{ "id": 3491631, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM R. BONDI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bondi", "decision_date": "1984-12-04", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201482\u20140248", "first_page": "536", "last_page": "544", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 536" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 1108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3127648 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480180 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3198346 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 1327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3031274 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386723 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632099 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1081" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494131 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404456 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 1017", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" }, { "page": "1024" }, { "page": "1024" }, { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3174771 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679-80" }, { "page": "680" }, { "page": "680" }, { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156187 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938265 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 U.S. 385", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180644 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "298-99" }, { "page": "2412" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "298-99" }, { "page": "2412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/437/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027286 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2673127 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 N.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0376-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 864, "char_count": 16593, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7233445438930864e-07, "percentile": 0.7042734923927997 }, "sha256": "fb66cd3bedffa5a438d17c559b5e3b69337a82b6b0bf6177031303ff799ee1eb", "simhash": "1:23346dd69dd3a75c", "word_count": 2708 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM R. BONDI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, William R. Bondi, was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Franklin County on a charge of murder under section 9\u20141(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141(a)(1)) and was sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.\nOn appeal defendant contends: (1) that the circuit court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of defendant\u2019s property, (2) that the prosecutor\u2019s comments during closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial, and (3) that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment.\nSince defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him, a complete recitation of the facts adduced at trial is unnecessary; however, those facts related to the issues raised by defendant are detailed below. We first address defendant\u2019s contention that the circuit court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of defendant\u2019s property.\nOn Monday, December 31, 1979, Genevieve Bondi was reported missing by her cousin, Dorothy Hopkins. Genevieve Bondi\u2019s body was found three days later in a shallow grave on property owned by her and her husband, the defendant, approximately 300 feet from their place of residence. A postmortem examination indicated that the cause of death was either a small caliber gunshot wound to the left side of the head penetrating into the brain, a skull fracture at the left forehead, or a combination of both injuries. The pathologist who conducted the examination testified that the skull fracture occurred prior to the death of the victim and that it was not the result of the bullet which inflicted the gunshot wound but that it resulted from independent causes. The record establishes that the search for Genevieve Bondi had been conducted without a warrant and without the consent of the defendant, who, by the time the search was commenced, was no longer present in the State. Based on these facts, defendant requested the trial court to suppress the body of the victim and various items of personal property discovered during the search.\nThe Illinois courts have had occasion to address the issue raised by defendant\u2019s assertions in this regard and have held that no warrant is necessary when, as here, the authorities\u2019 entry into and search of the premises was for the purpose of providing aid to persons or property in need thereof. (See People v. Clayton (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 376, 339 N.E.2d 783; People v. Brooks (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207.) Evidence of crime discovered during such an entry may be legally seized without a warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022; People v. Clayton (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 376, 379, 339 N.E.2d 783, 785; People v. Brooks (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 777, 289 N.E.2d 207, 214.\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures. \u201c \u2018[SJearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment\u2014subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.\u2019 \u201d (Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 390, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 298-99, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412, quoting Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514.) The issue raised by defendant\u2019s appeal involves one such exception.\nEntry and search of premises for the purpose of providing aid to persons or property in need thereof is permitted without a warrant under the so-called \u201cemergency\u201d doctrine. (Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 390, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 298-99, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412; People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 395-96, 447 N.E.2d 218, 226.) The basic elements of this exception to the warrant requirement under the fourth amendment have been summarized in the following manner:\n\u201c(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.\n(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.