{ "id": 3492957, "name": "ANASTASIA PESEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY DISCEPOLO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Pesek v. Discepolo", "decision_date": "1985-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 83\u20142613", "first_page": "785", "last_page": "788", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 785" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 Kan. App. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 416856 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan-app-2d/4/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 P.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Cal. App. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2244937 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "317, 253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/116/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ariz. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 620304 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "1277" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "1277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/109/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5642594 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 A.L.R.3d 974", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5252025 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/342/0266-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 426, "char_count": 7156, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.292624765688315e-07, "percentile": 0.7864522217318461 }, "sha256": "75468eb9b53b6638a6f878501fedd7574d683b8e440175d88844d454ee4edf32", "simhash": "1:baf1d303d722f83a", "word_count": 1165 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:49.109718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANASTASIA PESEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY DISCEPOLO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McGLOON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Anastasia Pesek, filed a three-count complaint against Anthony Discepolo, his parents, Armino and Lydia Discepolo, and Morton Township District 201, doing business as Morton East High School. Counts II and III, directed against the parents and high school, respectively, were dismissed with prejudice by the trial court. Plaintiff appeals, contending counts II and III successfully stated causes of action against those defendants.\nWe affirm.\nAccording to plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, on May 18, 1982, she was at her home when she was raped by Anthony Discepolo. He was 15 years old and a registered student at Morton East High School. The rape occurred on a school day at 11:10 a.m. Count I is directed at Anthony Discepolo and is still pending. Count II was directed against his parents, alleging they knew of Anthony\u2019s truancy, they knew or should have known of Anthony\u2019s association with juvenile delinquents, they knew or should have known that Anthony was engaged in criminal or quasi-criminal conduct prior to the rape, and they knew or should have known that Anthony was frequently and voluntarily under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Count II alleged that the parent\u2019s lack of supervision of Anthony was negligent and proximately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Count III recited the same litany of Anthony\u2019s conduct, imputed knowledge thereof to Morton East High School, and alleged the school\u2019s lack of supervision proximately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nPlaintiff contends count II stated a cause of action against Armino and Lydia Discepolo.\nThe general rule in Illinois is that a parent \u201cis not liable for the tort of his minor child merely from the relationship ***.\u2019\u2019 (While v. Seitz (1930), 342 Ill. 266, 269, 174 N.E.2d 371. See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 974, 977 (1973).) In Cooper v. Meyer (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 69, 365 N.E.2d 201, we applied an exception to that general rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 316 (1965):\n\u201cA parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent\n(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and\n(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.\u201d\nIn Cooper, plaintiff alleged defendant\u2019s minor child threw a \u201cbrick bat\u201d which struck plaintiff, that defendant knew of his child\u2019s \u201cpropensities to attack persons,\u201d and that defendant\u2019s failure to supervise his child proximately resulted in plaintiff\u2019s injuries. (50 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71.) We held plaintiff did not allege a cause of action under section 316 of the Restatement:\n\u201cIn the present case, there is no pleading which indicated that the defendant had any knowledge that the plaintiff would visit. There is no assertion that the defendant had any prior knowledge of the possibility of a visit by the plaintiff. We also note that the defendant was not at home and thus, had no opportunity to directly control the conduct of the minor child at the time of the tort. Further, the pleadings do not state that the defendant had knowledge that there had been opportunity to so control the minor child.\u201d 50 Ill. App. 3d 69, 72.\nSimilarly, in Parsons v. Smithey (1973), 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the trial court\u2019s directed verdict for the parents of a minor who attacked three people with a knife. The court noted that although the parents had general knowledge of past acts of violence by their child, they could not reasonably foresee the particular type of violent acts committed by the minor. The court reasoned:\n\u201cHere, we find that all of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs, either admitted or excluded, was not sufficient to send the case to the jury on the issue of whether Mr. and Mrs. Smithey should have had knowledge of Michael\u2019s propensity to commit the type of act complained of. Under no view of the evidence is it proper to conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Smithey should have reasonably foreseen that Michael had a disposition to perform such a violent act.\u201d 109 Ariz. 49, 54, 504 P.2d 1272, 1277.\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges the parents\u2019 knowledge of Anthony\u2019s propensities toward truancy, associating with juvenile delinquents, committing criminal or quasi-criminal acts, and being intoxicated. There is absolutely no evidence that the parents had any knowledge of any previous acts committed by Anthony. Certainly there was no allegation that the parents had any knowledge of similar acts of violence committed by Anthony (see Parsons v. Smithey (1973), 109 Ariz. 49, 54, 504 P.2d 1272, 1277), nor that Anthony\u2019s parents had the opportunity to control Anthony\u2019s behavior. See Cooper v. Meyer (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 69, 72.\nPlaintiff relies principally on Ellis v. D\u2019Angelo (1953), 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675. We find Ellis distinguishable from the case at bar.\nIn Ellis, plaintiff was injured when the defendant\u2019s four-year-old child \u201cpushed impelled and knocked [plaintiff] violently to the floor.\u201d (116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 312, 253 P.2d 675, 676.) Plaintiff\u2019s complaint specifically alleged the parents had knowledge that their minor child \u201chabitually engaged in violently attacking and throwing himself forcibly and violently against other people, and violently shoving and knocking them.\u201d (116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 317, 253. P.2d 675, 679.) Therefore, unlike the case at bar, the plaintiff in Ellis alleged the parents had knowledge of previous similar acts of violence committed by their minor child. Therefore, we conclude count II of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint does not state a cause of action against Armino and Lydia Discepolo.\nNext, plaintiff contends count III stated a cause of action against Morton East High School. Plaintiff argues that because the school acts in loco parentis, it should be liable under the same theory as Anthony\u2019s parents. (See Mitchell v. Wiltfong (1979), 4 Kan. App. 2d 231, 604 P.2d 79.) However, plaintiff\u2019s allegations directed at the high school are identical to those directed at Anthony\u2019s parents. Therefore, the reasoning from which we concluded the propriety of the dismissal of count II applies with equal force to the dismissal of count III. Even if we were to accept plaintiff\u2019s theory that the school should be under the same legal duty to control Anthony\u2019s behavior as Anthony\u2019s parents, the instant complaint does not state a cause of action against Morton East High School.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing counts II and III of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint.\nJudgment affirmed.\nCAMPBELL and BUCKLEY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McGLOON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James F. Stack, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lanzillotti, Gribben & Marchuk, of Berwyn (Robert C. Marchuk, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANASTASIA PESEK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY DISCEPOLO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 83\u20142613\nOpinion filed February 4, 1985.\nJames F. Stack, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLanzillotti, Gribben & Marchuk, of Berwyn (Robert C. Marchuk, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0785-01", "first_page_order": 807, "last_page_order": 810 }