{ "id": 3492403, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL YERO TORRES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Torres", "decision_date": "1985-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20140570", "first_page": "775", "last_page": "784", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 775" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030946 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146347 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5393764 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2801748 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473083 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Ill. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310922 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/409/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5470098 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5362185 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2788568 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0175-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 962, "char_count": 23215, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.697899514358837e-08, "percentile": 0.4069893650170338 }, "sha256": "c8d2bc51a7ea6715a6c718028d6202b816f2e5ca2476b3446fc90d68baedfce0", "simhash": "1:b30cf4b4c7888ff0", "word_count": 3789 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL YERO TORRES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Manuel Yero Torres was convicted of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141) and sentenced to 28 years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals and contends that he was prejudiced by the erroneous introduction of hearsay motive testimony, and that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence of the victim\u2019s gang affiliation. The following facts pertain to our decision.\nAt about 6:30 p.m. on May 21, 1981, David Caceres went to the 2600 block north on Spaulding Avenue, along with Edgar Vega, Antonio Rios, and Danny. Edgar Vega testified that Caceres had planned to tatoo him, and in order to borrow the necessary inks and needles, they went to see defendant. Defendant was in front of his apartment building when the group arrived, and while defendant and Caceres entered the building, Vega waited outside. Fifteen minutes later, Vega heard \u201csomebody get smacked.\u201d He turned and saw defendant strike Caceres two or three times. Caceres moved toward Vega, who extended his cane toward Caceres; but Vega saw defendant pull a revolver from the back of his pants, so he withdrew the cane and gestured toward defendant. Caceres then saw the gun, and ran away. Defendant shot two or three times; Caceres fell to the ground 50 feet past Vega. Vega testified that defendant approached Caceres, who was face down on the ground, and fired two or three more bullets into him.\nOn cross-examination, Vega admitted that he had said at preliminary hearing that defendant fired \u201cat least nine times,\u201d but he explained that defendant \u201cclicked\u201d the gun several times after the bullets ran out. Defense counsel asked whether he had told the police at the scene that he gave the cane to Caceres, that Caceres turned upon defendant, and that it was only then defendant pulled the gun. Vega responded that he wasn\u2019t sure, but he could see how the police could get that impression in the confusion. Vega said he tried to chase defendant, but defendant ran too fast. Vega admitted that he had belonged to the Orchestral Albany (OA) street gang when he was in eighth grade, but he stated that he was not a member at the time of the shooting.\nAntonio Rios substantially corroborated Vega\u2019s testimony. He saw defendant strike Caceres two or three times, saw Caceres fall back toward Vega, and saw Vega reach toward Caceres with his cane. Next, he heard shots, but at this time, saw no gun. Caceres ran in Rios\u2019 direction and defendant chased him, shooting the gun, which Rios then saw. Rios stated that Caceres fell on his stomach 10 feet short of where he, Rios, was standing, and that defendant walked up to Caceres, pointed the gun at his lower spine, and fired three shots. Rios stayed with Caceres while Vega chased defendant.\nRios testified that he asked Caceres \u201cwhat this was all about.\u201d Defendant objected to hearsay. Away from the jury, the State argued that Caceres\u2019 hearsay statement should be admitted as a spontaneous utterance, as a dying declaration, or as part of the res gestae. Defendant argued that a response to a question is not spontaneous, and that defendant was entitled to a hearing if the State wanted to introduce a dying declaration. The trial court denied all defense objections.\nBefore the jury, Rios testified that Caceres \u201ctold me that he had owed him $30 and he got shot over that,\u201d and that the $30 was \u201c[f]or dealing reefer.\u201d Rios said that he had seen defendant about twice weekly prior to the shooting, when defendant was selling marijuana on Spaulding. Rios recalled that he was walking his bicycle that evening, and Danny was on roller skates.