{ "id": 3493086, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN W. YOUNG III, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Young", "decision_date": "1985-01-14", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201484\u20140169", "first_page": "117", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 117" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2714912 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434359 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 279", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 636618 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "774" }, { "page": "3093" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/458/0279-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 353, "char_count": 5411, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4916476050659184e-08, "percentile": 0.28116600620345045 }, "sha256": "e2972cff21c7b25cc9762049350646171bccda0f4dce3364e303d301adee6e55", "simhash": "1:388c045628f00fd1", "word_count": 923 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN W. YOUNG III, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, John W. Young III, appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea. Young pleaded guilty to three counts of theft by deception. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16\u2014 1(b)(1).) We affirm.\nThe instant case involves a series of checks written on accounts held in various banks. On March 3, 1983, the defendant established an account at the Standard Chartered Ltd. Bank. This account was established with two checks totaling $125,000 and drawn on an account which had not contained any funds since 1981. The defendant next wrote a check on the Standard account for $250,000 and used this check to establish an account at Moline National Bank on March 8, 1983. The defendant then wrote six checks on the Moline account. It is the writing of these six checks which was the basis for the charges against the defendant.\nThe defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that there was a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea. The defendant argues specifically that the facts presented do not establish the requisite deception by the defendant because a check cannot be true or false.\nThe defendant relies on the decision in Williams v. United States (1982), 458 U.S. 279, 73 L. Ed. 2d 767, 102 S. Ct. 3088. The Supreme Court held in Williams that, because a check cannot be true or false, the writing of a check not supported by sufficient funds could not constitute the offense of false statement. The defendant argues that, based on the Williams decision, a \u201cbad\u201d check cannot be a means of deception.\nThe defendant\u2019s reliance on Williams is misplaced. The court in Williams directed its analysis toward the issue of whether a check constituted a \u201cstatement\u201d which could be true or false, as defined in 18 U.S.C. sec. 1014 (1976). Section 1014 prohibits, in relevant part, the making of \u201cany false statement or report\u201d for the purpose of influencing the action of any of the described financial institutions.\nYoung was charged with theft by deception under section 16\u2014 1(b)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(b)(1)). One element of the offense of theft by deception is that the accused knowingly obtained control over property by deception. (People v. Gunn (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 446 N.E.2d 281.) Deception is defined, in part, as knowingly creating or confirming another\u2019s impression which is false and which the offender does not believe to be true. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 15\u20144(a).) Thus, the State was required to prove only that the defendant knowingly created a false impression which he himself did not believe to be true when he wrote the checks in question.\nThe distinction between the Federal offense of making a false statement and the instant offense of deception is critical. The Williams court concluded that a check does not make a factual \u201cstatement\u201d as to the state of an individual\u2019s bank account despite the Government\u2019s argument that a drawer on a check is generally understood to represent that he has sufficient funds to cover the face value of the check. The Supreme Court found the Government\u2019s argument to be plausible, but declined to adopt it for two reasons.\nThe first reason was that the argued interpretation contravened the express language of the statute, specifically the term \u201cstatement.\u201d By contrast, the statutory language of section 116\u20141(b)(1) is broad, establishing an offense when only a false impression is created. The language of section 116\u20141(b)(1) is clearly broad enough to encompass the impression a drawer creates when writing a check that the drawer has sufficient funds in his account to support the check.\nThe second reason was that adoption of the Government\u2019s argument would have made \u201ca surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law.\u201d (458 U.S. 279, 286, 73 L. Ed. 2d 767, 774, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3093.) The Supreme Court found no evidence of an intent by Congress to enact a law covering this range of conduct. Again, by contrast, the Committee Comments to section 16\u20141(b)(1) expressly provide that the writing of a check not supported by sufficient funds falls within the scope of prohibited conduct. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 16\u20141(b)(1), Committee Comments, at 18 (Smith-Hurd 1977).) The decision in Williams does not, therefore, preclude an accused from being charged in Illinois with theft by deception based upon the writing of a check not supported by sufficient funds.\nWe find that a sufficient factual basis for the defendant\u2019s convictions was presented to the trial court. Whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty is within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. O\u2019Connor (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 310, 345 N.E.2d 520.) We find no abuse of discretion in the instant case.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE and STOUDER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Frank W. Ralph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN W. YOUNG III, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201484\u20140169\nOpinion filed January 14, 1985.\nRobert Agostinelli and Frank W. Ralph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0117-01", "first_page_order": 139, "last_page_order": 141 }