{ "id": 3495130, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1985-02-05", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20140604", "first_page": "758", "last_page": "763", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 758" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482377 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 942", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3176109 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0942-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5439483 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045271 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3187696 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5450584 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 882", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660663 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" }, { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0882-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 601, "char_count": 11027, "ocr_confidence": 0.712, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.583395890917424e-08, "percentile": 0.4494609531289276 }, "sha256": "97ce2593dbcaed211b0535f4f7dff0015c732a10654687e543ab09db5f905849", "simhash": "1:aee28449bf55fcc4", "word_count": 1803 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRichard Williams (defendant) was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 18\u20142) and murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141(a)(3)) and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 40 years for murder and an extended term of 40 years for armed robbery. Defendant here contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements and physical evidence and that the sentences imposed were excessive.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, Detective Minogue testified for the State: he and his partner, Detective Oravetz, were assigned to investigate the February 13, 1982, murder of Mr. Cha, who was found beaten and shot to death in the novelty store he owned in Chicago. On February 24, 1982, Detectives Oravetz and Minogue interviewed Lonnie Reid in connection with the Cha murder. After Reid was given his Miranda warnings, he told the detectives that he lived with defendant, defendant\u2019s brother and defendant\u2019s sister in the first-floor apartment at 6041 South Calumet, in Chicago. A few days before Cha\u2019s murder, defendant had told Reid that defendant would like to rob Cha \u201cif the opportunity arose and [defendant] needed some money.\u201d Shortly after Cha\u2019s murder, defendant brought to the apartment four bags of merchandise which defendant told Reid had come from Cha\u2019s store. Reid stated that the two gold chains Reid was then wearing around his neck were given to him by defendant and that they too came from Cha\u2019s store. Reid further advised the detectives that there was a .22 pistol in the apartment \u201chidden on a shelf near a horse.\u201d\nThe police officers then presented Reid with a \u201cconsent to search\u201d form for the apartment he shared with defendant, which Reid signed in their presence. The officers then went to the apartment building and knocked on the door of the apartment located on the first floor left. Ms. Belinda Shenault, defendant\u2019s sister, opened the door. After introducing themselves as police officers, Ms. Shenault \u201callowed\u201d them into the apartment, wherein defendant and his brother were arrested. The gun was recovered from the area designated by Reid, as were various items of merchandise which Minogue stated were similar to the kind of merchandise he had observed in Cha\u2019s store. Ms. Shenault assisted the officers in their search for merchandise. At the police station, Minogue read defendant his rights and interrogated him for 30-45 minutes.\nDetective O'Callaghan testified for the State: on February 25, 1982, at 9 a.m., he read defendant his rights and interrogated him. After some 30 minutes, O\u2019Callaghan returned to defendant\u2019s apartment and recovered several articles of clothing. Returning to the station, O\u2019Callaghan further interrogated defendant for 15 minutes, after which O\u2019Callaghan went to a novelty shop where additional merchandise taken in the Cha robbery was recovered. At 5 p.m. defendant confessed to his participation in the robbery and shooting of Cha.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney John Cooney testified that on February 25, 1982, at 7 p.m., he was present when defendant made a statement regarding the Cha killing; defendant was not beaten or threatened, and did not request an attorney. The State then rested.\nThe only witness called by defendant on his motion to suppress was Detective Silvestrini. Neither Shenault nor Reid testified. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, finding that Reid had executed a consent to search form, and that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant.\nAt trial the State introduced defendant\u2019s confession in which he admitted that he and Reid had committed the crimes; evidence that clothing recovered from defendant\u2019s apartment contained blood of Mr. Cha\u2019s type; and the testimony of the owner of the novelty shop from which items taken in Cha\u2019s robbery were recovered affirming that defendant had sold that merchandise to her.\nDefendant contends that the search of his apartment and his arrest therein were illegal because the police were without a warrant, and the alleged \u201cconsent\u201d to search the apartment was not shown to be voluntary.\nThe rule in Illinois is that:\n\u201c*** the police cannot enter a person\u2019s apartment or home to effect a warrantless arrest based on probable cause alone. There must be factors of exigency justifying prompt police action [citations] or a showing of a consent to enter [citation].\u201d (People v. Columbo (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 928, 455 N.E.2d 733.)