\nOn cross-examination, Rios said that at the time of the incident, he and Vega were about 16 years old, and Danny was about 14. He denied that he had told the police that defendant fired only after Caceres menaced defendant with the cane. Rios admitted that he and Vega had been members of the Orchestral Albany street gang, but said that that was a long time ago. On redirect, Rios said that Caceres had not been a member of the OA\u2019s, that OA members were primarily of Puerto Rican descent, and that he knew Caceres to be Cuban.\nErnesto Garcia testified that he heard shots and saw defendant stand over Caceres and shoot him. Garcia had been at defendant\u2019s apartment several days before the incident, and defendant had told him that he was going to shoot Caceres over $5. Several minutes after the shooting, defendant told Garcia that he shot Caceres because \u201che felt like it.\u201d Garcia stated that he was serving a prison sentence for aggravated battery and armed violence. He knew the victim and the defendant, and he knew that both were Cuban.\nThe Cook County medical examiner testified that the victim had five bullet wounds: four in the back, another near the left knee. The victim died at 4:40 a.m. on May 22, 1981, and the medical examiner opined that the bullet wounds caused death. He indicated that the wounds were consistent with the victim\u2019s running away from defendant and with the victim lying on his stomach when he was shot. The victim was 5 feet 5x/2 inches, 164 pounds.\nDuring his case, defendant called Chicago police officer Clifford Wood. Wood stated that he was one of the first officers on the scene, and that he prepared the police report. He recalled that someone had said that defendant pulled the gun when he saw Caceres coming at him with a cane, but he could not recall whether Vega, Rios, or someone else had made the statement. He said that comments were offered by many citizens whose names did not appear in the police report, and that the report\u2019s narrative was a composite of his understanding of what was said.\nDefendant testified that he was born and raised in Cuba, and that he came to the United States in 1980. He met Caceres, also Cuban, in November of 1980. Defendant said that in April of 1981, about a month before the shooting, he and Caceres had a conversation at the corner of Diversey and Kedzie. The State objected to hearsay, and the court sustained the objection. Asked what Caceres did after the conversation was over, defendant testified that Caceres struck him and threatened to kill him. The State renewed its objection, and the trial court held a hearing away from the jury.\nDefense counsel indicated that defendant would testify to Caceres\u2019 statements concerning gang affiliation, robberies and other violence. Defense counsel argued that the testimony was not hearsay because it was offered to establish the defendant\u2019s state of mind relative to self-defense and was not offered for the proof of the matter asserted. The trial court stated, \u201c[I]t is clear to me as it is to anybody with any experience that [the statements] are only being offered by the defense to dirty up a dead man,\u201d and ruled that defendant could testify to Caceres\u2019 actions and threats, but that defendant would not be permitted to recount Caceres\u2019 statements of gang affiliation or other crimes.\nExamination resumed, and defendant testified that Caceres had told him that he was having problems with the gang. Defendant advised Caceres to stay away from gangs. He said that the two of them had left Cuba to change their lives, and he questioned why Caceres should become involved with gangs and their problems. Defendant then repeated his testimony that Caceres struck him and threatened to kill him. Also in April, Caceres came to defendant\u2019s apartment and asked him to store a gun and two boxes of ammunition.\nDefendant testified that on May 21, 1981, he was in his apartment when Caceres called to him from the street, asking for the gun. Defendant brought the gun downstairs, but not the ammunition, and he said that he did not know whether the gun was loaded. Caceres said, \u201cRemember that I said I was going to kill you,\u201d then slapped defendant. Caceres walked over to Vega and took the cane, brandished it menacingly and approached defendant. Defendant pulled out the gun, pointed down, turned his face, closed his eyes and fired. Defendant said that he was afraid of Caceres and the others with him, and hoped the gun or a shot would scare them away. He then walked away from the scene and disposed of the gun.\nFrom photographs of graffiti on the 2600 block of Spaulding, defendant identified gang insignia which Caceres had told him were OA gang markings. Defendant loaned Caceres neither $30 nor $5; he had no ink and no needles. Defendant stated that Ernesto Garcia had never been in his apartment, and that Garcia was at the lake with a mutual friend on the day of the incident. Defendant explained that he did not come forward after the shooting because he was afraid of the police, Vega, Rios and Caceres\u2019 group.