nonetheless be a misrepresentation where it omits qualifying material, because a half-truth may be more misleading than an outright lie. Perlman v. Time, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 190, 195, 380 N.E.2d 1040, 1044.\nSection 4 \u2014 105(a)(5) of the Code prohibits a person from making a material false statement or concealing a material fact on title applications. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95V2, par. 4 \u2014 105(a)(5).) The Secretary held Lindsey\u2019s licenses could be revoked under section 5\u2014 501(a)(12) for his violation of section 4 \u2014 105(a)(5). Lindsey complains because he did not apply for any of the \u201cclean\u201d Illinois titles. He concludes he did not conceal any material fact on an application. He, however, had to sign his cousin\u2019s application because he was the dealer in the transaction. His signature amounts to an assertion that the material facts behind the transaction had been revealed on the application. Section 3 \u2014 118.1 makes the previous S.V. title material.\nFinally, Lindsey argues neither section 5 \u2014 501(a)(2) nor 4 \u2014 105(a)(5) apply because the application did not specifically request the disclosure of previous S.V. titles. For a concealment to amount to a misrepresentation, it must have been done with an intent to deceive under circumstances creating an opportunity and a duty to speak. (Lagen v. Lagen (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79, 302 N.E.2d 201, 205.) Lindsey concedes he- acted with an intent to deceive. Moreover, his licenses created a duty to speak. Apparently, he argues he had no opportunity to reveal the previous salvage certificates. In light of the fact that his entire scheme was designed to avoid revealing this information, Lindsey\u2019s argument seems particularly paltry. One cannot purposely act to suppress information and then claim he had no opportunity to disclose it.\nThe order of the Secretary of State revoking plaintiff\u2019s licenses is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN, P.J., and TRAPP, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. Casey, of Casey & Casey, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Mark A. LaRose, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND DEAN LINDSEY, d/b/a Lindsey Auto Sales, et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201484\u20140341\nOpinion filed December 28, 1984.\nJohn J. Casey, of Casey & Casey, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Mark A. LaRose, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0718-01", "first_page_order": 740, "last_page_order": 746 }