{
  "id": 5343474,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David James Hundley, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hundley",
  "decision_date": "1973-09-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 11863",
  "first_page": "935",
  "last_page": "939",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 935"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "93 S.Ct. 2260",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "S. Ct.",
      "case_ids": [
        6173133
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/412/0434-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "274 N.E.2d 65",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "49 Ill.2d 491",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2910155
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/49/0491-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "297 N.E.2d 129",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "130"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "54 Ill.2d 372",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2934127
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "375"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/54/0372-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "280 N.E.2d 253",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "4 Ill.App.3d 51",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2911035
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/4/0051-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 405,
    "char_count": 7094,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.756,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.308798892436126e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5126990029148417
    },
    "sha256": "0d01f3048953cd65bf58b92b69b0b2d18288343f95078b13fe24aa4e14c3f6a7",
    "simhash": "1:09e2faa5a0818df7",
    "word_count": 1162
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:28.394088+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David James Hundley, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the State from a judgment discharging the defendant for the State\u2019s failure to bring him to trial within 120 days.\nOn July 24, 1971, the defendant, along with two others, attempted to escape from the Illinois State Penitentiary at Pontiac, wherein they were lawfully imprisoned. The defendant was indicted on August 31, 1971, and arraigned on September 7, 1971, on the charge of attempted escape. At the arraignment defendant was found to be indigent and counsel was appointed. A recess was called to permit the defendant to confer with bis appointed counsel concerning his plea. After the recess defendant\u2019s counsel informed the court that defendant desired to address it concerning his need for psychiatric care. The defendant essentially stated that he was suffering adversely from being incarcerated in his cell with nothing to do and that he felt a great deal of pressure to his brain. He stated that he had told the prison officials of his need for psychiatric care but that they had done nothing.\nThe court ordered that counsel prepare a formal motion supporting defendant\u2019s request. The judge noted that he was concerned and stated that defendant should consult his attorney on this matter, and that the court would consider the matter \u201cin connection with these charges\u201d. In the same proceedings, the defendant pleaded not guilty and the cause was continued for a trial.\nOn September 14, 1971, defendant submitted a motion with supporting affidavits requesting psychiatric care. The motion states in full:\n\u201cComes the defendant, David James Hundley, by his attorney, Chester Crabtree, Public Defender of Livingston County, Illinois, and moves the court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine and treat him, for the reason that there are times when he has mental lapses, has dizzy spells, when the floor on which he stands appears to move, and when he is often unable to think clearly.\nThe defendant, in support of his motion, submits his affidavit hereto attached and made a part of this motion as if set out in full.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s supporting affidavit states in full:\n\u201cDavid James Hundley, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says that he needs to be treated by a psychiatrist for the reason that he often suffers mental lapses when he cannot think clearly, has dizzy spells, when the floor on which he stands appears to move, when objects in his room appear to move round and round, and when he seems to be floating through the air.\u201d\nThe motion was granted.\nOn January 12, 1972, defendant\u2019s attorney filed a motion to dismiss the cause on the grounds that defendant had been in custody for more than 120 days without being brought to trial on the charges pending. At the hearing on the motion, defendant submitted that he had caused no delays that resulted in tolling the 120-day time limitation. On January 18, 1972, the trial court granted said motion. The State appealed.\nThe limited issue is whether the trial court erred in discharging the defendant under the mandate of the 120-day rule of section 103 \u2014 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 5(a)). Defendant contends that his original request for general psychiatric care was unrelated to his competency to stand trial on the charges, and, therefore, did not constitute a delay. The State submits that defendant\u2019s request was for an examination for competency which tolled the 120-day limitation.\nThe right to a speedy trial is an absolute right emanating from the federal and state constitutions and is implemented by the 120-day rule. The statutory 120-day limitation commences to run from the time defendant is incarcerated on charges, or, as in this case, from the time defendant was arraigned while incarcerated on unrelated charges. People v. Vaughn, 4 Ill.App.3d 51, 280 N.E.2d 253.\nIn People v. Nunnery, 54 Ill.2d 372, 375, 297 N.E.2d 129, 130, the supreme court has stated:\n\u201cThe controlling question in determining if the defendant was entitled to discharge under the 120-day rule is whether the delay of the trial beyond 120 days was occasioned by the defendant,\u2019 and if answered affirmatively, he was not entitled to discharge. * #\nA request for a competency examination and hearing by defendant is a delay chargeable to him and will toll the 120-day statute People v. Siglar, 49 Ill.2d 491, 274 N.E.2d 65.\nA defendant can request a competency examination or the court may so order such an examination on its own motion. In either case, if a competency examination is ordered, section 104 \u2014 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 2) requires that the trial court suspend the proceedings until the defendant\u2019s status is finally determined. After a competency examination is completed, a competency hearing is then held at which time defendant\u2019s competency is adjudicated. The suspended proceedings are not reinstated until defendant is again found to be competent.\nIn the case at bar, we are unable to glean from the record the nature of defendant\u2019s request and how the trial court interpreted it. Defendant made a broad request for psychiatric care at his arraignment. After his request was made, the court did not suspend the proceedings. Rather, the court accepted defendant\u2019s plea of not guilty and refused to consider defendant\u2019s request until a formal motion was submitted to the court. Yet, the trial court stated it was concerned with the defendant\u2019s request as it related to these charges; then the court continued the proceedings until trial. Even after defendant\u2019s formal motion was submitted to the court and granted, the proceedings were not suspended. It is unclear what the trial court meant by its statement in connection with its conduct.\nThe State cannot be held accountable for the delays caused by a defendant, but it is responsible for the ultimate disposition of a case when not attended by delays occasioned by defendant\u2019s conduct. (Strunk v. United States, (U.S.), 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56.\nWe reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing so the trial court can enter an appropriate order based on the evidence presented, either granting or denying the defendant\u2019s motion requesting a discharge under the 120-day rule. If defendant\u2019s request was for a competency examination, the 120-day limitation was tolled and he cannot be discharged; but if his request was for general psychiatric care, the 120-day limitation was not tolled and he must be discharged. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nSMITH and TRAPP, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John G. Satter, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac, (George S. Dzielak, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.",
      "John F. McNichols, Deputy Defender, of Springfield, (J. Daniel Stewart, Assistant Appellate Defender, of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David James Hundley, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 11863;\nFourth District \u2014\nSeptember 5, 1973.\nJohn G. Satter, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac, (George S. Dzielak, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People.\nJohn F. McNichols, Deputy Defender, of Springfield, (J. Daniel Stewart, Assistant Appellate Defender, of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0935-01",
  "first_page_order": 957,
  "last_page_order": 961
}