\n(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.\u201d (2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure sec. 6.6(a), at 469 (1978).)\nApplying these guidelines to the case at bar, we conclude: (1) that the fact that Genevieve Bondi was reported missing gave the authorities reasonable grounds to believe that she might be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, (2) that as such the primary intent of the search of the premises was to locate her and provide assistance to her, not to seize evidence against the defendant, and (3) that her residence and the property surrounding it were the most likely places to search for evidence of the whereabouts of a missing occupant.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s contention that because the victim was dead by the time her body was discovered, no emergency existed which would justify the warrantless intrusion which resulted in the discovery. Until the body was unearthed and identified as that of Genevieve Bondi, it was essential that the search for her continue and to continue with sufficient haste. These facts bring the instant search within the scope of the emergency doctrine. It is for this reason that the excavation of the burial site was within the permissible scope of the authorities\u2019 search for Genevieve Bondi. In the context of their search for the missing woman, the presence of the fresh diggings which marked her grave provided sufficient grounds for the authorities to investigate. This excavation is different in no substantive way from the entry and search of the premises in People v. Brooks (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207, in which the odor of a deceased body led the authorities to enter an apartment without a warrant. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was proper.\nWe next address defendant\u2019s claim that he was deprived of a fair trial by various comments the prosecutor made during closing argument. Defendant urges that reversible error occurred when the prosecutor stated that defendant murdered his wife because she would not divorce him, when the prosecutor misstated the testimony of a psychologist who testified as a defense witness, and when the prosecutor impugned defendant\u2019s motive for surrendering himself to authorities by stating that defendant did so in order to be able to return and inherit his wife\u2019s property. Defendant further contends that the prosecutor made inflammatory statements to the jury to the effect that the victim had been buried alive; and finally, defendant objects to the prosecutor\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s trial tactics as smoke screens.\nDefense counsel objected only to the prosecutor\u2019s comment concerning the defendant\u2019s wife\u2019s refusal to grant defendant a divorce. However, that comment was later ably rebutted at trial when defense counsel pointed out to the jurors that there was no evidence to support the prosecutor\u2019s statement. We can therefore conclude that the statement was not a significant factor in the jury\u2019s determination and accordingly does not warrant reversal. (See People v. Moore (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 570, 576-77, 304 N.E.2d 622, 625.) Any error resulting from the remaining allegedly prejudicial remarks is waived by defendant\u2019s failure to object thereto unless the comments are so inflammatory that defendant could not have received a fair trial or so flagrant as to threaten deterioration of the judicial process. (People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 88, 104, 464 N.E.2d 261, 268.) We have considered these additional comments and conclude that not only were neither of the above conditions reached, but that the comments are free of error.\nWe do not agree with defendant\u2019s assertion that the prosecutor misstated the testimony of the defense psychologist. A comparison of the prosecutor\u2019s description of the psychologist\u2019s testimony and the actual testimony reveals only insignificant difference. Any misstatement was apparently unintentional and does not require reversal. (See People v. Hine (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 671, 679-80, 410 N.E.2d 1017, 1024.) Nor do we believe that the comments of the prosecutor which implied that the defendant surrendered in order to inherit his wife\u2019s property transcend the bounds of proper argument. The purpose of the prosecutor\u2019s comments was to counter defendant\u2019s claim that he surrendered in order to exonerate himself. Although not supported by any direct evidence, the prosecutor\u2019s comments were based on legitimate inferences therefrom. (See People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 531, 309 N.E.2d 537, 542; People v. Hine (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 671, 680, 410 N.E.2d 1017, 1024.) The evidence reveals that defendant had begun to withdraw funds from the couple\u2019s joint checking account prior to his wife\u2019s death and that after her death defendant withdrew the remaining funds, closed the account and shortly thereafter left the State. Furthermore, the defendant testified that he was aware that he was the sole beneficiary under his wife\u2019s will and that prior to his surrender he had begun to rim low on money. The prosecutor\u2019s comments here are therefore distinguishable from those found in the cases cited to us by defendant. Unlike People v. Whitlow (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629, where the prosecutor made an unsupported allegation that the defendant had committed another crime while having reason to know that no such crime had been committed, here the prosecutor\u2019s comments drew into question defendant\u2019s stated reason for his surrender and were supported by evidence in the record. See People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 531, 309 N.E.2d 537, 542; People v. Hine (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 671, 680, 410 N.E.2d 1017, 1024.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s claim of prejudice from the prosecutor\u2019s statement that \u201che [defendant] took that woman out, presumably, unconscious, put her in a grave, made sure it was done, made sure it was done right.