{
  "id": 3491265,
  "name": "SPRINGFIELD MECHANICAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONEL TECHNETICS, INC., Defendant (Ronald Shetley et al., Respondents-Appellants; Edward Frank et al., Respondents)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Springfield Mechanical Corp. v. Ronel Technetics, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1984-12-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 4\u201484\u20140278",
  "first_page": "733",
  "last_page": "736",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 733"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 820",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3525129
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/128/0820-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "439 N.E.2d 1048",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 834",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3012700
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/108/0834-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 364,
    "char_count": 6715,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.756,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08,
      "percentile": 0.437252133232478
    },
    "sha256": "9ef6bb7155da623c22ba44e0e6504e1eee143821cc8ad987287efd1137a5815c",
    "simhash": "1:c2f7dd5f29a2b97c",
    "word_count": 1102
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:09:03.101627+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "SPRINGFIELD MECHANICAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONEL TECHNETICS, INC., Defendant (Ronald Shetley et al., Respondents-Appellants; Edward Frank et al., Respondents)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPursuant to the power given us by Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(iv) (87 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(iv)), we have granted respondents, Ronald Shetley and Neil Wensel, leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of the circuit court of Sangamon County entered March 20, 1984. That order denied respondents\u2019 motion for transfer of venue of a supplementary proceeding brought against them by plaintiff-petitioner, Springfield Mechanical Corporation (SMC), under the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 277 (87 Ill. 2d R. 277). As the motion for transfer was not timely filed, we affirm the order denying the motion.\nRule 277(d) states that a supplementary proceeding \u201cagainst a third party must, *** be commenced in a county of this State in which [the party respondent] resides, *** is employed or transacts his business in person,\u201d if some county in the State so qualifies. (87 Ill. 2d R. 277(d).) The motion for transfer was fully supported by affidavit showing that McHenry County was the proper venue for the supplementary proceedings. However, section 2 \u2014 104(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 104(b)) provides that improper venue is waived unless a motion to transfer is filed \u201con or before the date upon which [the party objecting to the venue] is required to appear or within any further time that may be granted him or her to answer or move with respect to the complaint.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Respondents did not move to transfer venue within the time granted them to \u201cmove with respect to the complaint.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe supplementary proceedings arose from a suit commenced in the circuit court of Sangamon County on June 2, 1981, by plaintiff, Springfield Mechanical Corporation (SMC), against defendant, Ronel Technetics, Inc. (Ronel), seeking damages for breach of contract. The record indicates that Ronel had been dissolved, but defendant\u2019s attorneys appeared on behalf of Ronel in August of 1981 and filed interrogatories. On June 11, 1982, Ronel was defaulted, and a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for $28,832.42. On September 23, 1982, the instant supplementary proceedings were initiated by SMC against respondents. On October 28, 1982, respondents filed a motion, on special and limited appearance, challenging the court\u2019s jurisdiction of their person. On January 5, 1983, the court denied that motion and ordered all respondents to answer or otherwise plead within 28 days.\nThe January 5, 1983, order fixed the time in which respondents were required \u201cto answer or move with respect to the\u201d supplementary petition within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 104(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis added.) Thus, they were required to \u201cmove to transfer venue\u201d within that time in order to avoid waiving the issue. On February 2, 1983, respondents filed a motion objecting to both the court\u2019s jurisdiction over them in the supplementary proceedings and also as t\u00f3 the venue. However, the motion requested -that the case be dismissed rather than that the case be transferred to the proper venue. The earlier pleading by respondents, purporting to be a special and limited appearance, had also questioned the venue but failed to request a transfer to a proper venue. On February 10, 1984, respondents did file a motion which requested transfer to the proper venue, but this occurred well after the date upon which they were required \u201cto move against the pleadings.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe Historical and Practice Notes following section 2 \u2014 104 explain that a motion to dismiss is no longer the proper way to contest venue. The Notes state:\n\u201cNo longer may the defendant move to dismiss for lack of venue. [Citation.] The objection must now be cast in the form of a motion to transfer the case to a court of proper venue, and this must be the earliest defensive pleading, with the single exception stated in the subsection.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 104(b), Historical and Practice Notes, at 92-93 (Smith-Hurd 1983).\nIn a case where the sufficiency of an objection to venue by a respondent to a supplementary proceeding was questioned, the First District held that a motion to quash the citation because of improper venue did not raise the venue issue, because the motion did not request a transfer to a proper venue. (Bank of Hickory Hills v. Hammann (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 834, 439 N.E.2d 1048.) Similarly, this court has recently noted that a defendant to a case at law waives the issue of improper venue if a timely and \u201cproper motion to transfer\u201d is not made. (Memorial Medical Center v. Matthews (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 820.) We thus conclude that, under section 2 \u2014 104(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, no request for change of venue is effective unless it contains a request for a transfer to a proper venue.\nHere, no proper motion to transfer venue was made until February 10, 1984, which was well after the expiration of respondent\u2019s allotted time of \u201cwithin 28 days of January 5, 1983,\u201d given them to \u201cmove as to the pleadings.\u201d The trial court properly denied the February 10,1984, motion to transfer venue.\nIn addition to raising the timeliness of respondents\u2019 filing of their motion for transfer of venue, plaintiff also maintains that respondents waived the issue of venue by not raising that issue in an appeal in the underlying case taken from the default judgment entered against Ronel. Although not parties defendant to that case, respondents filed notice of appeal on February 2, 1983, the same day they filed notice of appeal in the supplementary proceedings. In view of our conclusion that respondents failed to timely or properly attack the venue in the supplementary proceeding, we need not decide whether respondents waived the issue by their failure to raise the question of venue in the supplementary proceeding in the appeal of the underlying case. However, it is clear that no waiver resulted. A final order which was appealable had been entered in the underlying case. The proceedings were separate cases. Any ruling denying relief based on improper venue of the supplementary proceedings entered by February 2, 1983, was interlocutory and not appealable as of right.\nOur affirmance is for the reasons stated.\nAffirmed.\nMILLS and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Costello, Long & Young, of Springfield, for appellants.",
      "Brown, Hay & Stephens, of Springfield (Robert H. Stephens and William F. Trapp, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SPRINGFIELD MECHANICAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONEL TECHNETICS, INC., Defendant (Ronald Shetley et al., Respondents-Appellants; Edward Frank et al., Respondents).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201484\u20140278\nOpinion filed December 28, 1984.\nCostello, Long & Young, of Springfield, for appellants.\nBrown, Hay & Stephens, of Springfield (Robert H. Stephens and William F. Trapp, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0733-01",
  "first_page_order": 755,
  "last_page_order": 758
}