\nIn the instant case, we believe it clear that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. Probable cause exists if a reasonable and prudent person in possession of the arresting officer\u2019s knowledge would believe that the person arrested had committed a crime. (People v. Amft (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 619, 440 N.E.2d 924.) Reid\u2019s statements that defendant, before the shooting, had expressed a desire to rob Cha and defendant\u2019s subsequent action in bringing four bags of merchandise into the apartment which he stated were taken from Cha\u2019s store, coupled with Reid\u2019s testimony that there was a .22 gun in the apartment established probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest. See, e.g., People v. Beto (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 622, 408 N.E.2d 293.\nProbable cause to arrest, alone, however, is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest in defendant\u2019s apartment; the police must have a consent to search, or there must exist exigent circumstances justifying the police action. The State contends that here the police had the consent of two persons, Reid and Shenault, which justifies their action. It is true that consent need not be given by the defendant himself; it may be obtained from a third party who has control of the premises. (People v. Bean (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 64, 417 N.E.2d 608.) Defendant does not deny that Reid and Shenault could give valid consent for the search of the apartment; defendant does, however, contend that the State failed in this case to meet its burden to show that the consent given was voluntary.\n\u201cIn warrantless arrest situations, the standard for valid consent to enter a dwelling which has been applied by the Supreme Court is whether the consent was voluntarily given. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041.)\u201d (People v. Columbo (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 928.) It is the State\u2019s burden to demonstrate that the consent was voluntarily given. \u201c[T]he consent must be proved by clear and positive testimony and it must be established that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied. The prosecution must show a consent that is unequivocal and specific, freely and intelligently given.\u201d (People v. Wahlen (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 194, 196, 443 N.E.2d 728.) Voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from all of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041.\nTo establish consent here, the State relies on two statements by Detective Minogue at the suppression hearing in which he testified that Reid \u201cagreed\u201d to sign the consent to search form, and in which he testified that Shenault \u201callowed\u201d them into defendant\u2019s apartment. We do not consider these statements to sufficiently establish a voluntary consent by either Reid or Shenault. In denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court did not specifically address the issue of the voluntariness of either Reid\u2019s or Shenault\u2019s consent. We believe, therefore, that it is appropriate to return this case to the trial court for a hearing solely on the issue of the voluntariness of the consents) obtained. See People v. Lucas (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 942, 410 N.E.2d 1040.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that in light of defendant\u2019s youth (25 years old), the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 40-year sentence for murder, and a concurrent extended 40-year term for armed robbery. The evidence introduced at trial showed that when Reid and defendant discussed robbing Cha, Reid stated that it would be necessary to kill Cha because Cha knew Reid and could identify him. During the robbery, Reid and defendant beat and kicked Cha; Reid subsequently shoved a broom handle into Cha\u2019s anus several times, and Reid then shot Cha in the head with a single shot from a .22 pistol. Defendant kept some of the robbery proceeds, and sold the remainder for $20. Defendant had a prior conviction for burglary in 1976.\nThe determination of an appropriate sentence is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and will only be modified if a reviewing court determines that the trial court has abused its discretion. (People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344.) The trial court here appropriately considered the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20145\u20143.1 and 1005\u20145\u20143.2) and concluded that defendant\u2019s conduct caused serious harm, that defendant had a history of prior criminal activity, that the sentence was necessary to deter others, and that the offense was accompanied by exceptional cruelty indicative of wanton cruelty. The sentences, therefore, were within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature. Nor do we believe that defendant\u2019s age or \u201cpotential for rehabilitation\u201d require a lesser sentence. It is recognized that all criminal penalties are to be determined according to both the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1001\u20141\u20142.) The prime responsibility for striking the proper balance between these considerations rests with the trial court. (People v. Crosser (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 24, 452 N.E.2d 857.) We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination in the instant case, and we therefore decline to modify defendant\u2019s sentence.\nFor the above stated reasons, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and the cause is remanded for a hearing solely on the issue of whether a voluntary consent to the search of defendant\u2019s apartment was made. If the trial court determines that a valid consent was given, it shall thereupon reinstate the original judgments.\nVacated and remanded with directions.\nHARTMAN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.\nAt trial the State did not argue that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances; it relied solely on consent. The State\u2019s motion in this court on the day before oral argument to file an additional argument attempting to justify the police action based on exigent circumstances was denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas Peters, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, David C. Kluever, and Joseph R. Barbara, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 83\u20140604\nOpinion filed February 5, 1985.\nThomas Peters, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, David C. Kluever, and Joseph R. Barbara, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0758-01", "first_page_order": 780, "last_page_order": 785 }