\u201d Defendant contends that the prosecutor thus implied that the victim was buried alive. However, from the context in which such statement was made, it appears that the prosecutor\u2019s statement was made simply in an effort to refute defendant\u2019s claim that his wife\u2019s death was the result of an accidental shooting by pointing out to the jury that defendant\u2019s immediate efforts toward concealment of his wife\u2019s body were not those a person would typically expect in a case of an accidental shooting. Moreover, the statement is supported by the evidence adduced at trial. The pathologist who conducted the postmortem examination testified that the victim\u2019s skull had been fractured prior to her death. In an apparent attempt to explain that injury, the defendant had testified that the fracture must have occurred when he fell while carrying the body of his wife out to be buried. Thus, defendant\u2019s own statements raise the possibility that the victim was still alive when he took her out to bury her. We.conclude, therefore, that the prosecutor\u2019s remark regarding the burial of the victim was not grounds for reversal. See People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 531, 309 N.E.2d 537, 542; People v. Hine (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 671, 680, 410 N.E.2d 1017, 1024.\nFinally, comments similar to those made by the prosecutor here regarding the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and defense counsel\u2019s attempts to erect a smoke screen have been held to be within the bounds of proper argument. People v. Robinson (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081, 467 N.E.2d 291, 294; People v. Griggs (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 224, 226, 366 N.E.2d 581, 583.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment. Defendant claims that the circuit court\u2019s sentence was based on unreliable information, failed to consider certain mitigating factors, and failed properly to assess defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential.\nThe trial judge set forth on the record his reasons for imposing the natural life sentence, stating in part:\n\u201cI have, however, considered the mitigating factors listed in other portions of the statutes in the hope that there would be some mitigating factor that would be applicable to this case. The only significant mitigating factor in this case is the defendant\u2019s lack of any prior criminal history, and I am giving that due consideration; however, all of the facts of the case provide a more than minimum amount in aggravation.\nThe death of Genevieve Bondi was caused by this defendant by some combination of means, which there is a very heavy indication that either of two separate means might have been sufficient, and there is the possibility that she was buried while still alive. The record in this case indicates that this may well have been part of a pre-meditated course of cleaning out of marital assets.\nThere does not appear to be the traditional significant amount of remorse or other recognizable indication of extraordinary rehabilitation potential, and I find that the conduct in this case does show brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.\u201d\nRather than being nonstatutory aggravating factors, as defendant claims, the above-cited observations regarding the victim\u2019s death and burial and the defendant\u2019s appropriation of marital assets represent the basis of the circuit court\u2019s finding of wantonness upon which defendant\u2019s natural life sentence is predicated. The circuit court\u2019s observations are supported by evidence in the record, and that evidence in turn supports the finding of wanton cruelty. We believe that mention of the victim\u2019s being buried alive was not made so much to demonstrate the brutality of defendant\u2019s conduct as it was to demonstrate that defendant showed little concern for the gravity of his actions. (See People v. Winston (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 673, 688, 435 N.E.2d 1327, 1338.) So viewed, its inclusion in the trial judge\u2019s remarks may well have been to support his later stated conclusion regarding defendant\u2019s lack of remorse at the death of his wife. In this context, defendant\u2019s lack of remorse is a proper factor upon which to base a sentence. People v. Carter (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 818, 828, 407 N.E.2d 584, 592.\nWe likewise reject defendant\u2019s claim that the circuit court failed to consider certain mitigating factors. Although the trial judge did not recite all the mitigating factors he considered, evidence relating to mitigation and rehabilitative potential was in the record, and the trial judge\u2019s statement of reasons indicates that he considered that evidence. A trial judge is not required to state the evidence he considered or the weight accorded each factor in determining sentence. People v. Meeks (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 524, 534, 411 N.E.2d 9, 14.\nLast, while the circuit court\u2019s use of the word \u201cextraordinary\u201d in the context of assessing defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential may have been ill-advised, we find nothing which would indicate that defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential was disregarded or that it was sufficient to cause a natural life sentence to be an abuse of discretion. Although there have been instances in which defendants received lesser sentences where the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors appear to be less favorable therein than here, such a showing by itself does not indicate an abuse of discretion. (People v. Bartik (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 696, 701, 418 N.E.2d 1108, 1113.) We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to natural life imprisonment. See People v. La Pointe (1982), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Franklin County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJONES and HARRISON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy E. Blue and Susan A. Diehl, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Terry M. Green, State\u2019s Attorney, of Benton (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Susan M. Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM R. BONDI, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201482\u20140248\nOpinion filed December 4, 1984.\nRandy E. Blue and Susan A. Diehl, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nTerry M. Green, State\u2019s Attorney, of Benton (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Susan M. Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0536-01", "first_page_order": 558, "last_page_order": 566 }