\nOn cross-examination, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney asked defendant whether he had given Caceres \u201csix nickel bags of marijuana\u201d valued at $30. Defendant objected, but the trial court overruled the objection, stating that it was better to have defendant\u2019s answer before the jury. Defendant denied any and all involvement with marijuana.\nIn closing argument, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney said that there was evidence that defendant supported himself by selling marijuana on Spaulding. Defense counsel stressed the gang-related nature of the crime, arguing that \u201cDavid Caceres was more content to be a gang member, the kind of person who goes out and does the type of things you read about in the papers every day.\u201d Fourteen times, at least, defense counsel referred to Vega or Rios as gang members, and he suggested that Vega and Rios concocted a story to avenge their fellow gang member, Caceres.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 28 years in prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nOpinion\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in permitting Rios to relate Caceres\u2019 statements immediately following the shooting. He maintains that the victim\u2019s statements were not spontaneous because they were made in response to questioning. Defendant further complains that numerous drug references by the prosecutor, including the \u201csix nickel bag\u201d question, were improper, and that the prejudice engendered by these references outweighed the probative value of the evidence.\nIllinois recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous declarations where three factors are present: (1) an event sufficiently startling to produce an unreflecting statement; (2) a statement which relates to the circumstances of the event; and (3) absence of time to fabricate. (People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181, 174 N.E.2d 804.) Such exclamations are considered reliable in theory because the shocking occurrence paralyzes the ability to fabricate, producing a statement which expresses the true belief of the declarant. (People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 471, 193 N.E.2d 25.) Consistent with this rationale, one could argue that posing a question to the declarant necessarily engages the declarant\u2019s reflective faculty and destroys spontaneity, but our supreme court has rejected this analysis. In People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25, the court held that a victim\u2019s statements to a police officer were properly admitted as spontaneous declarations, even though the statements were made in response to the officer\u2019s question, \u201cWhat happened?\u201d The court stated that the question was insufficient to destroy the spontaneity of the statement. (28 Ill. 2d 464, 472, 193 N.E.2d 25.) More recently, this court held that asking the declarant \u201cWho did this to you?\u201d did not destroy the spontaneity of the response. (People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 488, 491-92, 434 N.E.2d 395.) We conclude that the issue is not simply whether the declarant reflected; rather, it is whether the statement was produced by the shock of the event or by the self-interested reflective faculty of the declarant.\nApplied to the facts at hand, we find that Caceres\u2019 statements were properly admitted as spontaneous declarations despite Rios\u2019 question. Certainly, being shot five times qualifies as a startling event. The statements concerned the shooting and were made almost immediately afterwards. It is true that reasoning is involved in responding to a question, but the same is true of all meaningful speech. We believe that the statements at issue were dominated by the shooting and not by Caceres\u2019 self-interest.\nWith respect to the other drug references, we believe that defendant\u2019s complaints are meritless. Defendant failed to object contemporaneously to comments during opening and closing arguments, and failed to specify such comments as error in his post-trial motion. Similarly, Rios\u2019 testimony, that he had seen defendant dealing marijuana on Spaulding, was unchallenged at or after trial. Therefore, we consider any error in such comment and testimony to have been waived. See People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-78, 404 N.E.2d 233, and authority cited therein.\nFurther, if we reached the merits, we would approve the testimony and comment at issue. Caceres\u2019 statements tended to show defendant\u2019s motive for the crime, thus Rios\u2019 testimony was a relevant explanation of motive. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination concerning \u201csix nickel bags of marijuana\u201d was not baseless; rather it was based on Caceres\u2019 statement that he owed defendant $30 for marijuana, Rios\u2019 testimony that defendant dealt marijuana, and Garcia\u2019s testimony that defendant intended to shoot Caceres over $5. It is well settled that a defendant who testifies on his own behalf subjects himself to legitimate and pertinent cross-examination, the scope of which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Provo (1951), 409 Ill. 63, 68-69, 97 N.E.2d 802.) Since the question had some basis in evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting defendant to respond. All of these matters being properly in evidence, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney was entitled to comment. See People v. Warmack (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 112, 125-26, 413 N.E.2d 1254.\nFinally, with respect to drug references, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that prejudice outweighed probity. Defendant relies upon People v. Battle (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 592, 182 N.E.2d 713. In that case, the State\u2019s theory of motive was that the victim had informed the police of the defendant\u2019s narcotic sales, and the defendant sought revenge. Our supreme court disapproved testimony of narcotics sales because the State adduced no evidence that the defendant knew that the victim had informed the police: the evidence failed to establish a logical connection between drugs and the shooting. (24 Ill. 2d 592, 596-97.) By contrast, the testimony in this case fully sustains that connection. Rios testified that Caceres said he was shot over $30 for dealing marijuana. The testimony was highly probative on the issue of motive, and no unfair prejudice resulted.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in excluding testimony to Caceres\u2019 involvement in gang-related shootings and robberies. The State argues in the alternative that defendant\u2019s offer of proof was inadequate, that the testimony was properly excluded, or that the exclusion, if error, was harmless. We believe that defendant\u2019s offer of proof was sufficient, and that the trial court\u2019s ruling was error.\nThe State first maintains that defendant\u2019s offer of proof was inadequate in that it did not show \u201chow those alleged facts affected defendant\u2019s state of mind,\u201d and did not provide a basis for the trial court to conclude \u201cthat these allegations of the victim\u2019s prior activities could be substantiated.\u201d We are aware of no rule which requires that an offer of proof contain references to corroborative evidence, and the State suggests no reason that the law should be so. \u201c[H]ow those alleged facts affected defendant\u2019s state of mind\u201d is obvious: the victim\u2019s statements to defendant concerning gang-related shootings and robberies could be found by the jury to have contributed to defendant\u2019s fear of the victim, his perception of danger at the time, and his motive. See People v. Stombaugh (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 130, 139, 284 N.E.2d 640.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s objection went to the hearsay nature of the evidence. Defense counsel stated that defendant would testify to Caceres\u2019 statements that he had participated in gang-related robberies and shootings, and counsel argued that the statements were not hearsay because they were offered to show defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the shooting and not to show that Caceres participated in other crimes. In our view, this offer of proof sufficiently apprised the trial court of the nature of the evidence and the proposed basis for admission.\nMoreover, we believe that the trial court erred in excluding defendant\u2019s testimony as set forth in the offer of proof. The court ruled that defendant could testify to his personal observations of Caceres and to any threats, but that he could not repeat statements of gang affiliation or other crimes. The court stated that such evidence was irrelevant and untestable, and was offered only to \u201cdirty up a dead man.\u201d\nThe State concedes that threats and acts of violence by the victim are admissible to show the defendant\u2019s state of mind, but argues that defense counsel sought to elicit the victim\u2019s reputation for violence, and that such testimony is inadmissible. The State\u2019s reading of the record is strained. The offer of proof extended beyond reputation and focused upon the victim\u2019s statements as they affected defendant\u2019s state of mind. The trial court\u2019s ruling broadly forbade testimony to gang affiliation and other crimes.\nIn People v. Gonzalez (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 332, the trial court prohibited all references to gang affiliation. There, the defendant maintained that one of the State\u2019s witnesses had framed him in order to \u201cget even\u201d for the defendant\u2019s having quit the gang. Our supreme court held that the defendant was unfairly limited in presenting his theory of defense, and noted:\n\u201cIllinois courts have often held questions regarding gang affiliation proper when the State has sought to introduce evidence of the defendant\u2019s gang activities, in spite of the risk of prejudice to the defendant. [Citations.] Simple justice requires a symmetrical rule that allows a defendant to ask such questions on cross-examination to show bias in a State\u2019s witness.