{
  "id": 3494962,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD KLAUB, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Klaub",
  "decision_date": "1985-02-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201484\u20140354",
  "first_page": "704",
  "last_page": "708",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 704"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "226 N.E.2d 38",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 205",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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        2865750
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/37/0205-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD KLAUB, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Ronald Klaub, appeals from his conviction for driving while license revoked. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 6\u2014 303.) The sole issue on appeal is whether, under the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 1\u2014100 et seq.), the defendant, at the time of his arrest, was legally operating a motor vehicle in Illinois. We have in this case no disagreement over the facts. Rather, this is a case which turns solely on statutory construction.\nIn January 1974, the defendant was a resident of Illinois. In that month, the defendant\u2019s Illinois driver\u2019s license was revoked following his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs. Under that revocation, as later extended, the defendant was not eligible until May 1983 to be reissued an Illinois driver\u2019s license. Sometime around September 1976, the defendant moved from Illinois to Indiana. While he was a resident of Indiana the defendant obtained and maintained an Indiana driver\u2019s license. In September 1983, the defendant moved from Indiana back to Illinois.\nOn November 11, 1983, the defendant was operating a motor vehicle in Illinois when he was issued a Uniform Traffic Citation for the instant offense. At the time of his arrest, the defendant did not have a valid Illinois driver\u2019s license. The defendant did possess an Indiana driver\u2019s license. The State has presented no challenge to the defendant\u2019s representation that his Indiana driver\u2019s license was then valid. We, therefore, presume that license was valid.\nSection 6\u2014303(a) of the Code defines the offense of which the defendant was convicted. That section provides, in relevant part, that a person is guilty of driving while his license to drive is revoked if he operates a motor vehicle on an Illinois highway when his license, or the privilege to obtain a license or permit, is revoked as provided by the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 6\u2014303(a).) The trial court found that the defendant\u2019s Illinois driver\u2019s license was revoked at the time of the instant arrest.\nThe defendant argues that at the time of his arrest he was driving lawfully in Illinois, as he then possessed a valid foreign license which was entitled to recognition under the Code. In order to review the defendant\u2019s argument, we set out the several statutes relevant to the defendant\u2019s argument.\nSection 6\u2014102 of the Code provides, in relevant part, that:\n\u201c7. A nonresident who becomes a resident of this State, may for a period of the first 90 days of residence in Illinois operate any motor vehicle which he was qualified or licensed to drive by his home state or country so long as he has in his possession, a valid and current license issued to him by his home state or country.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 6\u2014102(7).\nThe defendant acknowledges that section 6\u2014210 of the Code also applies to the instant case. Section 6\u2014210 provides, in relevant part, that after any resident\u2019s or nonresident\u2019s license to operate a motor vehicle in Illinois is revoked under the Code, he shall not operate a motor vehicle in Illinois until he obtains a license as permitted under the Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014210(1).\nAlso pertinent here are the provisions of the Driver License Compact (the Compact) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014700 et seq.). The Compact, to which both Illinois and Indiana are party States, is incorporated as part of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, pars. 1\u2014100, 1\u2014117.) It has the stated purposes of promoting compliance with motor vehicle operation regulations and making more equitable the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 6\u2014701(b).\nThe Compact also includes specific licensing provisions relevant to the defendant\u2019s argument. Under the Compact, upon receipt of an application for a license to drive, a party State will ascertain whether the applicant ever held a driver\u2019s license from another party State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014704.) A party State may not grant an application of a person who has a party State\u2019s license currently revoked for a violation, unless it is one year after the revocation and the application is permitted by law. Further, the Compact specifically empowers a party State\u2019s licensing authority to investigate and then to deny, on the grounds of safety, a license to such an applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014704(2).\nThe defendant asserts that to decide this case we must read together sections 6\u2014102(7) and 6\u2014210 of the Code and provisions of the Driver License Compact. He further asserts that we must resolve in his favor any ambiguity or apparent inconsistency in relevant statutes. According to the defendant\u2019s argument, he was issued a valid driver\u2019s license by Indiana. Because both Illinois and Indiana are party States to the Compact, the defendant argues, Illinois must recognize his valid Indiana license under the 90-day grace period of section 6\u2014102(7). Thus, the defendant concludes, at the time of his arrest he was legally operating a motor vehicle in Illinois notwithstanding the prior revocation of his Illinois driving privileges.\nThe State disagrees that the defendant in the instant case was covered by the grace period of section 6\u2014102(7). The State argues, rather, that the grace period does not apply to a person whose Illinois driving privileges have been revoked and not restored pursuant to section 6\u2014208 of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014 208.) Under section 6\u2014208, the Secretary of State shall not issue a driver\u2019s license to a person whose license was revoked unless that person applies for a license and, thus, discloses his revocation history. Section 6\u2014208 provides that such a person may apply for relicensing after the cause for revocation is removed. He also may apply after expiration of one year from the date of revocation and upon payment of a special reinstatement fee. The section further provides that the Secretary shall not issue such an applicant a license except if the Secretary is satisfied, following an investigation, that to grant the applicant a driver\u2019s license will not endanger the public safety or welfare. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014208. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, pars. 6-103(3), 6-118(g).\nTo decide this case, we must reconcile these statutes. On the one hand, we consider section 6\u2014303 of the Code, which prohibits driving in Illinois by a person whose Illinois driver\u2019s license is revoked, and section 6\u2014208, which reflects the continuing nature of the revocation sanction and sets requirements for relicensing in Illinois. On the other hand, we consider the provisions of the Driver License Compact and the grace period of section 6\u2014102(7), both of which support Illinois\u2019 recognition of foreign licenses to drive.\nTo reconcile the statutes here we first consider whether the defendant was prohibited by section 6\u2014210 from driving in Illinois. After the defendant\u2019s Illinois license was revoked, section 6\u2014210 of the Code prohibited the defendant from driving in Illinois \u201cuntil a license is obtained when and as permitted under [the Code].\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95x/2, par. 6\u2014210.) However, the Driver License Compact is part of the Code. Therefore, when the defendant was issued a valid Indiana license he was issued a license satisfying the requirement of section 6\u2014210.\nSecondly, we consider the Code\u2019s objective of ensuring that only qualified and safe drivers be entitled to operate motor vehicles on Illinois highways. We find, in that regard, that the Compact provides essentially the same safeguards for issuance of a license to a driver who has had his license revoked as are found in the comparable Illinois procedures under section 6\u2014208 of the Code. Consequently, we find that in this case the Code\u2019s safety objective is met through reliance on the Compact, as incorporated by the Code.\nLastly, we note that we construe penal statutes strictly in favor of an accused. People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38.\nUltimately, then, we conclude that here the relicensing requirements of section 6\u2014208 are subordinate to the comparable relicensing provisions of the Compact. Because the defendant possessed a valid license from a party State to the Compact, as a new Illinois resident he was entitled to the benefit of the section 6\u2014102(7) grace period. Therefore, at the time of his arrest the defendant was driving lawfully in Illinois.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is hereby reversed.\nReversed.\nHEIPLE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael E. Brandt, of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "Bruce W. Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (John X. Breslin and Peter M. Tumminaro, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD KLAUB, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201484\u20140354\nOpinion filed February 5, 1985.\nMichael E. Brandt, of Peoria, for appellant.\nBruce W. Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (John X. Breslin and Peter M. Tumminaro, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0704-01",
  "first_page_order": 726,
  "last_page_order": 730
}