\u201d (104 Ill. 2d 332, 338.)\nAlthough gang affiliation went to a different issue in Gonzalez, we believe that the principle enunciated is applicable here.\nThe trial court\u2019s ruling in this case unnecessarily restricted defendant in the full presentation of his theory of self-defense. The testimony offered was both relevant and capable of being tested: relevant to defendant\u2019s state of mind, and capable of being tested by cross-examination. The absence of corroboration diminished the weight of the evidence, but did not affect its admissibility. If the trial judge felt that the testimony would \u201cdirty up a dead man,\u201d he could admonish the jury that the evidence was not offered for its truth. While protection of the victim\u2019s reputation is laudable, protection of defendant\u2019s right to place relevant evidence before the jury is essential.\nFinally, the State argues that the error was harmless, and we agree. The Illinois Supreme Court has outlined three approaches to measuring error: (1) focusing on the error to determine whether it contributed to the conviction; (2) examining other evidence to see if it overwhelmingly established guilt; and (3) deciding whether the evidence was merely cumulative or duplicative. (People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526.) We believe that the testimony actually excluded was largely cumulative, that such testimony would contribute little to the jury\u2019s resolution of the facts, and that the evidence overwhelmingly established defendant\u2019s state of mind.\nThe record reveals that defendant testified to Caceres\u2019 gang affiliation more than once, despite the trial court\u2019s ruling. He testified that Caceres said he was having problems in the OA\u2019s, that Caceres explained the OA gang graffiti, and that defendant feared Caceres\u2019 \u201cgroup.\u201d Defendant testified further that one month before the shooting, Caceres struck him and threatened to kill him, and that immediately before the shooting, Caceres struck him, renewed the threat, then menaced him with a cane. In addition, defendant testified that Caceres had asked him to hold a gun and ammunition.\nDefense counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses regarding gang affiliation. In closing argument, defense counsel argued not only that Vega and Rios were involved in a gang, but also that Caceres was a member. Counsel stressed the gang theme as it related to defendant\u2019s state of mind during the incident, and argued that prosecution witnesses were lying because they belonged to the same gang as Caceres.\nGiven this extensive testimony and argument as to the reasons for his fear, defendant\u2019s additional testimony to Caceres\u2019 purported statements concerning other robberies and shootings would have been cumulative. More compelling is our belief that the jury resolved the state-of-mind issue on the occurrence testimony.\nThe eyewitnesses testified that defendant struck the victim two or three times, then pulled a gun as the victim reached for a cane. The victim ran, defendant fired two or three times, and the victim fell face first to the ground. Defendant walked up to the victim and fired two or three bullets into his back. The medical examiner corroborated this testimony, stating that the victim died from bullet wounds, four of which entered the back, and none of which entered frontally.\nDefendant\u2019s occurrence testimony, on the other hand, is implausible. Defendant stated that one month after threatening him, Caceres asked for his gun back. Defendant, not knowing if the gun was loaded, put it in the back of his pants and went downstairs. Then, without asking for the gun, Caceres slapped and threatened to kill defendant. And although Caceres had the better of the fight to this point, he disengaged and took Vega\u2019s cane. As Caceres approached menacingly, defendant pulled out the gun (loaded or unloaded), pointed down, turned his face, closed his eyes, and fired.\nWe believe that the occurrence testimony established defendant\u2019s intent beyond any doubt, regardless of the historical development of defendant\u2019s mentum. We further believe that the jury must have resolved the issue on this basis. Accordingly, we find that the exclusion of defendant\u2019s further testimony constituted harmless error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nMEJDA, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Milton S. Travis, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Timothy J. Joyce, and Patrick J. Foley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL YERO TORRES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 83\u20140570\nOpinion filed February 1, 1985.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Milton S. Travis, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Timothy J. Joyce, and Patrick J. Foley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0775-01", "first_page_order": 797, "last_page_order": 806 }